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Foreword
By Martin Rama
Building vibrant cities is critical to the future of Sub-Saharan Africa. With the 
majority of the population in the continent rural, it will be diffi  cult to make 
substantive inroads into poverty reduction if agricultural jobs do not become 
more productive. But without vibrant cities, the surplus labor from rural areas 
will have no serious prospect for a better life. Rural-urban migration is bound 
to continue. If cities do not play their part, it will remain a migration of despair 
rather than a migration of hope. In the absence of poles of economic dynamism, 
declines in rural poverty will be matched by increases in the number of urban 
poor. 
It is diffi  cult to single out what makes a city thrive. Some point to aff ord-
able land, others to infrastructure or the logistics connecting it to the rest 
of the world. But few would disagree on the importance of well-functioning 
labor markets. In fact, it can be argued that most of the spillovers and learning 
associated with economic agglomeration occur through urban labor markets. 
Th e importance of these markets is what makes this well-researched book so 
timely.
A well-functioning labor market is not necessarily the same as a formal 
labor market. In Sub-Saharan Africa, most economic activity is informal, and 
the public sector accounts for the lion’s share of the rest. With so many peo-
ple working on their own or in microenterprises, informal is normal. Many 
workers and economic units choose to stay below the radar of the authorities 
simply because it would be too costly for them to operate by the rules. And 
in many cases, forcing them to do so would not lead to substantial effi  ciency 
gains, even if they were to pay their share of public goods. When analyzing labor 
markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is important to come to terms with this reality, 
avoiding a normative view on formality and focusing instead on the way formal 
and informal activities coexist and interact. Such is the approach taken in this 
book—yet another reason why it is so welcome.
Methodology is another reason why this book is of value. In industrial 
 countries, we have grown used to looking at labor markets from two sides, 
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mimicking the notion of a place where supply and demand meet. We use 
household survey data to understand the supply side of the labor market and 
plant-level data to understand the demand side. Applying this methodology in 
developing countries, where the informality is the norm, oft en yields meaning-
less data. In fact, in places where self-employment and employment in micro-
enterprises are the norm, the very distinction between supply and demand for 
labor becomes blurred. 
Rather than look at plant-level data, this book builds on the pioneering 1-2-3 
surveys developed over the years by Développement, Institutions et Mondialisa-
tion (DIAL). Th e great merit of these surveys is that they allow researchers to 
construct the distribution of economic activities from the household side and, 
once the universe has been identifi ed, to survey a subset of those activities, 
regardless of whether or not they are formal. Th e fi ndings in this book still rely 
on the household survey side of the 1-2-3 edifi ce, but the foundation is the right 
one, and the work bodes well for the continuation of the research program.
Th e fi ndings themselves are of great interest. One could even argue that they 
are encouraging. Higher education is associated with higher earnings across 
all the countries studied. Ethnicity is a less important determinant of earnings 
than one would have feared. Not all informal activities amount to survivor-
ship: some genuine small-scale entrepreneurs can be found among the pack. 
Return migrants from industrial countries do better than their peers. In all 
these ways, labor markets in Sub-Saharan Africa may be more effi  cient than is 
usually acknowledged. At the same time, the fi ndings reveal the importance of 
inherited circumstances and networks in accessing much-coveted formal sec-
tor jobs, a hint to an economy of privilege existing alongside more effi  cient and 
anonymous markets.
Beyond its specifi c fi ndings, this book provides a very good analytical model 
for people working on labor issues in the region. Its rigor in the use and analysis 
of data, its choice of econometric techniques depending on the topic at hand, 
and its balanced interpretation of estimation results should serve as guidance 
for academics and policy advisers in the region. 
Despite the importance of the labor market, it is a relatively new area of work 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. I hope that this book will serve as inspiration to others 
willing to take this research agenda forward.
Martin Rama
Director of the World Development Report 2013: Jobs
xxv
Foreword
By Moubarack Lo
Jobs are key to all development processes. Although growth is obviously a 
driver, it alone cannot ensure the inclusion and sustainability that all nations 
should seek to guarantee their people. Policy makers therefore need to place 
this vital task of creating enough quality jobs high on their agenda. Failure to 
do so will expose their countries to the risk of crumbling social cohesion and, 
in turn, spiraling political instability. Th e poverty reduction strategies launched 
by most of Africa’s countries cannot hope to be successful without improving 
labor earnings, the main (if not the only) resource of the poor.
Regrettably, these basic considerations have been largely overlooked in Africa 
until very recently; rare are the countries with employment policies worthy of 
the name. Fortunately, the times are changing. Recognition of the important role 
played by labor markets can be seen in a number of emblematic publications on 
the subject. Just two examples are the World Development Report 2013: Jobs and the 
African Economic Outlook 2012 report on promoting youth employment, public 
presentation of which sparked an impassioned debate in Dakar in November 2012. 
Th e international development community’s interest in employment ties in 
with national concerns. Senegal has taken a step forward in its political transition 
with the election of President Macky Sall, whose election has raised high hopes.
It is important to mention the crucial role in this successful election played 
by young people, who were passed over by the previous authorities. Th e inability 
of these people—many of them with skills—to fi nd jobs to match their abilities 
formed the main driving force for change in Senegal. Leaders in other countries 
on the continent, such as Tunisia, recognize that the youth employment issue 
played a key role in the political transition known as the Arab Spring. 
African countries now need to defi ne and carry out ambitious programs 
that promote jobs and income-generating activities. At the same time, they 
need to improve young people’s skills by setting up vocational training centers 
nationwide; adapting school and university curricula to labor market needs; 
and assisting project initiators, especially young people and women, with credit 
facilities (guarantee facilities, in particular).
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In view of this continental and national environment, Urban Labor Markets in 
Sub-Saharan Africa comes right on cue. Decision makers need high-quality infor-
mation and analyses to diagnose problems and take eff ective action—precisely 
what this book provides. Th e authors draw on a series of original, representative, 
and perfectly comparable surveys of 11 cities in 10 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
to take the reader on a fascinating, multifarious tour of a wide range of labor mar-
ket topics. Th e overview discusses the issues, data, and methods and briefl y sums 
up the fi ndings. Th e fi rst chapter paints a full picture of the main characteristics 
of labor markets in urban Africa today and the questions raised regarding their 
functioning. Th is review, underpinned by sound empirical foundations, shatters 
many preconceived ideas, such as the weight and role of the informal sector and 
the particularities of unemployment in Africa, to name but two. Th e questions it 
raises pave the way for the following 13 chapters, each of which analyzes a specifi c 
area in detail. Th is far-reaching overview explores and explains an array of issues, 
including returns to education, segmentation, ethnic and gender discrimination, 
employment vulnerability and job satisfaction, the role of migration, domestic 
work, child labor, and social and professional mobility. Th e analyses in this broad-
based and cohesive roundup are commendable for their quality. 
Th e authors—all renowned experts in their fi elds (many of the chapters have 
appeared as academic papers in leading international journals)—have done 
their best to make the reasoning and main conclusions accessible to the lay 
reader. Th e comparative approach adopted has two advantages, in that it brings 
to light the structural regularities found more or less constantly from one coun-
try to the next and identifi es the particularities of each national environment. 
Th ere is no one Africa, but many Africas. I naturally followed Senegal’s relative 
position among its peers with particular interest.
To my knowledge, this book is the fi rst undertaking of its kind. As such, it 
fi lls a void. Th ere is something in it for all levels of expertise and areas of inter-
est. Th e book has given me food for thought, both generally and in terms of 
the huge challenge before me of how to help solve the employment equation 
in Senegal. I wholly subscribe to the authors’ intent to avoid one-size-fi ts-all 
thinking and standard, uniform policy recommendations, to be applied across 
the board. Th e raw material the authors present forms an invaluable source of 
inspiration for future employment policies. I therefore suggest this book for 
African decision makers and the public at large, to build deeper understand-
ing of the employment question with a view to designing suitable policies or 
enriching the democratic debate in our societies on a key issue that looks set to 
remain on our agendas for many years to come. I would also suggest that our 
researchers draw inspiration from this original initiative.
Moubarack Lo
Minister
Deputy Chief of Staff  to the President of the Republic of Senegal
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Little did we know at the start of this project that we were on an odyssey bearing 
more than a passing resemblance, in time and hazards, to Ulysses’ journey home 
to his beloved Ithaca. We had our own Trojan War to wage—although thankfully 
not for 10 years—when we conducted the 1-2-3 surveys that served as the raw 
material for this book. Fortunately, we were not alone. We salute our statisti-
cian brothers in arms and unfl inching allies in the preparation, promotion, pro-
duction, and analysis of the fi rst survey fi ndings: experts from the Observatoire 
économique et statistique d’Afrique Subsaharienne  (AFRISTAT), with a special 
mention for Lamine Diop, Director General when the Programme D’Appui 
Régional à la Statistique (PARSTAT) was launched in West Africa; managers at 
national statistics institutes (NSIs); and researchers in the Statistics Division of 
Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation (DIAL). You all know who you 
are. At the time, few research centers felt it was worth investing in huge data col-
lection operations. Th ings have changed somewhat since, mainly as a result of the 
advent of impact assessment protocols, although alliances with offi  cial statistics 
are still held in low esteem, despite their positive capacity-building outcomes.
Th e idea for this book germinated in 2004. Who knows whether the chapters’ 
authors, who sailed with us through thick and thin, would have come on board 
had they known the journey would be so long. We thank them for trusting us to 
reach our destination. We spare a thought for three crew members (Lisa Chauvet, 
Jean-Pierre Cling, and Gilles Spielvogel) who, for one reason or another, we 
failed to steer to harbor. We take our hats off  to the revolving DIAL management 
teams, who never doubted us—or at least never said so in all these years. Others 
boarded at key ports of call along the way: Robert Peccoud, Director of Research at 
the French Development Agency (AFD), which provided the project with fund-
ing when DIAL was experiencing some serious institutional upheavals; Diane 
Bertrand, our trusty translator, who braved hell and high water, not only wad-
ing through the convoluted language of Molière to fashion a faithful rendi-
tion in the language of Shakespeare but also resigning herself to a rehash of 
her prose by her American cousins tasked with molding it to the World Bank 
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1Overview
Philippe De Vreyer and François Roubaud
Th e population of Sub-Saharan Africa stood at 854 million in 2010 (World Bank 
2012a). Annual population growth averaged 2.5 percent, with a relatively high 
sustained fertility rate, fostered by the fact that two-thirds of the population is 
under 25. Th e region has the highest proportion of poor people in the world, 
with 47.5 percent of its population living on less than $1.25 a day, as measured 
in terms of purchasing power parity in 2008. It is also the only region in which 
the number of poor is still rising. 
Th e eradication of extreme poverty and hunger is at the top of the list of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted by the member states of the 
United Nations (UN) in September 2000. Th is goal comprises three targets:
1. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is 
less than $1 a day.
2. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suff er from 
hunger. 
3. Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including 
women and young people.
Th e three targets are closely linked: monetary poverty is a key factor in mal-
nutrition and is determined in large part by access to employment. In 2007, 
an estimated 55 percent of working-age women and 79 percent of working-
age men in Sub-Saharan African were employed (UN 2008). Th ese rates are 
slightly higher than the average in developed countries (49 percent of women 
and 64 percent of men) and developing countries (49 percent of women and 
77 percent of men). Th ey thus suggest that lack of access to work is not the main 
cause of poverty in Africa. 
Sub-Saharan Africa has the world’s largest proportion of poor workers. In 
2007, before the international fi nancial crisis, 51 percent of employed people 
lived on less than $1 a day, measured in terms of purchasing power parity. Th e 
2007 average for developing countries was 20 percent, representing a sharp drop 
from 1997, when it stood at 31 percent. Progress in Sub-Saharan Africa was 
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much slower: in 1997, 56 percent of employed people lived on less than $1 a 
day. Th ese fi gures suggest that working conditions rather than access to work 
are behind sustained poverty rates in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Scope and Purpose of the Book
Th is book contributes to knowledge on the functioning of urban labor 
markets in Sub-Saharan Africa by investigating a variety of questions. Which 
individuals lack access to employment or are employed beneath their capaci-
ties? Does education improve working conditions? What opportunities does the 
labor market off er to climb the social ladder? Is the lack of good-quality jobs 
for adults and the poverty it implies one of the reasons for the prevalence of 
child labor? Do women and ethnic minorities have the same access to the labor 
market as everyone else? How does the formal sector live alongside the informal 
sector? What role does migration play in the functioning of labor markets? Are 
there traits common to all urban labor markets in Africa, or is each country 
diff erent? 
Th is book attempts to answer these questions by studying 11 cities in 
10 countries (table O.1). Eight are members of the Communauté Financière 
Africaine (CFA) Franc Zone, and seven belong to the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union (WAEMU); all 10 are French speaking. Th ey are thus not 
representative of Sub-Saharan Africa.1 However, the sample of countries is very 
close to the continental average, whatever the economic and social indicator 
considered. 
Comparative studies are oft en based on disparate measurement instruments, 
which risk marring the validity of the fi ndings.2 Th is study diff ers from earlier 
studies in that it is based on a set of perfectly comparable surveys (the 1-2-3 
surveys, described below).With the notable exception of a report by the Inter-
national Institute for Labor Studies (Lachaud 1994), no other study presents 
a detailed overview of the labor market landscape in Sub-Saharan Africa. For 
10–15 years, no work of this kind was conducted.3 Th e study also covers a num-
ber of topics (migration, child labor, job satisfaction, discrimination, and work 
aft er retirement) in addition to the topics covered by Lachaud (unemployment, 
access to employment and mobility, segmentation, labor supply, and poverty). 
Th is book also draws on more and better-quality data. Th e Network for Labor 
Market Analysis in Africa (RAMTA) surveys contain only a few hundred obser-
vations per country, far fewer than the number of observations captured by 
the 1-2-3 surveys, which survey more than 120,000 people, including 80,000 
people of working age and 6,000 unemployed and 50,000 employed workers 
(table O.2). In addition, the sampling plans adopted by the RAMTA surveys 
are arguably “quasi-random,” with no updated sampling frame available. Th ese 
3Table O.1 Geographic, Demographic, and Socioeconomic Characteristics of the 10 Countries Sampled 
Country
Land area
(1,000 square 
kilometers)
Population
(1,000)
Urbanization 
(percent)
Per capita 
GDP 
(purchasing 
power parity 
dollars) 
GDP 
growth in 
2010 
(percent)
Net primary 
enrollment 
(percent)
Life 
expectancy 
(years)
Poverty
headcount 
(percent)a
Country 
Policy and 
Institutional 
Assessment 
(CPIA)
(1–6)b
Benin 111 8,850 42 1,590 3.0 94 56 16 3.5
Burkina Faso 274 16,468 20 1,250 9.2 58 55 45 3.5
Cameroon 473 19,600 58 2,270 3.2 92 51 10 2.5
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2,267 65,965 35 320 7.2 64 48 53 2.0
Côte d’Ivoire 318 19,738 50 1,810 3.0 61 55 24 2.0
Madagascar 582 20,714 30 960 1.6 79 66 81 2.5
Mali 1,220 15,370 33 1,030 4.5 62 51 50 3.5
Niger 1,267 15,512 17 720 8.8 57 54 44 3.0
Senegal 193 12,434 43 1,910 4.1 75 59 11 3.0
Togo 54 6,028 43 890 3.4 92 57 11 2.5
Average 676 20,068 37 1,275 5.0 73 55 35 3.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 491 17,780 37 1,188 5.1 75 54 47 2.7
Source: Based on data from World Bank 2011.
Note: Most data are for 2010. Last available year for net primary enrollment rate and poverty headcount are 2007–10 for most countries. Data on net primary enrollment are from 
2003 for Madagascar and 2005 for the Democratic Republic of Congo. Poverty headcount data are for 2003 for Benin, 2005 for the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 2006 for 
Senegal and Togo.
a. The poverty headcount corresponds to the $1.25 purchasing power parity poverty line. 
b. The transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector rating (1 = low, 6 = high) was available for 37 out of 48 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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shortcomings—attributable to the pilot nature of the operation—undermine its 
analytical potential. Although the 1-2-3 surveys used here focus solely on the 
main cities, their scope is broader than most other household surveys, which 
have much smaller sample sizes (generally a few thousand observations for the 
entire country).
Th is book makes use of only a small fraction of the data in the 1-2-3 
surveys. Although a number of surveys have broad coverage (national coverage 
in Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo, all major urban centers in 
Madagascar), coverage here is restricted to the main cities, for several reasons. 
First, the editors believed that it was preferable to achieve homogeneity across 
countries by choosing the surveys’ highest common denominator (in terms of 
geographical coverage). Second, rural labor markets were excluded, for theo-
retical reasons. Th e questions and analytical instruments used to study peasant 
farmers in rural Africa are very diff erent from those used in urban settings. 
Th ird, the time dimension of existing surveys was not used, either in repeated 
Table O.2 Sample Sizes of African Cities Studied
Region/city
Number of 
households
Number of 
people 
Number of 
working-age 
population 
(10 years and 
above)
Number in 
unemployment
Number in 
employment
West Africa
Abidjan 2,494 11,352 8,682 769 4,884
Bamako 2,409 13,002 9,061 311 4,435
Cotonou 3,001 11,574 8,967 301 5,276
Dakar 2,479 19,065 14,871 907 6,313
Lomé 2,500 9,907 7,548 428 4,652
Niamey 2,500 14,577 10,141 651 4,231
Ouagadougou 2,458 13,756 10,295 928 4,914
Total 17,841 93,233 69,565 4295 34,705
Central Africa
Douala 1,399 5,726 4,326 330 2,295
Kinshasa 2,081 12,599 9,054 572 3,251
Yaoundé 1,198 5,159 3,783 304 1,766
Total 4,678 23,484 17,163 1206 7,312
Indian Ocean
Antananarivo 3,020 12,338 9,459 262 5,499
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the following 1-2-3 surveys: Cameroon 2005 (Développement, Institutions et 
Mondialisation [DIAL] and National Statistics Institute [NSI]); Democratic Republic of Congo 2005 (DIAL and NSI); 
Madagascar 2001 (DIAL and Institut National de la Statistique [INSTAT]); West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU) 2001/02 (Observatoire économique et statistique d’Afrique Subsaharienne 
[AFRISTAT], DIAL, and NSI). 
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cross–sections or panel data. Fourth, the study was deliberately restricted to 
Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 survey, which is most closely associated with the labor 
market. 
Two main factors explain the lack of a comparable study to date. Th e fi rst is 
the dearth of data. Th e second is the change in policy focus by the development 
community.
Th e Dearth of Meaningful Data 
Although employment is the main source of income for the poor, knowledge 
of the workings of African labor markets is spotty, giving rise to a number of 
preconceived—and oft en mistaken—ideas. Despite the universally recognized 
role of employment as a driver of macroeconomic growth and poverty reduc-
tion, information on African labor markets remains sketchy. Many research 
projects launched on the subject in the last three decades have run into this wall 
and been unable to produce signifi cant fi ndings. For example, of the 25 chap-
ters in Labor Markets and Economic Development (Kanbur and Svejnar 2009), 
which presents a good overview of the subject, only three concern Sub-Saharan 
Africa (excluding South Africa).4 Moreover, none of the three chapters is based 
on labor force surveys, the main source of data in this fi eld in the rest of the 
world. Too oft en, labor market studies cover a few hundred formal businesses 
(concentrated mainly in a few English-speaking African countries), which are 
themselves nonrepresentative. Th is type of study is unsatisfactory given that the 
(nonagricultural) informal sector represents 50–80 percent of urban employ-
ment, agricultural (and informal sector) employment is the most important type 
of employment in rural areas, and employment in the formal sector accounts for 
just a small proportion of total employment in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Th e Regional Program on Enterprise Development (RPED) project and its 
avatars are symptomatic of this problem. Launched by the World Bank in a 
dozen Sub-Saharan African countries in the early 1990s, the project consists of 
matched (employer/employee) multiround surveys of a few hundred businesses 
in the formal manufacturing sector (Bigsten and Söderbom 2005). Th e project 
has produced some interesting and original results (Fafchamps and Söderbom 
2006; Van Biesebroeck 2007; Nordman and Wolff  2009, to cite but a few recent 
publications). Th e problem emerges when these fi ndings are used to shed light 
on the functioning of the labor market as a whole and to determine public poli-
cies (Mazumdar and Mazaheri 2002). 
Th e formal manufacturing sector represents just 1–2 percent of total national 
employment in most Sub-Saharan African countries. Even in the main cities, 
formal sector industrial employment (including employment in the public 
sector) accounts for less than 5 percent of total employment (table O.3). In 
contrast, the informal sector accounts for more than two-thirds of industrial 
jobs (up to 78 percent in West Africa). Contrary to popular belief, industry in 
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Sub-Saharan Africa is essentially an informal sector aff air. Even among wage 
earners, the informal sector accounts for more than a quarter of employment 
(40 percent in West Africa). Th e rate of wage employment is therefore not a good 
indicator for capturing formal sector jobs. Comprehensive coverage of the infor-
mal sector is vital for understanding urban labor markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Th e annual report on employment produced by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO 2010a, b) shows just how poor the statistics on employment 
in Sub-Saharan Africa are: for the 1991–2008 period, only 11 of 45 countries 
were able to estimate the national unemployment rate for at least three years, 
and 16 countries had no employment statistics at all for the period. No other 
developing region has such a severe lack of data. 
Labor force surveys are a key to understanding households’ economic activi-
ties in most countries, mainly in developed countries but also in the developing 
countries and emerging economies of Latin America, Asia, and North Africa. 
Sub-Saharan African countries have not adopted this tool (a notable excep-
tion is South Africa), for a variety of reasons (Roubaud 1994; Rakotomanana, 
Ramilison, and Roubaud 2003; Razafi ndrakoto and Roubaud 2003; Brilleau, 
Ouedraogo, and Roubaud 2005; Razafi ndrakoto, Roubaud, and Torelli 2009). 
Table O.3 Share of Formal Manufacturing Employment in Selected African Cities
(percent)
Region/city
Formal industrial 
employment in total 
employment
Informal sector 
employment in total 
industrial employment 
Wage informal sector 
employment in total 
wage employment
West Africa
Abidjan 6.1 68.7 42.7
Bamako 3.7 81.7 35.1
Cotonou 2.2 87.7 31.2
Dakar 6.2 77.9 43.9
Lomé 2.7 86.9 29.0
Niamey 3.6 86.3 29.0
Ouagadougou 4.8 74.5 32.1
WAEMU countries 4.9 77.6 39.5
Central Africa
Douala 11.0 50.9 24.2
Kinshasa 4.5 69.7 25.6
Yaoundé 7.6 59.6 25.2
WAEMU countries 6.9 61.0 25.1
Indian Ocean
Antananarivo 18.4 46.3 22.4
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table O.1 for details).
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One is the crowding-out eff ect triggered by household surveys of living condi-
tions (such as the Living Standards Measurement Study surveys promoted by 
the World Bank), which occurs when the fi nancial and human resources of 
national statistics institutes are thin on the ground.
In addition to the dearth of statistical tools, there are conceptual problems 
caused by the particularities of developing economies’ labor markets. Labor mar-
kets in poor countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, diff er from developed 
countries’ labor markets in terms of their small proportion of wage employment 
and large proportion of self-employment. Th ese markets are also characterized 
by apparent segmentation between a formal sector, comprising “modern” busi-
nesses known to the public authorities, and an informal sector, comprising “tra-
ditional” businesses operating outside of labor law, business law, taxation, and so 
forth. In addition, worker protection is weak: where unemployment insurance 
does exist (in a tiny minority of some of the richest countries in Africa), it is 
reserved for a small proportion of the population working in the formal sector. 
Few workers pay into a pension or are protected in the event of illness. Public 
employment agencies are underdeveloped, and the public is largely oblivious 
to them where they do exist. Job-seekers generally use their families and social 
networks to fi nd work.
Th e informal sector’s lack of respect for regulations has created some con-
fusion between the informal sector and inactivity, blurring the boundary 
between being in and out of the labor force and partially invalidating the notion 
of unemployment as defi ned by the ILO. Only 35 percent of employed work-
ers in the seven French-speaking countries of WAEMU were wage earners in 
the early 2000s, according to the 1-2-3 surveys (described below). Th e other 
65 percent were independent workers who had created their own jobs 
(as employers or self-account workers) or contributing family workers. More 
oft en than not, then, fi nding a job in Africa is a matter of drawing on an infor-
mal network to build the information and capital needed to start up a small 
service or trade without a shop. Th e strong tendency in Africa to employ family 
members means that a signifi cant proportion of employed workers are unpaid 
contributing family workers, who are hard to classify in the usual way. Another 
complicating factor is that work in rural areas is characterized by large seasonal 
fl uctuations, which means that the seven-day reference period generally used 
to defi ne work is not relevant.
Th e measurement of remuneration is also no easy matter. People who work 
in the informal sector operate in production units that do not keep accounts. 
Trying to capture their earnings by asking them how much they earned in the 
past 30 days will therefore probably not yield reliable information, because the 
notions of value added and intermediate inputs are hard to defi ne and measure 
in the case of informal production units. In addition, informal production units 
experience large business fl uctuations, making annual extrapolation of income 
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measured over a month risky. For all these reasons, understanding employment 
in Sub-Saharan Africa calls for the development of a special statistical tool that 
can home in on the particularities of labor markets on the subcontinent. 
Changes in Policy Focus by the Development Community
Th e lack of data is not the only factor explaining the small number of studies on 
African labor markets. A second factor is the loss of interest by the development 
community (researchers and decision makers), which turned to new issues at 
the beginning of the 2000s. 
Beginning in the late 1980s, much was written about structural adjustment. 
During this period, the catalyst behind the focus on labor issues was the World 
Development Report 1995: Workers in an Integrating World, which examined 
whether labor markets were too rigid (World Bank 1995). Markets needed to 
be liberalized, the argument went, by making labor laws (hiring and fi ring pro-
cedures, minimum wages, social security, and so forth) more fl exible. Th e pre-
1994 devaluation franc zone countries were viewed as bogeymen (Rama 2000). 
Labor markets were liberalized, but the expected eff ects—upturns in growth 
in formal employment and wages—did not materialize (Kingdon, Sandefur, and 
Teal 2006). African labor markets, scholars concluded, were not so rigid aft er 
all, and labor regulations were not binding constraints (Teal 2000; AfDB and 
others 2012). At the time, a few unorthodox economists, in association with 
the major UN agencies, tried to sound the alarm about the devastating eff ects 
of structural adjustment and the need for social adjustment (Rodgers 1989; 
Standing and Tokman 1991), as a local version applied to labor markets of the 
“adjustment with a human face” advocated by Cornia, Jolly, and Stewart (1987).
At the end of the 1990s, when the structural adjustment rhetoric fi zzled 
out, the emphasis shift ed from the labor market to poverty, and both inter-
national and national development policies focused on poverty reduction 
(Cling, Razafi ndrakoto, and Roubaud 2003). Rare were the Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategy Papers (PRSPs)—the framework in which all national policies 
(general or specifi c) were supposed to be embedded—that mentioned specifi c 
employment policies. 
Only at the end of the 2000s were the virtues of effi  cient labor markets at 
reducing poverty rediscovered. National employment policies were put in place 
in some countries, generally without a suitable system to evaluate their impact. 
Th e international fi nancial crisis of 2008–09, with its disastrous eff ects on 
employment in the developed countries, has been a catalyst for putting labor 
markets back at the top of the development agenda. At the international level, 
the World Development Report 2013: Jobs (World Bank 2012b) and the thematic 
chapter of the African Economic Outlook 2012 on youth employment (AfDB and 
others 2012) are important initiatives. Th ere has not, however, been a massive 
resurgence of studies on employment in Africa, mainly because of the lack of data. 
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The 1-2-3 Surveys: A Tool for Understanding 
Labor Markets in Africa 
Th e contributors to this book use a unique series of identical—thus perfectly 
comparable—1-2-3 surveys conducted simultaneously in the main cities of 
seven West African countries and a few other countries (Cameroon, the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, and Madagascar) in the fi rst half of the 2000s (box 
O.1). Th ey present original, innovative fi ndings on labor markets using best-
practice statistical and econometric methods. 
Each chapter begins with a detailed presentation of the descriptive statistics 
used to elucidate a particular aspect of labor market functioning. Compari-
sons across locales are conducted. Th e descriptive sections are followed by in-
depth analyses of a broad spectrum of issues, ranging from segmentation to job 
satisfaction. 
Phase 1 is specially designed to measure the informal sector and employ-
ment. A series of questions identifi es people in the informal sector. Th e ques-
tions cover all the criteria contained in the international defi nition (the number 
of people employed in the business, the diff erent types of registration, and the 
type of accounts for self-employed workers). Th is information is collected for 
BOX O.1
What Is a 1-2-3 Survey? 
The 1-2-3 survey is based on the survey grafting principle. It nests three surveys target-
ing different statistical populations: individuals, production units, and households. The 
survey is based on the principle of a mixed (household/business) modular survey.
Phase 1—an augmented labor force survey—is a survey of household and individ-
ual employment, unemployment, and working conditions. It documents and analyzes 
labor market functioning and serves as a ﬁ lter for Phase 2, in which a representa-
tive sample of the heads of the informal production units identiﬁ ed in Phase 1 are 
interviewed. The Phase 2 survey seeks to measure the main economic and produc-
tive characteristics of the production units (production, value added, investment, and 
ﬁ nancing); the main business development problems encountered; and the kind of 
support informal sector entrepreneurs want from the public authorities. (Given the 
characteristics of Phase 2, the survey can also be said to be an employer/employee 
matched survey.) In Phase 3, a survey on income and expenditure is conducted on a 
subsample of households selected from Phase 1 to estimate the weight of the formal 
and informal sectors in household consumption by product and household type. Phase 
3 also estimates household standards of living and monetary poverty based on income 
or expenditure.
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both the main job and the second job, making the operational defi nition of the 
informal sector extremely fl exible, as it can vary depending on the aim of each 
study (national defi nition, international comparison, or research). Information 
can be produced on total employment in the informal sector and on the num-
ber of informal production units using the status in employment variable. Th e 
number of informal production units is vital for the selection of a representative 
sample of informal production units for Phase 2. 
Use of this survey means that for the fi rst time ever, informal sector employ-
ment and its characteristics can be described on a basis that is compatible 
with the ILO’s international recommendations (ILO 1993). Th roughout this 
book, the informal sector is defi ned as including all unincorporated enterprises 
(household businesses) that are not registered or do not keep formal accounts. 
Phase 1 provides all the information required to be disaggregated by the insti-
tutional sector.
Phase 1 is also a suitable instrument for measuring informal employment 
(corresponding to unprotected jobs), as defi ned by the ILO (2003). In addition 
to employment in the informal sector, the questionnaire also measures informal 
employment in the formal sector, using a set of questions on the type of job 
protection (type of employment contract, payslip, and benefi ts). Th e Phase 1 
questionnaire allows for a certain amount of fl exibility in terms of the informal-
ity criteria to be selected in keeping with international recommendations. 
Although the focus is on informal employment and the informal sector, 
Phase 1 also generates classic indicators such as statistics on employment, 
unemployment, and underemployment. Th ese indicators, especially open 
unemployment, do not properly measure tensions in African labor markets, 
however (see chapters 1 and 2). 
Phase 1 collects a wide range of information. It is a good instrument for in-
depth analysis of earnings and returns to human capital (education and expe-
rience); on-the-job training; gender and ethnic discrimination; labor market 
segmentation; migration; intergenerational mobility; job quality (hours worked, 
income, bonuses, social security, and so forth); job satisfaction; interaction and 
neighborhood eff ects; and other characteristics of the informal markets. 
Phase 1 has several limitations, however. First, to keep the length of the 
questionnaire reasonable, it studies few subjects in detail. For example, only a 
small set of information can usually be collected on the previous job, parents’ 
job, activities other than the main job and second job, and the income of inac-
tive people. In addition, the choice of a reference period for the questions on 
employment (generally the previous week, in keeping with international stan-
dards) is incompatible with the seasonal nature of certain activities (such as 
agricultural activities). Th is information is especially important when house-
holds combine informal and agricultural activities. 
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Second, dependent workers (employees, contributing family workers, and 
apprentices) may not know precisely what the legal status of the business they 
are working for is. Th is problem is serious if the estimation of manpower in the 
informal sector is based solely on Phase 1. However, the estimate derived from 
Phase 1 may be corroborated by Phase 2, which directly generates the number 
of informal workers in each establishment.5 
Th ird, measuring earnings in household surveys is a well-known problem: 
reluctance to declare one’s remuneration (especially at the top of the earnings 
distribution) and unavailability of book accounts or payslips (especially for 
informal workers) usually generate measurement errors and create downward 
biases. 
Given these shortcomings, special care was taken to capture income in Phase 
1. Labor earnings are associated with each remunerated job. For wage workers, 
the survey captures their current monthly wage as all nonwage components of 
remuneration (bonuses, public holidays, social benefi ts, and so forth, in cash 
or in kind). Unlike usual labor force surveys, Phase 1 captures the earnings of 
self-employed workers, which correspond to their disposable income (before 
taxation). National accountants used to call this income mixed income, because 
it includes returns to both capital and labor. For survey respondents who do not 
want to declare (or do not know) their precise earnings, a complementary ques-
tion asks for brackets of detailed minimum wage ranges. Measurement errors 
may remain despite these procedures, but robustness checks can be performed 
using Phase 2 data. 
Like all labor force surveys, Phase 1 authorizes the use of proxy respon-
dents. Many researchers believe that information obtained in this way is less 
accurate than information obtained by other means (Blair, Menon, and Bickart 
2004; Bardasi and others 2010). For this reason, Phase 1 guidelines recommend 
avoiding proxy respondent answers whenever possible, in order to limit poten-
tial bias. In West Africa, 82 percent of individual interviews are self-response; 
75 percent of the proxy respondents are either the household head or his or 
her spouse (Amegashie and others 2005). Th ese indicators are even higher in 
Madagascar, where 90 percent of individual interviews are self-response and 
82 percent are either the household head or his or her spouse (Rakotomanana, 
Ramilison, and Roubaud 2003). 
This book uses, but does not exhaust, the analytical potential of Phase 1 
of the 1-2-3 survey. It concentrates on the surveys conducted in the main 
cities of seven West African countries (Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, 
Lomé, Niamey, and Ouagadougou) in 2001/02 (map 0.1). Some chapters 
also cover surveys of Antananarivo, Madagascar (2001 and 2004); Douala 
and Yaoundé, Cameroon (2005); and Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of 
Congo (2005).
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A  Brief Survey of Labor Market Theories Applied 
to Development
Th is book is about the remuneration, job quality, and allocation of labor across 
sectors in low-income economies and across economies as a whole—issues that 
lie at the heart of the earliest models of economic development. Th e theoreti-
cal apparatus of development economics includes a number of key models and 
assumptions that are concerned with labor market functioning and the move-
ments of labor across sectors. Th is section briefl y reviews these models in order 
to set up the theoretical framework that is common to all of the chapters and to 
describe the methodology adopted.
Th e seminal work of Arthur Lewis (1954) places emphasis on the migration 
of labor from the agricultural to the industrial sector as a condition for out-
put growth. Th is model stands as a milestone in the theoretical development 
Map O.1 Sites of 1-2-3 Surveys Conducted in Africa 
Note: *Surveys used in this book. C = capital city; N = national; U = urban center.
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CHAD
NIGER
CONGO
TOGO
SENEGAL
CÔTE
D’IVOIRE
DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC
OF CONGO
MADAGASCAR
COMOROS
CAMEROON
GABON
MALI
MOROCCO
BENIN
BURKINA FASO
IBRD 39778
March 2013
Morocco
1999–2000 Phases 1-2 (N)
2006–07 Phases 1-2 (N)
Niger
2002* Phases 1-2-3 (C)
2012 Phase 1–2 (N)
Senegal
2002* Phases 1-2-3 (C)
Chad
2011 Phases 1-2 (N)
Comoros
2011 Phases 1-2
Côte d’Ivoire
2002* Phases 1-2 (C)
Gabon
2010 Phases 1-2 (N)
Congo
2009 Phases 1-2 (N)
Togo
2001* Phases 1-2-3 (C)
Benin
2001* Phases 1-2-3 (C)
2003–04 Phases 1-2 (U)
2006–11 Phases 1-2-3 (N)
Cameroon
1993 Phases 1-2-3 (C)
1994 Phase 1 (C)
2005* Phases 1-2 (N)
2010 Phases 1-2 (N)
Mali
2001* Phases 1-2-3 (C)
2004, 2007, 2010 Phase 1 (N)
Burkina Faso
2001* Phases 1-2-3 (C)
2006–07 Phases 1-2-3 (N)
2012 Phases 1-2 (N)
Burundi
2006 Phases 1-2-3 (C)
2007 Phases 1-2 (U)
2008 Phases 1-3 (U)
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
2005* Phases 1-2-3 (N)
2012 Phases 1-2-3 (N)
Madagascar
1995–2010* Phases 1-2-3 (CU)
2012 Phases 1-2 (N)
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economics literature, because it is the fi rst to off er a representation of the func-
tioning of a “dual” economy. Dual economy models are a subclass of two-sector 
models of economic growth (Kanbur and McIntosh 1987). Th ey are intended 
to capture the main features of developing economies in order to enable better 
analysis of development paths and policies. What distinguishes dual economy 
models from others is not that they are two-sector models but that there exist 
asymmetries between sectors in their use of factors or in the way in which factor 
remuneration is established.
In the Lewis model, land is used in agriculture but not in industry, and capi-
tal is used in industry but not in agriculture. Land and capital are thus perfectly 
immobile; equilibrium is reached by the movement of workers between the two 
sectors. 
Th e second asymmetry lies in the assumption that a surplus of labor exists in 
agriculture that can be reallocated to industry without decreasing the amount 
of food produced in the economy, because the marginal productivity of labor 
in agriculture is zero. Wages in the agricultural sector are set according to 
 “conventional norms” rather than marginal products. 
Th e Lewis model assumes that the urban labor market always clears, mak-
ing involuntary unemployment impossible. Th e model predictions are thus 
at odds with what is observed in urban areas of low-income countries, which 
are characterized by high levels of visible and disguised unemployment and a 
large informal sector that includes small unregistered fi rms and self-employed 
workers. 
Another milestone of development economics, the Harris and Todaro (1970) 
migration model, explains these features by assuming that agricultural workers’ 
decision to migrate depends on the diff erence between the prevalent agricul-
tural wage and the expected urban wage, which is positively correlated with 
the wage level in the modern sector and negatively correlated with the unem-
ployment rate. Th e model predicts an equilibrium rate of unemployment and 
is compatible with the existence of a large informal sector with low income 
levels. Like Lewis’s model, the Harris and Todaro model is dual. Th e wage in the 
modern sector is assumed to be higher than the market-clearing level, because 
rigidities can result from labor market legislation (such as minimum wages) or 
from fi rm rational behavior (the effi  cient wage hypothesis [Stiglitz 1974, 1976; 
Akerlof 1982; Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984] is among the possible explanations). 
Th e theory of labor market segmentation was born in the early 1970s to explain 
the challenge of persistent poverty in the affl  uent society of the 1960s (Cain 
1976). According to this theory, poverty could be best understood in terms of a 
dual labor market, in which “the poor are confi ned to the secondary labor mar-
ket. Eliminating poverty requires that they gain access to primary employment” 
(Piore 1970, p. 55). Unless segmentation is removed, policies that increase the 
human capital of the poor are not likely to produce results. 
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Th is theory pictures the labor market divided into primary and secondary 
“segments.” Jobs in the primary segment are supposed to be more desirable 
because they off er higher pay, more promotion possibilities, and better working 
conditions and are more stable than jobs in the secondary segment. In low-
income countries, the secondary segment is oft en identifi ed with the informal 
sector, which comprises small unregistered fi rms and self-employed workers, 
whereas the primary segment is composed of registered private fi rms and the 
public sector. Several explanations have been off ered as to why such segmenta-
tion persists. Workers in the secondary labor market could be discriminated 
against because of their race, gender, or social class. It could also be the case 
that workers confi ned to the secondary segment develop tastes and attitudes 
that exacerbate their disadvantaged position (for instance, women preferring to 
hold part-time jobs in order to dedicate more time to caring and family duties) 
(Piore 1970; Doeringer and Piore 1971). Segmentation could also result from 
imperfect capital markets if some occupations require high levels of invest-
ment that cannot be supported by people with low initial wealth (Banerjee and 
 Newman 1993). Capital market imperfections may also explain why the infor-
mal sector itself is sometimes dual, in the sense that some workers work in the 
lower tier and others work in the upper tier of the informal sector, into which 
entry is restricted by human capital and fi nancial capital requirements (Fields 
1990, 2010).
Th ese theories challenge the predictions of the human capital theory, which 
predicts a positive relationship between educational attainment and wages 
(Becker 1964). Th e presence of discrimination in the labor market goes against 
the prediction that better-educated workers should receive higher wages and 
suggests that gender, race, or ethnicity may play prominent roles. 
Th e job competition theory makes the assumption that the number of jobs 
in the primary segment is limited and that workers compete to obtain them. 
In this competition, employers use screening devices to hire workers based 
on their trainability and adaptability (Th urow 1972, 1975; Th urow and Lucas 
1972). Education may be linked to higher wages and better jobs—not because 
it provides workers with a higher level of human capital but because it helps 
employers screen people with the desirable characteristics: only people with the 
capacities desired by fi rms are able and willing to acquire the signal (in other 
words, to get educated) (Spence 1973). 
Th e theoretical foundations of development economics were at play in the 
choice of the topics treated in the 14 chapters of this book. Th e contributors 
take an agnostic view, recognizing that although education and working expe-
rience remain the principal determinants of individual earnings, disguised 
unemployment, segmentation, duality, and discrimination are probably key 
dimensions of labor markets in urban Africa (indeed, several chapters study 
these phenomena). 
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Another important assumption implicit throughout the book is the ratio-
nality of individuals—the notion that people choose where to live and where 
to work by maximizing their utility under constraint. Whenever necessary, the 
contributors account for the self-selection of individuals into activities, sectors, 
and markets in their econometric estimations. 
Th e development literature is divided over the appropriateness of the “homo 
economicus” paradigm for studying low-income economies. Th e “formal” 
school assumes that the laws of economics apply whatever the society’s level of 
development (Cook 1966; Schneider 1974; see Isaac 2005 for a survey). People 
everywhere face the same problem of maximizing gains and minimizing losses 
given their (scarce) resources. Th e “substantivist” school of Karl Polanyi (Polanyi 
1957; Dalton 1967) rejects this assumption for peasant societies and societies 
with low levels of development, in which, they claim, people do not engage in 
maximizing behavior. Given that this book assumes that people are driven by 
some sense of maximizing behavior, it might seem that it stands on the formal-
ist side of the controversy. In fact, it follows Becker (1962), who argues that the 
most important dimension in explaining individual behavior lies not in the 
objective function but rather in the constraints under which decisions are made. 
In other words, it does not really matter whether individuals are rational in the 
sense that they engage in maximizing behavior. What is important is the fact 
that it is not possible to use more resources than those that are available at the 
time decisions are made. 
Th is view is not far from that of Levi-Strauss (2001), who closes the debate 
between substantivists and formalists by noting that between the two schools 
of thought 
the diff erence is relative, not absolute, in that one can compare the explana-
tory power of economic theory to a piston that moves in a cylinder that is 
sometimes a bit larger and sometime much larger than it. Even in the best 
case, the piston never perfectly adheres to the surface and lets a minimum 
quantity of energy escape or, in the case of economic theory, information that 
is lacking in order to allow a complete understanding of the society in purely 
economic terms (authors’ translation). 
Th is book testifi es to the soundness of Levi-Strauss’s view.
Overview of Main Findings
 Th is book is divided into fi ve parts. Part I provides a comparative analysis of 
urban labor markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. Composed of a single chapter, it 
provides a descriptive overview and presents the main stylized facts investigated 
throughout the book. Part II focuses on job quality and labor market conditions 
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(unemployment and underemployment, vulnerability, job satisfaction). Part III 
explores the many dimensions of labor market inequalities. Th is multifaceted 
issue is examined through various lenses, including returns to education, labor 
market segmentation, intergenerational mobility, time-related inequality, and 
gender and ethnic discrimination in earnings. Part IV addresses some key cop-
ing mechanisms and private responses, with a focus on migration, child labor, 
and activity in old age. It examines migration from diff erent angles. In particu-
lar, it considers for the fi rst time the determinants of subregional migration 
(within West Africa) and the performance of returning migrants. Part V identi-
fi es the way forward. It stresses three promising avenues for the labor market 
research agenda: employment and the informal sector in relation to poverty, 
the microeconomic and macroeconomic dynamics of the labor market, and 
the impact of public policies. It also advocates for urgently addressing the data 
challenge.
Given the richness and complexity of the chapters, synthesizing the main 
results is diffi  cult. Two lenses are adopted: a macro perspective, in which coun-
try specifi cities are explored, and a micro perspective, in which the heterogene-
ity at the level of the individual is taken into account. 
Th e Macro Level: Labor Market Homogeneity and 
Heterogeneity in Africa 
Determining whether labor markets are homogeneous or heterogeneous has 
important policy implications. If the diff erences between countries are mar-
ginal, policies for improving the way they function will be similar. If the diff er-
ences are signifi cant, policies will have to be tailored to local situations.
Homogeneity of urban labor markets in Africa. Urban labor markets in Africa 
are surprisingly homogeneous (the consistency of the results is a good indi-
rect indicator of the quality of the surveys). Despite increases in school enroll-
ment rates, Africa’s working-age population is low skilled. Th e average years of 
schooling (seven) in the countries studied is more or less the same as the level 
in France in 1913; in West Africa, the average is comparable to the level in the 
United Kingdom in 1870 (Maddison 1995). 
Unemployment rates (about 10 percent) are similar to the rates observed in 
developed countries (albeit at the high end of the scale). Unlike in developed 
countries, however, unemployment rates tend to rise with the level of educa-
tion (falling off  at university level only in certain countries), a feature shared by 
North African countries (AfDB and others 2012). Th is fi nding would appear to 
bear out the “luxury unemployment” hypothesis that in the absence of unem-
ployment benefi ts, the very poor cannot aff ord to be unemployed. Underem-
ployment, rather than unemployment, is the main adjustment variable between 
labor supply and demand. 
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One of the main features of urban labor markets in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
the importance of the informal sector (which employs about 70 percent of all 
workers) and its corollary, the low rate of wage employment (the correlation 
coeffi  cient between the two indicators is –0.93, signifi cant at the 1 percent level). 
Excluding agriculture, nowhere else in the world are wage employment rates as 
low as in Africa, no matter how far back the historical series go (Marchand and 
Th élot 1997). In 1851, for example, the wage employment rate was 60 percent 
in France—well above the less than 40 percent in the African countries covered 
in this book. Moreover, this gap is hugely underestimated, as the surveys cover 
only the main cities, where wage employment is highest. Wage employment 
rates in France (and in developed countries in general) quickly shot up to more 
than 80 percent. A similar trend has not occurred in Africa, where the particu-
larly rapid urban transition has not been accompanied by a shift  to nonagri-
cultural wage employment and workers who enter the informal sector tend to 
get stuck there (although there is some nonnegligible movement between the 
formal and informal sectors). Labor market theories and instruments developed 
by labor economists for the industrial world are thus totally unsuited to analyz-
ing Africa, even its urban areas. 
Heterogeneity of urban labor markets in Africa. Urban labor markets in Sub-
Saharan Africa also display a great deal of heterogeneity (fi gure O.1). Diff er-
ences are at least as great as in the countries of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). Labor force participation rates are 
43  percent in Kinshasa and 68 percent in Lomé. Observed unemployment 
rates are 4.4 percent in Antananarivo and 15.4 percent in Ouagadougou. Time-
related underemployment rates are 9.9 percent in Yaoundé and 19.6 percent 
in Kinshasa, and invisible underemployment rates range from 37.1 percent, 
in Douala to 66.6 percent in Ouagadougou.6 Th e informal sector accounts for 
53 percent of jobs in Antananarivo and 81 percent in Lomé. Wage employment 
rates are 24 percent in Lomé and Cotonou and 53 percent in Antananarivo. 
Even the generally low rate of public employment for all countries (compared 
with developed countries)—a mark of chronic underadministration—ranges 
from less than 7 percent in Douala and Abidjan to 17 percent in Kinshasa and 
Yaoundé, indicating wide diff erences even within the same country. Multiple 
jobholding rates range from 4 percent in Dakar to 14 percent in Douala and 
Yaoundé. Earnings levels range from €20 a month in Kinshasa and €30 in Lomé 
to €110 in Abidjan and Yaoundé. Th e formal/informal earnings gap also diff ers 
widely across cities, with a ratio in favor of the formal sector of 1.8 times in 
Antananarivo and Kinshasa and 4.2 in Abidjan and Ouagadougou. Gini coef-
fi cients range from 0.53 in Antananarivo to 0.62 in Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, 
and Kinshasa and 0.64 in Ouagadougou. Th e economic policy implications are 
clear: even in countries arguably as comparable as the ones examined here, a 
one-size-fi ts-all solution is not going to work. 
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Figure O.1 Key Urban Labor Market Indicators in Sub-Saharan African and OECD Countries
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It is diffi  cult to produce a straightforward typology of labor markets; no 
simple explanatory model seems to withstand examination of the empirical 
results. A detailed econometric analysis is inappropriate because of the small 
number of observation points (11, each corresponding to one city). Analysis 
of the correlation matrix for some key indicators does reveal the diversity and 
complexity of the confi gurations, however (see table O.3). Th e proposed typol-
ogy of Teal (2000), which includes three archetypes and is based on just three 
countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, and South Africa), is also much too simplistic. For 
example, the correlation between unemployment and employment rates in the 
informal sector is not signifi cantly diff erent from zero (–0.07, not statistically 
Sources: Panels a, c, e, g, i based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table O.1 for details); 
panels b, d, f, h, j, ILO 2012.
Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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Figure O.1 (continued)
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signifi cant), suggesting that there is no easy trade-off  between the two, as the 
mismatch between (formal) labor supply and demand is expressed by either 
unemployment or the expansion of the informal sector. 
A few interesting conclusions can be drawn from table O.4 (although the 
small number of observations calls for caution, and causal links cannot be estab-
lished). First, the participation rate is negatively correlated with the unemploy-
ment rate (–0.33, not statistically signifi cant) and the extended unemployment 
rate (–0.63, signifi cant at the 10 percent level). Th e quantity of labor is thus 
not constant, and a large labor supply is not associated with higher unemploy-
ment—far from it. Th e quantity of labor is also not associated with employment 
in the informal sector (the correlation between the two phenomena is not sig-
nifi cant). However, as public jobs are rationed, a high labor force participation 
rate is associated with a low public employment rate (–0.67, signifi cant at the 
5 percent level). With respect to unemployment, although the two measures 
used (the ILO defi nition and extended unemployment) display huge diff erences 
in levels (see chapter 1), they are very closely correlated (0.88, signifi cant at 
the 1 percent level). However, there are no links between the diff erent forms 
of underemployment (unemployment and time-related and invisible under-
employment). Th ese phenomena are therefore independent manifestations of 
the mismatch between supply and demand. A high unemployment rate is not 
associated with a low rate of informal sector employment or a high reservation 
wage among the unemployed (see chapter 1).
With respect to job structure, the share of informal sector employment is 
logically inversely proportional to the wage employment share (–0.93, signifi cant 
at the 1 percent level), even though the informal sector represents a large per-
centage of wage earners. Th e relations with the public employment share (–0.36) 
and the industrial employment share (–0.43) are negative but not statistically 
signifi cant. However, the multiple jobholding rate falls very signifi cantly with the 
presence of the informal sector (–0.81, signifi cant at the 1 percent level), high-
lighting the narrow room for maneuvering (especially in terms of time) freed 
up by this sector. Th e higher the share of employment in the informal sector, 
the lower the earnings (–0.25, not statistically signifi cant); the more widespread 
invisible underemployment (0.69, signifi cant at the 5 percent level); and the 
wider the gaps between formal and informal sector earnings (0.49, not statisti-
cally signifi cant) and male and female earnings (0.73, signifi cant at the 1 percent 
level). Th e relations between these features of the labor markets are refl ected by 
higher levels of inequality in earned income (the correlation with the Gini coef-
fi cient of 0.80 is signifi cant at the 1 percent level). Th e inverse relation is found 
for the wage employment rate, which is negatively related to the earnings gap by 
gender and institutional sector and to inequality but is positively related to the 
multiple jobholding rate. Finally, the higher the invisible underemployment rate, 
the higher the inequality (0.56, signifi cant at the 10 percent level).
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Table O.4 Correlation Matrix for Main Labor Market Indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa 
PR UR1 UR2 REG UTR IUR WER IER PER IndER MJR Earnings M/F E F/I E Q3/Q1 Gini0 Gini
Participation rate (PR) 1
Unemployment rate ILO (UR1) –0.33 1
Unemployment rate extended 
(UR2) –0.63* 0.88*** 1
Reservation earnings gap 
(REG)a 0.58* –0.21 –0.39 1
Time-related underemployment 
rate (UTR) –0.33 –0.33 –0.06 –0.32 1
Invisible underemployment 
rate (IUR) 0.19 –0.06 –0.11 0.36 –0.26 1
Wage employment rate (WER) –0.02 0.21 0.44 –0.13 –0.31 –0.64** 1
Informal sector employment 
rate (IER) 0.06 –0.07 –0.43 0.19 0.25 0.69** –0.93*** 1
Public employment rate (PER) –0.67** 0.44 0.63** –0.50 –0.12 –0.26 0.21 –0.36 1
Industrial employment rate 
(IndER) 0.09 –0.35 0.26 0.34 –0.03 0.04 0.44 –0.43 –0.19 1
Multiple jobholding rate (MJR) 0.17 –0.29 –0.17 –0.02 –0.15 –0.65** 0.64** –0.81*** 0.09 0.30 1
Nominal earnings 0.23 0.26 –0.08 0.54* –0.39 –0.29 0.46 –0.25 –0.23 0.06 0.16 1
Male/female earnings ratio 
(M/F E) 0.39 –0.40 –0.73** 0.54* –0.00 0.48 –0.72** 0.73*** –0.54* –0.29 –0.37 0.08 0.49 1
Formal/informal sector 
earnings ratio (F/I E) 0.51 0.35 –0.10 0.64** –0.52* 0.64** –0.32 0.49 –0.40 –0.15 –0.52 0.37 1
Quartile 3 (high)/Quartile 1 (low) –0.32 0.19 0.29 –0.04 0.27 0.27 –0.60* 0.50 0.27 –0.28 –0.52 –0.36 0.18 0.38 1
Gini0 (including earnings = 0) –0.12 0.38 0.04 0.02 –0.10 0.56* –0.77*** 0.80*** 0.05 –0.68** –0.73*** –0.17 0.57* 0.57* 0.69** 1
Gini (excluding earnings = 0) –0.26 0.45 0.25 –0.11 0.08 0.31 –0.63** 0.68** 0.12 –0.67** –0.73*** –0.12 0.41 0.45 0.78*** 0.92*** 1
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table O.1 for details).
a. The reservation earnings gap is the gap between the minimum earnings at which the unemployed would accept a job and the earnings of workers with equivalent characteristics (see the 
methodology described in chapter 1, table 1.10). 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
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Th e Micro Level: Heterogeneity across Individuals
Moussa and Fatou are 20-year-olds living in the capital of a French-speaking 
African country. Both graduated from upper-secondary school. What are their 
prospects? What benefi ts can they hope to gain from their qualifi cations? Were 
their parents right to invest in their education? Will it increase their chances 
of entering the world of work and fi nding a good job? Will they be able to 
fi nd fulfi lling jobs, or will they have to accept jobs for which they are over-
qualifi ed? Will they be unemployed, out of the labor force, wage workers, or 
self-employed? Will they work in the formal or informal sector? What will the 
outcome depend on? How late in life will they have to keep working to ensure 
they maintain a decent standard of living? 
Moussa, Fatou, and their families have surely asked themselves these ques-
tions and many others. Th ey are vitally important. Africa is the youngest conti-
nent in the world today, with more than 64 percent of the population under 25 
years old. In view of demographic growth, the number of young people arriving 
on the labor market is expected to grow steadily.
Fatou is an exception. Like Moussa, she graduated from upper-secondary 
school. She therefore has an above-average education compared with young 
people in her generation, 27 percent of whom, boys and girls included, did 
not attend school between the ages of 10 and 14 (chapters 1 and 12). Fatou 
is even more exceptional than the other young girls, 34 percent of whom 
(compared with 20 percent of boys) in her generation did not attend school 
between 10 and 14. 
In French-speaking Africa, there continues to be a wide gap between boys’ 
and girls’ levels of education, despite substantial narrowing in recent decades 
as a result of the widespread increase in school attendance rates. At the turn 
of the 21st century, school enrollment conditions remain diffi  cult. Schooling 
competes with other activities that potentially bring in income for households. 
On average, 45 percent of children 10–14 participate in domestic activities 
and 12 percent engage in an economic activity. Th ese activities do not always 
prevent them from attending school: nearly 31 percent of children 10–14 
both work and attend school. Th e competition seems to be mainly between 
 economic activity and school, not between domestic activity and school 
 (chapter 12). Children frequently combine domestic activities, sometimes for 
long hours, with school, whereas economic activity and school attendance tend 
to be mutually exclusive. 
Th is general fi nding calls for some qualifi cation. Girls and boys diff er. When 
girls are not in school, their labor is more oft en used to bring in income for the 
family or to attend to domestic tasks. Boys are more oft en employed as appren-
tices. Although apprenticeships are generally unpaid, they create human capital. 
Not surprisingly, diff erences in time use are evident across cities and social 
backgrounds. Sons and daughters of educated parents have a higher probability 
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of attending school, as do children from wealthier households. Th ese diff erences 
probably refl ect the role of the budget constraint in the trade-off  between work 
and education.
What benefi ts can Fatou and Moussa hope to gain from their qualifi cations? 
In most countries, education reduces the risk of unemployment, increases 
access to good jobs, and raises pay. In West Africa, unemployment increases 
with education, as shown in chapter 1: 15–18 percent of people with secondary 
or higher education are unemployed as opposed to just 11 percent of people 
with primary education and 8 percent of people with no education. Th e unem-
ployment observed in these countries is therefore oft en viewed as a voluntary 
“queuing” phenomenon, in which the unemployed can aff ord to be unemployed 
until they fi nd a job in line with their aspirations. In these circumstances, many 
discouraged job-seekers could be expected to either withdraw from the labor 
market or accept jobs that are not appropriate given their capabilities. 
Chapter 2 examines the extent and impact of this job mismatch. It shows 
that only 53 percent of workers 25 and over hold jobs that match their skills, 
with 30 percent underqualifi ed and 16 percent overqualifi ed for their job. Not 
surprisingly, the incidence of underqualifi cation is higher among workers with 
low levels of education and overqualifi cation is more common among workers 
with secondary or higher education. Fift y-nine percent of people with com-
pleted lower- secondary school but not upper-secondary school and 69 percent 
of people with completed secondary education but not completed higher educa-
tion are overqualifi ed. Higher-education graduates are slightly better off , with 
“just” 45 percent overqualifi ed for the work they do. Job-seekers’ expectations 
of fi nding a job that matches their education dwindle with the length of unem-
ployment, bearing out the hypothesis of “queuing” unemployment.
Given these realities, are Fatou and Moussa wrong to have spent time in 
school? Although their chances of fi nding a job that matches their qualifi cations 
probably fell as a result, they can expect to earn more: each additional year of 
education implies 10 percent higher pay. And even for overqualifi ed workers, 
each year of education beyond the minimum required education level to hold 
their job generates an additional increase in pay of 5–6 percent. 
Th ese fi ndings are confi rmed in chapter 5, which examines the distribution of 
workers in diff erent employment sectors (public, formal private, and informal) 
and evaluates the returns to education in each sector. It shows that although 
education is no safeguard against unemployment, it does open doors to the 
highest-paid sectors (public sector and formal private sector) and yields posi-
tive returns, including in the informal sector. Th e returns are convex, contrary 
to “standard” human capital theory, which posits that they are concave. Th is 
fi nding has important implications for education policy. If returns are convex, 
the massive investment in primary education may not produce the expected 
eff ects if access to secondary education is not also facilitated. Poor households 
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may choose to educate only some of their children to make the most of this 
convexity—with girls oft en suff ering as a result.
Th e fi nding of positive returns to education in the informal sector is impor-
tant, because this sector employs more than 70 percent of the employed labor 
force in Sub-Saharan Africa. Th e large size of the informal sector is oft en per-
ceived as refl ecting segmentation in the employment market. Th e market is 
segmented when jobs are rationed by restrictive wage rules (minimum wage, 
wage-setting based on an effi  ciency wage principle, and so forth) or other rea-
sons. Because access to this sector is restricted, people who cannot enter it are 
thrown into a market segment where workers are less protected and less well 
paid. In developing countries, this issue is usually studied by distinguishing 
between the formal employment sector (public sector and formal private sec-
tor) and the informal sector. Th is distinction suggests that the informal sector is 
homogeneous. In fact, it covers a multitude of types of workers, including busi-
ness heads with employees, employees of these businesses, and own-account 
workers. Given that people working in the informal sector are able to evade 
taxation and social security contributions, some people in the sector may have 
chosen to work in it. Th is may be the case, in particular, with business heads. In 
a situation where many workers have only limited access to the capital market, 
not everyone can become a business head. Th is means that the informal sector 
itself could be segmented. 
Chapter 6 looks into this issue. It studies the allocation of labor among 
three sectors: the formal sector (public and private formal), the upper informal 
sector (entrepreneurs employing at least one person), and the lower informal 
sector (own-account workers and employees). It fi nds labor market segmenta-
tion between the upper and lower segments of the informal sector in the seven 
WAEMU cities studied: the proportion of people who, in view of their educa-
tion and experience, should be working in the formal or upper informal sector 
appears to be lower than it would be if the market were not segmented. Restric-
tion of access to the upper segment of the informal sector therefore emerges as 
an explanatory factor for poverty.
Th e emphasis on remuneration in studying populations exposed to the risk 
of poverty should not cloud the fact that other aspects of the labor relation-
ship are just as important. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on aspects of employment 
still rarely addressed in developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Chapter 3 analyzes individual job satisfaction, measured in terms of the absence 
of desire to change job or status on the labor market. Th e fi ndings confi rm that 
a high wage increases job satisfaction but that it is not its only determinant. For 
example, other things equal, satisfaction increases with age (a refl ection of youth 
employment problems) and decreases with the level of education. Th is inverse 
relationship with education is consistent with the observation that the risk of 
being overeducated for one’s job increases with one’s skills level. In general, 
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working conditions appear to be just as important as earnings in determining 
satisfaction. For example, satisfaction is increased by working in the public sec-
tor; earning a fi xed wage; having a steady rather than a casual job; and being a 
senior executive, employer/proprietor, or even own-account worker. Working 
in the informal sector does not systematically reduce job satisfaction, a result 
at odds with conventional wisdom. Chapter 3 also underscores the role of indi-
vidual aspirations in job satisfaction: other things equal, people whose fathers 
have more than primary education have lower satisfaction than people with less 
educated fathers. 
Chapter 4 examines some of these employment aspects, addressing the ques-
tion of vulnerability in employment. Th is is virgin territory for the literature, at 
least in Sub-Saharan Africa. Th e authors build a composite indicator of vulner-
ability that covers many aspects of the job held: contractual insecurity, working 
conditions, unstable remuneration, underemployment, and a mismatch between 
job and individual characteristics. Th ey show that 85 percent of private sector 
workers in all of the cities considered are vulnerable on the basis of at least one 
of seven criteria. In a competitive labor market, the theory of compensating wage 
diff erentials predicts that everything else equal, people in jobs with undesirable 
characteristics, in terms of strenuous or hazardous work or the protection off ered 
to workers, should be better paid. Chapter 4 shows that although on average, 
employment vulnerability is associated with lower pay in the formal private sec-
tor, everything else equal, average earnings in the informal sector are higher for 
high-vulnerability jobs. Th e assumption that average gains can compensate for a 
certain level of vulnerability therefore holds in the informal sector.
Fatou may well have the same level of qualifi cations as Moussa, but does 
she have the same chances as Moussa of securing the job she wants? Do Fatou 
and Moussa have the same chances as people of diff erent origins with the same 
level of qualifi cations? Chapters 8 and 9 address these questions, each from a 
diff erent angle. Chapter 8 uses the information on jobs held by respondents and 
their fathers to analyze inequality of opportunities on the labor market. Th e 
fi ndings show that social origin plays a decisive role in labor market position, 
fostering the intergenerational transmission of inequalities. Transmission chan-
nels are both direct and indirect. In some cities, access to the upper segments 
of the labor market (the public and formal private sectors) is determined by 
the level of education, itself dependent on the parents’ occupational status. In 
other cities, employment in one sector rather than another depends directly on 
the parents’ socioeconomic status. Ethnic group and migrant status also have 
signifi cant impacts in some cities. 
Chapter 9 addresses discrimination. It decomposes the earnings gap between 
men and women and between the largest and other ethnic groups. Th e results 
show a large earnings gap between men and women, with women earning 
21–50 percent of men’s earnings. Diff erences in the average characteristics of 
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male and female workers cannot explain these gaps. Th e gaps between ethnic 
groups are much smaller, and the largest group does not appear to systemati-
cally enjoy a more favorable position than other groups. 
Despite their qualifi cations, Moussa and Fatou have reason to feel appre-
hensive about their entry into the world of work. Th e labor market does not 
give everyone the same opportunities. Access to the most desirable employment 
sectors appears to be restricted and to depend as much on parents’ social status 
as on the qualifi cations individuals hold. Unemployment is high among people 
with good qualifi cations, and a sizable proportion of people who are employed 
are frustrated because they have not found jobs that match their skills, even 
though they have above-average earnings. Th e outlook for Fatou is even bleaker, 
because she is likely to suff er discrimination as a woman.
Fatou might marry quickly and ultimately choose to run the household. She 
would then specialize in performing domestic tasks and educating the children. 
Even if she works outside the home, however, she is very likely to shoulder 
most of the domestic work, as chapter 7 shows. In the 10 countries considered, 
domestic work represents nearly one-third of the total time worked on average. 
Despite a lower labor force participation rate, on average, women account for 
56 percent of the total time worked in the household, including domestic activi-
ties (62 percent in the WAEMU countries). Women in Africa do most of the 
domestic work whether or not they work a paid job. Th ey account for 43 percent 
of market working hours but 89 percent of domestic working hours. Working 
women work a “double day,” in that their domestic workload is not lighter than 
it is for nonworking women. 
A number of factors are correlated with inequalities in the gender division 
of labor. Social norms, measured by various variables, appear to play a decisive 
role: relative position in the household, age bracket, religion, and, to a lesser 
extent, education all have a signifi cant impact on the gender distribution of 
domestic and market work. Th e type of household and its demographic struc-
ture also play an important part in this distribution: large, polygamous house-
holds and households with a larger number of adults have a diff erent gender 
division of labor than households made up of monogamous couples with young 
children.
Faced with problems fi nding work, many young people consider migrat-
ing. Th is book addresses the migration question from two novel points of view. 
Chapter 10 deals with migration within the WAEMU economic area. Th e simul-
taneous series of labor force surveys conducted in the same format in the seven 
French-speaking capitals provides an opportunity to examine the monetary 
determinants of migration within this zone, in which member countries have 
signed a free movement agreement. 
Th e chapter paints a picture of migration between Southern countries, a sub-
ject still somewhat neglected by the literature; it does not address South-North 
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migration, which requires data of a diff erent type. Th e chapter documents the 
magnitude of migration between WAEMU countries. Not surprisingly, Côte 
d’Ivoire is by far the leading country for immigration in the region. Mali and 
Burkina Faso supply the largest contingent of emigrants. Togo and Benin post 
high immigration and emigration fi gures. 
Given that Fatou and Moussa graduated from upper-secondary school, they 
are unlikely to migrate within WAEMU, as the fi ndings show that migrants who 
move from one African capital to another are less educated on average than 
nonmigrants, both in their country of origin and in their destination country.7 
In most countries, they have a higher probability of working in the informal 
sector and earning lower wages. Th erefore, the brain drain phenomenon does 
not appear to be the main characteristic of migratory fl ows between French-
speaking West African countries. However, other things equal, migrants’ choices 
as to where they live do appear, at least in part, to respond to diff erences in 
remuneration: like nonmigrants, migrants choose to live in cities where, given 
their characteristics, their earnings expectations are highest.
With their qualifi cations, Fatou and Moussa are more likely to migrate to 
a developed country than another developing country. Moreover, if they do 
migrate, they are likely to do so only temporarily: recent analyses of interna-
tional migration show that a large proportion of migrants ultimately return 
to their country of origin. Th e net impact of international migration, skilled 
or otherwise, on migrants’ country of origin is thus still a research question. 
Migration of educated workers might not be as negative as feared if migrants 
return in suffi  cient numbers, bringing with them capital and know-how they 
manage to use productively in their country of origin. 
Th is subject is analyzed in chapter 11, which uses data from the 1-2-3 sur-
veys conducted in the WAEMU countries to evaluate wage diff erential between 
nonmigrant workers and migrant workers who have returned to their coun-
try of origin (“return migrants”). Th e chapter’s fi ndings distinguish between 
migrants based on whether they have returned from a developed country or 
from another WAEMU capital. Migrants returning from WAEMU member 
countries and nonmigrants display very similar labor market participation 
behavior and characteristics. In contrast, migrants returning from OECD 
countries are much more educated, more likely to be employed, and wealthier 
than nonmigrants. Th ey also have a greater probability of working in the formal 
sector. However, this diff erence vanishes (or turns negative) when migrants’ 
characteristics are taken into account, suggesting that they suff er a loss of social 
capital that reduces their access to formal sector jobs. In terms of income, the 
results reveal the existence of a large migration premium for migrants returning 
from OECD countries. Informal sector businesses run by migrants returning 
from OECD countries are also more productive than businesses run by nonmi-
grants or migrants returning from WAEMU or other countries. 
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One problem is the same for everyone: migrants and nonmigrants, formal 
sector employees, informal sector entrepreneurs and employees, and even the 
economically inactive all need to ensure that they have enough disposable 
income at retirement age to maintain a minimum level of well-being. Th is 
question probably has not yet occurred to Fatou and Moussa. Yet they can see 
around them that many people at retirement age have to keep working because 
they do not receive enough replacement income. If they foresee fi nding them-
selves in this situation when they are old, they might be encouraged to adopt 
certain precautionary behavior to cope with the situation as best they can when 
the time comes. For example, they may decide to have more children than 
they would have had if a public pension scheme had been available, in order to 
ensure that their children can look aft er them in their old age. Having people 
remain in the labor market into old age probably reduces the chances of young 
people fi nding work. Th e question of working at retirement age, addressed in 
chapter 13, is therefore an important one.
Pensions are available only to the minority of Africans who worked in private 
fi rms in the formal sector or the public sector. Moreover, most pensions are 
paltry, especially in the private sector. Pensions are not a source of wage replace-
ment but more like a minimum subsistence income. Despite the lack of pen-
sions, few seniors in Africa are dependent on their children. In fact, most still 
have young children to support, forcing them to struggle to make their meager 
incomes meet family outlays that burden them through a late age. Th ese elderly 
heads of household also oft en have to support older children who have not yet 
entered the labor market. Consequently, a relatively large number of men still 
work aft er retirement age. More than 60 percent of people 55–59 and 47 percent 
of people 60–64 still work. As they age, workers are increasingly confi ned to the 
informal sector. Th e debate on raising the retirement age is therefore high on 
the agenda in the South, as it is in the North. However, it is not put in the same 
terms. Whereas workers in the North are calling to keep the retirement age as 
low as possible, one of the major demands of unions in this Southern subregion 
is to raise the retirement age. 
Many diff erences can be observed across the cities studied, some of which 
warrant particular attention. Chapters 2 (job mismatch), 8 (inequality of oppor-
tunities), and 9 (discrimination) identify two groups of more or less homoge-
neous countries. Labor markets in the capitals of the coastal countries (Benin, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, and Togo) appear to have greater intergenerational social 
mobility, less segmentation, and less discrimination against women and ethnic 
groups than the capitals of the landlocked countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, and 
Niger). Among the seven WAEMU countries studied, the landlocked countries 
also have the lowest human development, wealth, and urbanization levels. With-
out seeking causality, one cannot help but be struck by the link observed between 
the extent of development and the functioning of the labor market. It may be 
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no coincidence that Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are, in that order, the three 
countries that produce the largest contingents of migrants in the subregion (see 
chapter 10). Th e landlocked countries are not behind the coastal countries in all 
aspects: Mali and Benin post the highest levels of satisfaction (with 50 percent 
satisfi ed workers), for example, way ahead of Côte d’Ivoire (37 percent).
Making Data Collection Work for Research
All of this book’s contributors are researchers at Développement, Institutions et 
Mondialisation (DIAL), a joint research unit of the Institut de Recherche pour le 
Développement (IRD) and the University of Paris Dauphine. (Brief biographies 
of the contributors appear at the beginning of the book).
Th is work is based on an original approach taken by DIAL since its establish-
ment (in 1990), which consists of combining statistical production, economic 
research, and public policy analysis (Cling and Roubaud 2006; Nordman and 
Roubaud 2010). Th e involvement of a research center in the production of offi  -
cial statistical data is unusual: economists have long worked “far from the fi eld,” 
using databases produced by others, especially public statistics. (Th e World 
Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study program represents a notable 
exception.) It is only recently, at the instigation of promoters of ex post pub-
lic policy impact evaluation methods (such as the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty 
Action Lab), that academic development economists have started collecting 
data, albeit generally in the form of ad hoc protocols rather than offi  cial sur-
veys. Academic involvement in data collection kills two birds with one stone. 
It helps fi ll the hole in statistics in developing countries, particularly in Africa, 
thereby broadening the scope of applied economics research while ensuring 
that the analyses produced are compatible with offi  cial fi gures. It also helps 
build bridges between the statistical and academic communities, which are 
nowhere as disconnected as in Africa. We hope that readers will see the merits 
of this approach, which warrants becoming widespread practice.
Target Audience
Th is book targets the whole development community interested in labor mar-
kets and, more broadly, Sub-Saharan African development, including research-
ers and students, policy makers, donors, and informed ordinary citizens, from 
the South or the North. Pursuing such a large and heterogeneous audience inev-
itably creates a trade-off . Th e book adopts the best econometric practices (for 
the research-oriented reader) but is accessible to all readers in order to provide 
food for thought and stimulate democratic debate. Readers interested in more 
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details can consult the full version of the book posted on the book’s website 
(http://www.dial.ird.fr/publications). 
Our approach is mainly quantitative, not because we consider it supe-
rior to any other approach but because it corresponds to our skills. Th ere-
fore, readers who are more prone to qualitative and narrative approaches are 
invited to put their own in-depth knowledge in the broad picture perspective, 
in which they are embedded in, and eventually confront, these two comple-
mentary lenses. 
Th is book does not provide press-a-button policy recommendations; pro-
viding such recommendations is neither our aim nor our area of expertise. 
Instead, it provides the evidence base on which sound policies should be 
grounded. 
Notes
 1. Many characteristics in English-speaking countries are probably quite diff erent, 
given the lasting imprint of institutions and economic and social structures inher-
ited from colonization (Cogneau 2007; Austin 2010). Sub-Saharan Africa is a mainly 
rural continent. Focusing only on urban areas, as this book does, ignores a funda-
mental component of African specifi city.
 2. Th e studies by Guha-Khasnobis and Kanbur (2006); Perry and others (2007); 
Ostrom, Kanbur, and Guha-Khasnobis (2007); Jütting and de Laiglesia (2009); and 
Bacchetta, Ernst, and Bustamante (2009), for example, contain as many defi nitions 
of informal employment as they do chapters.
 3. Th is study, based on the Network for Labor Market Analysis in Africa (RAMTA) 
network data, draws on a series of pilot employment surveys of households in seven 
African cities (Abidjan, Antananarivo, Bamako, Conakry, Dakar, Ouagadougou, and 
Yaoundé) between 1986–87 and 1992. RAMTA collected these data at the initiative 
of the International Labour Organization’s International Institute for Labor Studies. 
Th is process closely resembles the Programme d’Appui Régional à la Statistique (PAR-
STAT) project system, launched by the WAEMU Commission and funded by the 
European Commission, from which this book takes its data. Th e same labor force 
survey was conducted in several West African cities in a short space of time to allow 
for comparability.
 4. South Africa, with one of the highest unemployment rates in the world and a rela-
tively small informal sector in urban areas, is atypical of the rest of the continent.
 5. In most of the countries in which the two phases have been conducted, the Phase 1 
and Phase 2 estimates of informal sector size are not signifi cantly diff erent.
 6. Time-related underemployment is defi ned as working less than a certain norm (here 
35 hours a week) when the individual would prefer to work more. Invisible under-
employment refers to workers who earn less than a certain amount (here the mini-
mum wage) (see chapters 1 and 2).
 7. Not all of the cities examined are administrative capitals. Abidjan and Cotonou are 
referred to as capitals throughout this book because they are the most important 
economic centers in their countries (Cotonou is also the seat of government).
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Th is chapter presents an overview of the main characteristics of urban labor 
markets and the workers employed in them at the turn of the 21st century. 
Th e descriptive analysis of a dozen 1-2-3 surveys conducted in Africa over the 
last decade establishes several robust stylized facts about the particularities 
of these markets.1 Th e chapter examines a broad sweep of indicators, such as 
the level of education and the training-employment link; unemployment and 
underemployment; the distribution of jobs and job properties by institutional 
sector, especially the informal sector; job quality (earnings and social security 
 coverage); and multiple jobholding. Th ese indicators identify the major trends, 
which are then studied in detail in the subsequent chapters.
Th is chapter is structured as follows. Th e fi rst section describes the 
sociodemographic characteristics of the 11 cities studied. Th e second section 
examines labor force participation. Th e third section looks at unemployment. 
Th e fourth and fi  fth sections examine the structure of employment and labor 
force characteristics by institutional sector and earned income and working 
conditions. Th e last section takes up the question of employment prospects, 
with a focus on young people. Th e chapter devotes special attention to unem-
ployment (which other chapters do not specifi cally address), the informal 
sector, and earnings. Where possible, indicators are separated by gender. 
Sociodemographic Characteristics
Th e population in the main cities of the 10 countries studied totaled nearly 
20 million people in the fi rst half of the 2000s (table 1.1).2 About 9 million 
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Table 1.1 Population and Demographic Characteristics of 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Item
West Africa Central Africa Indian Ocean
Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
WAEMU 
countries Douala Kinshasa Yaoundé Antananarivo
Population 
(thousands) 3,046 1,143 809 1,906 784 675 856 9,219a 1,907 5,751 1,817 1,248
Percentage of 
population 17 11 12 22 16 6 7 13 11 10 10 8 
Percentage of urban 
population 39 37 31 53 43 32 37 39 22 35 21 30 
Structure by age
0 –14 (percent) 34.0 44.0 36.5 34.6 35.0 43.0 37.6 36.7 33.2 39.9 36.8 40.5
15–59 (percent) 64.2 52.5 60.0 60.8 62.0 54.0 58.7 60.2 63.8 56.0 61.1 55.7
60 and over (percent) 1.8 3.5 3.5 4.6 3.0 3.0 3.7 3.1 3.0 4.1 2.1 3.8
Average age (years) 22.4 21.1 22.8 23.9 23.0 21.2 22.5 22.5 23.5 23.0 21.3 24.2
Median age (years) 21 17 20 20 21 17 19 20 22 19 20 20
Women (percent) 50.6 50.0 52.0 51.5 51.6 50.7 49.5 50.8 49.1 51.3 49.7 50.3
Migrants (percent) 51.0 36.0 38.0 27.6 48.2 36.5 43.0 41.3 53.6 22.3 51.9 19.9
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the following 1-2-3 surveys: Cameroon 2005 (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation [DIAL] and National Statistics Institute [NSI]); Democratic 
Republic of Congo 2005 (DIAL and NSI); Madagascar 2001 (DIAL and Institut National de la Statistique [INSTAT]); West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 2001/02 
(Observatoire économique et statistique d’Afrique Subsaharienne [AFRISTAT], DIAL, and NSIs).
Note: Figures for the percentage of the population and the percentage of the urban population should be viewed with caution, as they are based on census figures that can be as 
much as 10 years old.
a. Total population.
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people live in the seven cities in the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU); 1.3 million live in Antananarivo, Madagascar, the only rep-
resentative of the Indian Ocean region. Th e cities range in size from Niamey 
(675,000 inhabitants) to Kinshasa (5.8 million inhabitants). 
Th e cities in West Africa represent a small percentage of their countries’ popula-
tions (6–7 percent in Niamey and Ouagadougou, 22 percent in Dakar), refl ecting 
the low rates of urbanization in Sahelian Africa. Together the cities studied represent 
almost 40 percent of the urban population of West Africa. Th e underdevelopment 
of secondary cities is particularly severe in Senegal, where 53 percent of the popu-
lation lives in Dakar. Cameroon has two similar-sized main cities (Yaoundé and 
Douala), which together account for more than 40 percent of the urban population 
of Cameroon. Focusing on capital cities makes sense in Africa not only because 
secondary cities are relatively underdeveloped but also because the characteristics 
and functioning of labor markets are more homogeneous than and diff er greatly 
from those of other urban areas.
Th e age distribution of the population displays the classic characteristics of 
cities in developing countries, with a massive predominance of young people. 
Across the 11 cities, the average age is 22.5. Th e inhabitants of Bamako and 
Niamey are the youngest (average age 21, median age 17). Gender diff erences 
in the age distribution are small. Women account for slightly more than half of 
the population in the 11 cities.
Th e proportion of migrants (people who have not always lived in the city) is 
substantial in all 11 cities (see chapters 10 and 11). Th e lowest proportions are 
in Antananarivo (20 percent), Kinshasa (22 percent), and Dakar (28 percent). 
Th e highest proportions are in Douala (54 percent), Yaoundé (52 percent), and 
 Abidjan (51 percent). Migration is essentially a domestic phenomenon in all of 
the cities studied: even within WAEMU, the region that is most open to interna-
tional migration, for example, just 21 percent of migrants are domestic.  Migration 
from abroad accounts for less than 4 percent of migrants in Antananarivo, Kin-
shasa, and the Cameroonian cities and about 10 percent in Dakar. Th e share of 
foreign migrants is higher in Lomé (28 percent) and Abidjan (25 percent).
Half of migrants—including two-thirds of women migrants—would like to 
join their families. Th irty percent of all migrants cite the desire to fi nd a job as 
their main reason for migrating (the fi gure is even higher among men). Twelve 
percent cite study as the reason for migrating. 
Household Composition
Th e average household size in the cities sampled is 5.1 people, but national 
averages cover a wide range, from Lomé (3.9 people) to Dakar (7.4 people). 
More than a quarter of households in Dakar contain 10 or more people. Th is 
proportion is less than 5 percent in Lomé and Cotonou. Dakar aside, household 
size can be used to defi ne two groups of cities: the Sahelian cities (Bamako, 
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Niamey, and Ouagadougou), with an average household size of 5.6–6.0 people, 
and the West African coastal cities (Abidjan, Cotonou, and Lomé) and the cities 
of Central Africa and Madagascar, with an average household size of 4.6 people. 
About one in fi ve heads of household is a woman. In the Sahelian countries, 
the proportion of female household heads is less than 16 percent (less than 
10 percent in Bamako). In contrast, in Cotonou, Dakar, and Lomé, the share 
reaches 25–30 percent. 
Education
In West Africa, 30 percent of people 10 and older never attended primary school. 
Th is fi gure is less than 5 percent in Central Africa and the Indian Ocean, two 
regions that have long promoted schooling (table 1.2). Th e percentage of people 
who never attended school is extremely high in Bamako (41 percent), Niamey 
(36 percent), and Ouagadougou (34 percent). In contrast, just 16 percent of the 
population in Lomé and 20 percent in Cotonou never attended school. Abidjan 
(29 percent) and Dakar (31 percent) are in an intermediate position. In Central 
Africa and Madagascar, there is a tendency to either educate children beyond 
primary level or to concentrate on the quality of the education provided.
Few changes in the hierarchy between the coastal and Sahelian cities are 
evident when the focus switches from stock (all cohorts) to fl ow (people still in 
school). However, some changes are worth mentioning. Ouagadougou, with a 
net primary enrollment rate of 79.7 percent, catches up to Cotonou (81.2 per-
cent) and Lomé (83.2 percent). Ouagadougou’s net lower secondary school 
enrollment rate is second aft er Cotonou’s. In contrast, Abidjan and Dakar leave 
from one-quarter to one-third of their 6- to 11-year-olds out of the system. 
With a net primary enrollment rate of 65.9 percent, Dakar performs hardly 
better than Bamako (70.7 percent). Bamako performs worst across most educa-
tion indicators, in both stock and fl ow. In Central Africa and Madagascar, Kin-
shasa has the highest and longest rates of school attendance. Given the failed 
nature of the state and years of economic and political crises in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, this fi nding is an indicator of the importance the Congolese 
attach to education.
In all 11 cities, the rate of school attendance has grown steadily over the gen-
erations. Some cities, such as Ouagadougou and especially Niamey, have expe-
rienced spectacular growth. In Niamey, for example, 88 percent of adults 60 and 
older but just 16 percent of children 10–14 never attended school (fi gure 1.1). In 
Ouagadougou, these ratios are 84 percent and 12 percent. Both cities have virtu-
ally caught up to cities like Cotonou and Lomé. In the cities where high school 
enrollment is long established, growth in the rate of school  attendance is, of 
course, less spectacular. In Antananarivo, for example, the younger generation 
has no greater probability of attending school than its elders, with just 6 percent 
of each cohort never attending school.
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Table 1.2 Education of Population in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(percent)
West Africa Central Africa Indian Ocean
Characteristic Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
WAEMU 
countries Douala Kinshasa Yaoundé Antananarivo
No education 
(≥10 years old) 28.5 40.8 20.2 31.4 16.1 36.3 33.7 29.7 4.2 4.5 2.7 4.2
Net primary enrollment 
rate 73.2 70.7 81.2 65.9 83.2 70.5 79.7 73.3 92.6 81.2 90.7 92.3
Net lower secondary 
enrollment rate 23.0 28.2 33.8 19.9 27.5 28.7 29.4 25.4 63.0 53.9 61.5 39.3
Spoken and written 
French (≥10 years old) 66.4 49.6 70.9 58.4 72.9 57.4 60.4 62.6 89.2 69.6 91.8 33.0
Postprimary education 
(≥15 years old) 46.2 38.4 49.2 31.2 47.6 37.2 37.2 41.1 72.6 95.2 75.5 66.3
Higher education 
(≥20 years old) 13.8 7.1 12.1 7.0 6.8 9.1 6.8 9.9 13.2 16.3 18.6 13.7
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details).
Note: Age brackets for calculation of net school enrollment rates are as follows: Abidjan, Antananarivo, Cotonou, Douala, Lomé, Yaoundé: 6–10 (primary), 11–14 (secondary); 
Bamako, Dakar, Kinshasa, Niamey, Ouagadougou: 7–11 (primary), 12–15 (secondary).
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Across the board, growth in school enrollment has gone hand in hand with a 
narrowing in the gender gap. Dakar posts the best performance. Among adults 
60 and older, men are four times as likely to have attended school; this diff er-
ence narrows to 7 percentage points among children 10–14. At the other end of 
the scale, girls are still highly disadvantaged compared with boys in Cotonou 
and especially Abidjan. Th ere is room for improvement everywhere: in none of 
the countries studied are girls’ enrollment rates equal to boys’.
School enrollment rates have risen markedly in the countries studied: despite 
the severe public fi nance crisis, increasingly large numbers of children are receiv-
ing an education. Th is quantitative performance has probably been secured at the 
cost of a marked deterioration in the quality of the education provided, however. 
Labor Force Participation 
Th ere are more than 14 million people of working age (10 and older) across the cit-
ies studied: 6.9 million in West Africa, 6.2 million in Central Africa, and 947,000 in 
Madagascar. On average, nearly 60 percent of them are in the labor force (employed 
or unemployed). Among people 15 and older, the labor force participation rate is 
70 percent. In Abidjan and Lomé, about 70 percent of the population 10 and older 
is in the workforce. In Niamey, Dakar, Bamako, and especially Kinshasa, labor force 
participation is lower and averages about 50 percent of the population 10 and older.
Female Employment in the Labor Market
Labor force participation is almost 15 percentage points higher for men than for 
women (table 1.3). Th e largest gaps observed are in Niamey (28 points); Dakar 
Figure 1.1 Intergenerational Changes in School Enrollment in 11 Cities in 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details). 
Note: WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union.
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Table 1.3 Labor Force Participation Rates in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Gender 
(percent) 
Gender
West Africa Central Africa Indian Ocean
Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
WAEMU 
countries Douala Kinshasa Yaoundé Antananarivo
Men 70.1 59.3 58.8 62.1 68.9 63.5 66.3 65.3 69.7 50.2 63.2 64.0
Women 60.3 45.6 60.9 41.1 66.9 35.2 49.6 52.5 52.4 35.8 47.7 55.5
WAEMU 
countries 65.1 52.4 59.9 51.1 67.9 48.8 58.0 58.7 61.2 42.8 55.5 59.7
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details). 
Note: Population 10 and older. 
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(21 points); Ouagadougou and Douala (17 points); Yaoundé (16 points); and 
Bamako and Kinshasa (14 points). In Abidjan (10 points) and Lomé (2 points) 
the gaps are much smaller. In Cotonou, women’s participation rates (61 percent) 
are higher than men’s (59 percent).
Variations in labor force participation rates across cities are much more 
pronounced for women than for men. Less than 20 percentage points separate 
the highest rate for male workers (70 percent, in Abidjan) from the lowest rate 
(50 percent, in Kinshasa). In contrast, the diff erences in female participation 
rates range from 35 percent (in Kinshasa and Niamey) to 67 percent (in Lomé).
Th e larger diff erences for women refl ect the social role played by women, 
who divide their time between domestic activities (including childbearing 
and rearing) and economic activity in the market. On average, women spend 
17 hours (and men 4 hours) a week on domestic activities. Th e situation is even 
more unequal in West Africa, where men spend just 2 hours a week on domestic 
activities and women 17. Th e least inequitable distribution of domestic chores 
is in Antananarivo, where men spend 8 hours and women 17. Working women 
spend more time on domestic activities than women who do not work (18 ver-
sus 16 hours), clearly demonstrating the “double day” phenomenon among 
working women (see chapter 7).
Youth Employment on the Labor Market
Observed labor force participation rates are consistent with the stages of the 
life cycle. Participation rates rise sharply as people leave the education system 
and enter the world of work. Th e peak comes at 30–49, when male participation 
rates top 85 percent across all cities except Kinshasa. Labor force participation 
rates start to slide aft er 50, plummeting aft er 60.
People 20 and under account for 35 percent of the working-age population 
(10 and older) in the cities surveyed. Th irty-fi ve percent of these people are 
active (either working or seeking employment), although the situation varies 
widely across cities. In Bamako and Niamey, which have the largest percent-
ages of young people, one-quarter of young people work. Th is proportion is 35 
percent in Abidjan and 37 percent in Lomé. 
Participation rates are higher for girls than for boys, especially in Abidjan 
and Cotonou, and more girls than boys are in the labor market. In Cotonou, 
Abidjan, and Lomé, 35–43 percent of young women work—13–15 percentage 
points more than their male counterparts. Th e youth participation rate is lower 
(less than 25 percent) elsewhere. In Kinshasa, it is just 7 percent, because of the 
dual eff ect of higher school enrollment rates and higher inactivity rates (exclud-
ing school). Th e diff erences between girls and boys are narrower in Kinshasa 
than elsewhere.
Children in Africa enter the labor market at a very young age. In West 
Africa, 13 percent of children 10–14 work (table 1.4). Th e problem is more 
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Table 1.4 Labor Force Participation Rates in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Age
(percent)
West Africa Central Africa Indian Ocean
Age Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
WAEMU 
countries Douala Kinshasa Yaoundé Antananarivo
10–14 16.3 11.2 14.1 9.3 17.2 13.2 9.1 13.0 10.2 1.7 4.5 6.1
15–29 63.0 50.3 56.6 52.1 68.3 42.8 60.6 57.9 57.2 29.3 50.3 58.9
30–49 90.7 81.8 91.1 74.7 93.0 73.6 84.9 85.1 87.1 73.5 88.0 87.7
50+ 64.2 53.5 62.6 48.9 60.6 64.1 57.3 57.6 61.8 63.8 62.4 60.3
WAEMU 
countries 65.1 52.4 59.9 51.1 67.9 48.8 58.0 58.7 61.2 42.8 55.5 59.7
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details). 
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severe among girls than boys, with 16 percent of girls and 10 percent of boys 
participating in the labor force (see chapter 12). Th e phenomenon is less severe 
in Central Africa and Madagascar, where more children are in school. Nev-
ertheless, in Douala 1 in 10 children 10–14 works, most of them combining 
school and work.
Status within the household also aff ects labor force participation rates. Th e 
highest rates are among heads of household (86 percent for all 11 cities), followed 
by their spouses (62 percent) and household members other than spouses and 
children (51 percent). In last place come children, with the lowest labor force par-
ticipation rates (31 percent). Household survival relies fi rst and foremost on the 
head of household. Where necessary, the strategy is then to mobilize the spouse 
and other household members. Children are sent to work as a last resort.
Labor force participation rates also vary a great deal by migrant status, with 
66 percent of migrants (and 43 percent of natives) participating. Th ese diff er-
ences refl ect the fact that the prospect of working draws migrants to cities.
Th e Inactive Population 
In West Africa, 41 percent of the potential working population do not have 
and are not looking for a job. In Bamako, Dakar, and Niamey, about half of 
the population 10 and older is out of the labor force (table 1.4). Th e two main 
inactive groups, school children and students, represent between two-thirds 
and three-quarters of the inactive population in Cameroon and Madagascar 
(table 1.5). Housewives are the second most important group of inactive people 
(20 percent in West Africa and about 15 percent elsewhere). Th e proportion of 
retirees is small, averaging less than 4 percent, refl ecting both a wide-based age 
pyramid and the need to work aft er 60 because of the insuffi  ciency of pensions 
(see chapter 13). 
Th e share and composition of inactive individuals varies across cities. Th ere are 
proportionally more pupils and students outside West Africa and more inside West 
Africa in Cotonou and Lomé, and more housewives in Niamey, Dakar, and Bamako. 
Almost all (91 percent) of inactive individuals are looked aft er by their fam-
ilies. Only about 5 percent rely on pension income (work, disability, and so 
forth). Th is fi nding highlights the underdevelopment of institutional transfers, 
the major role played by solidarity and informal transfers (within and between 
households), and the massive predominance of earned income in households’ 
total income.
Nearly 70 percent of all inactive individuals chose this status of their own 
accord, either because they consider themselves too young to work or because 
they do not need to work to live. However, for 1.85 million inactive individuals 
(about 30 percent of the inactive population), the absence of work represents 
a form of hidden unemployment: they have withdrawn from the labor market, 
either because they believe that the economic situation is too weak or their skills 
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too low to fi nd a job or because they are waiting to hear about a job for which 
they have applied. On average, people out of the labor force (“discouraged work-
ers”) and the unemployed have two more years of education than people who 
are truly inactive.
Th e magnitude of unused labor supply is large in Africa. Th ese people join 
or withdraw from the labor market depending on the incentives they face 
(increases in the demand for labor, the real wage, and so forth). Th e number of 
jobs that need to be created to mop up unemployment is therefore much higher 
than the number of unemployed.
Unemployment
Based on the ILO defi nition of unemployment, there are an estimated 963,000 
job-seekers in the 11 cities, which corresponds to an average unemployment rate 
of 12 percent (table 1.6). Th e rate is slightly higher in Central Africa and much 
lower in Madagascar, which enjoyed extremely strong growth in 2001, following 
a trend that began in the mid-1990s. Th e highest unemployment rates are in Oua-
gadougou (15.4 percent), Kinshasa (14.9 percent), and Yaoundé (14.7 percent). 
Th e lowest rates are in Antananarivo (4.4 percent) and Cotonou (5.5 percent).
Table 1.5 Reasons for Inactivity in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa 
City
Reason for inactivity (percentage of total)
Number 
of inactive 
individuals
In the education 
system Housewife Retiree
Long 
illness Other
West Africa
Abidjan 58.4 14.1 3.6 4.7 19.2 812,000
Bamako 56.4 21.1 3.2 6.9 12.4 361,000
Cotonou 70.1 9.6 5.5 5.1 9.7 246,000
Dakar 42.8 28.2 4.5 7.1 17.4 712,000
Lomé 65.3 9.0 4.3 7.7 13.7 192,000
Niamey 46.1 36.3 1.8 6.3 9.5 238,000
Ouagadougou 58.1 18.1 3.0 6.9 13.9 267,000
WAEMU 
countries 54.7 20.0 3.8 6.1 15.4 2,828,000
Central Africa
Douala 65.5 13.5 3.4 7.0 10.6 515,700
Kinshasa 57.3 15.0 1.8 5.4 20.5 2,300,000
Yaoundé 74.2 14.1 2.2 5.6 3.9 584,700
Madagascar
Antananarivo 67.9 17.3 6.0 4.4 4.4 381,500
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details).
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Th e ILO defi nition of unemployment is extremely restrictive. It considers as 
unemployed only individuals who did not work a job during the reference week, 
even for an hour; were actively looking for a job; and were available to work it. 
Expanding this defi nition to include inactive individuals who may not have 
looked for a job during the reference month but who are still available to work 
a job if off ered one changes the picture in two important ways. First, the unem-
ployment rates increase from 11 percent to 16 percent in West Africa, from 14 
percent to 17 percent in Cameroon, and from 15 percent to 24 percent in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, where nearly one in four workers is unem-
ployed under the broader-based defi nition (data were not available for Anta-
nanarivo) (table 1.7). Second, gender gaps widen, as hidden unemployment 
aff ects women more than men. Th e broader unemployment concept includes 
population groups on the fringes of economic activity—young people, women, 
and seniors—who have weaker connections to the labor market 
Th e rest of the analysis covers only ILO-defi ned job-seekers who correspond 
to the international defi nition of unemployment.
For the sample as a whole, nearly as many men (11 percent) as women 
(12 percent) are unemployed. Th is average conceals some particularities: a 
Table 1.6 ILO-Defined Unemployment Rates in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
by Gender and Age
City
Gender Age All
Men Women 10–29 30–49 50+ Percentage Number
West Africa
Abidjan 13.1 14.0 17.4 10.0 7.3 13.5 205,400
Bamako 7.1 7.0 10.7 4.6 2.9 7.1 28,000
Cotonou 6.3 4.9 7.3 4.2 3.7 5.5 20,400
Dakar 9.9 14.1 14.4 10.0 6.7 11.7 87,000
Lomé 10.9 5.7 10.4 5.8 7.7 8.2 33,300
Niamey 12.1 15.0 18.7 8.7 11.1 13.1 29,900
Ouagadougou 14.6 16.4 22.4 9.2 5.9 15.4 56,500
WAEMU countries 11.2 11.7 15.2 8.3 6.5 11.4 460,500
Central Africa
Douala 10.6 15.1 17.8 7.8 9.0 12.5 108,900
Kinshasa 17.3 11.8 26.3 11.2 8.5 14.9 259,100
Yaoundé 11.4 19.2 21.1 9.6 5.0 14.7 108,700
Indian Ocean 
Antananarivo 5.0 3.9 7.9 2.5 1.1 4.4 25,300
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details). 
Note: See text for ILO definition of unemployment.
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higher proportion of women than men are unemployed in Dakar, whereas 
unemployment rates in Cotonou and Lomé are higher for men than women.
Across the board, the rate of unemployment falls with age. Young people 
in Ouagadougou are the hardest hit, with an unemployment rate of 22.4 per-
cent among people 10–29. On the whole, young labor force participants fi nd it 
extremely hard to enter the world of work. 
Among older participants, Dakar and Abidjan stand out, with an unemploy-
ment rate of 10 percent for the intermediate age bracket (30–49). Th e oldest age 
bracket (50+) posts an unemployment rate of more than 11 percent in Niamey. 
Th e unemployment rate also varies by level of education and type of training 
(table 1.8). Paradoxically, the unemployment rate rises with the level of educa-
tion across all the West African cities. It is lowest among workers who never 
attended school, presumably because these workers are the least demanding 
regarding the jobs they will accept. In four West African cities, Central Africa, 
and Madagascar, the unemployment rates are bell shaped, falling only aft er sec-
ondary education. Even in these cities, however, unemployment rates among 
people who attended university are high, indicating that a degree is no guaran-
tee of protection against unemployment (see chapter 5).
Heads of household (the households’ main breadwinners) are the least 
aff ected by unemployment, with an average rate of 7 percent. “Secondary” 
Table 1.7 Broader-Based Unemployment Rates in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
by Gender and Age
City
Gender Age All
Men Women 10–29 30–49 50+ Percentage Number
West Africa
Abidjan 14.2 17.6 20.6 11.2 8.6 15.8 245,000
Bamako 9.2 16.5 17.8 8.5 7.2 12.5 53,000
Cotonou 7.1 6.5 8.6 5.1 5.8 6.8 25,000
Dakar 12.8 26.2 23.0 16.0 10.9 18.9 153,000
Lomé 12.6 9.8 13.9 8.1 10.5 11.2 47,000
Niamey 17.3 32.0 33.4 14.9 16.5 23.3 60,000
Ouagadougou 17.4 28.3 31.0 14.5 8.7 22.4 90,000
WAEMU 
countries 13.2 18.8 20.9 11.4 9.5 15.9 673,000
Central Africa
Douala 12.0 21.2 21.4 10.8 13.4 16.0 138,000
Kinshasa 24.2 23.2 38.9 18.2 14.5 23.8 461,000
Yaoundé 12.4 24.8 24.8 12.4 6.2 17.9 131,000
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details). 
Note: Data on Antananarivo were not available.
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members suff er the most from low labor demand, with unemployment averag-
ing 17 percent for “other household members” and 21 percent for children of 
the head of household.
In all countries, unemployment is higher among natives (15 percent) than 
migrants (11 percent). Th is fi nding refl ects not higher wage expectations but 
rather the fact that natives are more concentrated in the high unemployment 
risk categories (younger, more educated, and so forth). 
Who Are the Unemployed?
Fift y-fi ve percent of the unemployed are men (table 1.9). Men are the majority 
in all cities except Dakar, where women represent half of the unemployed, and 
the two Cameroonian cities (women represent 51 percent of the unemployed 
in Douala and 56 percent in Yaoundé). Th e average age of the unemployed is 
30, but nearly one in four job-seekers (one in two in Ouagadougou) is 15–24. 
Th e average level of education of the unemployed is eight years of completed 
studies.
Table 1.8 ILO-Defined Unemployment Rates in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Level of 
Education 
(percent)
City All Uneducated Primary
Lower- 
secondary
Upper- 
secondary
Secondary 
technical 
education
Higher 
education
West Africa
Abidjan 13.5 8.7 11.4 18.1 19.2 23.3 20.7
Bamako 7.1 5.2 6.9 8.4 10.2 14.0 8.3
Cotonou 5.5 2.4 4.4 6.8 8.9 9.5 12.9
Dakar 11.7 8.9 12.3 15.2 14.6 0.4 12.7
Lomé 8.2 3.5 6.8 9.3 13.4 17.0 19.4
Niamey 13.1 9.1 15.0 21.5 14.1 15.0 8.5
Ouagadougou 15.4 9.5 16.0 23.9 22.7 25.8 14.3
WAEMU 
countries 11.4 7.6 10.5 15.3 16.1 18.0 16.6
Central Africa
Douala 12.5 1.5 20.6 25.8 15.7 23.6 12.8
Kinshasa 14.9 7.8 11.8 16.5a 16.5 a 16.5 a 15.6
Yaoundé 14.7 2.0 18.3 31.0 23.4 12.3 13.0
Indian Ocean
Antananarivo 4.5 1.4 4.3 5.1 3.6 5.6 4.7
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details). 
Note: See text for ILO definition of unemployment.
a. Inaccuracies in the Kinshasa survey prevent the disaggregation of the unemployment rate at the secondary level.
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Table 1.9 Job-Seeker Characteristics in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa
(percentage of total, except where otherwise indicated)
West Africa Central Africa Indian Ocean
Characteristic Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
WAEMU 
countries Douala Kinshasa Yaoundé Antananarivo
Men 51.3 56.2 53.3 49.2 64.2 57.7 54.8 53.1 49.3 65.8 44.3 58.7
Women 48.7 43.8 46.7 50.8 35.8 42.4 45.2 46.9 50.7 34.2 55.7 41.3
Average age (years) 28.3 28.7 30.3 29.9 29.6 30.0 26.7 28.7 29.7 33.0 27.9 26.6
Average education (years 
of completed schooling) 6.9 5.7 8.0 5.6 8.3 5.4 5.9 6.5 9.4 10.2 9.3 7.8
First-time job-seekers 54.0 57.8 40.0 53.8 50.8 61.1 63.2 54.9 39.0 60.9 45.6 42.7
Previously employed 46.0 42.2 60.0 46.2 49.2 38.9 36.8 45.1 61.0 39.1 54.4 58.3
Months of unemployment 36.9 33.3 32.3 46.9 32.1 59.5 48.6 40.7 36.7 66.7 33.0 16.0
Long-term unemployed 69.5 62.1 55.1 64.5 53.9 84.2 70.1 67.4 64.2 62.0 56.4 50.4
Number (thousands) 205.4 28.0 20.4 87. 0 33.3 29.9 56. 5 460.5a 109.7 259. 1 108.7 25.3
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details). 
Note: The long-term unemployed are people who have been looking for a job for more than one year.
a. Total population.
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Th e unemployed are a heterogeneous population that includes two types of 
job-seekers: fi rst-time job-seekers and previously employed workers. Fift y-three 
percent of the unemployed are fi rst-time job-seekers, suggesting that the formal 
sector has adjusted to economic conditions mainly by freezing recruitment and 
only secondarily by cutting jobs.
Fift y-seven percent of unemployed women are fi rst-time job-seekers. First-
time job-seekers represent the majority of unemployed women in all cities; their 
share is particularly large in Ouagadougou, Niamey, and Kinshasa, where more 
than 70 percent of unemployed women are fi rst-time job-seekers. First-time 
job-seekers have more years of education (8.7) than the previously employed 
(7.6 years), with an even wider gap in West Africa. Th ey also have more years of 
education than employed women (6.9 years).
Unemployment among the previously employed refl ects the weak economic 
situation in Sub-Saharan Africa: redundancies, contracts coming to an end, 
business closures, and staff  cuts accounted for 57 percent of job losses. Nearly 
three in 10 job-seekers were made redundant or came to the end of their con-
tract. One-third of job-seekers in Lomé were made redundant and one-quarter 
in Ouagadougou lost their job at the end of their contract. Abidjan suff ered the 
most from the economic downturn (because of the political crisis), with more 
than 36 percent of job losses caused by closures and staff  cuts.
Th e unemployment rate for the previously employed is higher among former 
public enterprise employees, where it aff ects more than 11 percent of workers 
(15 percent in Douala and 17 percent in Dakar). Privatization and restructur-
ing have hit redundant employees hard, and a large number of them have not 
found new jobs. 
Across institutional sectors and cities, unemployment hits the bottom of 
the wage ladder hardest. Whereas less than 6 percent of senior managers are 
unemployed, 13 percent of unskilled manual and nonmanual employees and 
12 percent of laborers are unemployed.
Characteristics and Length of Unemployment
Unemployment averages nearly three and a half years (41 months) in West 
Africa, 35 months in Cameroon, and more than fi ve years (66 months) in 
 Kinshasa (these fi gures indicate the period during which the unemployed did 
not work a “real” job rather than the period during which they did not work at 
all). Nearly two-thirds of job-seekers have been unemployed for more than a 
year. On the whole, long-term unemployment hits fi rst-time job-seekers harder 
than it hits the previously employed. Th e long average length of unemployment 
indicates how very hard it is for the unemployed to enter or reenter the labor 
market.
Two groups of cities can be distinguished. In the fi rst group, made up of 
Cotonou, Lomé, Bamako, and especially Antananarivo, the labor market 
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appears to be more fl exible than elsewhere. Th e unemployment rate is below 
10 percent, and the length of unemployment is shorter than in other cities. Th e 
second group, made up of the cities in Central Africa, Dakar, Ouagadougou, 
and especially Niamey, unemployment rates are higher, and average unemploy-
ment lasts four to six years.
Job-Seeking Methods
Th e preferred job-seeking method among the unemployed is to draw on family 
solidarity networks. Two-thirds of the unemployed deploy this strategy. One 
in fi ve job-seekers (55 percent in Antananarivo) directly prospects employ-
ers. About 4 percent of job-seekers (8 percent in Cotonou and Bamako and 
13 percent in Antananarivo) respond to advertisements for jobs.
Only 7 percent of job-seekers are registered with an employment agency, and 
just 2 percent have actively tried to fi nd a job through that agency. Registra-
tion rates are low because the majority of job-seekers (56 percent) are unaware 
that employment agencies exist. Another 28 percent are pessimistic about the 
agency’s capacity to help them. 
Th ese fi ndings suggest that the authorities need to do a better job of help-
ing job-seekers, especially by providing them with information. Employment 
agencies should make it easier for job-seekers to look for jobs by matching job 
vacancies that come in from businesses with the profi les of potential appli-
cants. Placement agencies may need to be restructured if they are to perform 
eff ectively.
Type of Job Sought
Th e majority (59 percent) of job-seekers are looking for a wage-earning job, 
especially in Central Africa and Madagascar (where this percentage stands at 
75 percent). Nearly one-quarter (22 percent) would prefer to be self-employed 
(8 percent in Antananarivo), and one-fi ft h have no preference regarding the 
type of employment found. A large majority (70 percent) would like to fi nd 
permanent, full-time employment with an average working week of 44 hours. 
Job-seekers are thus not a pool of manpower on the fringe of economic activity.
Th e reasons for preferring one type of employment over another are simi-
lar across cities. As might be expected, the majority of people seeking wage 
employment (58 percent) do so for the security it is supposed to provide in 
terms of employment and wages. Twenty-fi ve percent of job-seekers are pre-
pared to work in any kind of business, and 48 percent will accept any sector or 
occupation. Only 10 percent are drawn to public administration, which is not 
the end-all of a trepid workforce, to use an image that is all-too-oft en evoked. 
Unemployment therefore is not solely the upshot of dissatisfi ed manpower with 
ambitions that are incompatible with market conditions. At least in part, it also 
refl ects the absence of job opportunities.
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Earnings Expectations
One possible reason why people are unemployed is that their earnings expec-
tations are unrealistic. Job-seekers in the seven West African cities expect to 
earn €162 for a 44-hour working week—about twice the average earnings of an 
employed worker (table 1.10). Only in Ouagadougou and Niamey are expecta-
tions closer to reality. Outside West Africa, job-seekers expect to earn €162 a 
month in Douala (where employed workers earn an average €99 a month), €138 
in Yaoundé (where employed workers earn €111), and €67 in Antananarivo 
(where employed workers earn €58).
However, 75 percent of job-seekers are prepared to revise their earnings 
demands downward if they remain unemployed too long. Th e reservation 
earnings—that is, the minimum earnings a job-seeker would accept—is 
 estimated at an average of €118 across the WAEMU region, about €100 in 
Cameroon, and €48 in Madagascar. Th ese earnings are higher than average 
earnings in all cities except Antananarivo.
Table 1.10 Earnings Expectations and Reservation Earnings in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa
City
Monthly 
earnings 
expectations
(euros)
Percentage 
prepared to 
revise earnings 
expectations if 
unemployment 
lasts too long
Monthly 
reservation 
earnings
(euros)
Reservation 
earnings gap
(euros)
Ideal working 
week
(hours/week)
West Africa
Abidjan 206 79.4 151 71.6*** 44.5
Bamako 119 68.3 107 85.9*** 41.4
Cotonou 115 81.9 90 61.6*** 44.7
Dakar 174 78.6 126 85.9*** 43.4
Lomé 105 82 71 87.8*** 44.6
Niamey 86 77.4 67 80.4*** 43.2
Ouagadougou 89 82.3 60 127.0*** 45.8
WAEMU 
countries 162 79.1 118 n.a. 44.1
Central Africa
Douala 162 86.6  109 53.7*** 42.9
Kinshasaa 45 57.8 31 89.6*** 41.9
Yaoundé 138 87.7  88 37.7*** 45.6
Indian Ocean
Antananarivo  67 86.3  48 2.1ns 43.9
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details). 
Note: The reservation earnings gap corresponds to the percentage of additional earnings targeted by the unem-
ployed (reservation earnings) compared with employed workers. It is calculated from a standard ordinary least 
squares Mincerian hourly gains equation based on gender, migrant status, status in the household, number of 
years of education and number of years of education squared, and potential experience. n.a. = not applicable.
a. More than half of the unemployed in Kinshasa did not answer the question.
*** significant at the 1 percent level; ns = not significant. 
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Th e explanation for disparities in job-seekers’ reservation earnings needs 
to be developed using such parameters as work experience, skill level, gender, 
age, and type of employment sought. For example, for identical characteristics 
(gender, education, potential experience, and migrant status), the minimum 
wage for which job-seekers would be willing to work is more than 70 percent 
higher than the earnings of employed workers in their main job in the West 
African cities and about 40–50 percent higher than in Cameroon. Th is fi nding 
suggests that aspirations are out of line with actual labor market conditions. In 
Antananarivo, reservation earnings are not signifi cantly diff erent from actual 
earnings, which probably has something to do with the low unemployment rate. 
(Results are not reliable for Kinshasa, where more than half of the unemployed 
did not answer the question about earnings expectations.) 
Job Structure and Dynamics 
Forty-four percent of the 7 million people employed in the 11 cities studied were 
women (table 1.11). Women are very much in the minority in Niamey (36 per-
cent of jobholders); in Cotonou and Lomé, they form the majority. Except in 
Dakar, Kinshasa, and Antananarivo, migrants form the majority of the employed 
labor force. Average job seniority is seven years. It is higher in Niamey, Bamako, 
Dakar, and Kinshasa, partly because of a slightly higher average age in these cities. 
For the sample as a whole, the rate of wage employment (wage workers as 
a percentage of all workers), an indicator of the extent of the formalization of 
labor relations, is 39 percent (35 percent in West Africa). Th e highest rates of 
wage employment are in Antananarivo and Cameroon (slightly more than half 
of all workers) and in Abidjan (41 percent) and Dakar (38 percent), the two 
most prosperous cities in West Africa.
Multiple jobholding is oft en considered to be a household and individual 
strategy for increasing income and off setting declines in income during reces-
sions. Th e rate of multiple jobholding is 8 percent for the sample as a whole. 
In West Africa, the lowest rate of multiple jobholding (less than 5 percent) is 
in the two largest cities (Dakar and Abidjan). In contrast, 9 percent of work-
ers in Cotonou hold a second job. Th e highest rate of multiple jobholding is in 
Antananarivo (14 percent). Th ese fi gures belie the notion that multiple jobhold-
ing is the norm in Africa.
Nearly half of all workers (49 percent) head up their own production unit, 
either as an employer with Wage-earners or as an own-account worker. Th e 
cities in West Africa can be classed into three groups. In Bamako, Lomé, and 
Cotonou, about 60 percent of workers are self-employed; in Ouagadougou and 
Niamey, just under 50 percent are self-employed; in Abidjan and Dakar, 45 per-
cent of workers are self-employed. Th e situation is more disparate in Central 
Africa and Madagascar, where the proportion is 36 percent in Antananarivo, 
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Table 1.11 Worker Characteristics in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa
West Africa Central Africa Indian Ocean
Characteristic Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
WAEMU 
countries Douala Kinshasa Yaoundé Antananarivo
Number of jobs (thousands) 1,312 369 348 658 371 197 311 3,566a 760 1,477 630 540
Men (percent) 53.3 55.9 46.6 59.2 47.1 63.6 58.1 54.4 59.3 55.1 59.5 59.3
Women (percent) 46.7 44.1 53.4 40.8 52.9 36.4 41.9 45.6 40.7 44.9 40.5 40.7
Migrants (percent) 73.3 59.2 56.0 42.7 66.5 61.3 60.5 62.2 75.2 45.3 77.0 28.9
Average age (years) 31.4 33.4 32.7 32.8 31.5 34.2 32.8 32.3 33.4 39.4 33.0 33.4
Education (years) 5.0 4.1 5.4 4.6 5.9 4.7 4.3 4.9 8.8 9.2 9.3 8.8
Seniority (years) 5.4 7.3 6.6 7.4 5.9 8.2 6.0 6.3 4.9 8.1 4.3 4.9
Type of worker (percentage of total)
Self-employed 44.7 62.5 57.1 44.4 60.2 47.2 49.5 49.9 41.6 60.3 38.2 35.6
Manager 9.0 10.8 8.3 6.7 4.5 13.8 9.1 8.5 9.8 14.9 17.0 8.3
Manual or nonmanual employee 17.3 9.8 11.3 17.9 12.3 11.9 12.8 14.8 25.0 16.0 23.6 32.5
Laborer or similar 29.0 16.9 23.3 31.0 23.0 27.1 28.6 26.8 29.5 8.8 29.2 23.6
Wage employment (percent) 40.8 28.0 24.7 37.5 24.0 35.0 33.0 34.6 46.5 35.7 51.0 53.2
Multiple jobholding (percent) 4.9 7.2 9.2 4.3 6.1 7.7 6.2 5.9 14.0 6.5 11.6 14.0
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details).
a. Total number of jobs (thousands).
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38 percent in Yaoundé, 42 percent in Douala, and 60 percent in Kinshasa. 
Skilled manual and nonmanual employees account for just over 18 percent 
of jobs, largely refl ecting the development of wage employment. Th ese fi gures 
range from an average of 15 percent in West Africa and Kinshasa to about one-
quarter in Cameroon and one-third in Madagascar.
Th e job structure by sector reveals the predominance of trade and services 
(the “tertiary” sector). Th is sector accounts for at least three-quarters of all 
jobs, except in Antananarivo (60 percent) (table 1.12). Industrial activities 
account for a little more than one-fi ft h of jobs. Th eir weight is heaviest in Dakar 
(28 percent), Niamey (26 percent), and Antananarivo (35 percent), where a 
buoyant export processing business sector exists, especially in textiles. Subur-
ban agriculture remains marginal (3 percent), with a maximum of 5 percent in 
Kinshasa, Niamey, Antananarivo, and Ouagadougou. 
Th e distribution of jobs by institutional sector is a good composite indica-
tor of the structure of the labor market. Th e largest sector is the informal sec-
tor, which employs 70 percent of workers on average and up to 76 percent in 
West Africa. Th e formal private sector is in second place, with 17 percent of 
jobs. Only 11 percent of employed people work in the public sector (8 percent 
in the administration and 3 percent in public and semipublic enterprises). 
Th e very small share of public employment invalidates the idea of a bloated 
public sector. 
Th e structure by institutional sector reveals some remarkable similarities 
across cities. In West Africa, Abidjan has the most developed formal private sec-
tor (about 18 percent of jobs). Dakar is in second place with 15 percent. Niamey 
posts the largest concentration of public sector jobs, but they account for just 
15 percent of total employment. Cotonou and Lomé are leading cities for the 
informal sector, which accounts for more than 80 percent of jobs. 
Even sharper contrasts are found in Central Africa and Madagascar. At one 
end of the scale is Kinshasa, where 71 percent of jobs are in the informal sec-
tor, the public sectors employs 17 percent of the workforce, and the formal 
private sector employs just 9 percent of the workforce (the smallest share of 
the 11 cities). At the other end of the scale are the Cameroonian and Malagasy 
cities, where a smaller (albeit still high) share (53–62 percent) of jobs are in the 
informal sector.
Public Sector
Public jobs are naturally concentrated in the nonmarket sectors. However, 
industrial employment accounts for 25 percent of jobs in semi-public enter-
prises, a slightly higher share than in the labor market as a whole (21 percent). 
Women are less well represented in public employment (26 percent) than in 
the labor market as a whole (45 percent). In all cities, the highest proportion of 
migrants (70 percent) is found in the public sector (table 1.13). 
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Table 1.12 Job Structure in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Institutional and Activity Sector 
(percent)
West Africa Central Africa Indian Ocean
Sector/industry Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
WAEMU 
countries Douala Kinshasa Yaoundé Antananarivo
Institutional sector 
Public administration 5.5 7.5 6.3 5.7 5.2 13.5 10.4 6.6 4.8 11.9 15.0 8.1
Public enterprise 1.1 2.5 2.2 1.8 2.3 1.8 2.3 1.8 1.8 5.0 2.3 2.6
Formal private sector 17.6 11.4 9.9 15.0 10.5 11.8 11.8 14.2 30.7 8.8 23.8 34.6
Informal sector 74.7 77.5 80.3 76.4 81.0 71.1 73.4 76.2 61.9 70.9 57.2 53.1
Nonproﬁ t organization 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.8 2.1 1.2 0.8 3.4 1.7 1.5
Industry
Primary sectora 1.6 2.6 2.1 3.1 2.1 5.4 4.9 2.6 2.7 5.8 2.5 5.0
Industry 19.7 20.0 18.0 28.2 20.5 26.2 23.2 21.9 22.5 14.8 18.8 34.9
Trade 34.1 41.7 37.0 26.6 38.4 26.3 36.4 34.0 27.2 42.3 20.9 23.2
Services 44.6 35.5 42.9 42.1 39.0 42.1 35.5 41.5 47.6 37.1 57.8 36.9
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details). 
a. The primary sector includes agriculture, forestry, and fishery.
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Table 1.13 Job Structure in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Institutional Sector
(percent, except where otherwise indicated)
Institutional sector Number Share of total
Average age
(years)
Proportion of 
women
Proportion of 
migrants
Completed 
years of 
education
Seniority in the 
job (years)
Proportion 
of informal 
employment 
Public administration 588,300 8.4 41.7 27.3 69.5 12.3 10.0 8.0
Public enterprise 178,600 2.6 44.0 21.9 72.0 11.4 10.9 11.2
Formal private sector 1,216,700 17.4 34.4 25.8 61.5 9.3 5.3 40.7
Informal sector 4,877,700 69.9 32.8 52.6 58.3 5.4 6.1 97.0
Nonproﬁ t organization 120,200 1.7 36.9 28.8 61.1 9.7 6.6 37.0
All 6,981,500 100 34.2 44.6 60.2 6.9 6.4 76.5
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details). 
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Public sector employees are more skilled than the rest of the labor force. 
Employees in this sector have by far the highest level of education (12 com-
pleted years of education). Public sector employees have more than 10 years 
seniority on average, compared with just 6 in the other sectors. Th e longer ten-
ure refl ects the job-for-life phenomenon as well as the freeze on recruitment.
Formal Private Sector 
Th e formal private sector has the highest rate of wage employment (86 percent 
across all the cities) aft er the public sector. Th irty-fi ve percent of employed work-
ers in the sector work in businesses with fewer than 10 people (21 percent work 
in businesses with fewer than 6 people); 26 percent work in businesses with 
more than 100 people. In Bamako, Ouagadougou, Lomé, Niamey, Cotonou, and 
Yaoundé the majority of formal private sector jobs are in establishments that 
employ a maximum of 20 people. 
Th e average age (34) is much lower than in the public sector (42). Formal 
private sector employees have an average of 9.3 years of education, second only 
to workers in the public sector. 
Informal Sector
Th e informal sector is similar in all cities in terms of age (young), activities, 
the size of the production unit (small), and rates of wage employment (low). 
Ninety percent of informal sector jobs are in production units with fewer than 
six people, and 54 percent are own-account workers. Th is sector has the lowest 
wage employment rate of all institutional sectors (17 percent).
Th ree-quarters of informal sector jobs are in trade and services. Trade 
accounts for half of all informal sector jobs in Bamako, one-third in Niamey 
and Dakar, and 56 percent in Kinshasa. However, the industrial sector is 
not inconsequential; it provides 21 percent of informal sector jobs (25–32 
percent in Dakar, Niamey, and Ouagadougou). Sixty-eight percent of indus-
trial jobs (70 percent in WAEMU) are informal. Only in Antananarivo is the 
formal sector developed enough to provide more than half (54 percent) of 
industrial jobs.
Across the 11 cities, about 20 percent of informal sector workers work on 
proper professional premises (more than 25 percent in Abidjan and Dakar, 
20 percent in Antananarivo, 9 percent in Niamey). Fourteen percent of infor-
mal sector workers work from home without dedicated facilities (20 percent 
in Kinshasa, 18 percent in Niamey, and 17 percent in Cotonou); 6 percent of 
informal sector workers work from home in a space specifi cally set aside for the 
purpose (13 percent in Antananarivo and 10 percent in Cotonou). Across the 
11 cities, 11 percent of workers are itinerant. Th ese percentages are higher in 
Lomé, Cotonou, and Bamako. Workers in the informal sector are young, with 
one-third of them under 25. With an average 5.4 years of education, more than 
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60 percent of informal workers have no more than primary school education 
(77 percent in the WAEMU countries). 
Th e informal sector is also disproportionately female (53 percent). Th e per-
centage of women ranges from 41 percent in Niamey to 60 percent in Cotonou 
and Lomé. Contrary to a widely held belief that migration is responsible for 
the development of the informal sector, the sector actually contains the lowest 
proportion of migrants (about 50 percent).
Informal Employment
Th e ILO (2003) defi nes informal employment as employment that does not 
provide coverage in the institutional social protection scheme. Workers in this 
sector include the vast majority of the informal labor force and unprotected 
employees in the formal sector (Herrera and others 2012). We defi ne informal 
employment as all contributing family workers, all independent workers in the 
informal sector, and all employees without written contracts and not benefi ting 
from social protection. 
Two main conclusions can be drawn from table 1.13 and the detailed results 
by country (not reported to save space). First, informal employment is domi-
nant: on average, 77 percent of the labor force is informally employed. Th e larg-
est shares are in Lomé (83 percent), Cotonou and Bamako (82 percent), and 
Ouagadougou (81 percent); the smallest share is in Antananarivo (62 percent). 
Second, informal employment is signifi cant in every institutional sector. As 
expected, nearly all informal sector jobs (97 percent) are informal. But informal 
employment represents 41 percent of private formal sector jobs (26 percent in 
Antananarivo, 33 percent in Abidjan and Dakar, and 36 percent in Kinshasa). 
Cameroonian cities have both the highest proportion of formal sector jobs and 
the highest rate of informal jobs in the formal sector (50 percent in Douala and 
58 percent in Yaoundé). Informal employment also accounts for 8 percent of 
public administration jobs and 11 percent of public enterprise jobs. 
Composition of Working Labor Force by Age Bracket
Th ree main groups account for virtually the entire working labor force studied: 
self-employment in the informal sector (in the form of own-account work or 
work as an employer) (48 percent); wage employment in the public and private 
formal sector (27 percent); and dependent employment in the informal sector as 
an employee, apprentice, or contributing family worker (22 percent) (fi gure 1.2). 
Th e remaining 3 percent are nonwage workers in the formal sector.
Up to the age of about 20, the majority of employed workers work in the 
informal sector (96 percent among people 10–14, 90 percent among people 
15–19, and 80 percent among people 20–24), mainly in dependent employment. 
Th e second period sees the emergence of wage employment in the formal sector 
as a labor market integration mode. Th is curve rises steadily through age 55. 
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Aft er 55, individuals return to informal sector jobs as self-employed workers. 
Up to 80 percent of jobs held aft er age 69 are in self-employment. 
It is tempting to interpret this age-based curve in terms of the professional 
life cycle: workers fi rst acquire informal sector work experience, then integrate 
into the formal sector as wage earners before setting up in self-employment at 
the end of the working life with human and fi nancial capital accumulated in 
the previous stage. In fact, only panel data on the entire life cycle or backward-
looking surveys (biographical-type surveys) could bear out this three-phase 
trajectory at the individual level.
Labor Income and Working Conditions
Labor provides most of the income received by African individuals and house-
holds. Analyzing this indicator therefore evaluates the quality of the jobs gen-
erated by the diff erent productive sectors and measures the standard of living 
and extent of poverty in the 11 cities studied. Th e analysis at this stage con-
centrates on nominal incomes (further analysis converts these data into real 
incomes using purchasing power parity). As with all household surveys, captur-
ing incomes is an extremely tricky business (see overview). Th e following fi nd-
ings should therefore be interpreted with caution. In particular, more attention 
should be paid to within-city than between-city diff erences and to the aggre-
gates for the region.
Figure 1.2 Sectoral Composition of Employed Workforce in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
by Age 
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details). 
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Earnings in Main Job
Th e average monthly earned income across all 11 cities is estimated at €72 
(including contributing family workers’ zero earnings). Th is average conceals 
large disparities (table 1.14). Average earnings in West Africa are €83. Th e high-
est earnings are in Abidjan (€108) and Dakar (€89). By far the lowest earnings 
are in Lomé (€39). Th e situation elsewhere ranges from barely €20 in Kinshasa 
to €52 in Antananarivo and more than €100 in Cameroon. 
Public sector workers are better paid than workers in the private sector. An 
employee in a public enterprise earns €163 and a civil servant in the adminis-
tration €208, whereas an employee in a formal private business earns just €116 
a month. Th e lowest income is in the informal sector, where monthly earnings 
average just €52. 
Th e higher earnings of public sector employees partly refl ect the characteris-
tics of the manpower employed in the sector, where senior and middle manag-
ers account for 59 percent of jobs (as opposed to 20 percent in the formal private 
sector). Th e percentage of managers in the public sector ranges from 37 percent 
in Lomé to 69 percent in Abidjan and 72 percent in Bamako. 
Average seniority is also higher in the public sector (10 years versus about 6 in 
the formal private sector) (table 1.15). Average tenure in the public sector is shorter 
in Douala (eight years), Ouagadougou (seven years), and Yaoundé (fi ve years).
Distribution of Earnings
Average monthly earnings vary by industry (table 1.16). Civil servants are at the 
top of the ladder. Civil servants in Dakar earn 10 times more than “small street 
traders”; civil servants in Cotonou earn 6.8 times more than workers in “cloth-
ing.” Th e smallest gap is in Bamako, where civil servants earn 3.8 times more 
than “small street traders.” In general, small traders are paid the least.
Th e minimum monthly wage ranges from €9 in Kinshasa to €59 in Dakar 
(table 1.17). Even within WAEMU, the range is wide (€21 in Lomé to €59 in 
Dakar). About half of workers earn less than the minimum wage in West Africa, 
ranging from 44 percent in Bamako to 61 percent in Ouagadougou. Th e propor-
tion is lower elsewhere (about 40 percent in Antananarivo and Kinshasa and 
30 percent in Cameroon). Th is fi nding reveals clear shortcomings in compli-
ance with the legislation in force. Th e percentage of workers earning less than 
the minimum wage is highest in the informal sector. At the other end of the 
scale, about 10 percent of workers are paid more than four times the minimum 
wage in all cities except Yaoundé and Douala, where the minimum wage has not 
been adjusted for many years and the share of workers earning more than four 
times the minimum wage stands at about 20 percent. All in all, the minimum 
wage does not seem to be a binding constraint in any institutional sector. Th e 
African Economic Outlook 2012 (African Development Bank and others 2012) 
confi rms this result, concluding that “minimum wage is not an issue.”
64 Table 1.14 Average Monthly Earnings from Main Job in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Institutional Sector 
(euros)
West Africa Central Africa Indian Ocean
Sector Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
WAEMU 
countries Douala Kinshasa Yaoundé Antananarivo
Public administration 337 136 137 228 126 137 144 212 198 18 235 99
Public enterprise 390 214 186 205 106 171 153 226 340 52 400 107
Formal private sectora 219 141 100 169 73 121 112 170 149 34 117 59
Informal sector 60 57 40 59 27 44 31 50 58 17 64 38
All 108 77 56 89 39 69 57 83 99 21 111 52
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details). 
Note: Figures include contributing family workers, whether or not they were paid. 
a. Includes formal private businesses and nonprofit organizations.
Table 1.15 Average Seniority in Main Job in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Institutional Sector 
(years)
West Africa Central Africa Indian Ocean
Sector Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
WAEMU 
countries Douala Kinshasa Yaoundé Antananarivo
Public administration 9.8 10.8 9.3 13.3 11.5 10.1 6.9 10.2 8.1 11.4 5.3 10.6
Public enterprise 9.8 11.2 8.4 10.7 10.1 12.7 8.8 10.1 9.0 13.1 7.2 8.2
Formal private sectora 5.5 6.7 5.5 7.8 5.9 6.9 5.4 6.1 4.6 6.9 3.3 5.0
Informal sector 5.0 6.9 6.4 6.7 5.5 7.9 5.9 5.9 4.8 7.4 4.4 7.0
All 5.4 7.3 6.6 7.4 5.9 8.2 6.0 6.3 4.9 8.1 4.3 6.6
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details). 
Note: Figures include contributing family workers, whether or not they were paid.
a. Includes formal private businesses and nonprofit organizations. 
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Table 1.16 Average Monthly Earnings from Main Job in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Industry 
(euros)
West Africa Central Africa Indian Ocean
Sector Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
WAEMU 
countries Douala Kinshasa Yaoundé Antananarivo
Primary sectora 123 87 79 97 30 48 40 79 80 15 42 24
Industry 102 82 46 73 32 47 48 73 120 23 92 49
Trade 63 59 46 70 28 53 32 54 63 18 64 47
Services 145 96 69 110 54 97 90 111 110 23 137 63
All 108 78 56 89 39 69 57 83 99 21 111 52
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details). 
Note: Figures include contributing family workers, whether or not they were paid. 
a. The primary sector includes agriculture, forestry, and fishery.
Table 1.17 Monthly Earnings as Multiple of Minimum Wage in Main Job in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa
West Africa Central Africa Indian Ocean
Item Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Ouagadougou Niamey
WAEMU 
countries Douala Kinshasa Yaoundé Antananarivo
Minimum wage (euros) 55 34 38 59 21 41 34 – 36 9 36 29
Less than the minimum 
wage (percent) 49.9 43.9 54.9 53.6 49.0 61.3 45.3 51.1 31.1 41.0 29.1 40.1
More than four times the 
minimum wage (percent) 10.6 12.5 9.0 7.4 10.3 9.1 13.1 10.0 17.8 11.7 22.3 8.1
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details). 
Note: Figures include contributing family workers, whether or not they were paid.
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Th e distribution of earned income can also be analyzed by comparing quar-
tiles and the interquartile ratio (table 1.18). Median monthly earnings are much 
lower than average earnings, partly because of the large number of unpaid 
workers. When unpaid workers are excluded, the gap between median and aver-
age earnings narrows, although median earnings still remain much lower. On 
average, workers in the third quartile of the distribution earn fi ve times more 
than workers in the fi rst quartile. Th is ratio is highest in Bamako and Niamey 
(about 6) and lowest in Cotonou and Dakar (about 4). Th e gaps are wider in 
West Africa than in Central Africa and Madagascar. 
Taking into account people who work without being paid (zero earnings), 
especially contributing family workers, the Gini coeffi  cients are similar across 
cities (table 1.19). In West Africa, they range from 0.59 in Dakar to 0.64 in Oua-
gadougou. Antananarivo stands out, with a lower albeit still fairly high level of 
inequality of 0.53. Th is fi nding refl ects the higher rate of wage employment in 
Antananarivo, especially in the formal sector. 
With no eff ective labor market regulatory mechanisms, earnings inequalities 
are very high in all cities. Gini indexes at the household level are of the same 
order of magnitude, suggesting that no compensating mechanisms are at work 
within households to mitigate individual inequalities.
Gender Diff erences 
On average, women’s earnings are half of men’s (table 1.20). Women are even 
worse off  when their incomes are viewed in terms of median earnings: their 
median remuneration is about one-third of men’s. Th is gap refl ects the weight 
of contributing family workers, who are overwhelmingly female. 
Th ese fi ndings are similar across cities, although the ranking depends on 
the indicator used. Based on average remuneration, comparisons show women 
to be best off  in Central Africa and Madagascar (where the male/female ratio 
is about 1.6), Dakar (1.87), and Niamey (1.94). Th ey are worst off  in Cotonou 
(2.51) and Bamako (2.59) (see chapter 9).
Th e second gender-related characteristic of earned income is the higher 
inequality among women than among men. One of the reasons for this dif-
ference is the weight of informal sector jobs, which are less egalitarian than 
jobs in other sectors. Ouagadougou has both the largest within-gender earnings 
inequalities and the widest gender gap.
Earnings Ladder 
Th e earnings ladder is evident across all institutional sectors (table 1.21). Man-
agers and employers earn the most. Th ey are better paid in the formal private 
sector than in the public sector, except in Lomé and Cotonou. Next come man-
ual and nonmanual employees, with laborers and others (apprentices and family 
workers) earning least.
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Table 1.18 Monthly Earnings from Main Job in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Quartile 
(euros)
West Africa Central Africa Indian Ocean
Item Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
WAEMU 
countries Douala Kinshasa Yaoundé Antananarivo
First quartile 23 15 14 22 9 14 11 15 24 3 30 17
Second quartile 55 46 31 46 23 45 23 38 53 10 55 42
Third quartile 112 92 61 92 46 88 61 92 100 19 122 68
Average monthly earnings 108 78 56 89 39 69 57 83 99 21 111 52
Interquartile ratio (third 
quartile/ﬁ rst quartile) 4.9 6.0 4.4 4.1 5.2 6.1 5.6 6.0 4.2 5.4 4.0 4.0
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details). 
Note: Figures include contributing family workers, whether or not they were paid.
Table 1.19 Gini Index of Monthly Earnings and Household Income in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa
West Africa Central Africa Indian Ocean
Type of earnings Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou Douala Kinshasa Yaoundé Antananarivo
Individual earnings from main job, 
including zero earnings 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.59 0.61 0.61 0.64 0.58 0.62 0.58 0.53
Individual earnings from main job, 
excluding zero earnings 0.58 0.60 0.54 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.59 0.53 0.59 0.53 0.47
Household labor earnings 0.58 0.58 0.55 0.54 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.55 0.64 0.61 0.47
Total household income 0.59 0.58 0.53 0.51 0.62 0.59 0.56 0.51 0.62 0.55 0.46
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details).
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Table 1.20 Average and Median Monthly Earnings from Main Job and Gini Index in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Gender 
West Africa Central Africa Indian Ocean
Item Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
WAEMU 
countries Douala Kinshasa Yaoundé Antananarivo
Average earnings (euros)
Men 147 106 83 110 55 84 73 111 122 25 132 64
Women 64 41 33 59 25 43 35 49 65 16 81 39
Median earnings (euros)
Men 83 57 50 79 31 48 46 67 75 15 76 42
Women 29 18 18 28 12 18 13 23 38 7 46 25
Gini coefficient
Men 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.54 0.60 0.55 0.50
Women 0.63 0.59 0.59 0.57 0.60 0.63 0.67 0.63 0.60 0.63 0.60 0.54
All 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.59 0.61 0.61 0.64 0.63 0.58 0.62 0.58 0.53
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details). 
Note: Figures include contributing family workers, whether or not they were paid.
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Table 1.21 Average Monthly Earnings from Main Job in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Institutional Sector and Socioeconomic Group 
(euros)
West Africa Central Africa Indian Ocean
Sector Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
WAEMU 
countries Douala Kinshasa Yaoundé Antananarivo
Public sector
Managers 417 182 190 308 177 185 206 281 315 37 311 153
Manual and nonmanual 
employees 200 96 98 151 80 84 101 131 157 15 152 77
Laborers and others 112 54 39 88 47 48 47 64 73 14 56 45
Formal private sector a                
Managers and employers 484 240 149 364 170 248 263 351 370 48 280 152
Manual and nonmanual 
employees 140 80 76 134 62 74 84 118 108 23 83 50
Laborers and others 84 42 27 61 20 32 30 59 67 20 49 28
Informal sector                
Managers and employers 128 117 87 169 52 156 90 115 155 25 215 94
Own-account 63 61 49 76 30 50 35 56 57 15 64 43
Manual and nonmanual 
employees 83 60 45 68 34 62 44 69 63 16 55 38
Laborers and others 24 17 6 19 9 14 13 18 23 8 20 9
All 108 78 56 89 39 69 57 83 99 21 111 52
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details). 
Note: Figures include contributing family workers, whether or not they were paid. 
a. Includes formal private businesses and nonprofit organizations.
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In the formal sector, internal heterogeneity is greater in the private sector 
than in the public sector: formal private sector managers earn two to three times 
more than manual and nonmanual employees. Th e ratio between managers and 
laborers ranges from 6 (in Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, and Dakar) to more than 
8 (in Lomé, Niamey, and Ouagadougou). Th ere is less wage inequality in the 
public sector, where managers earn no more than twice the wages of manual 
and nonmanual employees and up to four times more than laborers. On aver-
age, the formal private sector pays its managers relatively more and the public 
sector pays its low-skilled employees relatively more.
Th e informal sector is the worst-paid sector, both because of the predomi-
nance of the least skilled categories of workers and because workers in the 
informal sector earn less than their counterparts in other sectors (see chapter 5). 
Own-account workers in the informal sector generally earn less than half the 
wages of manual and nonmanual employees in the formal sector. However, 
except in Ouagadougou, they earn more than the monthly minimum wage 
in all cities.
Working Hours and Underemployment
Th e average work week is 48 hours for formal private sector workers, 44 hours 
for workers in public enterprises, and 42 hours in public administration 
(table 1.22). Informal sector workers also work long hours (more than 47 hours 
a week). Th is sector is thus not a source of marginal, part-time jobs; it leaves 
little time to work a second job. Th e longest weekly hours are in Lomé and 
Ouagadougou (about 50 hours a week). Th e average work week is 45 hours in 
Dakar and 43 in Antananarivo. 
Diff erences in the work week are very wide in the cities studied: one in 
fi ve workers works less than 35 hours a week and 41 percent work more than 
48 hours. Th e formal sector (public and private) is the most compliant with 
legislation on work duration: 70 percent of workers in the sector work 35–48 
hours a week. In contrast, just 30 percent of informal sector workers work these 
hours. Th e work week is much longer in the informal sector, where 46 percent 
of workers work more than 48 hours a week (the fi gure is 29 percent in the 
formal sector).
Time-related underemployment. Th e number of hours worked reveals 
the amount of time-related underemployment. Fift een percent of employed 
workers—more than 1 million people—involuntarily work less than 35 hours 
a week (table 1.23). Th e rate of time-related underemployment varies across 
cities (10 percent in Ouagadougou and Yaoundé, 17 percent in Bamako and 
Lomé, and 20 percent in Kinshasa). It is highest in the informal sector (16 
percent). 
Invisible underemployment. Time-related underemployment is just one man-
ifestation of underemployment. For example, excessively long working hours 
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Table 1.22 Average Weekly Hours Worked in Main Job in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Institutional Sector 
West Africa Central Africa Indian Ocean
Sector Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
WAEMU 
countries Douala Kinshasa Yaoundé Antananarivo
Public administration 43.2 40.8 41.0 41.5 49.9 43.2 41.4 42.7 39.9 42.6 38.0 40.3
Public enterprise 43.5 45.9 44.0 42.7 45.3 43.8 46.6 44.4 41.8 44.7 41.7 43.0
Formal private sectora 46.3 50.2 48.0 44.2 51.2 49.7 50.8 47.2 50.0 47.5 50.6 47.7
Informal sector 48.7 45.3 46.8 46.0 49.6 48.0 52.2 48.0 44.3 46.7 49.9 40.9
All 47.9 45.6 46.5 45.4 49.7 47.5 50.7 47.5 45.9 46.2 48.1 43.3
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details). 
a. Includes formal private businesses and nonprofit organizations.
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Table 1.23 Forms of Underemployment in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa
(percent)
Form of 
underemployment
West Africa Central Africa Indian Ocean
Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
WAEMU 
countries Douala Kinshasa Yaoundé Antananarivo
Time-related underemployment 
rate 12.6 17.1 13.4 16.2 17.1 16.0 10.6 14.3 14.4 19.6 9.9 14.0
Invisible underemployment 
rate (percentage of employed 
workers earning less than 
minimum hourly wage) 53.2 45.4 61.1 57.8 55.8 51.1 66.5 55.2 37.1 40.8 38.4 40.9
Total underemployment rate 66.4 58.8 69.2 69.4 68.4 64.4 73.0 67.1 53.7 63.0 53.7 52.7
Not in employment, education, or training (NEET) rate among people 10–24
All 22.2 21.8 11.3 30.5 11.1 34.3 22.9 22.9 14.1 21.5 14.2 9.8
Women 28.4 28.8 15.0 39.6 14.5 40.3 30.3 29.5 19.3 24.9 18.5 11.6
Men 14.0 14.2 7.2 20.4 7.1 27.1 14.9 15.3 8.6 17.7 9.5 8.1
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details). 
Note: Time-related and invisible underemployment are based on all employed workers. Total underemployment is based on all workers (employed and unemployed). 
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can (paradoxically) be a sign of underemployment when they are made neces-
sary by abnormally low labor productivity. Th is form of underemployment is 
called invisible underemployment.
We have chosen the percentage of employed workers earning less than the 
minimum hourly wage as our indicator of invisible underemployment. On this 
basis, we estimate the rate of invisible underemployment at 48 percent across all 
11 cities. It is highest in Ouagadougou (66.5 percent). Even in Bamako, it stands 
at more than 45 percent. Outside West Africa, the rate of invisible underem-
ployment is lower, albeit still high, at about 40 percent. 
Intercity comparisons need to be interpreted in relative terms, because the pur-
chasing power of the minimum wage in force is not necessarily the same across cit-
ies, and wage policies do not necessarily pursue the same objective. Th e minimum 
wage should therefore be seen more as a social standard associated with a national 
environment than as a universal and absolute benchmark (physiological minimum 
for subsistence, for example). Th is manifestation of the mismatch between labor 
supply and demand is most glaring in the informal sector, where 60 percent of 
workers are in a situation of invisible underemployment (two-thirds in WAEMU); 
this share is much lower among formal private sector workers (28 percent), civil 
servants (14 percent), and public enterprise employees (8 percent). 
Another indicator of underemployment is the NEET (not in employment, edu-
cation, or training) rate, which takes into account discouraged workers. Among 
people 10–24, the NEET rate is 23 percent in West Africa (31 percent in Dakar and 
34 percent in Niamey), 22 percent in Kinshasa, 14 percent in Cameroon, and 10 
percent in Madagascar (see table 1.23). Th e NEET rate for young women is twice as 
high as for young men, except in Niamey, Kinshasa, and particularly Antananarivo, 
where both the levels and the gap (3.5 percentage points) are lowest.
When the diff erent components of underemployment (unemployment, time-
related underemployment, and invisible underemployment) are aggregated to 
obtain a composite indicator of underemployment, the total underemployment 
rate is 62 percent—5 million out of nearly 8 million workers—across all 11 cit-
ies. Total underemployment aff ects almost 60 percent of workers in Bamako 
and almost 75 percent in Ouagadougou. Women are more aff ected than men, 
whatever the type of underemployment (19 percent for women and 12 percent 
for men for visible underemployment; 61 percent for women and 38 percent 
for men for invisible underemployment). Underemployment of the labor force 
therefore seems to be the main problem in the labor market and, more generally, 
the region’s urban economy (see chapter 2).
Working Conditions and Dependent Workers’ Benefi ts
Job quality is conditioned by more than just earnings and working hours. 
Other factors, such as the steadiness of the job, the provision of an employ-
ment contract, the existence of social security coverage and paid holidays, and 
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promotion opportunities and in-house training, are also important. Th is sub-
section focuses on dependent workers (employees, contributing family work-
ers, and apprentices), because independent workers are not covered by labor 
legislations.
Nearly 9 in 10 jobs are permanent across all 11 cities. Niamey leads in the 
share of casual jobs (19 percent of all jobs). In the informal sector, 85 percent of 
jobs are permanent jobs. Th erefore, job insecurity does not manifest itself in a 
string of “odd jobs” and short-term jobs.
Job insecurity is expressed in the low level of employment contracts. Nearly 
two-thirds of employees have no written contract with their employer, and an 
equivalent proportion do not receive a payslip (table 1.24). Labor relations 
vary a great deal by institutional sector. In the informal sector, just 9 percent 
of dependent workers have a written contract, and less than 3 percent receive 
payslips.
Another indicator of poor job quality is the small share of workers with 
welfare benefi ts: 9.1 percent of workers are affi  liated with the offi  cial social 
security body, and 3.3 percent have health insurance provided by the busi-
ness. Diff erences are evident across institutional sectors. One-third of public 
sector employees have social security coverage, and 47 percent are entitled to 
paid holidays. Th ese fi gures are much higher than in the formal private sector, 
where 12 percent of employees have social security coverage and 28 percent are 
entitled to paid holidays. Dependent workers in the informal sector appear to 
be totally deprived of these benefi ts. Th e gap between the two sectors is widened 
by the fact that the majority of informal workers are self-employed. Welfare 
and other benefi ts (allowances, job security, and so forth) are more common 
among the highest-paid socioeconomic groups, accentuating the diff erences in 
job quality (see chapter 4).
Union membership remains low among dependent workers. It stands at 
13 percent in West Africa (ranging from 7 percent in Cotonou to 17 percent 
in Niamey). It is 15 percent in Kinshasa and less than 10 percent in Cameroon 
and Antananarivo. Unions are more widespread in the public sector: about one-
third of public employees are union members as opposed to from one-tenth 
(Central Africa) to one-fi ft h (West Africa) in the formal private sector and less 
than 2 percent in the informal sector.
Job Mobility and Prospects
Data from Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys can be used to quantify the quality of the 
match between the jobs people hold and the jobs they aspire to hold. Th e nature 
of the mismatches captures potential labor market rigidities, which can aff ect 
labor force participation rates, unemployment, and remuneration. 
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Table 1.24 Working Conditions for Dependent Workers in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa
(percent)
Feature
West Africa Central Africa Indian Ocean
Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
WAEMU 
countries Douala Kinshasa Yaoundé Antananarivo
Permanent job 92.0 82.6 92.5 84.6 84.7 81.4 87.0 88.2 86.9 87.8 91.8 90.8
Payslip 31.4 39.9 31.5 32.8 25.0 36.1 32.3 32.2 33.8 52.1 37.6 53.8
Contract 34.6 38.3 36.7 32.9 37.0 37.9 33.5 35.0 36.2 65.2 42.6 54.5
Social security 6.5 18.7 7.8 7.7 7.0 15.2 14.9 9.1 8.4 5.8 6.0 44.3
Health insurance 2.9 2.5 3.6 3.7 1.6 5.0 4.6 3.3 4.1 5.2 5.1 41.8
Paid holidays 19.3 22.8 16.1 7.9 11.0 13.1 23.2 16.3 11.7 7.3 17.2 44.7
In-house training 11.9 15.6 11.3 11.1 16.3 21.0 20.4 13.6 22.2 31.0 17.0 17.4
In-house promotion 9.1 3.5 5.7 11.1 13.8 15.5 18.0 10.4 12.1 22.0 13.7 7.2
Union members 15.5 15.0 7.2 10.0 13.2 16.6 7.9 12.8 9.6 14.8 6.9 8.1
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details).
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Th e analysis in this section covers only people 15–24, because this genera-
tion constitutes the vast majority of people entering the labor market currently 
or in the near future. Some 4.6 million people 15–24 live in the 11 cities stud-
ied: 2.7 million are inactive, 1.5 million have jobs, and 341,000 (18 percent) 
are unemployed. Among jobholders, 38 percent report being satisfi ed with the 
position they hold and do not intend to look for another job in the near future. 
Fift y-two percent would like to fi nd a new job, either by changing establishment 
(41 percent) or by being promoted within their current establishment.
Th e high level of job dissatisfaction decreases with age, falling to 44 percent 
among people 30–39 and 14 percent among people 60 and older. Th is phenom-
enon stems from two factors. Th e fi rst is the “normal” life-cycle eff ect, in which 
work experience and seniority enable young people to secure better-quality 
jobs. Th e second is the fact that the depressed labor market is preventing young 
people from entering jobs that correspond to their skills (see chapter 3).
Young civil servants are more inclined to want to keep their jobs (59 percent) 
than young people working in the informal sector (37 percent). Surprisingly, 
this diff erence virtually disappears in West Africa, where 34 percent of young 
civil servants and 35 percent of young people in the informal sector are dissat-
isfi ed. However, among people who want to change jobs, proportionally more 
young civil servants would like to remain with their current institution. 
Th e level of dissatisfaction is negatively correlated with remuneration. In 
West Africa, for example, “satisfi ed” young people earn an average of €35 a 
month, whereas people who would like to change jobs earn just €27 a month 
and people hoping for promotion earn €29. Th is hierarchy is found irrespec-
tive of the institutional sector, socioeconomic group, or city. A similar pattern 
is found outside West Africa, with the only diff erence being that people who 
would like to be promoted earn more than people who want to keep their job. 
Th e diff erence refl ects the fact that the prospects for promotion are restricted 
mainly to the highest-paid jobs.
Th e mismatch between young people’s preferences and real job opportunities 
is huge. Although the public sector (administration and public enterprises) cre-
ated virtually no jobs in the two years preceding the survey (less than 4 percent 
of new jobs), 27 percent of young people still aspire to work in it (table 1.25). Th e 
informal sector, the main job provider during the two years before the survey, 
holds less drawing power for young people. In West Africa, for example, the sec-
tor accounted for 82 percent of job creation, but just 48 percent of job-seekers 
aspired to work in it. Th ese fi ndings are common to all 11 cities, although the 
extent to which aspirations are unrealistic varies considerably. Young people 
in Abidjan take the least account of the actual situation. Although fewer than 
10,000 civil service jobs were fi lled in Abidjan in 2001–02, 140,000 young peo-
ple aspired to secure one. Young people in Niamey have their feet a little more 
fi rmly on the ground: the city recruits about 5,000 civil servants from a pool of 
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Table 1.25 Job Aspirations of People 15–24 in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Sector 
(percent)
Sector
West Africa Central Africa Indian Ocean
Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
WAEMU 
countries Douala Kinshasa Yaoundé Antananarivo
Jobs wanted
Public administration 22.8 32.7 26.7 13.0 8.7 28.1 32.8 22.4 21.6 10.2 16.7 22.7
Public enterprises 3.5 6.0 7.2 2.9 11.4 4.8 4.6 4.8 7.7 12.7 4.2 6.8
Formal private sector 25.8 15.9 18.3 33.0 23.5 19.8 20.2 24.4 31.3 43.5 23.1 47.8
Informal sector 47.9 45.4 47.8 51.0 56.4 47.5 42.4 48.4 39.4 33.6 56.0 22.7
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Jobs created
Public administration 1.8 3.0 3.2 2.8 1.5 11.3 8.1 3.0 2.5 4.9 11.6 3.3
Public enterprises 0.2 1.2 1.9 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.2 0.8 1.2 3.0 1.5 1.4
Formal private sector 15.6 9.7 12.8 17.1 10.5 14.4 15.2 14.5 32.1 14.3 28.8 44.2
Informal sector 82.4 86.1 82.1 78.8 86.8 73.3 75.5 81.7 64.3 77.8 58.1 51.1
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 1.1 for details). 
Note: Findings are for 2000 and 2001 for Antananarivo, Bamako, Cotonou, and Lomé; 2001 and 2002 for Abidjan, Dakar, Niamey, and Ouagadougou; and 2004 and 2005 for 
Douala, Kinshasa, and Yaoundé. The formal private sector includes formal private businesses and nonprofit organizations.
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27,000 young hopefuls. Yaoundé is unique, in that the jobs created are on the 
whole in line with aspirations.
Analysis of socioeconomic groups confi rms that young people’s ambitions 
are unrealistic. In West Africa, for example, nearly 35 percent of young peo-
ple want to become managers, even though just 5 percent of positions are in 
management. Th e situation is similar in Antananarivo, Douala, and Kinshasa. 
Yaoundé displays similar patterns. Although young people appear to shun the 
idea of becoming laborers, contributing family workers, or apprentices (only 7 
percent aspire to these occupations), these jobs account for 30–40 percent of 
jobs created.
Th ese fi ndings suggest that young job-seekers are heading for serious dis-
appointment, which, if not corrected, could generate major social tensions. 
Although problems have not yet emerged and it is not a new issue (Berthelier 
and Roubaud 1993). 
Adjustments need to be made in two directions. First, young people need to 
be made to understand that wage employment is not the be-all and end-all of 
a successful career and that the link between a university education and public 
employment is a thing of the past. Schools should prepare their students to 
envisage the possibility of setting up their own business by steering the cur-
riculum more toward vocational training. Second, greater fairness and trans-
parency are needed in managing formal sector jobs, particularly in the public 
sector. A more equitable distribution of these jobs needs to be promoted—by, 
for example, encouraging voluntary redundancies and early retirement to open 
the door for more qualifi ed and motivated young people (see ILO 2010).
Notes
 1. For a description of 1-2-3 surveys, see box O.1 in the overview.
 2. Th e 10 countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Th e 11 cities 
are Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire; Bamako, Mali; Cotonou, Benin; Dakar, Senegal; Lomé, 
Togo; Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; and Niamey, Niger, in West Africa; Douala and 
Yaoundé, Cameroon; and Kinshasa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, in Central 
Africa; and Antananarivo, Madagascar.
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Javier Herrera and Sébastien Merceron
Traditional labor market indicators fail to capture the distinctive characteris-
tics of low-income countries and the ways in which markets in those countries 
adjust. Th e absence of unemployment insurance, the importance of informal 
sector employment, and the weakness of state regulations, among other factors, 
reduce the relevance of quantity adjustments (measured by the unemployment 
rate) in these countries, where changes in the quality of employment seem to 
play an important role. 
No offi  cial indicator captures this dimension. Th is chapter tries to fi ll this gap 
by focusing on the measurement of job mismatch and its consequences on rev-
enues in Sub-Saharan Africa. Th e chapter posits that a key element of the adjust-
ment of supply and demand is found in changes in the quality of employment. 
Individuals who are members of households that do not have the necessary 
resources to withstand extended unemployment are forced either to create their 
own jobs or to accept wage jobs whose remuneration, skills match, social secu-
rity, job security, and other features are oft en inferior to the features of the job 
they previously held. None of the labor market indicators captures this situation. 
Th e chapter is organized into seven sections. Th e fi rst section describes the 
limitations of traditional unemployment and underemployment indicators 
given the characteristics of the labor markets in developing countries in gen-
eral and in Sub-Saharan Africa in particular. Th e second section examines the 
literature on “overeducation” and discusses the measurement of job mismatch. 
Th e third section presents estimates on the extent of job mismatch and identifi es 
its determinants. Th e fourth section examines the impact of job mismatch on 
earnings, both in developed countries and in Sub-Saharan Africa. Th e fi  fth sec-
tion examines nonwage compensation for overeducation and undereducation. 
Th e sixth section examines wage downgrading as a pathway out of unemploy-
ment and economic inactivity. Th e last section summarizes the main fi ndings 
and analyzes their implications. 
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The Inadequacy of Standard Unemployment 
Indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Although work-related issues are central to economic policy debates and 
to African households’ concerns, no regional labor market diagnoses had 
been conducted until recently (see the overview for a review). Th e dearth of 
regional studies mainly refl ects gaps in primary data. Very few African coun-
tries have employment indicators (the International Labour Organization [ILO] 
LABORSTA database presents unemployment rates for just 10 African coun-
tries). Where these indicators do exist, diff erences in operational defi nitions, cov-
erage, period, and type of primary source (surveys, censuses) make the indicators 
hard to compare across countries. As a result, diff erent sources produce con-
fl icting diagnoses of employment. For example, the World Development Report 
2013: Jobs (World Bank 2013) sets the youth unemployment rate in Sub-Saharan 
Africa at less than 10 percent, the second-lowest in the world (aft er South Asia). 
Th e Economic Report on Africa 2005 paints a totally diff erent picture, estimating 
youth unemployment at about 18 percent (UNECA 2005). Th e ILO’s regional 
report (ILO 2006) also paints a bleak picture of youth unemployment. 
Th ere is a huge gap between the classic measure of unemployment on the 
one hand and underemployment and the reality of the situation as perceived 
by households in developing countries, in Africa in particular, on the other. 
Th e forms of labor market imbalances in Sub-Saharan Africa should no longer 
be assessed solely on the basis of the level of unemployment and the number 
of hours worked: the specifi cities of labor markets in Africa call for the use of 
indicators that address both the quantity and quality of jobs.
Th e unemployment rate in Sub-Saharan Africa, as in many other develop-
ing countries, is relatively low, comparable to the rate in developed countries. 
In addition, despite wide macroeconomic fl uctuations, unemployment rates 
remain fairly stable. African labor markets thus do not appear to adjust either 
solely or primarily quantitatively.
Unemployment benefi ts exist in only a few African countries, and earnings 
levels are relatively low. As a result, during downturns, households depend on 
other households—something traditional measures do not capture. Th e tradi-
tional underemployment indicator shows that the employment problem cannot 
be characterized by the existence of a large contingent of individuals working 
fewer hours than the statutory working week. In fact, on average, the number 
of weekly hours actually exceeds the statutory working week.
If the unemployment and underemployment rates in Sub-Saharan Africa are 
relatively low and stable, why does employment appear to be one of the main 
challenges perceived by households? How and through what mechanisms do 
labor markets adjust in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
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Serious doubts have been raised about the relevance, accuracy, and compa-
rability of the classic indicators of unemployment in Sub-Saharan Africa.1 Th e 
notion of unemployment as defi ned in the developed countries is not applicable 
in Sub-Saharan Africa because labor market characteristics there diff er. If the 
ILO defi nition of unemployment is expanded to include extended unemploy-
ment, including discouraged workers (people who are no longer actively seek-
ing a job because they fear they will not fi nd one), the unemployment rate in 
Sub-Saharan Africa rises by half to some 16 percent (see chapter 1). 
Unemployment and time-related underemployment rates (using the ILO 
defi nition) are relatively low in urban Sub-Saharan Africa: in the commer-
cial capitals of the countries in the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU), unemployment averages 11.4 percent and time-related 
underemployment 14.3 percent (see chapter 1).2 However, polls of households 
reveal that lack of work is their main problem, and more than 40 percent of 
employed workers in West Africa report being dissatisfi ed with the job they 
hold (see chapter 3). 
Several particularities of the African economies may explain why the stan-
dard unemployment indicator is not a useful measure in Sub-Saharan Africa:
• Th ree-quarters of jobs are concentrated in the informal sector. Th ese jobs 
typically are highly insecure. Th ey provide no social security coverage and 
poor working conditions. 
• Th e absence of unemployment benefi ts and the predominance of family and 
social networks in job-seeking alters the approach to prospecting. Job-seeking 
oft en means getting together enough capital to start up a small informal, own-
account business, generally with the help of family and friends.
• Th e scale of unpaid family and child labor makes it hard to distinguish 
between work and nonwork.
• Education plays a diff erent role in access to employment. Unlike in devel-
oped countries, the level of education and the unemployment rate are 
inversely related in Sub-Saharan Africa (see chapter 5).
• Th e seasonal nature of many jobs in Sub-Saharan Africa raises a reference 
period problem.
Th ese features of African labor markets make the classic labor market evalu-
ation indicators unsuitable. Th ere is a pressing need for better indicators that 
more fully and accurately cover the reality of African employment problems. 
Measures of underemployment do a better job of capturing labor market 
imbalances. Th ey aim to quantify the number of people who are forced to work 
fewer hours or take a less skilled job in a less productive economic unit to avoid 
unemployment and who therefore earn less than they could normally earn 
(Borgen, Amundson, and Harder 1988; Hecker 1992; ILO 1997).3 
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Th e 16th International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ILO 1998) 
decided that underemployment refl ects the underutilization of the productive 
capacity of the employed population. It is to the labor force what the underuse 
of capital is to business. Time-related underemployment refl ects the quantity of 
work rather than its quality.
On average, time-related underemployment remains low in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: 14.3 percent of employed workers in the WAEMU capitals spend less 
than 35 hours a week at their main job when they would prefer to work more.4 
Another 43 percent of employed workers work more than 48 hours a week (48 
percent among informal sector workers). 
Th e fi rst limitation of this standard time-related underemployment indicator 
is that people may work a second job to supplement their main job. Only 5.9 per-
cent of workers across the West African capitals hold a second job in addition to 
their main job, however. Th is low rate explains why including hours worked in 
the second job does very little to change the rate of time-related underemploy-
ment, which falls just 0.1 percent on average across WAEMU (0.2 percent in 
Cotonou, where the rate of multiple jobholding is at the highest, at 9.2 percent).
This notion of time-related underemployment therefore needs to be 
expanded to include measures of the quality of the work, characterized by such 
factors as low hourly earnings, the underutilization of professional skills, and 
low labor productivity resulting from the misallocation of labor resources or a 
fundamental imbalance between labor and other factors of production.5 When 
long hours are made necessary by abnormally low labor productivity or hourly 
earnings, they may also refl ect invisible underemployment. 
Minimum wage regulations are generally not relevant in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Measuring invisible underemployment in terms of underpayment calls for 
hourly income norms by type of occupation, rather than just a legal minimum 
income that is uniform for all individuals.
Invisible underemployment measures the shortfall in productivity, which 
can be measured at the worker level: individuals may work at jobs that do 
not require them to use their skills or human capital (Becker 1975). Profes-
sional match analysis compares job quality with individuals’ expectations and 
characteristics. 
Job Mismatch
Job mismatch is the deviation between a worker’s skill level and the level 
required by the job. It covers two situations. Th e terms skill-related under-
employment, downgrading, and overeducation refer to workers who are forced 
to accept jobs for which they are overqualifi ed or that do not match their skills 
or training. Th e terms underqualifi cation and undereducation refer to workers 
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who hold jobs for which they are not qualifi ed enough: in a dysfunctional labor 
market, applicants may be hired based on their social network rather than their 
abilities. Both concepts are based on norms that may change over time and space.
Th e Economic Literature on Overeducation 
Job mismatch exists in developed economies, where many people have many 
years of education. In France, for example, nearly one in fi ve employees reported 
that their education did not match their job in 1996, a consequence of the fl ood 
of graduates (Bodier and Crenner 1997). 
Many economists have addressed overeducation. Freeman (1976), one of 
the earliest, endeavored to explain the downgrading of graduates in the United 
States by the oversupply of graduates, challenging the principle of an automatic 
link between qualifi cations and economic success.
Human capital theory posits that workers are paid commensurate with their 
level of productivity, which is directly dependent on the level of human capital 
(education, work experience, training, seniority, skills, and all other unobservable 
competencies) (Becker 1975). In a fl exible labor market, overeducation would 
be a purely transitional phase of adaptation, during which individuals need to 
compensate for their lack of other human capital endowments (that is, the lack 
of experience of young graduate workers) (Groot 1996). Sicherman (1991) fi nds 
that overeducated workers change jobs more oft en, suggesting that overeducation 
is part of a phase of adaptation to the fi rst stages of a career. Rubb (2003a) posits 
that overeducation may be a short-run phenomenon for individuals but a long-
run phenomenon for the economy. Individuals who take a break in their careers, 
such as women who have children, are more likely to hold a job for which they 
are overeducated because of their lack of experience (Groot and Maassen van den 
Brink 2000). Older workers off set their lack of training with more experience. 
Th e job competition model (Th urow 1975) posits that an individual’s 
employability is inversely proportional to the training costs required aft er his 
or her recruitment. He believes that employers’ decisions to hire one individual 
over another are dictated by the training costs they will have to pay to make the 
individual operational. Th e more educated individuals are at the point of hir-
ing, the lower these costs will be and the greater their chances of being hired. 
From this point of view, employers may end up hiring individuals with higher 
levels of education than strictly required for the position; workers therefore 
fi nd themselves overeducated for their jobs. Candidates in the queues for each 
job in an environment of high unemployment have to choose between being 
unemployed and reducing their reservation wage. Professional downgrading 
(overeducation) is therefore a defense against unemployment and the deci-
sion to remain unemployed a defense against downgrading. Th e lengthening of 
education is therefore making education an essentially defensive investment to 
keep one’s place in the queue for the desired job. Overeducation in this model 
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is therefore associated more with macroeconomic circumstances and long-run 
disequilibria than the human capital life cycle.
Empirical research in developed countries has shown that overeducated 
individuals earn more than their counterparts with appropriate qualifi cations 
doing the same job but less than similarly educated individuals employed in 
jobs for which they are not overqualifi ed (Sicherman 1991; Cohn and Khan 
1995; Verdugo and Verdugo 1989; Groot and Maassen van den Brink 2000). As 
Rubb (2003b p. 621), notes, “On average, the literature fi nds that the premium 
paid for overeducation is about equal to the penalty for undereducation, but 
lower than the returns associated with an increase in required education.” 
Very little research has been conducted in developing countries, especially 
Africa, on job mismatch and overeducation. Th e only empirical studies are by 
Simon and Stark (2007) on overqualifi cation as a result of international migra-
tion, by Herrera (2005) on Peru, and by Esteves and Martins (2007) on Brazil. 
Measuring Job Mismatch 
Th e literature identifi es four main ways of measuring the level of education 
required for a given job (and therefore overeducation and undereducation) 
(Hartog 2000). “Subjective” methods are based on workers’ self-assessment. 
“Objective” methods are based on experts’ job analysis or realized matches.6 
Realized matches measure the diff erence between the education attained and 
the dominant level of education observed for the studied worker’s occupation. 
It can be defi ned in terms of years of education (a method developed by Clogg 
[1979] and Clogg and Shockey [1984], called the Clogg indicator) or education 
levels (an approach developed by de Grip, Borghans, and Smits [1998], called 
the de Grip indicator). Individuals are overeducated if the number of years 
(level) of education is greater than or equal to the central value that defi nes 
the norm. Individuals have an inadequate match if the observed number of 
years of education is more than one standard deviation from the mean or two 
standard deviations from the median number of years of education observed 
in the occupation for the reference population. In the case of education lev-
els, the norm is defi ned in terms of the dominant level of education for each 
occupation.7
Each method has advantages and drawbacks. Self-assessment by workers has 
the advantage of providing education norms directly at the local level. However, 
individuals tend to subjectively infl ate the level required for their job and over-
estimate the level of their position. 
Th e choice of method is dictated above all by the availability of data. Many 
authors rely on experts’ analysis of job qualifi cations, which provides an objec-
tive, clear, and fairly unbiased measurement of the levels of education required 
by fi rms for a given position. No such evaluations exist in developing coun-
tries. Th e method based on realized matches yields the balance between labor 
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supply and demand; it does not measure the level of education required by 
fi rms  (Hartog 2000). In general, endogenous measurements based on the gen-
eral trend (such as the modal, median, and mean values) do not refl ect each 
job’s required level of education when the economy (or sector) is in a situation 
of underemployment or overemployment (ILO 1997). 
Constructing a Job Mismatch Indicator
Th e compilation of surveys conducted in the capitals of nine African countries 
covering more than 100,000 people allows for the fi rst-ever large-scale estima-
tion of empirical educational norms at a detailed (three-digit) occupational clas-
sifi cation level and a robust deduction of the job mismatch level and profi les. Th e 
data come from the 1-2-3 surveys conducted in seven West African countries 
(Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo) between 
2001 and 2002; in the administrative capital (Yaoundé) and economic capital 
(Douala) of Cameroon (2005); and in the capital of Madagascar (Antanana-
rivo 2001–04).8 Th e questionnaires used were identical, and the same collection 
methodology, data processing, and variable coding were used to facilitate their 
compilation and consolidate the estimates. 
Th e economic and monetary integration of the WAEMU countries studied 
guarantees strong homogeneousness within the population concerned, worker 
mobility in the region, and, therefore, the relevance of the norms and indicators 
developed throughout the region in this study. It allows analysis of questions 
regarding the impact of the job mismatch on earnings. 
Th e focus in this chapter is on employed workers 15 and older living in urban 
areas. However, it is useful to restrict the reference population to adults old 
enough to have fi nished their schooling (that is, people 25–44). Th e restricted 
sample includes 18,000 paid workers, representative of about 3.6 million people 
aft er weighting. Th e occupations are aggregated into 70 categories covering all 
the jobs on the labor market in the cities concerned.
Th e realized matches method was used to measure overqualifi cation or 
underqualifi cation by profession (that is, the distribution of levels of education 
by occupation was used to estimate an endogenous qualifi cation norm for each 
of the professions). Doing so entailed fi rst estimating the reference qualifi cation 
norm for each type of profession. Th e overqualifi cation indictor is measured by 
the proportion of workers with a qualifi cation level greater than the normative 
threshold estimated for the profession concerned. 
Estimating the Extent of Job Mismatch 
For all professions and all cities together, 14.8 percent of workers 15 and older 
are undereducated based on Clogg’s continuous indicator (25.0 percent based 
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Table 2.1 Clogg and de Grip Measures of Job Mismatch in 10 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(percent)
Discrete indicator 
(de Grip)
Continuous indicator (Clogg)
Job match
Job mismatch
All
Undereducation Overeducation
Undereducation
Extreme 
undereducation Overeducation
Extreme 
overeducation
Job match 47.9 1.6 0.0 4.1 0.1 53.7
Undereducation 11.5 11.9 1.4 0.3 0.0 25.0
Overeducation 5.1 0.0 0.0 13.4 2.7 21.3
All 64.5 13.4 1.4 17.9 2.8 100.0
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the following 1-2-3 surveys: Cameroon 2005 (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation [DIAL] and National Statistics Institute [NSI]); Democratic 
Republic of Congo 2005 (DIAL and NSI); Madagascar 2001 (DIAL and Institut National de la Statistique [INSTAT]); West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 2001/02 
(Observatoire économique et statistique d’Afrique Subsaharienne [AFRISTAT], DIAL, and NSI).
Note: Figures are for working individuals 15 and older.
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Figure 2.1 Incidence of Job Mismatch (Clogg Indicator) for 10 Countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 2.1 for details).
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on de Grip’s discrete indicator) (table 2.1). Th e share of the labor force that is 
overeducated is 20.7 percent based on the continuous indicator and 21.3 per-
cent based on the discrete indicator. For developed countries, Groot (1996) 
estimates undereducation at 21.8 percent and overeducation at 16.0 percent, 
Cohn and Khan (1995) estimate undereducation at 12 percent and overeduca-
tion at 13 percent, and Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) estimate undereducation 
at 9.9 percent and overeducation at 10.9 percent. A meta-analysis of the litera-
ture reveals an average incidence of 14.4 percent for undereducation and 23.3 
percent for overeducation in Western Europe and the United States (Groot and 
Maassen van den Brink 2000). Th e estimate for Sub-Saharan Africa using the 
Clogg method is similar.9
Th e Clogg and de Grip measures of overeducation are similar (20.7 per-
cent and 21.3 percent of occupied individuals). A larger discrepancy is evident 
in undereducation, where the indicators diff er by about 10 percentage points 
(14.8 percent according to Clogg’s indicator, 25.0 percent according to de Grip’s 
indicator). Th e correlation coeffi  cient between the two indicators is 0.77, which 
means that both indicators capture the phenomenon fairly well.10 
Th e Clogg continuous indicator is more restrictive in its job mismatch mea-
surement than the discrete indicator (fi gure 2.1). It estimates that 64.5 percent 
of people hold jobs that match their level of education. Th e de Grip measure 
estimates this fi gure at 53.7 percent. 
92  URBAN LABOR MARKETS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Identifying the Determinants of Job Mismatch 
A multivariate nonlinear econometric model is used to identify the eff ect of 
each explanatory variable on job mismatch aft er controlling for bivariate eff ects 
caused by the other explanatory variables observed. Th e specifi cation of a mul-
tinomial or ordered logit model seemed most appropriate, because it can simul-
taneously estimate the probability of overeducation and undereducation. Th e 
choice of an ordered or unordered model depends on the type of dependent 
variable and whether there is a possibility of ranking the variable’s categories. 
As there is no unequivocal order between the dependent variable’s categories, 
an unordered model is used here.11
Th e explanatory variables in the model cover individual characteristics, 
household characteristics, and characteristics of the business and the job held. 
Th e dependent variable is Clogg’s continuous indicator. It was chosen in order 
to reduce the risk of endogeneity in the model introduced by the presence of 
qualitative education variables as explanatory variables (education dummy vari-
able). Th is education variable sharply increases the model’s explanatory power 
and reveals that the probability of being overeducated increases with the level 
of education.12
Table 2.2 presents the results of the multinomial model. In most cases, a sig-
nifi cant variable for overeducation (such as the size of the business in which the 
Table 2.2 Job Mismatch Modeling Results for 10 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(multinomial logit model)
Variable Undereducated Overeducated
Type of business (reference = self-employment [1 person])
Microbusiness (2–5 people) 1.34*** 0.81***
Small business (6–20 people) 1.64*** 0.43***
Large business (>20 people) 1.64*** 0.41***
Migrant status (reference = native)
Interurban migrant 1.26*** 0.99
Rural migrant 1.12** 0.96
Foreigner 1.20*** 1.04
Jobholding and time-related underemployment
Multiple jobholder (reference = one job) 0.80*** 1.18**
Time-related underemployment (reference = no 
time-related underemployment)
0.90*** 0.92**
Education (reference = no education or informal education)
Primary education 0.10*** 0.13***
Lower-secondary education 0.01*** 39.54***
(continued next page)
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Upper-secondary education 0.01*** 346.92***
Higher education 0.01*** 726.20***
Position in household (reference = head of household)
Head of household’s spouse 1.01 1.04
Secondary household member 0.88*** 1.06
Marital status and gender
Couple (married or unmarried) (reference = single) 0.70*** 1.04
Male (reference = female) 1.38*** 1.21***
Sector (reference = secondary sector)
Tertiary sector 1.80*** 0.93
Primary sector 1.89*** 1.28***
Sector (reference = public sector)
Informal sector 0.86 1.48***
Formal private sector 0.83* 1.23***
Age
Age 0.97*** 1.07***
Age squared 1.001*** 0.999***
Cohort (reference = 50+)
Young cohort (10–29) 0.81** 1.01
Medium cohort (30–49) 0.98 1.03
Religion (reference = other)
Christian 0.41*** 2.33***
Muslim 0.43*** 2.67***
Seniority in the business
Seniority in the business 1.00 0.99***
City (reference = aggregate of Douala and Yaoundé)
Abidjan 1.61*** 0.53***
Antananarivo 7.19*** 0.41***
Bamako 1.54*** 0.38***
Cotonou 1.94*** 0.47***
Lomé 0.87 0.93
Niamey 1.47*** 0.33***
Ouagadougou 1.16 0.49***
Constant 1.60 0.001
Number of observations 61,984 61,984
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 2.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for working individuals 10 and older. Dakar was dropped because of collinearity.
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 2.2 (continued)
Variable Undereducated Overeducated
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individual works) is also signifi cant for undereducation. A “confusion matrix” 
is used to evaluate the quality of the model by comparing the predicted values 
with the true values of the indicator. Th e correct classifi cation rate—the ratio of 
the number of correct predictions to the sample size—is 74 percent.13 
Several fi ndings emerge from the data in table 2.2: 
• Th e probability of being overeducated (undereducated) increases (decreases) 
as the level of education increases (decreases). Th e higher a worker’s quali-
fi cations, the greater his or her risk of being overqualifi ed for the job he or 
she holds. 
• Internal migrants have a greater probability than nonmigrants of holding 
a job that requires more education than they have. Th e fact that on aver-
age they are less educated than the native population probably refl ects their 
lower access to the education system, despite recent decentralization and 
deconcentration eff orts in most African countries.
• Foreign migrants also have a higher probability of being undereducated: the 
role of social capital (social and community networks of migrants living in 
the country’s main city) appears to come into play here. Moreover, a selec-
tion bias exists for migrants: other unobservable characteristics explain the 
fact that for a given level of education, migrants are more likely to occupy 
jobs that require education levels higher than those they have attained. We 
fi nd no statistically signifi cant support to the stylized fact posited by Simon 
and Stark (2007) that overeducation in developing countries is the result of 
international migration. 
• Members of the oldest cohort are more likely to be undereducated than mem-
bers of younger cohorts, because the qualifi cation norms (level of education) 
for a given occupation were lower when they entered the labor market.
• Aft er controlling for cohort eff ects (and therefore diff erential access to edu-
cation by generation), age increases the chances of being overeducated, in 
a nonlinear manner (both age and age squared are signifi cant). As age is 
closely related to potential experience, it may be individuals’ potential expe-
rience (and not age) that positively infl uences the probability of being over-
educated. Th is paradoxical result would tend to invalidate the stylized fact 
noted by Sicherman (1991) and Freeman (1976) that individuals become 
overeducated in order to compensate for the lack of human capital endow-
ments, such as experience and training. What is being measured here is the 
age eff ect within a cohort (age bracket); the cohort eff ect is wholly in line 
with human capital theory.
• Working in the informal sector increases the chances of being overeducated. 
Th is fi nding can be explained by the fact that the informal sector does not off er 
suffi  ciently skilled work because of lack of access to technology and capital. 
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• Men have a higher probability than women of being undereducated or 
overeducated.
• Overeducation is positively correlated with job dissatisfaction. Th is fi nd-
ing comes not from the estimation of the multinomial model but from the 
simple study of the coeffi  cient for the correlation between the dichotomous 
overeducation variable and the variable covering job satisfaction as reported 
by the individual. Th e correlation (0.18) is positive. Th e job satisfaction vari-
able is not introduced into the model as an explanatory variable because of 
the high risk of endogeneity: although overqualifi cation can clearly generate 
job dissatisfaction, job dissatisfaction (measured by the desire to change a 
job) can infl uence the probability of a job mismatch.
Having a high level of education, being a man, and belonging to a young 
cohort are correlated with overeducation; having a low level of education, being 
a migrant, being a woman, and working in a very small business are correlated 
with undereducation. 
Impacts of Job Mismatch: Premium or Penalty? 
Does wage or nonwage compensation exist for job mismatch? Are overedu-
cated individuals paid more or less than matched individuals, aft er control-
ling for the eff ects of other individual characteristics? Do they have more 
stable jobs? 
Impact of Job Mismatch on Earnings in Developed Countries
Human capital is defi ned as the stock of productive capacities an individual 
acquires (through the accumulation of general and specifi c knowledge, know-
how, and so forth) (Becker 1975). Investment in human capital is an individual 
choice resulting from the cost-benefi t trade-off  between the costs (out-of-pocket 
cost of education and opportunity cost of going to school rather than working) 
and the future discounted earnings that can be generated by additional educa-
tion. Individuals may choose to invest in order to raise their future productivity 
and therefore their earnings. Human capital theory assumes that individuals are 
paid in accordance with their productivity level at work and that this marginal 
productivity is determined more by the components of human capital (educa-
tion, training, experience, skills, and so forth) than by the characteristics of the 
job (Mincer 1974; Becker 1975). 
Becker posits that wage growth over a career more or less refl ects the accu-
mulation of human capital. He believes it to be concave: gross investment tends 
to decline with age, because any wage increase raises the opportunity cost and 
the return diminishes with age, because there are fewer years available in which 
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to make the investment pay off . Th us, from a human capital point of view, the 
rates of return on investment in education are expected to be positive: the more 
an individual has studied, the higher his or her earnings. 
Th e results of 11 studies on diff erent countries reviewed by Card (2001) 
suggest that the marginal returns to education estimated by the instrumental 
variables method were 6–10 percent. As with any investment, the returns to 
education diminish: the more an individual studies, the smaller the margin 
gain in earnings for each additional year of studies. Kuépié, Nordman, and 
Roubaud (2009; see also chapter 5 of this book) invalidate this assumption 
for Sub-Saharan Africa, fi nding that private returns to education are convex 
for workers in the West African capitals. Spence (1973) notes that, as human 
capital is hard for others to perceive, qualifi cations form a credible signal of 
the worker’s level of productivity for an employer in a situation of informa-
tion asymmetry. Wages in this case are essentially contingent upon the level 
of qualifi cations.
Impact of Job Mismatch on Earnings in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Individual earnings are modeled to identify the eff ect of overeducation and 
undereducation on the level of earnings, controlling for the classic explanatory 
eff ects. For this purpose, Mincer’s model can be extended as follows: 
 lnYs = c + rS + aE + bE2 + ∑diXi + f1. UNDER + f2 OVER + u (2. 1)
where the Xi cover observable demographic characteristics (gender, ethnic 
group, religion, migratory status, father’s socioeconomic group); OVER is a 
dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual is overeducated for the job 
he or she holds and 0 if not; and UNDER is a dummy variable taking the value 
1 if the individual is undereducated for the job he or she holds and 0 if not.
Th e estimations of lnY based solely on observed earnings therefore need to 
take selection bias into account (Heckman 1979). Aft er estimating a selection 
model (on the probability of working a paid job), we incorporate the Mills ratio 
into the earnings models to correct for selection bias. 
Use of the standard ordinary least squares method is potentially problematic 
when estimating returns to education (and therefore returns to overeducation), 
because of the endogenous nature of education (that is, its correlation with the 
earnings equation residuals because of unobservable individual characteristics). 
In principle, this endogeneity can be overcome using the instrumental variable 
procedure, which consists of fi nding variables that are assumed to be correlated 
with education but not earnings. In practice, no convincing instrument (that 
had not already been used as an explanatory variable in the model) was found. 
Earnings Model 1 proposes inserting job mismatch (undereducation and 
overeducation) dummy variables into Mincer’s equation. Th is log-linear 
regression model of hourly earnings is initially tested on all adults 25–44. Two 
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additional estimations are made, for men and for women (table 2.3). Th e model 
yields the following results:
• A (small) penalty for overeducation and a premium for undereducation is evi-
dent aft er controlling for the level of education and selection biases. Overedu-
cated individuals earn more than individuals in the same occupation with an 
appropriate level of education for the job, but they earn less than individuals 
with the same level of education working in better jobs. Th e penalty or pre-
mium associated with the job mismatch is smaller among women than men.
Table 2.3 Heckman-Corrected Mincerian Earnings Equation with Overeducation and 
Undereducation Variables for Men and Women in 10 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(log of hourly earnings) 
Variable All Men Women 
Job mismatch (reference = job match)
Undereducated (discrete indicator) 0.179*** 0.187*** 0.159***
Overeducated (discrete indicator) –0.0901*** –0.0945*** –0.0547
Years of education 0.0820*** 0.0799*** 0.0770***
Size of business (reference = self-employment [1 person])
Microbusiness (2–5 people) 0.1510*** 0.0645*** 0.2000***
Small business (6–20 people) 0.263*** 0.138*** 0.516***
Large business (>20 people) 0.418*** 0.281*** 0.740***
Migrant status (reference = native)
Interurban migrant –0.0378** –0.0319 –0.0387
Migrant from the rural exodus –0.0615** –0.0493 –0.0756*
Foreign migrant 0.01250 0.00355 0.02180
Jobholding and time-related underemployment 
Multiple jobholder (reference = one job) –0.0291 –0.0377 –0.0219
Time-related underemployment (reference = no time-
related underemployment)
0.640*** 0.666*** 0.635***
Position in household (reference = head of household)
Head of household’s spouse –0.208*** –0.262 –0.146***
Secondary household member –0.200*** –0.204*** –0.179***
Marital status and gender 
Couple (married or unmarried) (reference = single) 0.0602*** 0.0565** 0.0432
Male (reference = female) 0.320*** — —
Sector (reference = secondary sector)
Tertiary sector 0.0942** 0.1280** 0.0440
Primary sector –0.00367 0.0247 –0.0231
(continued next page)
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• Th e penalty for overeducation and the premium for undereducation do not 
off set each other: undereducation is much more profi table than overeduca-
tion is costly (in the log-linear model, the parameter corresponding to over-
education is twice as high in absolute value as the parameter corresponding 
to the undereducation dummy variable). Th is fi nding is diff erent from what 
Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000) report for developed countries
• Th e penalty (premium) for overeducation (undereducation) is smaller than 
the returns to high levels of education. Th e returns to education are positive 
and high (8 percent), for both women and men.
Th e model was also estimated using the number of surplus (defi cit) years 
of education the individual has above (below) the norm for the years of educa-
tion required for the occupation (Model 2 [not shown]). Th is model allows 
estimation of the returns to years of overeducation. Th e results confi rm that 
the returns to required education are positive and large: one additional year 
Sector (reference = public sector)
Informal sector –0.352*** –0.308*** –0.454***
Formal private sector –0.181*** –0.155*** –0.227**
Age
Age 0.0328 0.0341 0.0215
Age squared –0.000348 –0.000310 –0.000244
Religion (reference = other)
Christian 0.0129 –0.0145 0.0278
Muslim 0.0553* 0.0444 0.0491
Seniority in the business
Seniority in the business 0.0199*** 0.0182*** 0.0202***
Selection model: Probability of participation
Cohabiting couple (married or unmarried) 
(reference = single)
0.313*** 0.349*** 0.207***
Age 0.0281*** 0.0267*** 0.0266***
Male (reference = female) –0.109*** — —
Number of earners in household 0.571*** 0.540*** 0.651***
Number of children in household 0.0514*** 0.0323** 0.0860***
Total number of people in household (excluding visitors) –0.166*** –0.157*** –0.183***
Constant –3.324*** –0.173 –0.157
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 2.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for working individuals 25–44. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
Table 2.3 (continued)
Variable All Men Women 
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of required education (which enables the worker to hold a job demanding one 
more year of schooling) generates a 10.1 percent increase in the hourly earn-
ings logarithm, for both men and women. Each year of education beyond the 
required schooling norm for the occupation generates additional earnings (by 
6.2 percent in the hourly earnings logarithm); each year of education short 
of the normal length of schooling for the occupation decreases earnings (by 
5.1 percent in the hourly earnings logarithm). Th e return to years of overeduca-
tion is thus positive but lower than the return to years of required education. As 
in Model 1, undereducated individuals earn a premium over their colleagues in 
the same occupation with the level of education required for the job. Model 2 
erases the asymmetry revealed in Model 1 between the overeducation penalty 
and the undereducation premium: the results for the two components are simi-
lar in Model 2. By way of comparison, the meta-analysis conducted by Groot 
and Maassen van den Brink (2000) estimates the average returns to one year of 
overeducation in developed countries at 3 percent. 
Th e results of the two models bear out the results of Verdugo and Verdugo 
(1989), Groot (1996), and Hartog (2000) for developed countries: overeduca-
tion generates a penalty and undereducation a premium once the eff ects of 
required education, selection biases, and other sociodemographic variables are 
controlled for.
Underemployment and Nonwage Compensation
In developed countries, nonwage benefi ts oft en compensate individuals who 
are overeducated for the position they hold (for a discussion of compensating 
diff erential theory, see chapter 4). Th is section examines whether nonwage com-
pensation exists in Sub-Saharan Africa in the form of increased job security. 
Insecurity (the risk of losing one’s job) can be measured across an array 
of variables refl ecting the extent of formality linking employee to employer: 
the existence or absence of a written contract that protects the employee; the 
existence of a payslip; social security coverage; the steady or unsteady nature of 
the work done (casual, temporary, or steady); access to a union; and so forth. 
Th e choice of components for this indicator was determined by the availability 
of data. 
Workers are classifi ed as dependent (wage-earners) or independent (own 
account, managers, and employers). Th e insecurity score for dependent work-
ers is the arithmetic sum of the values of three variables: contract (long-term 
written contract, short-term written contract, oral contract, no contract); pay-
slip; and steadiness (steady, casual, or temporary). For independent workers, 
the presence of written accounts captures the extent of the business’s formality 
(and therefore its sustainability). Apprentices were excluded from the analysis.
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Th e job mismatch indicators (Clogg’s continuous indicator covering three 
to fi ve categories and de Grip’s discrete indicator covering three categories) 
and the insecurity score are negatively correlated.14 Th is correlation suggests 
that overeducated workers are indeed compensated with greater job security 
(table 2.4). 
To analyze the net eff ects of job mismatch on insecurity (by controlling 
for other infl uential variables), it would be preferable to conduct an ordered 
multinomial logistic regression (because the score values are discrete, whole, 
and ordered). However, the number of categories in this score (six) makes the 
analysis and interpretation tricky and the conclusions hazy. For this reason, a 
simple linear regression of the insecurity score on the classic explanatory vari-
ables (from the corrected Mincer equation) and the overeducation and under-
education dummy variables (measured by the Clogg continuous indicator, for 
example) using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method is presented (table 2.5). 
It would have been desirable to address the possible endogeneity of the job mis-
match in the explanation of the level of insecurity using an instrumental variable 
procedure, but no instrument was found to be conclusive. 
Given the construction of the insecurity indicator, it appears preferable to 
concentrate on a split (dependent/independent) interpretation of the results. 
Th e results of the regression model show that for dependent workers, other 
things equal, the insecurity score (and hence the level of job insecurity) 
increases with overeducation and decreases with undereducation. Th is result 
means that aft er controlling for the level of completed education (in particu-
lar), the level of job security of overeducated workers is actually higher. For 
independent workers, the explanatory variables associated with job mismatch 
are not signifi cant. Th is phenomenon is therefore of concern to employees, not 
employers or self-account workers. 
Table 2.4 Correlation Matrix between Job Mismatch and Insecurity Indicators in 10 Cities in 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Variable
Continuous job mismatch indicator 
(Clogg indicator)
Discrete job 
mismatch indicator 
(de Grip indicator)
Five categories Three categories Three categories
Insecurity of dependent 
workers –0.09 –0.17 –0.12
Insecurity of independent 
workers –0.07 –0.15 –0.15
Insecurity score –0.08 –0.22 –0.18
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 2.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for working individuals 15 and older. 
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Table 2.5 Insecurity Score Equation with Overeducation and Undereducation Variables for 
Dependent and Independent Workers in 10 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(ordinary least squares) 
Variable All
Dependent 
workers
Independent 
workers
Job mismatch (reference = job match)
Undereducated (continuous indicator) –0.0807*** –0.2000*** 0.0322
Overeducated (continuous indicator) 0.2210*** 0.1980*** 0.0716
Size of business (reference = self-employment 
[1 person])
Microbusiness (2–5 people) –0.3090*** –0.2220*** –0.0775***
Medium-size business (6–20 people) –0.815*** –0.559*** –0.297***
Large business (>20 people) –1.426*** –1.152*** –1.599***
Migrant status (reference = native)
Interurban migrant –0.0318 –0.0547* 0.0302
Migrant from the rural exodus 0.00259 –0.02680 0.06090**
Foreigner 0.0385 0.0536 0.0594**
Jobholding and time-related underemployment
Multiple jobholder 0.0867** 0.0800 0.0331
Time-related underemployment 0.332*** 0.478*** 0.227***
Education (reference = no education or informal 
education)
Primary –0.1060*** –0.2570*** 0.0111
Lower-secondary –0.27900*** –0.49000*** –0.00262
Upper-secondary –0.673*** –0.892*** –0.212***
Higher –0.977*** –1.247*** –0.408***
Standing in household (reference = head of household)
Head of household’s spouse 0.0979*** 0.1190** 0.0533*
Secondary household member 0.06940** 0.15500*** –0.00527
Marital status and gender 
Couple (married or unmarried)(reference = single) –0.0880*** –0.1040*** –0.0882***
Male (reference = female) 0.1320*** 0.1790*** 0.0416*
Sector (reference = secondary sector)
Tertiary sector –0.348*** –0.445*** –0.346***
Primary sector –0.240*** –0.449*** –0.312***
Sector (reference = public sector)
Informal sector 1.363*** 0.894*** 1.752***
Formal private sector 0.371*** 0.258*** 0.513***
(continued next page)
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Wage Downgrading as a Pathway Out of 
Unemployment or Economic Inactivity
Th e decision to remain unemployed can be interpreted as resistance to down-
grading and skill-related underemployment. Conversely, overeducation can be 
interpreted as resistance to unemployment. Examination of an overeducated 
jobholder’s previous situation (similar job or unemployment) was used to evalu-
ate the likelihood of this hypothesis. Table 2.6 presents the results.
A Chi-squared test rejects (at the 5 percent level) the hypothesis of indepen-
dence between the mobility variable change between the employed worker’s 
previous situation and current employment and the job mismatch indicator 
(Clogg indicator).
Relative to individuals in a job match situation, proportionally more over-
educated individuals were upwardly mobile (that is, moved up socioeconomi-
cally since their previous job or completion of studies). Th is fi nding could 
refl ect the theory of the human capital life cycle, which states that individuals 
temporarily hold a series of jobs below their level in order to accumulate experi-
ence and know-how that prepare them to apply for positions more in keeping 
with their qualifi cations.
A slightly smaller than average proportion of overeducated workers is unem-
ployed or out of the labor force just before holding their current job. Th is fi nd-
ing contradicts the economic intuition that overeducation oft en follows a period 
of unemployment. Th is question calls for further examination of the determi-
nants of professional mobility.
Age
Age –0.01530*** –0.03220*** –0.00571
Age squared 0.000166*** 0.000318*** 0.0000532
Religion (reference = other)
Christian –0.0112 –0.0645 0.0318
Muslim 0.0214 –0.0104 0.0792*
Seniority in the business
Seniority in the business –0.00750*** –0.01940*** –0.00262**
R 2 0.59 0.50 0.61
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 2.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for working individuals 15 and older. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
Table 2.5 (continued)
Variable All
Dependent 
workers
Independent 
workers
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Th e long-term unemployed (people unemployed for more than a year) 
appear to be less particular than the short-term unemployed about the match 
between the job and their qualifi cations: just 29 percent of the long-term unem-
ployed seek a job that corresponds to their training or their trade, as opposed 
to 37 percent of the short-term unemployed (table 2.7). Th is simple empirical 
result validates the theory that a mismatch occurs in the event of a strong risk 
of unemployment and a long period of unemployment: the longer the period of 
unemployment, the more the unemployed reduce their reservation wage and 
the skill level of the job they will apply for.
Conclusion
Th e special features of its labor markets—the lack of unemployment benefi ts, 
the predominance of the informal sector, the prevalence of personal networks 
to obtain jobs, the low unemployment rate, and so forth—make the classic 
Table 2.6 Labor Market Status before Current Employment in 10 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(percent)
Situation before current 
employment
Situation in current employment
Undereducated Job match Overeducated All
Unemployed/inactive 61.8 64.2 61.8 63.2
Previous employment
Held better job 3.4 8.2 22.0 7.3
Held worse job 3.8 4.9 3.9 4.4
Held similar job 31.0 22.7 12.3 25.1
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 2.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for working individuals 25–44.
Table 2.7 Type of Job Sought by the Unemployed in 10 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
by Length of Unemployment 
(percent)
Job sought
Long-term 
unemployed
Short-term 
unemployed
Total 
unemployed
Job corresponding to trade or training 29.4 36.6 31.0
Job in another trade or sector 16.1 15.7 16.0
Indifferent 54.5 47.7 53.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 2.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for working individuals 25–44.
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indicators of unemployment and time-related underemployment inappro-
priate, if not misleading, for understanding labor markets in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Th e harmonized job mismatch measurement captures these as yet 
unmeasured aspects by concentrating on underutilization of productive 
capacities. Job mismatch should be considered an extension of the under-
employment notion. 
Overeducation—measured as the gap between individual qualifi cations and 
the qualifi cations usually required for the job held—is not confi ned to devel-
oped countries: it aff ects 21 percent of workers in Sub-Saharan Africa. Men, 
older people, migrants, workers in the informal sector, the uneducated, and the 
highly educated are more likely than other workers to fi nd their job mismatched 
with their education. 
Job mismatch aff ects both earnings and job insecurity: other things equal, 
workers who are overeducated for the work they do have less job security than 
workers whose qualifi cations match their job and workers who are under-
educated for their jobs. Th e job mismatch evolves over the course of a career, 
with overqualifi cation following economic inactivity, unemployment, or more 
extreme overeducation.
Th e analysis makes a case for the widespread harmonization of job quality 
indicators and the extension of the inadequate employment measurement. Th e 
empirical methods used here need to be compared with other measurement 
methods, such as the expert job analysis method, which is more focused on 
business demand for qualifi cations and workers’ own declarations, which are 
more subjective but easier to set up.
Notes
 1. In its 2006 evaluation of African labor markets, the World Bank identifi ed four prob-
lems: the dearth of data, lack of comparability, measurement problems, and low 
relevance for low-income countries.
 2. Th e ILO defi nition of unemployment (1997) corresponds to workers who did not 
work (even one hour) in the seven days preceding the survey, who sought work 
during the previous month, and who are available to work. Time-related underem-
ployment covers gainfully employed workers whose working week is shorter than 
the statutory working week and who would like to work more.
 3. Th is type of situation used to be called disguised unemployment (Robinson 1937).
 4. Although Abidjan and Cotonou are not administrative capitals, we refer to them as 
capitals because they are the most important economic centers in their countries 
(Cotonou is also the seat of government).
 5. Th is extension used to be called invisible underemployment, which the ILO described 
as “primarily an analytical concept refl ecting a misallocation of labour resources 
or a fundamental imbalance between labour and other factors of  production. 
 Characteristic symptoms might be low income, underutilization of skill, and low 
productivity. Analytical studies of invisible underemployment should be directed to 
the examination and analysis of a wide variety of data, including income and skill 
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levels (disguised underemployment) and productivity measures (potential under-
employment)” (ILO 1982, pp. 52–53).
 6. Th urow and Lucas (1972), Hartog (1980), and others use the Dictionary of Occupa-
tional Titles (U.S. Department of Labor) to measure overeducation.
 7. De Grip developed an algorithm to identify the dominant (qualitative) level of edu-
cation for each type of occupation. Depending on the distribution of the types of 
education within the given occupation, the dominant type of education is either the 
most commonly occurring or a combination of two or three levels grouped together. 
Th e algorithm had some fl aws, which are corrected for here (de Grip, Borghans, and 
Smits 1998). 
 8. For a description of 1-2-3 surveys, see box O.1 in the overview. Cameroon and Mad-
agascar were included because their labor markets are very similar to labor markets 
in West Africa (see chapter 1).
 9. Th e fact that the share of overeducated people in Europe and the United States is 
similar to the share in Sub-Saharan Africa does not mean that the levels of education 
are similar. Th e level of education in Africa is still much lower than in the developed 
countries.
 10. If we use the mean instead of the median to estimate the norms when building the 
continuous indicator, the correlation factor rises to 86 percent.
 11. Stata’s test of independence on the logit procedure returns a positive and signifi cant 
result.
 12. Th e fi nal model estimated aims to be as sparing as possible. Th e explanatory vari-
ables ultimately chosen for the model are selected by a procedure of gradual elimina-
tion of the variables or categories with the least explanatory power.
 13. In the absence of an additional test sample, this confusion matrix was constructed 
from the data used to build the model. Th is evaluation could therefore be criticized 
for being overly optimistic.
 14. Clogg’s fi ve ordered categories are –2 (extreme undereducation), –1 (undereduca-
tion), 0 (match), 1 (overeducation), 2 (extreme overeducation). De Grip’s three cat-
egories are undereducation, job match, and overeducation. 
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Job Satisfaction in Eight African Cities 
Mireille Razaﬁ ndrakoto and François Roubaud
Researchers from various disciplines have examined job satisfaction. Psychologists 
and sociologists have explored the role of job satisfaction in individuals’ mental 
balance; other researchers have also studied individual well-being taking a broader, 
multidisciplinary approach. Economists have studied job satisfaction with a view 
to improving the understanding of the match between the supply and demand of 
labor.1 
Most work has focused on developed countries. Recent interest in this issue 
in developing countries stems largely from concerns about the quality of work-
ing conditions, as seen from discussions at the International Labour Organiza-
tion (ILO) and elsewhere on the concept of “decent work.” 
Th e analysis in this chapter seeks to improve the understanding of labor 
market conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa. To the authors’ knowledge, only two 
studies (Falco, Maloney, and Rijkers 2011; Rakotomanana 2011) examine the 
broad determinants of job satisfaction in Africa.2 
Empirical analyses confi rm the existence of negative links between job sat-
isfaction and objective facts such as the decision to quit a job (Freeman 1978; 
Lévy-Garboua, Montmarquette, and Simonnet 1999; Clark 2001). Studies also 
show that job satisfaction is correlated with on-the-job behavior, including 
absenteeism and productivity (Judge and others 2001). Th ese fi ndings challenge 
the idea that individuals’ assessments of their satisfaction are purely idiosyn-
cratic and economically irrelevant (pure “noise”).
Job satisfaction came to the fore with the rise in analyses of subjective well-
being, especially research by Easterlin (2001, 2003) and Frey and Stutzer (2002). 
Th e importance of work in an individual’s life, for both the income it provides 
and its intrinsic value, makes job satisfaction a key component of well-being. 
Judge and Watanabe (1993) show that the causal link between job satisfaction 
and subjective well-being can run in both directions. Most empirical results, 
however, fi nd that job satisfaction aff ects well-being (Warr 1999).
Interest in job satisfaction is growing in the developed countries, and research 
on the issue is on the rise in transition economies. Studies on this theme are still 
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rare, if not nonexistent, in developing countries, however, especially in Africa. 
Th e lack of research is surprising given that employment is the main source 
of income in these countries, and working conditions are oft en harsh; work 
is therefore particularly important in an individual’s life. Understanding how 
individuals assess their work—their earnings, working conditions, and intrinsic 
value placed on diff erent types of employment (fulfi llment, social recognition, 
participation/exclusion, and so forth)—is vital for evaluating labor markets.
Th is chapter is organized as follows. Th e fi rst section reviews the economic lit-
erature on this subject. Th e second section presents the data used and describes 
the approach adopted. Th e third section provides a preliminary descriptive anal-
ysis of job satisfaction in the eight African capitals studied.3 Th e fourth section 
presents and analyzes the results of the econometric estimations. Th e last section 
summarizes the main fi ndings and proposes avenues for further research.
Review of the Literature 
Warr (1999) distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic job satisfaction. 
Intrinsic components include the opportunity to manage and supervise, the 
degree of autonomy, the use of capacities and skills, the variety of tasks, the 
absence of physical danger, the clarity of information on the professional envi-
ronment, work relations, and social position. Extrinsic components include 
remuneration, working conditions, and job security.
Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza (2000) adopt the classifi cation used by Judge 
and Watanabe (1993) to compare job satisfaction in some 20 countries. Th ey 
adopt a bottom-up approach, assuming that various external factors aff ect job 
satisfaction. Job satisfaction is determined by the balance between work-role 
inputs (hours worked, eff ort, education) and work-role outputs (remuneration, 
nonwage benefi ts, status, opportunities for advancement, independence and 
self-direction, job security, job interest, social recognition, and relations with 
colleagues). Th is approach explains diff erences across countries in terms of the 
weight and relative importance of the two types of factors.
D’Addio, Eriksson, and Frijters (2003) look at the many criteria that come 
into play when assessing the quality of a job. Th ey identify another way of 
understanding satisfaction by distinguishing between the economic contract 
(in which the focus is on the relationship between eff ort and reward) and the 
psychological contract (in which the focus is on working conditions). 
Much of the debate in the literature concerns how to interpret several key fi nd-
ings. Th e fi rst is the relationship between income level and  satisfaction, which is 
not obvious (Clark and Oswald 1996; Lévy-Garboua and  Montmarquette 1984). 
A second issue is the relationship between objective job  characteristics (working 
hours and work pace, leave, job security, job type) and job satisfaction levels. 
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Th e literature fi nds a weak correlation between these variables and job satisfac-
tion (D’Addio, Eriksson, and Frijters 2003; Llorente and Macías 2005). Some 
fi ndings are counterintuitive: although women and the least educated generally 
have poorer-quality jobs, they are more inclined than other workers to report 
job satisfaction (Clark and Oswald 1996; Clark 1997; D’Addio, Eriksson, and 
Frijters 2003). Age also plays a role, with job satisfaction declining until about 
age 40 and then rising (Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette 1984; Clark, Oswald, 
and Warr 1996).
Two factors may help explain these results. First, classic economic variables 
(such as wages and working hours) do not capture job quality. A wide range 
of other job characteristics, which surveys rarely measure, also aff ect satisfac-
tion (see chapters 1, 4, and 5). Second, the level of self-reported satisfaction 
depends on the individual’s aspirations, which are determined by various fac-
tors, including social background and reference group. Th e closeness of the 
match between expectations and outcomes plays a decisive role in individual 
satisfaction levels. Based on an analysis of 19 countries in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Clark (2004) observes that 
workers report that wages and working time are among the least important 
characteristics in rankings of what matters in a job. Factors such as promotion 
opportunities are considered very important. Job type, content, and interest and 
work relations are also important (Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza 2000; D’Addio, 
Eriksson, and Frijters 2003). Idson (1990) and Garcia-Serrano (2008) stress the 
importance of the work environment. Th ey fi nd less fl exibility and autonomy 
in large businesses and posit that this characteristic explains the lower level of 
satisfaction at large companies.
Th e many factors involved in evaluating job quality are also behind the diff er-
ences in satisfaction by socioeconomic group, industrial sector, and institutional 
sector in some studies (Clark and Oswald 1996; D’Addio, Eriksson, and Frijters 
2003; Beuran and Kalugina 2005). Beuran and Kalugina (2005) observe that in 
the Russian Federation, working in the informal sector increases well-being, 
despite lower average earnings, poor working conditions, job insecurity, and 
exclusion from the social security system. Razafi ndrakoto and Roubaud (2006) 
draw the same conclusion for African countries. In Madagascar, Rakotomanana 
(2011) shows that, everything else equal, levels of job satisfaction in the infor-
mal sector and private formal sector are not signifi cantly diff erent; public sec-
tor employees are systematically the most satisfi ed. Using Ghanaian panel data, 
Falco, Maloney, and Rijkers (2011) fi nd that the informal sector and the formal 
sector (both private and public) provide similar levels of job  satisfaction. Raza-
fi ndrakoto, Roubaud, and Wachsberger (2012) fi nd the same result in Vietnam. 
Own-account workers—who may be more exposed to income instability— 
are more satisfi ed than wage earners (Blanchfl ower and Oswald 2004). Falco, 
 Maloney, and Rijkers (2011) confi rm this pattern in urban Ghana. Th ese fi ndings 
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confi rm the importance of factors such as self-direction and independence, fl ex-
ibility, employment status, and the quality of work relations.
Some analyses fi nd that union members express less satisfaction than other 
workers (Freeman 1978; Clark 2004). Th is seemingly paradoxical result may be 
explained by the fi nding by Bryson, Cappelari, and Lucifora (2005) that people 
who join unions have the highest expectations of working conditions and are 
therefore harder to satisfy. Th eir expectations may stem from better knowledge 
of their rights (labor law) or from higher levels of individual aspirations.
Women, the least educated, and the youngest and oldest workers have lower 
(or downward revised) aspirations and are therefore more inclined to say they 
are satisfi ed with their job. Individual, especially psychological, characteristics, 
also aff ect overall subjective well-being and job satisfaction, with causality run-
ning in both directions (Judge and Watanabe 1993; Warr 1999).
Diff erent interpretations have been posited to explain the weak correlation 
between income and job satisfaction. Cross-sectional analyses of subjective 
well-being show that once vital needs have been satisfi ed, the link between 
well-being and income is not strong (Easterlin 2001; Frey and Stutzer 2002). 
A large number of sociologists and psychologists have also looked at the role 
of culture, including both collective and individual values regarding work in 
general and certain types of work (Malka and Chatman 2003; Gelade, Dobson, 
and Auer 2008). 
Various authors emphasize the importance of social interaction eff ects 
(“social comparison”). Clark and Oswald (1996) show the negative eff ect 
of the income of the reference group (estimated from the predicted income 
value based on the characteristics of the job and the individual).  Relative 
income (the subjective perception of one’s income level compared with 
the income of one’s peers) has a greater eff ect on satisfaction than actual income 
amount (Clark 2004). Pichler and Wallace (2009) reach the same conclusion 
in an analysis of 27 European countries. Th ey show that, job and individual 
characteristics aside, the average level of earnings in a country infl uences the 
level of satisfaction.
A broader view is that not only the immediate environment but also the past 
and present context aff ect the formation of individual aspirations. Hamermesh 
(2001) points to the infl uence of changes in the socioeconomic context. Llorente 
and Macías (2005) draw on an analysis of some 20 countries to suggest that the 
fact that aspirations adjust with time and actual conditions indicates the weak 
correlation between objective variables and the level of satisfaction. Aspirations 
are revised downward or upward depending on the how the situation in a coun-
try develops.
Many analyses study the weight of the past as a determinant of satisfaction 
(Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette 1984; Clark and Oswald 1996; Hamermesh 
2001). Employment history (mobility and experience) infl uences the formation 
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of individuals’ aspirations. Longitudinal analyses study the relationship between 
individuals’ employment trajectories and their level of satisfaction. Lack of sat-
isfaction is found to be a good predictor of professional mobility, in particular of 
quitting or changing jobs (Freeman 1978; Lévy-Garboua, Montmarquette, and 
Simonnet 1999; Clark 2001; Kristensen and Westergård-Nielsen 2004).
As with the majority of analyses of perceptions (especially subjective well-
being), uncertainty remains regarding the direction of causality. It is hard to 
deal with problems of endogeneity, especially when psychological factors simul-
taneously aff ect the variables studied. For instance, optimistic people could 
feel intrinsically more satisfi ed and earn more because they are more dynamic 
or better appreciated by their boss or clients. Earning a good salary may be a 
source of satisfaction, but feeling satisfi ed may be a way to increase one’s wage 
(through promotions, for example). Th e nature of the data does not allow the 
causality path to be identifi ed. 
Self-selection biases, linked to nonrandom labor market participation or sec-
toral allocation, are also at play. Indeed, it could be said that people who work 
are people who can potentially derive the highest level of satisfaction from their 
job. Such a bias could prove important in explaining why women report satis-
faction more oft en than men. Given these problems, the results in this chapter 
should be interpreted as statistical correlations, not causal impacts. 
Data Used and Approach Taken
Th e Data 
Th e data for the analysis come from Phase 1 of the Programme d’Appui 
Régional à la Statistique (PARSTAT) regional program’s1-2-3 surveys of seven 
West  African economic capitals (Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Lomé, 
Niamey, and Ouagadougou) and Antananarivo (Madagascar).4 Th ese surveys 
were  conducted in 2001/02 using exactly the same methodology (Brilleau, 
 Ouedraogo, and Roubaud 2005). Th e data are thus perfectly comparable. (For a 
description of the 1-2-3 surveys, see box O.1 in the overview.)
Th e surveys, which provide information on both individual characteristics 
(including trajectory elements) and objective characteristics of the jobs held, 
provide an extremely rich database for studying job satisfaction. Th e question 
used to capture satisfaction diff ers from the one usually put to address this sub-
ject, which is generally “How satisfi ed are you with your main job?” Th e ques-
tion in the 1-2-3 surveys, put to all respondents 15 and older, was “What are 
your employment plans for the future?” Th e answer categories were as follows: 
1. Find a fi rst job, 2. Find a new job in the same fi rm (job promotion), 3. Find a 
new job in another fi rm, and 4. Keep the job you currently have or continue not 
to work. Given the diffi  culty of ranking the categories using an ordinal scale, 
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respondents were divided into two groups: people who want to keep their job/
employment status (category 4; that is, people who are presumably satisfi ed) 
and people who want to change their job (categories 1, 2, and 3; that is, people 
who are dissatisfi ed).5
Th e drawback to using a diff erent question than usual is that the results 
are not entirely comparable with the fi ndings presented in the literature. In 
addition, some workers may declare not wishing to change their position not 
because they are satisfi ed but because they have revised their aspirations down-
ward. Th is criticism is not unique to the question included in this analysis; it 
applies to all subjective approaches (including the standard job satisfaction 
question). It should be kept in mind when interpreting the results, however. 
Th e approach used here links satisfaction and aspirations. It also allows for 
the inclusion of job-seekers and inactive (in particular, discouraged) work-
ers and hence assessment of the extent to which inactivity is voluntary or 
involuntary.
Methodological Approach and Model Tested
We identify the determinants of job satisfaction by combining the approaches 
focusing on the importance of aspirations and of (generally unobserved) intrin-
sic work value factors (the possibility of promotion, training, autonomy, work 
relations) on the one hand and the classic objective working conditions vari-
ables (remuneration, working hours), which procure extrinsic satisfaction, on 
the other. We use the classifi cation used by Warr (1999) to capture job quality 
(fi gure 3.1). Our hypothesis is that satisfaction exists when a job’s characteristics 
are well matched to the jobholder’s aspirations. 
Figure 3.1 Model of Job Satisfaction
Plans for the future 
Keep job
Change job
Job satisfaction Aspirations
Economic environment
(country aggregates) 
Sociodemographic
characteristics
(age, gender, migrant status,
ethnic group)  
Psychological
factors 
Social interactions
(reference group’s income) 
Employment history
(previous employment
+ father’s job)
“Extrinsic”
factors
(income, working hours, type
of contract)   Union
membership
“Intrinsic”
factors
(autonomy, promotion, training,
job interest, social relations)
Job quality
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Th e model we test is Sik = f(X1ik, X2ik, Ai),where Sik is the satisfaction of 
individual i with job k; X1ik is the job’s extrinsic characteristics vector; X2ik is 
the job’s intrinsic characteristics vector; and Ai is the individual’s aspirations 
vector. X1ik captures earnings, fringe benefi ts, hours worked, and job security 
variables such as a written contract, status as a wage-earner, and steady work. 
Given the absence of accurate information on the majority of the factors relat-
ing to the intrinsic value of the job, we use the following proxies for X2ik: 
variables on socioeconomic group (which typifi es job content); institutional 
sector (public, formal private, and informal sector); fi rm size; and presence 
of a union.
Taking the results obtained in the literature as a starting point, we assume 
that aspirations (Ai) are determined by the individual characteristics of indi-
vidual i (gender, age, level of education, marital status, migrant status, and 
social background, including father’s level of education and employment) as 
well as by the characteristics of the individual’s reference group (reference 
group earnings = y*) and the socioeconomic context in the country (coun-
try dummy). Aspirations are not perfectly controlled for: if sociodemographic 
variables do capture some sociological patterns, they are at best rough proxies 
of individual expectations.
Individual factors also infl uence the quality of the job held. For equal job 
characteristics, however, the signifi cance of individual factors in determining 
the level of satisfaction essentially refl ects the eff ect of aspirations. More gener-
ally, we relax part of the endogeneity biases by introducing fi xed eff ects (coun-
tries and households). 
Because income relative to the reference group has a stronger eff ect than 
absolute income, rather than introduce individuals’ earnings levels, we use a 
variable that ranks individuals by the income centile to which they belong in 
their country (y/y* [earnings/average earnings in the country]). Th is option, 
adopted to overcome the problem of earnings comparability across countries, 
directly incorporates the comparative income eff ect and therefore one of the 
channels through which aspirations are determined. Th e two measurements are 
equivalent for the country models.
Th is approach provides a way to identify the nature and infl uence of the 
“intrinsic” job value factors, the more classic objective (“extrinsic”) variables, 
and the factors likely to infl uence aspirations. We do not seek to isolate the 
eff ect of psychological factors (which aff ect aspirations in particular), about 
which we have no information. However, if psychological factors are corre-
lated with individual sociodemographic variables, they can at least partially 
be taken into account. At the same time, we can check the extent to which 
the stylized facts obtained in developed countries apply to the African cities 
considered here. 
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Descriptive Findings on Satisfaction Levels
Level of Satisfaction by Labor Force Status
Analysis of the perceptions of the entire working-age population (15 and 
older) fi nds relatively similar satisfaction rates across cities (table 3.1). Overall, 
no more than half of the population report satisfaction with their situation. 
Abidjan and Antananarivo diff er from the other capitals for the very low per-
centage of satisfi ed individuals who are inactive. As labor force participation 
rates are not particularly low in the two cities (Abidjan has a higher than average 
rate), this fi nding refl ects labor market entry constraints that conceal the fact 
that many inactive individuals would actually like to work. 
Not surprisingly, job-seekers are the least satisfi ed with their status, with a sat-
isfaction rate of close to zero (the diff erence from zero may refl ect  measurement 
errors). Th is fi nding may appear to be a truism, as job-seekers are by defi nition 
looking for jobs. However, it contradicts the theories about the voluntary nature 
of unemployment. It bears out the conclusions of recent  studies on the mone-
tary and social integration defi cit and the psychological costs of unemployment 
(Frey and Stutzer 2002; Alesina and Glaeser 2004). 
More than 90 percent of discouraged workers are also dissatisfi ed. Th is fi nd-
ing points to the huge growth that could be expected in labor force participation 
rates in the event of an economic upturn.
When the analysis is narrowed to employed workers, the inhabitants of Dakar, 
Lomé, and Abidjan are the most dissatisfi ed (with rates of about 45 percent); a larger 
number of residents of Antananarivo (61 percent) and Cotonou (57 percent) report 
being satisfi ed with their work. It is hard to compare these fi gures with fi ndings in 
other countries, because the question was not put the same way. Nonetheless, satis-
faction rates appear to be much lower than in the developed countries and similar 
to those found in transition economies.6
Level of Satisfaction by Sociodemographic Characteristics
Th e rest of the analysis focuses on the employed working-age population. In 
keeping with the fi ndings in the literature, women are more oft en satisfi ed with 
their job than are men (table 3.2). However, additional analysis is required to 
determine the extent to which this phenomenon persists aft er controlling for 
other factors and handling any selection bias problems. Household heads and 
their spouses express job satisfaction much more oft en than other household 
members. Single people report job satisfaction less oft en than married people. 
Th is observation is surprising given that single people would seem to face fewer 
constraints (especially fi nancial constraints) and have greater leeway when 
looking for a job. Age may partially explain these results, as the job satisfaction 
rate increases with age. Job satisfaction among young people is very low (less 
than one-quarter of people under 20 are satisfi ed), mainly because of the entry 
117
Table 3.1 Level of Job Satisfaction in Eight Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Labor Force Status, 2001/02
(percent)
Status
West Africa Indian Ocean
Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou Antananarivo
Employed 46.9*** 54.9*** 56.7*** 45.0*** 46.8*** 49.1*** 53.1*** 61.1***
(1.2) (1.8) (2.0) (1.1) (1.8) (1.6) (2.2) (2.0)
Unemployed 2.3*** 6.7*** 4.0*** 5.5*** 3.8*** 2.6*** 1.0*** 0.4***
(0.7) (1.9) (1.5) (1.0) (1.2) (0.7) (0.3) (0.3)
Discouraged 2.6*** 10.1*** 8.2*** 7.8*** 13.2*** 3.4*** 3.7*** 16.5***
(1.3) (2.5) (4.2) (1.3) (3.6) (0.7) (1.2) (2.5)
Inactive 28.5*** 50.1 44.9** 50.7*** 45.6 50.6*** 54.5*** 28.4***
(1.8) (2.7) (3.6) (1.6) (3.0) (1.7) (2.1) (2.3)
All 36.8*** 49.2*** 50.4*** 41.7 42.9 42.4 44.8* 42.6
(1.1) (1.7) (2.0) (1.0) (1.7) (1.2) (1.6) (1.1)
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the following 1-2-3 surveys: West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 2001/02 (Observatoire économique et statistique d’Afrique 
Subsaharienne [AFRISTAT], Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation [DIAL]; and national statistics institutes); Madagascar 2001 (DIAL and Institut National de la Statistique 
[INSTAT]).
Note: Figures are for individuals 15 and older. The mean was modified to allow for the sampling design; the mean test shows the difference between each category and the rest of 
the sample. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
* significant at the 10 percent level,** significant at the 5 percent level,*** significant at the 1 percent level. 
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(percent)
Characteristic
West Africa Indian Ocean
AllAbidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou Antananarivo
Gender
Male 43.9*** 52.2* 54.5 36.8*** 44.4*** 45.6*** 50.1*** 60.9 47.3***
(1.2) (1.8) (2.0) (1.0) (1.8) (1.6) (2.0) (2.2) (0.7)
Female 57.2*** 61.1* 60.1 63.6*** 60.3*** 57.5*** 62.9*** 63.6 60.3***
(2.8) (4.7) (6.6) (5.3) (4.6) (4.0) (2.8) (4.7) (1.7)
Position in household
Household head 54.1*** 62.4*** 63.0*** 49.2*** 52.8*** 54.1*** 57.8*** 68.9*** 57.4***
(1.6) (2.0) (2.0) (1.6) (1.9) (1.8) (2.7) (2.1) (0.9)
Spouse 53.3*** 57.3*** 67.4*** 46.5*** 55.3*** 55.0*** 59.5*** 69.3*** 58.2***
(1.9) (2.7) (2.5) (2.1) (2.5) (2.3) (2.5) (1.7) (0.9)
Other 31.2*** 34.8*** 34.5*** 33.1*** 28.0*** 31.9*** 39.5*** 41.3*** 33.5***
(1.5) (2.2) (2.8) (1.1) (1.9) (1.9) (2.7) (3.9) (0.8)
Marital status
Married 55.2*** 60.7*** 65.1*** 47.6*** 55.1*** 55.2*** 59.4*** 60.6** 57.1***
(1.4) (2.1) (2.0) (1.2) (2.0) (1.8) (2.4) (2.1) (0.7)
Single 32.1*** 34.3*** 33.0*** 29.5*** 27.7*** 29.0*** 36.1*** 53.9* 31.9***
(1.6) (2.0) (2.7) (1.3) (1.8) (1.9) (2.8) (3.4) (0.8)
Separated, divorced, or 
widowed
56.5*** 61.1* 64.3** 46.0** 52.4*** 59.6*** 69.6*** 80.5*** 58.6***
(3.3) (5.1) (4.5) (3.1) (3.1) (3.2) (4.3) (2.7) (1.5)
Age
<20 22.3*** 23.3*** 24.3*** 25.8*** 20.0*** 22.6*** 30.3*** 26.6*** 24.1***
(1.9) (2.3) (3.3) (1.9) (2.1) (2.2) (2.4) (6.6) (1.0)
20–29 37.3*** 45.3*** 44.6*** 32.0*** 39.3*** 37.1*** 41.9*** 43.4*** 38.9***
(1.6) (2.6) (2.6) (1.5) (2.2) (2.3) (3.2) (2.3) (0.8)
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30–39 47.9** 52.0 59.6*** 37.5 47.1 45.4 52.2 62.7 49.9***
(1.7) (2.5) (2.4) (1.9) (2.3) (1.9) (2.4) (3.0) (0.9)
40–49 61.4*** 67.3*** 68.6*** 48.4*** 59.7*** 60.7*** 63.9*** 73.0*** 62.4***
(2.1) (2.6) (2.8) (1.8) (2.5) (2.3) (2.6) (2.6) (1.1)
50+ 72.2*** 76.4*** 82.1*** 60.4*** 73.0*** 69.3*** 81.9*** 84.9*** 74.4***
(2.2) (2.6) (2.2) (1.9) (2.7) (2.2) (3.1) (2.0) (1.0)
Education
None 54.0*** 57.3*** 61.2*** 42.6*** 55.3*** 54.8*** 58.0*** 65.2 53.3***
(1.8) (2.2) (3.2) (1.4) (2.3) (1.9) (2.8) (7.5) (0.9)
Primary 38.1*** 46.0*** 49.6*** 31.7*** 39.9*** 34.8*** 43.0*** 55.9** 41.9***
(1.5) (2.7) (2.3) (1.5) (2.3) (2.1) (2.2) (3.1) (0.9)
Lower-secondary 39.0*** 44.2*** 53.0 38.6 43.1 43.1* 44.5*** 58.4 45.5***
(2.1) (2.7) (2.8) (1.8) (2.1) (2.5) (2.8) (2.7) (1.0)
Upper-secondary 49.8* 43.5*** 53.2 37.7 44.2 41.8 52.7 67.5*** 51.5***
(2.8) (3.5) (3.6) (2.4) (2.5) (3.1) (3.8) (2.3) (1.4)
Higher 40.7 60.4*** 59.0 48.5*** 45.8 45.3 53.0 71.3*** 51.8**
(3.5) (3.2) (3.9) (3.1) (3.3) (3.2) (3.5) (2.2) (1.6)
Migrant status
Native 39.6*** 46.7*** 50.2*** 37.5** 43.0* 37.5*** 48.1*** 60.3** 46.2***
(1.8) (2.1) (2.3) (1.2) (1.9) (1.7) (2.6) (1.9) (0.9)
Migrant 47.6*** 57.5*** 58.6*** 41.4** 46.4* 52.6*** 53.8*** 65.1** 50.1***
(1.3) (2.3) (2.1) (1.5) (2.0) (1.7) (2.4) (2.6) (0.8)
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 3.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for all employed workers. The mean was modified to allow for the sampling design; the mean test shows the difference between each category and the rest of 
the sample. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
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problems they encounter and the fact that labor market conditions oft en fail to 
satisfy their aspirations. 
Th e link between job satisfaction and education reveals a U-shaped curve: 
people at the two tails of the distribution (the least educated and the most 
educated) post high rates of satisfaction. Th e fact that people with the least 
education—and therefore the fewest opportunities to fi nd good jobs—have 
high job satisfaction probably refl ects the fact that the least educated limit their 
aspirations. Labor market conditions are more positive for the few graduates 
there are. 
Migrants report satisfaction with their jobs more oft en than nonmigrants. 
Either a selection eff ect is at work or migrants adapt their aspirations, or they 
are driven by an integration goal and actually manage to fi nd better jobs than 
native residents. 
Th ese results do not establish direct links between satisfaction and individual 
characteristics (particularly position in the household and marital status), given 
the endogeneity issues. Th e variables do refl ect some psychological unobserv-
ables that infl uence both satisfaction and employment.
Level of Satisfaction by Job Characteristics 
Public sector workers are more likely than workers in other sectors to want to 
keep their job—an unsurprising result given the better benefi ts these workers 
enjoy (table 3.3). Workers in the informal private sector are more satisfi ed with 
their jobs than workers in the formal private sector (except in Antananarivo and 
Dakar). Additional checks are needed to determine whether this result holds 
aft er controlling for other variables and aspirations. 
Th e results by industry vary a great deal across countries, but they appear to 
refl ect the ranking of the sectors by their level of development and prosperity. 
Satisfaction is highest in trade in Cotonou and Lomé (and, to a lesser extent, in 
Niamey and Dakar). In Abidjan, satisfaction is higher in the primary sector (the 
country’s most buoyant sector). Wage-earner status does not guarantee greater 
job satisfaction in the countries studied. Although wage-earners are more satis-
fi ed than non-wage-earners in Antananarivo, Dakar, and Bamako, in the other 
cities, at least as many non-wage-earners as wage earners report being satisfi ed 
with their job. 
Th e level of satisfaction tends to grow as employees climb the socioeco-
nomic ladder, with the highest rates found among managers (except in Niamey, 
where managers have a very low rate of satisfaction). Among non-wage-earners, 
employers and proprietors are more likely to be satisfi ed than workers who are 
self-employed. Th e ranking of contributing family workers and apprentices is not 
clear-cut, but both categories exhibit low levels of satisfaction (about 20 percent on 
average; Antananarivo is once again an exception, with 44 percent of family work-
ers reporting being satisfi ed). 
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Table 3.3 Level of Job Satisfaction in Eight Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Job Characteristics, 2001/02
Sector
West Africa Indian Ocean
AllAbidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou Antananarivo
Institutional sector
Public sector 58.3*** 67.4*** 64.4** 58.1*** 61.5*** 48.7 59.7*** 79.5*** 62.9***
(3.6) (3.0) (5.0) (2.7) (3.3) (2.4) (2.9) (2.1) (1.4)
 Formal private sector 44.1 48.6 53.0 38.9 37.4*** 42.1* 47.3* 62.9 47.9
(2.3) (2.8) (3.3) (1.9) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6) (2.8) (1.3)
 Informal sector 44.3 51.1** 53.9 37.1*** 44.5 46.8 50.8 56.7*** 46.6***
(1.3) (2.0) (2.2) (1.1) (1.9) (1.8) (2.5) (2.0) (0.7)
Industrial sector
Primary 56.6** 55.7 59.3 40.3 46.3 43.4 50.9 64.5 53.5***
(4.8) (5.0) (8.1) (3.6) (4.6) (3.6) (4.1) (5.1) (2.0)
Manufacturing 42.5* 47.2*** 46.1*** 33.7*** 42.3* 43.7** 52.4 60.8 45.2***
(2.0) (2.7) (3.0) (1.6) (2.3) (2.2) (2.8) (2.8) (1.1)
Trade 51.0*** 54.3* 61.8*** 43.0*** 47.9*** 51.1*** 52.8 62.3 52.3***
(1.5) (2.0) (2.3) (1.5) (2.2) (2.1) (2.6) (1.8) (0.8)
Services 41.3*** 53.1 51.8*** 39.9 43.4 45.9 49.3* 60.2 46.3***
(1.5) (2.0) (2.1) (1.3) (2.0) (1.9) (2.3) (2.1) (0.8)
Wage-earner status
Non-wage-earner 46.7** 51.1** 55.0 37.5** 46.1** 46.3 52.1 59.6** 48.3
(1.4) (2.0) (2.2) (1.1) (1.9) (1.8) (2.3) (1.9) (0.7)
 Wage-earner 42.9** 56.4** 53.8 41.6** 41.2** 46.6 49.9 62.9** 48.3
(1.6) (2.3) (2.8) (1.5) (2.2) (2.0) (2.5) (2.3) (1.0)
Socioeconomic group
Wage-earner
Senior manager, engineer, 
or similar 
55.2* 71.3*** 62.8 65.5*** 58.3* 45.3 59.2 81.9*** 61.4***
(5.6) (4.7) (5.3) (5.1) (8.1) (4.3) (4.7) (3.9) (2.1)
122
Middle manager, supervisor 53.5** 54.9 59.6 52.9*** 53.6* 50.0 57.8 67.7* 55.6***
(3.3) (3.7) (5.2) (2.9) (5.0) (3.1) (4.2) (3.9) (1.6)
Skilled manual/nonmanual 44.2 60.8** 55.5 48.6*** 49.7* 54.7** 58.6** 69.1*** 56.0***
(3.5) (4.1) (3.0) (2.2) (3.0) (3.9) (3.6) (2.2) (1.5)
Semi-skilled manual/
nonmanufacturing
44.7 51.1 51.4 35.1 34.2*** 40.4* 51.4 59.1 45.0**
(2.5) (4.6) (4.1) (2.9) (3.3) (3.5) (7.1) (4.0) (1.5)
Unskilled 32.2*** 47.1 36.2*** 30.3*** 26.6*** 44.0 35.9*** 48.9*** 35.9***
(2.8) (4.6) (5.2) (2.7) (3.5) (3.4) (2.7) (3.7) (1.5)
Non-wage-earner
Employer 65.3*** 65.8*** 72.5*** 50.0* 55.5*** 69.3*** 66.0*** 84.5*** 66.4***
(2.5) (4.3) (3.9) (6.1) (3.9) (4.5) (4.5) (4.6) (1.6)
Self-account worker 52.9*** 54.4** 63.0*** 43.4*** 52.0*** 54.7*** 61.0*** 61.3 54.2***
(1.6) (2.1) (2.2) (1.4) (2.1) (2.0) (3.3) (2.5) (0.8)
Apprentice 18.6*** 22.7*** 23.7*** 23.1*** 21.6*** 15.1*** 16.6*** 11.2*** 20.6***
(2.4) (4.2) (3.9) (1.9) (3.5) (2.0) (2.7) (7.9) (1.2)
Contributing family worker 22.1*** 20.1*** 27.1*** 19.5*** 20.9*** 28.2*** 35.3*** 43.8*** 28.4***
(3.1) (3.7) (4.1) (2.6) (3.1) (2.9) (3.7) (4.0) (1.5)
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 3.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for all employed workers. The mean was modified to allow for the sampling design; the mean test shows the difference between each category and the rest of 
the sample. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 3.3 (continued)
Sector
West Africa Indian Ocean
AllAbidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou Antananarivo
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Econometric Analyses
Results at the Aggregate Level 
Th e aim of the analysis was to identify the infl uence of three types of factors on 
job satisfaction: 
• Variables aff ecting the formation of aspirations (individual, country, and 
household characteristics) 
• Classic objective job variables that generate “extrinsic” satisfaction (remu-
neration, working conditions, and job security)
• Variables that refl ect a job’s intrinsic value (socioeconomic group, institu-
tional sector, fi rm size, and existence of a union). Th ese variables capture 
the opportunity to manage and supervise, work on one’s own initiative, use 
one’s capacities and skills, perform a variety of tasks, maintain good work 
relations, hold a suitable social position, and so forth.
Controlling for the eff ect of aspirations clarifi es the nature of the eff ects of 
various job characteristics on job satisfaction.
Several approaches were considered to at least partially allow for endo-
geneity eff ects. First, country dummy variable controls were introduced for 
the unobserved factors relating to the national context, which infl uence the 
individuals’ satisfaction levels; access to good-quality jobs (employment con-
tract, steady work, wages, and so forth); and even the number of hours worked. 
Second, given that in the vast majority of households individual data were 
available on several members, we were able to conduct estimates purged of 
household fi xed eff ects. Th is approach controls for unobserved factors related 
to household characteristics (family background, potential common traits), 
which infl uence the individuals’ type of labor market integration as much as 
satisfaction does. 
Several stylized facts have been observed in developed countries and transi-
tion economies. Women; the least educated; people from modest social back-
grounds (people whose father had no more than primary education, people 
who are self-employed in a small family business); and, to a certain extent, the 
oldest individuals are more inclined than other workers to express job satisfac-
tion (table 3.4). Th ese stylized facts can be interpreted as evidence of the down-
ward revision of aspirations. 
Th e level of education has a convex eff ect on job satisfaction, with the least 
educated and university graduates more inclined to be satisfi ed with their jobs 
(the coeffi  cient corresponding to the square of the number of years of education 
is positive). Th e negative correlation with the level of satisfaction for widowed 
and divorced workers and migrants may refl ect the eff ect of psychological fac-
tors on general well-being. Th e fact that the coeffi  cients are no longer signifi cant 
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Table 3.4 Logit Model of Determinants of Job Satisfaction in Eight Cities in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 2001/02
Variable (1) (2)
(3)
Household
ﬁ xed 
effect (4) (5)
(6)
Household
ﬁ xed 
effect
Sociodemographic characteristics
Female 0.366*** 0.365*** 0.495*** 0.291*** 0.406***
Age 0.030** 0.024** 0.036* 0.017* 0.022
Age squared 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000*** 0.000
Number of years of education –0.046*** –0.047*** –0.057*** –0.042*** –0.054***
Number of years of education 
squared
0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Father self-employed 0.090*** 0.099** 0.098* 0.080** 0.092*
Father’s education > primary –0.220*** –0.220*** –0.430*** –0.222*** –0.436***
Migrant –0.121*** –0.101 –0.125*** –0.076
Single –0.131* –0.093 –0.065 –0.017
Widowed or divorced –0.219** –0.003 –0.207** –0.004
Job characteristics
Relative income 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.014***
Number of hours worked 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005***
Wage-earner 0.146 –0.241*** –0.097
Written contract 0.153*** 0.125*** 0.022
Steady work 0.401*** 0.316*** 0.292***
Wages and benefits (reference = not fixed, no benefits)
Fixed wage 0.245*** 0.213*** 0.235***
Beneﬁ ts 0.222** 0.171* 0.142
Sector (reference = formal private)
Public sector 0.284*** 0.188** 0.326**
Informal sector 0.053 0.016 –0.077
Type of worker (reference = unskilled/apprentice)
Senior manager 0.081 0.329** 0.563**
Middle manager –0.022 0.140* 0.216
Skilled/semi-skilled 0.161*** 0.230*** 0.203*
Proprietor/employer 1.207*** 0.704*** 0.851***
Self-employed 1.085*** 0.481*** 0.595**
Family worker 0.480** 0.299* 0.097
Number of workers (reference = >50)
Own account (1) –0.275** –0.236* –0.165
2–5 –0.169** –0.129* –0.037
6–50 –0.164*** –0.099 –0.093
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JOB SATISFACTION IN EIGHT AFRICAN CITIES  125
Union
Union in the ﬁ rm –0.016 0,017 –0,038
Union member 0.071 –0,031 –0,053
Country dummy (reference = Togo)
Benin 0.399*** 0.383*** 0.474*** 0.399***
Burkina Faso 0.110*** 0.101*** 0.308*** 0.145***
Côte d’Ivoire –0.029* –0.014 0.129*** 0.036*
Madagascar 0.724*** 0.629*** 0.867*** 0.718***
Mali 0.202*** 0.174*** 0.317*** 0.187***
Niger –0.077*** –0.083*** 0.204*** 0.002
Senegal –0.282*** –0.298*** –0.072*** –0.197***
Constant –1.981*** –1.736*** –2.184*** –2.264***
Number of observations 38,532 38,532 17,029 38,270 38,264 16,841
Pseudo R 2 0.105 0.106 0.237 0.08 0.117 0.254
Log (pseudo-likelihood) –2,3895.7 –2,3868.9 –4,941.6 –2,4369.2 –2,3409.4 –4,776.1
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 3.1 for details).
Note: Relative income refers to the classification of each individual based on income centile. Categories of 
income centile are calculated for each country: the first centile category includes the 1 percent of the population 
with the lowest income.
* significant at the 10 percent level,** significant at the 5 percent level,*** significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 3.4 (continued)
Variable (1) (2)
(3)
Household
ﬁ xed 
effect (4) (5)
(6)
Household
ﬁ xed 
effect
when we consider household fi xed eff ects confi rms that the link between these 
two variables and job satisfaction is not direct.
Th e classic objective variables used to describe working conditions are all 
signifi cantly correlated with job satisfaction:
• Th e link with income (relative income here) is signifi cant and has the 
expected sign. Th e higher the income (compared with standard earnings 
in the country studied), the greater the tendency to express job satisfaction. 
Income far from determines the level of satisfaction, however, as the variance 
explained by the univariate models of earned income only is no greater than 
a few percentage points (models not reported). 
• Steady work, a fi xed wage, and fringe benefi ts have a positive eff ect on 
satisfaction. 
• Th e positive value for the number of hours worked refl ects the specifi c cir-
cumstances in the countries studied, where the risk of underemployment is 
high (and the fear of working too hard limited). 
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• Being a wage-earner does not appear to signifi cantly infl uence the level of 
satisfaction, other things equal.7 In countries where wage labor is not the 
rule, employees probably perceive employer-employee relations as a form of 
dependence, prompting a feeling of subordination and vulnerability (as the 
employer can decide to terminate employment at any time).
• Most of the variables used to capture the intrinsic value of the job also 
infl uence satisfaction in the expected direction, although middle managers 
express less job satisfaction than would be expected. Th is fi nding could be 
explained by the ambiguous situation in which middle managers—who have 
some autonomy but may be burdened by pressure from senior managers—
fi nd themselves. 
• Th e public sector (administration and public corporations) is the most 
highly valued: given identical job characteristics, employed workers prefer 
to work in this sector. Job security elements are not captured by the models; 
prestige probably plays a decisive role in the preference for public sector 
employment. 
• Th e formal private sector does not appear to be more desirable than the 
informal sector. Th is fi nding challenges the queuing theory put forward by 
many economic studies, which see it as a refuge sector.
• People who work in large fi rms (more than 50 people) are more likely to 
be satisfi ed with their job. Advantages in terms of community and social 
networks (events, a company canteen, the fi rm’s reputation) may well win 
out over the benefi ts associated with smaller fi rms (autonomy, fl exibility, 
more family-type relations). However, as the link between fi rm size and sat-
isfaction is no longer signifi cant when household fi xed eff ects are taken into 
account, it probably refl ects endogeneity. 
Th e existence of or membership in a union has no eff ect on satisfaction, pos-
sibly because of the weak bargaining power of unions in the countries studied.
Analysis of the country dummy variables shows that people in Benin and 
Madagascar are more inclined to report being satisfi ed with their job; people 
in Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal tend to be more critical. Th ese fi ndings refl ect 
diff erences in labor market conditions (not captured by the variables in our 
models). Th e sociopolitical contexts allow optimistic views in Antananarivo and 
 Cotonou; it is less satisfactory in Dakar and Abidjan.8
Results by Country 
Th e signs of the coeffi  cients are the same in all capitals for most of the fac-
tors that have a signifi cant infl uence on satisfaction, and their magnitudes are 
extremely similar, suggesting the overall robustness of the approach and the 
results (table 3.5). However, the correlations are not systematically signifi cant 
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Table 3.5 Logit and Household Fixed-Effect Models of Determinants of Job Satisfaction in Eight Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2001/02
Variable Abidjan Antananarivo Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Sociodemographic characteristics
Female 0.283* 0.649*** 0.517*** 0.693*** 0.041 0.294** 0.496*** 0.780***
Age 0.078** 0.082** 0.041* 0.044 –0.027 0.034 0.012 –0.027
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.001**
Number of years of education 0.000 –0.102 –0.120*** –0.001 –0.051* –0.085** –0.090* –0.087**
Number of years of education squared –0.006* 0.000 0.005 –0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001
Father self-employed 0.046 –0.006 0.061 –0.071 0.225** 0.027 –0.025 0.063
Father’s education > primary –0.605*** –0.123 –0.547*** –0.528*** –0.176* –0.317* –0.868*** –0.678***
Migrant –0.108 –0.049 0.231 –0.288* 0.049 –0.183 –0.095 –0.016
Job characteristics
Relative income 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.008** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.009** 0.018***
Number of hours worked 0.001 0.010** 0.007* 0.004 0.007*** –0.002 0.002 0.010***
Wage-earner –0.584* –0.371 0.312 0.341 0.050 –0.544 0.150 0.069
Written contract 0.112 –0.001 –0.502* 0.128 0.133 0.099 0.475* –0.185
Steady work 0.345 0.772*** 0.141 0.262 0.337*** 0.076 0.257 0.215
Fixed wage (reference = not ﬁ xed) 0.174 –0.059 0.893** 0.278 0.061 0.098 0.369 0.243
Sector (reference = formal private)
Public 0.598** 0.110 0.428 0.641** 0.672*** 0.770** –0.349 0.227
Informal 0.156 –0.356 –0.302 0.028 0.159 –0.300 0.003 –0.484**
(continued next page)
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Type of worker (reference = middle manager/skilled or semi-skilled)
Senior manager 1.129** 0.486 0.647 –0.165 0.552 –0.382 0.031 0.822**
Proprietor/employer 0.766** 1.037** 1.211*** 1.337*** 0.091 0.688** 1.109** 1.146***
Self-employed 0.485* 0.009 0.798*** 1.220*** 0.217 0.731*** 0.616** 0.981***
Union
Union in the ﬁ rm –0.200 0.250 –0.183 0.170 –0.423** 0.280 –0.327 0.192
Union member 0.294 –0.362 0.395 –0.015 –0.094 –0.181 –0.023 –0.155
Number of observations  2,035  1,789 1,715  2,086 3,536 1,867  1,639 2,171 
Pseudo R 2 0.339 0.388 0.264 0.366 0.150 0.289 0.267 0.304
Log (likelihood) –503.2 –401.3 –472.9 –504.7 –1194.8 –486.8 –462.2 –573.3
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 3.1 for details).
Note: Relative income refers to the classification of each individual based on income centile. Categories of income centile are calculated for each country: the first centile category 
includes the 1 percent of the population with the lowest income. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
Table 3.5 (continued)
Variable Abidjan Antananarivo Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
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for each country. Th e level of education has no eff ect on aspirations in Anta-
nanarivo and Cotonou. Th e infl uence of father’s education is signifi cant in all 
cities except Antananarivo. In Dakar the relationship between satisfaction and 
father’s self-employment is stronger than elsewhere. 
Some working conditions are associated with the level of satisfaction only 
in certain cities. For example, the written contract is highly valued only in 
 Niamey. Having a fi xed wage is seen as positive, other things being equal, only 
in Bamako. Wage labor is perceived negatively in Abidjan (where wage-earning 
appears to imply adverse working conditions).
Working in the public sector is likely to generate satisfaction in Abidjan, 
Cotonou, Dakar, and Lomé; it has no signifi cant eff ect on satisfaction in 
Antananarivo, Bamako, Niamey, or Ouagadougou. Th e correlation between 
job satisfaction and informal sector employment is positive in Dakar but 
negative in Ouagadougou. Self-employment is associated with job satisfac-
tion except in Antananarivo and Dakar, where the link is not signifi cant. 
Having a union in the fi rm is not associated with higher job satisfaction; the 
link is actually negative in Dakar, where workers are more inclined to express 
dissatisfaction in fi rms with a union. An endogeneity eff ect is probably at 
work here (the union may have been set up in the fi rm because of poor work-
ing conditions).
Conclusion
Analysis of job satisfaction in eight Sub-Saharan Africa capitals fi nds signifi -
cant links between objective job characteristics and the satisfaction individuals 
express with their jobs. For some job characteristics, these links appear more 
clearly aft er controlling for individual aspirations. Th e eff ect of aspirations is 
identifi ed through the infl uence of individual characteristics and the circum-
stances in the country. 
Th e results validate the idea that job satisfaction is a suitable indicator of 
job quality, for three reasons. First, satisfaction provides a gauge of the match 
between jobs and individual aspirations. Given that a mismatch between expec-
tations and outcomes could create economic and social tensions, this match 
needs to be measured. Second, aft er controlling for the eff ect of aspirations, 
the correlations between satisfaction and objective job characteristics indicate 
that individuals take these characteristics into consideration in evaluating their 
working conditions. Th ird, labor market conditions (and the characteristics 
that capture those conditions) vary across countries. Diff erent values can be 
placed on a given job or status depending on the circumstances in a country. 
Th e fi ndings hence refl ect the intrinsic quality of a category of employment in 
the country studied.
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Th e analysis shows that the explanatory power of the factors chosen is lim-
ited. Th e controls used for endogeneity and selection biases are imperfect; the 
use of panel data or attitudinal questions would be a useful avenue for future 
research that would allow further exploration of causality, by explicitly con-
trolling for unobservables and psychological factors that shape behaviors and 
opinions. Closer attention should also be paid to the factors associated with 
employment history (to take account of upward and downward trajectories), 
in particular the characteristics of individuals’ previous job. Analysis of the 
impact of national socioeconomic circumstances could be honed by introduc-
ing macroeconomic variables (growth, stagnation, or crisis spells) or by build-
ing indicators to typify individuals’ reference groups and capturing comparison 
peer eff ects.
Notes
 1. Economists long overlooked job satisfaction—although pioneering work was done 
by Hamermesh (1977), Freeman (1978), and, more recently, Clark and Oswald 
(1996)—out of scepticism about drawing economic conclusions from data on feel-
ings and personal perceptions. Th eir interest in job satisfaction increased when the 
link was identifi ed between job satisfaction and work performance.
 2. Th e other studies related to this topic are ad hoc analyses of specifi c professions 
(nurses, surveyors, and teachers, for example). 
 3. Th e cities are Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire; Bamako, Mali; Cotonou, Benin; Dakar, Senegal; 
Lomé, Togo; Niamey, Niger; and Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in West Africa and 
Antananarivo, in Madagascar. Although Abidjan and Cotonou are not administra-
tive capitals, we refer to them as capitals because they are the most important eco-
nomic centers in their countries (Cotonou is also the seat of government).
 4. Th e 1-2-3 surveys have been conducted since 1996 in Antananarivo, where the 
methodology was strengthened before the surveys were implemented in West Africa 
in the framework of the PARSTAT program. 
 5. For unemployed and inactive individuals in category 1 (fi nd a fi rst job), satisfaction 
concerns their situation on the labor market (rather than job satisfaction). Th ese 
categories are not included in the econometric analyses on job satisfaction, which 
examine only the employed labor force. 
 6. We refer here in particular to the fi gures provided by Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza 
(2000). Th e satisfaction rate in their study includes everyone who indicated being 
more or less satisfi ed. 
 7. Other variables (steady work, full-time work, fi xed wage) take into account some of 
the advantages of being a wage-earner. 
 8. In 2002, Madagascar had just emerged from a major political crisis whose posi-
tive outcome raised high hopes. Benin is one of the rare African countries to 
have seen real democratic progress (with changeovers of political power made 
possible by transparent elections) following a long period of instability and 
dictatorship until the late 1990s. The hope inspired by the directions these two 
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countries have taken may have had a psychological effect on job satisfaction. 
The less stable sociopolitical situation in Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal at the time 
of the survey probably had a negative impact on individuals’ perceptions of 
working conditions.
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Are Workers Compensated for 
Accepting Vulnerable Jobs? 
Evidence from West Africa
Philippe Bocquier, Christophe J. Nordman, and 
Aude Vescovo
One of the main focuses of studies on labor markets in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
the institutional segmentation between formal and informal sectors (Maloney 
2004; see also chapter 6). Informal work is defi ned from the point of view 
of the fi rm, worker, or line of business, depending on the policy aim. Th e 
1993 System of National Accounts (SNA93)—a set of international standards 
designed to establish a framework for the production of statistics on national 
accounts—classifi es fi rms based on statistical or tax registration criteria and 
whether they keep written accounts. Th is distinction serves no purpose when 
it comes to capturing individuals’ working conditions, especially employment 
vulnerability. 
Th e concept of vulnerability refers to how diffi  cult it is for individuals to 
manage the risks or cope with the losses and costs associated with the occur-
rence of risky events or situations.1 Th e vulnerability of workers can be seen, 
for example, in contract insecurity (unstable remuneration and no written 
contract); adverse working conditions; and, more generally, a high level of 
exposure to job risks. Firm or business vulnerability criteria (industry, busi-
ness size, and institutional sector) are not used here, because they refl ect 
interfi rm rather than interindividual dualism. 
Vulnerable workers can be found in all formal and informal private fi rms; 
they work in public and semi-public corporations as well. Th is chapter focuses 
solely on the private sector (formal and informal businesses), based on the 
assumption that vulnerability is driven by diff erent mechanisms in the public 
and private sectors. 
Th e theory of compensating diff erentials—as formalized by Brown (1980), 
Rosen (1986), and Murphy and Topel (1987)—posits that workers may receive 
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pecuniary compensation commensurate with the danger or strenuousness of 
their tasks or the adverse nature of their working conditions.2 In developed 
countries, for instance, everything else equal, hazardous and highly strenuous 
jobs are oft en better paid than jobs without these attributes.3 Our interpretation 
of the link between vulnerability and income draws on developments in the 
theory of compensating diff erentials, which we apply to both working condi-
tions and employment vulnerability for the fi rst time in African countries. Our 
working assumption is that, other things equal, workers classifi ed as vulnerable 
earn more than more stable, steady workers classifi ed as less vulnerable. If this 
is the case, some individuals will be willing to hold vulnerable jobs, especially if 
the immediate need to earn income outweighs the medium- or long-run advan-
tage associated with stable jobs. 
Th e questions of what determines vulnerability and how vulnerability and 
remuneration are linked raise several methodological problems, which this 
chapter tries to solve. First, entry selection occurs in the labor market. Second, 
sample selection concerns the individual’s sector allocation (public, formal pri-
vate, or informal). Observable individual characteristics (such as human capital 
in general) as well as unobservable individual characteristics infl uence both 
the decision to participate in a particular labor market segment and the level 
of individual earnings in Africa. Th ird, vulnerability is likely to be endogenous 
in the earnings equations. It is endogenous if individuals’ unobservable char-
acteristics are correlated with both their level of vulnerability and their level 
of earnings. It is important to take these eff ects into account, because they can 
produce biases, such as overestimation of the impact of vulnerability on indi-
vidual earnings if, for example, unobservable characteristics such as low worker 
motivation or ability (or conversely, worker perseverance) are positively corre-
lated with the probability of obtaining a vulnerable job and negatively correlated 
with earnings.
Our analysis takes a distributional approach.4 It assumes that the worker’s 
relative position on the remuneration scale infl uences how vulnerability aff ects 
income. Whereas workers with vulnerable jobs at the low end of the pay scale 
receive less in compensation than workers with identical characteristics who do 
not hold vulnerable jobs, workers in vulnerable jobs at the high end of the pay 
scale are paid premiums. Th ese diff erent mechanisms could refl ect diff erences 
in bargaining power and labor market imbalances. Th eir greater bargaining 
would enable workers at the upper tail of the earnings distribution to secure 
higher pay for greater vulnerability. Conversely, workers at the bottom of the 
earnings distribution may be more forceful in negotiating for premium pay if 
they are seeking to secure a living wage. Compensation for vulnerability there-
fore would decrease the further the worker moves from a minimum subsistence 
income. In the case of labor market imbalances, employers’ capacity to provide 
fi nancial compensation for adverse working conditions may also depend on 
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the demand for and supply of labor. Where, for example, labor supply outstrips 
demand, employers do not need to compensate workers for adverse working 
conditions. 
All these hypotheses, which assume that the eff ect of vulnerability on earn-
ings diff ers depending on the position in the earnings distribution, are tested 
by quantile regressions.
Th e chapter is organized as follows. Th e fi rst section briefl y examines the 
theoretical arguments underlying the existence of compensating diff erentials 
and highlights the theory’s implications for the case study. Th e second section 
presents the data from the 1-2-3 surveys of the West African economic capitals 
and shows how key variables were constructed.5 Th e third section presents the 
econometric models. Th e fourth section discusses the results. Th e last section 
draws conclusions. 
The Theory of Compensating Differentials
Th ere is a long history of economic research into the forces that narrow or 
widen wage diff erentials between individuals. Th e fi rst models focused on com-
petitive markets. Th ey found wage premiums compensating nonpecuniary job 
attributes, such as working conditions, and diff erences in job stability across 
industries (Brown 1980; Rosen 1986; Murphy and Topel 1987). Most authors 
acknowledge that when job characteristics other than wages enter into the labor 
market decisions of fi rms and workers, market balance is achieved by the equal-
ization of workers’ utilities rather than their wages. 
Rosen (1986) posits that the reasoning behind compensating mechanisms is 
a simple supply-and-demand structure. Labor supply decisions have to balance 
the trade-off  between earned income (wages) and the cost of performing a job 
(stress, repetition, production deadlines, and so forth) such that, at the opti-
mum, wage diff erences correspond to the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and working conditions. Labor demand decisions by fi rms are 
based on a trade-off  between the need to provide compensation commensurate 
with the strenuous or hazardous nature of a task and the need to improve the 
working conditions off ered. 
Under the assumption of homogeneous individuals and heterogeneous work 
environments, wages across workers diff er such that all workers obtain the same 
utility. To encourage workers to accept worse working conditions, fi rms have to 
off er higher wages. Lift ing the assumption of homogeneous individuals neces-
sarily introduces a great deal of uncertainty as to the existence of compensation 
for working conditions when it is observed at the midpoint of the worker dis-
tribution. It could prove necessary to divide the population into more homo-
geneous groups—by, for example, using a conditional wage quantile derived 
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from quantile regressions, in order to reduce the noise created by the presence 
of individual heterogeneity in the estimation of the compensating diff erential.
Noncompetitive theories argue that wage deviations between apparently 
identical individuals tend to refl ect noncompensating diff erentials, such as 
workers’ relative bargaining power (Daniel and Sofer 1998; Manning 2003) and 
the existence of effi  ciency wages.6 Other hypotheses point to the existence of 
information asymmetries, which may increase friction in the match between 
the supply of and demand for labor (Hwang, Mortensen, and Reed 1998), and 
interfi rm diff erences in factor productivity (Burdett and Mortensen 1998; 
 Pissarides 2000; Mortensen 2003).
Th ere is a dearth of research on the link between compensating diff eren-
tials and observed job attributes, especially when it comes to distributional 
approaches.7 Fernández and Nordman (2009) show that the compensating 
diff erential probably depends on the worker’s relative position in the earnings 
distribution. For example, pecuniary compensation for adverse working condi-
tions could well be overestimated if the most capable (or resistant) workers are 
selected for employment where these attributes are more common. Moreover, 
given the assumption that the most capable individuals are also the most likely 
to receive effi  ciency wages, or to have a certain amount of bargaining power, 
working conditions could well have less to do with the wage-setting process for 
these individuals than for workers without these characteristics. More generally, 
workers could fi nd it easier to ask for premiums for adverse working conditions 
when the demand for labor exceeds the supply, creating a labor market imbal-
ance that probably varies along the earnings distribution.
Data and Deﬁ nition of Vulnerability
Th e data come from Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys conducted in the follow-
ing economic capitals in 2001/02: Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire), Bamako (Mali), 
Cotonou (Benin), Dakar (Senegal), Lomé (Togo), Niamey (Niger), and 
 Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) (for a description of the surveys, see box O.1 
in the overview). Th e sample was restricted to all working-age individuals as 
defi ned by International Labour Organization (ILO)—that is, people 15 and 
older. It was then reduced to include only people with at least fi ve years of 
potential labor market experience, in order to take account of workers’ employ-
ment histories and thereby understand the longitudinal aspects of vulnerability. 
Potential experience is defi ned as the individual’s age minus the number of years 
of education and the six years theoretically preceding the start of school. Th e 
fi ve-year potential experience span is broad enough to circumvent the problem 
of date measurement errors (end of education and end of previous job) and 
narrow enough to prevent the samples from being too small.
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Th e sample was reduced from 58,385 individuals 15 and older to 50,772 
individuals 15 and older with fi ve years or more of potential experience, from 
33,390 employed workers 15 and older to 32,314 employed workers 15 and 
older with fi ve years or more of potential experience. Among the employed 
workers, we are interested only in formal and informal private sector workers 
with some income. Informal work is defi ned from the point of view of the fi rm, 
worker, or line of business, depending on the policy aim. Th e 1993 System 
of National Accounts—a set of international standards designed to establish a 
framework for the production of statistics on national accounts—defi nes infor-
mality based on statistical or tax registration criteria and the keeping of written 
accounts.
Th e formal private sector regression samples include 302–950 workers 
(depending on the country), with a small minority of self-employed workers 
(table 4.1). Th e informal private sector regression samples range from 2,230 to 
3,492 workers, with a majority of self-employed workers. Individuals with no 
income are people with fi ve years of potential experience who are not working 
(as wage or self-employed workers). Unpaid (contributing) family workers are 
included among the self-employed, because they share profi ts with the lead-
ing independent worker in the family. Earnings for dependent workers include 
wages and benefi ts (bonuses, paid holidays, housing, benefi ts in kind, and so 
forth). Nonmonetary benefi ts are converted into wages. Profi ts of independent 
workers were reconstituted by recapping income and expenses (including inter-
mediary spending, employee’s wages, taxes, investment) over a reference period 
to which the respondent could relate. For both dependent and independent 
workers, monthly net income was estimated and divided by the number of 
hours worked per month to obtain hourly earnings.
Construction of the Vulnerability Variables
We used a number of individual employment status indicators, which we 
believe best capture the multifaceted nature of vulnerability in the main job. 
Business or production unit criteria (industry, business size, and institutional 
sector) were not used, because they refl ect interfi rm rather than interworker 
diff erences. 
Worker vulnerability is defi ned by nine dichotomous variables, correspond-
ing to diff erent aspects of vulnerability (table 4.2). Th e variables distinguish 
independent workers (employers and own-account workers) from dependent 
workers (employees, contributing family workers, and apprentices). 
Th e fi rst variable, contractual insecurity, concerns the informal nature of the 
contract. Th is variable equals 1 if the individual has no written contract or does 
not receive a payslip and 0 otherwise. (It is not defi ned for self-employed work-
ers, to whom it does not apply.) No distinction is made between workers with 
fi xed-term contracts and workers with open-ended contracts.
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Tab le 4.1 Descriptive Statistics of Study Sample in Seven Cities in West Africa 
Statistic Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Sample total 11,343 13,002 11,574 19,054 9,906 14,524 13,733
Working-age population 7,503 7,529 7,639 12,487 6,418 8,284 8,525
Working-age population with ﬁ ve or more years potential experience 6,537 6,561 6,517 11,014 6,546 7,269 7,328
 Working-age population with zero income 2,568 2,746 2,374 6,074 2,081 4,053 3,663
 Public sector (positive earnings) 302 457 398 498 306 577 584
 Regression samples
Formal private sector (positive earnings) 825 452 509 950 302 409 336
  Dependent 782 365 423 868 261 373 307
  Independent 43 87 86 82 41 36 29
Informal sector (positive earnings) 2,842 2,906 3,236 3,492 2,857 2,230 2,745
  Dependent 894 528 460 1,123 508 562 724
  Independent 1,948 2,378 2,776 2,369 2,349 1,668 2,021
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) conducted in 2001/02 by the Observatoire 
économique et statistique d’Afrique Subsaharienne (AFRISTAT); Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation (DIAL); and national statistics institutes.
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Table 4.2 Distribution of Vulnerability Criteria by Sector and Job Status in Seven Cities 
in West Africa 
Criterion
Criterion/job status
Formal private 
sector
Informal 
sector
All private 
sector
Contractual insecurity (no contract or no payslip)
Independent n.a. n.a. n.a.
Dependent 0.49 0.97 0.76
All n.a. n.a. n.a.
Independent with no employees (wage-earning or otherwise)
Independent 0.11 0.68 0.66
Dependent n.a. n.a. n.a.
All n.a. n.a. n.a.
Adverse working conditions (premises not dedicated to the job)
Independent 0.17 0.60 0.59
Dependent 0.05 0.22 0.15
All 0.06 0.50 0.42
Casual labor (piece-rate, day, or seasonal work)
Independent 0.13 0.20 0.20
Dependent 0.10 0.15 0.13
All 0.10 0.19 0.17
Unstable remuneration (paid in form other than fixed wage or, for independent workers, profits)
Independent 0.06 0.05 0.05
Dependent 0.18 0.40 0.31
All 0.17 0.14 0.15
Time-related underemployment (works fewer hours than statutory working week and would like to work more)
Independent 0.09 0.13 0.13
Dependent 0.07 0.07 0.07
All 0.07 0.12 0.11
Working second vulnerable job outside public sector in place or premises not dedicated to the job, in firm with 
fewer than five people
Independent 0.00 0.02 0.02
Dependent 0.01 0.01 0.01
All 0.01 0.01 0.01
Employment instability (on downwardly mobile or unstable career path)
Independent 0.01 0.03 0.03
Dependent 0.08 0.08 0.08
All 0.07 0.04 0.05
Unwanted job (involuntary departure from previous job or job dissatisfaction)
Independent 0.05 0.06 0.06
Dependent 0.09 0.06 0.07
All 0.09 0.06 0.06
(continued next page)
142  URBAN LABOR MARKETS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Th e second variable concerns independent workers only. It is equal to 1 if 
an independent worker has no employees, wage-earning or otherwise. Self-
employed professionals working alone in intellectual professions (computer 
engineers, doctors, notaries, lawyers) are not considered to be vulnerable.
Adverse working conditions are assessed in terms of the place or premises 
where the individual works. Th is variable is equal to 1 if the individual’s main 
job is itinerant, worked from a makeshift  or fi xed street post, at the customer’s 
home, or from the individual’s own home without having a dedicated set-up 
for the job. It is equal to 0 if the individual works from a vehicle, from home 
with a dedicated set-up for the job, in a public market, or on business premises 
(including fi elds, in the case of urban market gardening). Where jobs do not 
require premises even though they are not physically strenuous, the existence 
of premises, an offi  ce, or a surgery is taken as an indication of stability and 
nonadverse working conditions. Excluding all intellectual professions from 
vulnerability in terms of working conditions would be tantamount to defi ning 
a vulnerable worker profi le as consisting mainly of roving street vendors and 
servants. Doing so would be inconsistent with the analysis of the many forms 
of vulnerability and the link with earnings.
Casual labor is a source of vulnerability. According to Pagès (2003), vul-
nerability in employment covers both various forms of underemployment and 
the lack of socioeconomic security at work associated with institutional vari-
ables (employment contracts, compliance with labor code, and so forth) and 
their time-related factors (casual and unstable employment). Th us, even if a 
job is protected or off ers good conditions, the casual nature of employment 
means that this protection is not guaranteed over time and that the risk of vis-
ible underemployment is high. Th erefore, a casual job is deemed a criterion of 
vulnerability. Th e casual labor variable is equal to 1 if the individual works for 
a piece rate or as a day or seasonal worker. It is equal to 0 if the individual has 
a steady job.
Vulnerable (meets at least one of the vulnerability criteria)
Independent 0.42 0.87 0.86
Dependent 0.62 0.98 0.82
All 0.60 0.90 0.85
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 4.1 for details).
Note: The mean of the contractual insecurity variable for the subsample of formal private sector dependent 
workers who report strictly positive earnings is 0.49. This means that 49 percent of dependent workers in the 
formal private sector do not have a written contract or do not receive a payslip. n.a. = not applicable.
Table 4.2 (continued)
Criterion
Criterion/job status
Formal private 
sector
Informal 
sector
All private 
sector
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Th e unstable remuneration variable is equal to 1 if a dependent worker is not 
paid a fi xed wage or if an independent worker is not paid in the form of a fi xed 
wage or profi ts (by the day or hour, piece rate, commission, or in kind). Th is 
variable diff ers from the variable describing casual jobs. A worker in a steady 
job may be paid erratically (as is frequently the case). Such workers are assumed 
to be more vulnerable, because they cannot predict what their situation will be 
in the coming days or weeks.
Pagès (2003) defi nes vulnerability as underemployment or the probability 
of becoming underemployed. Time-related underemployment corresponds to 
the situation in which individuals work less than the statutory working week 
when they would like to work more. Time-related underemployment is similar 
to structural unemployment (see chapters 1 and 2). Th e underemployment vari-
able is equal to 1 if the individual works less than 35 hours and would like to 
work more. It is equal to 0 otherwise.
Working a second job could, in certain cases, refl ect underemployment or 
instability in the main job. Time-related or invisibly underemployed individuals 
or piece-rate workers may hold second jobs to keep money coming in when they 
are temporarily laid off  from their main job.8 Working a second job may be a way 
of reducing or spreading the risks of an income loss or decrease. Th e second job 
variable is equal to 1 if the individual works a vulnerable second job—that is, a 
job outside the public sector, in a place or premises not dedicated to this job and 
in a fi rm of less than fi ve people—and if the number of cumulative hours worked 
in the two jobs is 70 hours or more a week. It is equal to 0 otherwise.
Pagès (2005) emphasizes the importance of considering the dynamic aspect 
of vulnerability. Th e above employment situations aff ect workers’ capacities and 
behavior (the skills-employment causality is reversed). We defi ne two dynamic 
vulnerability criteria. Instability in employment is defi ned by a change of job in 
the last fi ve years without an improvement or with a drop in status.9 Th is vari-
able is equal to 0 if the individual is in his or her fi rst job or found a job following 
a period of unemployment or inactivity over the last fi ve years. It is also equal 
to 0 if the individual has been in the same job for fi ve years or the individual 
upgraded his or her job status (from the point of view of socioeconomic group, 
refl ecting upward professional mobility) in the last fi ve years. It is equal to 1 
when the individual changed job in the last fi ve years without an improvement 
in status. In the case of a transition from independent to dependent worker 
(or vice versa), the reason for the change of job (voluntary or involuntary) is 
used to determine whether or not the transition represents an upwardly mobile 
professional move.
An unwanted job is defi ned as a job with which the worker is dissatisfi ed 
and that he or she accepted following an involuntary departure from the previ-
ous job. Job dissatisfaction is measured by the answer to a question about the 
individual’s aspirations (keep or change job and, if the respondent indicates the 
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desire to change, for what type of job; see chapter 3). An unwanted job is more 
likely to be worked because of constraints and is hence mismatched with the 
worker’s expertise, skills, and preferences. Workers may be dissatisfi ed because 
they are overqualifi ed for their job, because working conditions are physically 
strenuous, because the hours are unsuitable, or for other reasons. Working an 
unwanted job may indicate that a worker has taken a “stopgap job” in the hope 
of immediate gains. 
Other potential vulnerability criteria were not taken into account. For 
example, we do not create a social security variable, because our income vari-
able includes all welfare benefi ts. Unstable remuneration or lack of a written 
contract, for example, should be enough to refl ect social insecurity. Mem-
bership in a union and access to in-house training are variables of interest. 
However, these phenomena are so rare in the cities studied that we deemed 
them negligible.
For each employment status (dependent or independent), we defi ne the inten-
sity of vulnerability as the sum of the eight previously defi ned criteria applicable 
to this status. Maximum vulnerability intensity ranges from 4 to 7 depending on 
the city and sector. No city posts the maximum score of 8 (table 4.3).
A dichotomous dummy variable for vulnerability, built by setting a vul-
nerability threshold (a minimum number of vulnerability criteria to be met 
to be deemed vulnerable) would have simplifi ed our measurement. However, 
the eff ect of vulnerability on earnings might be nonlinear, which would not be 
revealed by a dichotomous dummy variable. Th e fact that a worker meets one or 
two vulnerability criteria may refl ect constraints imposed by the labor market. 
However, workers may choose to accept more vulnerable working conditions 
if doing so yields higher earnings.
Descriptive Statistics
Contractual insecurity aff ects 97 percent of dependent workers in the infor-
mal sector (see table 4.2). Surprisingly, it also aff ects half of employees in the 
formal private sector, 49 percent of whom do not have written contracts or 
receive payslips. Similarly, 18 percent of dependent workers in the formal pri-
vate sector and 40 percent of dependent workers in the informal sector do not 
receive a fi xed wage. Th ese fi gures suggest that the distinction between formal 
private fi rms and informal fi rms is not suffi  cient for analyzing workers’ living 
and working conditions: worker vulnerability needs to be examined in all insti-
tutional sectors.
Th e main sources of vulnerability among independent workers in the infor-
mal sector are adverse working conditions (faced by 60 percent of independent 
workers), including the lack of dedicated premises or workplace, and own-
account employment (that is, not having any employees, 68 percent of indepen-
dent workers). Th ese percentages are small in the formal private sector, where 
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Table 4.3 Intensity of Job Vulnerability in Seven Cities in West Africa 
Sector/
intensity
(0–8)
Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Number 
of 
workers Percent
Number 
of 
workers Percent
Number 
of 
workers Percent
Number 
of 
workers Percent
Number 
of 
workers Percent
Number 
of 
workers Percent
Number 
of 
workers Percent
Formal private sector
0 321 38.9 185 40.9 194 38.1 424 44.6 90 29.8 136 33.3 129 38.4
1 280 33.9 175 38.7 199 39.1 243 25.6 116 38.4 112 27.4 110 32.7
2 145 17.6 68 15.0 69 13.6 160 16.8 58 19.2 87 21.3 55 16.4
3 42 5.1 19 4.2 35 6.9 88 9.3 27 8.9 46 11.3 26 7.7
4 28 3.4 5 1.1 11 2.2 29 3.1 7 2.3 23 5.6 16 4.8
5 8 1.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 6 0.6 3 1.0 4 1.0 0 0.0
6 1 0.1 0 0.0 1 0.2 0 0.0 1 0.3 1 0.2 0 0.0
7 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Total 825 100 452 100 509 100 950 100 302 100 409 100 336 100
Informal sector
0 347 12.2 263 9.1 306 9.5 286 8.2 267 9.4 126 5.7 329 12.0
1 995 35.0 933 32.1 1,029 31.8 1,077 30.8 738 25.8 502 22.5 848 30.9
2 972 34.2 1,035 35.6 1,241 38.4 1,102 31.6 1,052 36.8 761 34.1 907 33.0
3 372 13.1 495 17.0 488 15.1 644 18.4 508 17.8 502 22.5 450 16.4
4 124 4.4 154 5.3 151 4.7 300 8.6 235 8.2 263 11.8 166 6.1
5 23 0.8 25 0.9 19 0.6 72 2.1 49 1.7 68 3.1 40 1.5
6 8 0.3 1 0.0 2 0.1 10 0.3 8 0.3 8 0.4 5 0.2
7 1 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Total 2,842 100 2,906 100 3,236 100 3,492 100 2,857 100 2,230 100 2,745 100
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 4.1 for details).
Note: The lines cutting across the distributions represent the average vulnerability intensity position. For example, in the formal private sector in Niamey, average vulnerability is 1.3, so a line is 
drawn between 1 and 2. 
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self-employed workers represent less than 20 percent of workers in all cities 
studied. Working conditions for independent and dependent workers in the 
informal sector are very similar. Most independent workers are self-employed 
street vendors; others are tailors, hairdressers, repairers, mechanics, masons, 
carpenters, and metalworkers. Similarity in working conditions justifi es ana-
lyzing all informal workers in one category, controlling for their dependency 
status as a covariate.
Some 17 percent of dependent private sector workers and 14 percent of 
independent private sector workers are not vulnerable (do not meet any vul-
nerability criteria). Th ese rates mask huge diff erences between the formal and 
informal sectors. In the informal sector, just 2 percent of dependent workers 
and 12 percent of independent workers are not vulnerable. In all, 85 percent of 
the private sector workers in the cities studied meet at least one vulnerability 
criterion.
Testing the Existence of Compensating Mechanisms 
for Vulnerability
In a fi rst step, the determinants of vulnerability are analyzed using a simple 
linear model whose dependent variable is the intensity of vulnerability. Th e 
explanatory variables introduced are dummy variables for the individual’s status 
in the household (1 if household head) and the institutional sector of the indi-
vidual’s father when the individual was 15 years old (public, formal private, or 
informal private). Th ese fi rst variables are denoted Z. Th e set of control variables 
included in all the estimated equations (X) covers gender; education (number 
of years of completed education) and its square; potential experience and its 
square; religion; migrant status (rural, urban, or foreign migrant); marital sta-
tus; seniority in the fi rm or main job and its square; and independent versus 
dependent worker status.
To test the existence of compensating earnings diff erentials for vulnerability, 
we estimate the log of the hourly earnings rate for the main job for each city. 
Included in this earnings rate are benefi ts such as year-end bonuses, profi t-
sharing, paid leave, medical benefi ts, social security, bonuses, and benefi ts in 
kind, such as housing, electricity, and transport. Earnings are calculated based 
on the monthly earnings for the reference month and the number of hours 
worked per week.
Approach at the Mean
An approach at the mean studies the impact of vulnerability intensity on 
average earnings. In this approach, what counts is the cumulative number of 
vulnerability criteria met by an individual. 
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Let h be an indicator of four institutional sector categories (h = 1: zero earn-
ings, h = 2: public sector, h = 3: formal private sector, and h = 4: informal sector). 
Our purpose is to estimate the eff ect jh = (j1h,j2h) of vulnerability index I on 
earnings in the formal and informal private sectors using
Yh = bhX + j1hI + j 2hI2 + eh ∀h = 3,4. (4.1)
Introduction of a second-degree vulnerability intensity polynomial I2 is designed 
to take into account any nonlinearity in the eff ect of vulnerability on earnings. 
Yh is observed only if the individual has a paid job and chooses sector h. 
Given that the labor markets in developing countries are segmented, sector 
entry selection may exist in addition to labor market entry selection (see chap-
ters 5 and 6). A selection model is therefore needed. We use Lee (1983), an 
extension of Heckman’s method, to estimate the earnings equation with multi-
nomial selection. Th is method corrects the selection bias, by estimating
Yh = bhX + j1hI + j 2hI2 + lh + kh ∀h = 3,4 (4.2)
where lh, a generalization of the inverse Mills ratio in Heckman’s method, cor-
rects the selection bias generated by the fact that belonging to sector h rather 
than sector k (k ≠ h) may refl ect the action of unobservable variables also asso-
ciated with income. Th e selection eff ect is interpreted as the diff erence between 
the earnings of a fi rst individual in sector h and the income that would have 
been earned by a second individual—drawn randomly from the fi rst equation 
sample (that is, an individual from any sector) and with the same observable 
characteristics as the fi rst individual—had he or she belonged to sector h.
Th e identifying variables (M) required for the robustness of the selection 
model are the inverse of the dependency ratio (the ratio of the number of 
employed workers to household size); a dummy variable for whether the indi-
vidual’s father went to primary school; and a dummy variable for whether the 
individual’s head of household is a woman. Th ese variables are introduced into 
the selection equation (multinomial logit model with four categories for h: 1,…, 
4), but not into the earnings equation. Th e assumption is that these variables 
infl uence earnings only through sector allocation.10 
A second problem that needs to be addressed is the potential endogeneity of 
the intensity of vulnerability. Unobservable characteristics may aff ect both the 
explanatory variable for vulnerability and the level of earnings. Th is would be 
the case, for example, if “poor” workers were selected for employment statuses 
in which vulnerability is greatest. In this case, any positive eff ect vulnerability 
might have on earnings could be underestimated. As disregarding this factor 
could produce nonconvergent estimators of jh = (j1h,j 2h), the vulnerability 
intensity indicator needs to be instrumented.
To do so, we use the control function method rather than the two-stage 
least squares estimator (Garen 1984; Wooldridge 2005). Where earnings are 
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nonlinear in the potentially endogenous variable (here vulnerability inten-
sity), this method provides more accurate estimators than the two-stage least 
squares method (Card 2001). Th e control function method involves regress-
ing the intensity of vulnerability on the individual characteristics X and the 
instrumental variables Z, not correlated with k, the residual from the earnings 
equation (equation 4.2) and (partially) correlated with I (equation 4.3). Th ese 
instruments are the dummy variables for the status of the head of household 
and the dummy variables for the institutional sector of the individual’s father 
when the individual was 15. In principle, these variables do not have a direct 
impact on earned income, because they have nothing to do with productivity, 
the worker’s capacities, or the type of job held. Being a head of household could 
create an incentive to accept a more vulnerable job when faced with urgent 
family needs, but it is more likely that household heads would search for a less 
vulnerable job to guarantee household income stability. All things equal, heads 
of household may adopt long-term strategies and be less drawn by immediate 
gains at the cost of a vulnerable job. 
Another exogenous source of variation in job search can be obtained with 
the father’s occupation when the worker was 15. Th e father’s occupation is likely 
to infl uence the child’s aversion, attraction, or resistance to job vulnerability. Let 
the vulnerability index I be regressed on X and Z such that 
I = ahX + g hZ + mh ∀h = 3,4. (4.3)
Th e estimated residual from this fi rst linear regression, mˆ, is introduced as an 
explanatory variable, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, into the earn-
ings equation:
Yh = b hX + j1hI + j 2hI2 + lh + mˆh + kh ∀h = 3,4. (4.4) 
Th e resulting estimators of jh = (j1h,j2h) are convergent if the model satisfi es 
the classic identifi cation conditions and the instruments are independent of mˆ 
and not correlated with the earnings equation residual kh.
For all estimations, the bootstrap method (500 replications) was used to esti-
mate the standard deviations, which are biased by the nature of the two-stage 
estimations.
Distributional Approach
Th e impact of vulnerability on earnings may diff er across the earnings distribu-
tion. Quantile regressions are used to take these potential eff ects into account. 
First, equation (4.1) is reestimated using conditional quantiles, such that
qt (Yh⏐X,I,I2) = b h(t)X + j1h(t)I + j 2h(t)I2 ∀h = 3,4 (4.5)
where qt (Yh⏐X,I,I2) is the t th conditional quantile of Yh, and vector bh(t) and 
the estimated coeffi  cients j1h(t) and j2h(t) provide the eff ects of the diff erent 
regressors at the th quantile of the earnings distribution in sector h. 
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Th is framework does not take selection eff ects into account. Whereas the 
control function method can also be used in the case of quantile regression, 
to our knowledge no models exist that can estimate quantile regressions with 
multinomial selection. Moreover, this distributional approach corrects only the 
supposed endogeneity of vulnerability. Our approach is not a major drawback, 
because, as shown below, the results of the quantitative approach are not sensi-
tive to the consideration of a possible selection eff ect.
Results
Approach at the Mean
Table 4.4, based on models (4.1), (4.2), and (4.4), shows the marginal eff ects of 
the vulnerability indicator on earnings, calculated at the average vulnerability 
point.11 Whether or not the sample selection and endogeneity of vulnerability 
are corrected, the marginal eff ect of average vulnerability is negative in both 
sectors for all cities except the informal sector in Dakar, where this eff ect is 
slightly positive. In both the formal private and informal sectors, the selection 
correction barely alters the results. However, the correction for the endogeneity 
Table 4.4 Marginal Effects of Vulnerability Intensity on Earnings in Seven Cities in West Africa 
(percent)
Sector Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Formal private sector
No selection correction, 
exogenous vulnerability –12.6 –13.9 –10.9 –16.2 –7.4 –14.3 –9.3 
Selection correction, 
exogenous vulnerability –12.5 –13.8 –10.9 –16.2 –7.0 –14.2 –9.3 
Selection correction, 
endogenous vulnerability –24.2 –37.3 –15.5 –33.5 –24.8 –23.0 –22.5 
Number of observations 825 452 509 950 302 409 336
Average intensity 1.035 0.858 0.967 1.024 1.199 1.325 1.077
Informal sector
No selection correction, 
exogenous vulnerability –2.8 –1.3 –0.6 0.2 –0.1 –1.0 –1.7 
Selection correction, 
exogenous vulnerability –2.9 –1.3 –0.7 0.2 –0.3 –1.0 –1.6 
Selection correction, 
endogenous vulnerability –19.9 –17.2 –3.4 1.0 –13.1 –9.7 –15.6 
Number of observations 2,842 2,906 3,236 3,492 2,857 2,230 2,745
Average intensity 1.661 1.801 1.757 1.959 1.960 2.229 1.787
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 4.1 for details).
Note: The marginal effect at the average point of intensity (denoted I
–
) was calculated using the following equation: 
log( ) . . exp ( . . ) ( ) ( ) ( ) expy a I b I y a I b I em I
y
I
I â I= + ⇒ = + ⇒ =
∂
∂ = +
22 2 ( . . ).â I I+ 2bb
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of vulnerability alters the magnitude of the marginal eff ects. Th e marginal eff ect 
of vulnerability on earnings is already markedly negative before correcting for 
endogeneity. Aft er endogeneity is taken into account, the impact remains nega-
tive and increases.
In the formal private sector, one additional point of vulnerability reduces 
income by 16–34 percent. Th e eff ect is smaller in the informal sector; if the 
endogeneity of vulnerability had not been taken into account, the eff ect would 
have been negligible. Once the endogeneity of vulnerability is included, vulner-
ability has a large impact on earnings, with one additional point of vulnerability 
reducing income by 3–20 percent. Th e marginal eff ect is positive only in Dakar. 
Th ese marginal eff ects are calculated for average vulnerability intensity. In 
the formal private sector, workers satisfy one in eight vulnerability criteria on 
average. In the informal sector, the average vulnerability point is close to 2. 
Hence, if we want to identify any compensating eff ects for higher than average 
vulnerability levels, we have to study the coeffi  cients estimated for the second-
degree vulnerability intensity polynomial.
Regression results (not shown here but refl ected in fi gure 4.1) show that, 
regardless of the model used, vulnerability has a negative eff ect on earnings 
in all cities except Dakar and in both institutional sectors. However, the eff ect 
of vulnerability is nonlinear and convex, as the coeffi  cient of I2 is positive and 
signifi cant. Th is quadratic eff ect is signifi cant at the 5 percent level, at least, and 
mostly at the 1 percent level in all cities and sectors except the formal private 
sector in Bamako, where vulnerability squared has no signifi cant impact on 
earnings.
Th e convexity observed in the descriptive analysis holds in the formal and 
informal private sectors once individual characteristics, selection, and endoge-
neity are controlled for. It can be seen in fi gure 4.2, which shows the average 
income predicted by the Lee model with endogeneization of vulnerability by 
vulnerability level (the curves produced by the ordinary least squares model 
and the simple Lee model are similar).
In the formal private sector, earnings are convex in vulnerability intensity 
in all cities, albeit in a markedly decreasing manner. Th e curve is convex, but 
the slope does not change sign for low levels of vulnerability. A change of sign 
appears only at vulnerability levels that are not well represented in terms of the 
number of workers (four or more). In other words, income losses associated 
with vulnerability are lower for high levels of vulnerability but do not translate 
into gains. In Cotonou, however, the level of gains for a vulnerability level of 4 
is similar to the level of gains obtained for zero vulnerability.
In the informal sector, convexity is observed in all cities, with the slope of 
the earnings curves rising above a vulnerability level of 2. In all cities, average 
predicted earnings for a vulnerability level of 4 or 5 are higher than average pre-
dicted earnings for a vulnerability level of 2. In Cotonou, the average predicted 
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Figure 4.1 Marginal Effect of Vulnerability on Earnings in Seven Cities in West Africa, 
by Income Decile
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Figure 4.2 Average Predicted Earnings by Vulnerability Intensity in Seven Cities in West Africa
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earnings for a vulnerability level of 5 is even higher than the average predicted 
earnings for workers who are not vulnerable at all.
Th e assumption that earnings can compensate for a certain level of vulner-
ability therefore holds in the informal sector. More-vulnerable workers are 
better paid. In keeping with the theory of compensating wage diff erentials, 
this fi nding can be explained by the fact that employers off er higher earn-
ings to fi nd employees prepared to work in vulnerable jobs. For independent 
workers, vulnerability can be a way of earning more immediate gains from 
their work. 
In the informal sector, the marginal eff ect at average vulnerability is negative 
in all cities except Dakar, where it is slightly positive. Th e average vulnerability 
level (about 2) is close to the minima of the convex curves. At these average 
points, income is a decreasing function of vulnerability. Above these points, 
earnings are an increasing function of vulnerability. A signifi cant proportion of 
workers are above the average vulnerability level. Depending on the city, 27–62 
percent of workers in the formal private sector and 38–65 percent of workers in 
the informal sector are more vulnerable than average.
Employers do not compensate workers for the average level of vulnerability; 
it is simply a feature of the job market in a particular city. Workers can negoti-
ate wage compensation for higher levels of vulnerability. If dependent workers 
believe that they are more vulnerable than average, they may be in a position to 
negotiate premium pay. If the market imposes a certain level of vulnerability on 
independent workers, they will be inclined to make their job a bit more vulner-
able to earn a higher income. 
Distributional Approach
Th e distributional approach involves estimating model 4.5 for a certain number 
of earnings quantiles. For simplicity of presentation, we report only the series 
of marginal eff ects of vulnerability, calculated by deciles (fi gure 4.1). Th e curves 
presented are the third-degree trend curves, which are more fl exible than the 
quadratic function. Th e marginal eff ects are calculated using the coeffi  cients 
resulting from the quantile regressions, taking into account the endogeneity 
of vulnerability. In all cities, the marginal eff ect of vulnerability on earnings at 
the average vulnerability point varies depending on its position in the earnings 
distribution.
In the formal private sector, the marginal eff ect of average vulnerability 
is negative across the entire distribution, meaning there is no compensating 
mechanism in the formal private sector at the average point. Th e cities of Coto-
nou, Dakar, Lomé, Niamey, and Ouagadougou present the same concave and 
then convex marginal eff ect curves; the points of infl ection are close to median 
earnings in the distributions. Th e curve in Bamako diff ers. It is solely concave, 
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reaches its maximum at the median earnings. One additional point of vulner-
ability is associated with a 10 percent decrease in the earnings of an individual 
with average vulnerability in the fi ft h decile of the distribution. Abidjan’s curve 
is slightly convex at the lower tail of the distribution and then concave. Th e 
marginal eff ect of vulnerability on earnings varies little along the distribution 
(20–30 percent income loss).
In the informal sectors of Bamako, Cotonou, and Dakar the marginal eff ect 
of vulnerability along the conditional distribution of earnings is rising and 
mainly concave. It becomes positive as of the third decile in Dakar and as of 
the sixth decile in Bamako and Cotonou. Hence, for Dakar workers in the 
seventh decile with an average level of vulnerability, a one-point increase in 
vulnerability is associated with average increased earnings of 25 percent. In 
Cotonou, a one-point increase in the vulnerability of workers in the ninth 
decile with average vulnerability is associated with an average increase in earn-
ings of 15–20 percent. In Bamako the eff ect is lower, but not negligible, as 
the increase in earnings can be as high as 5 percent for workers in the eighth 
decile. In the other cities (Abidjan, Lomé, Niamey, and Ouagadougou), one 
additional point of vulnerability is associated with no increase in earnings 
compared with average vulnerability, regardless of the position in the distribu-
tion. In Niamey, however, the income losses caused by a one-point increase in 
vulnerability are smaller for the eighth and ninth deciles.
In Dakar, Cotonou, and Bamako, the marginal eff ect of average vulnerabil-
ity is positive for higher deciles of the earnings distribution. Dakar, Cotonou, 
and—to a lesser extent—Bamako display both the highest compensation for 
vulnerability and positive eff ects of vulnerability on high earnings for average 
levels of vulnerability. In the informal sectors of these cities, vulnerability has a 
diff erent eff ect on earnings depending on the worker’s relative position on the 
remuneration scale. For similar observable characteristics, workers at the lower 
tail of the earnings distribution (poor) are penalized in monetary terms for 
their vulnerability whereas workers at the upper tail of the distribution receive 
compensation for their vulnerability. Th is diff erence can be explained by greater 
bargaining power among workers at the upper tail of the earnings distribution. 
Dependent workers with higher skills may be in a better position to negotiate 
their wages. Among independent workers (the majority in the informal sector), 
the poorest cannot raise their income to compensate for the vulnerability of 
their work (by increasing the prices of goods or services they sell, for example). 
In contrast, independent workers at the upper tail of the earnings distribution 
can more easily make trade-off s between working conditions and earnings by 
keeping prices high. Furthermore, labor supply may well outstrip demand in 
low-income activity sectors. In this case, employers would not have to fi nan-
cially compensate workers for adverse working conditions, and own-account 
workers would not be able to raise their mark-up. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, we develop indicators of employment vulnerability in seven West 
African economic capitals and study their links with individual earnings from 
the main job. According to the theory of compensating diff erentials, workers 
receive pecuniary compensation commensurate with the strenuous or hazardous 
nature of their tasks or the adverse nature of their working conditions. Th is chap-
ter draws on this theory, applying it to working conditions and more broadly to 
vulnerability in employment (contractual insecurity, working conditions, under-
employment, and stopgap jobs mismatched with individual characteristics), a 
dominant characteristic of urban labor markets in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Indicators of employment vulnerability in seven West African cities  (Abidjan, 
Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Lomé, Niamey, and Ouagadougou) reveal that in the 
private sector, 83 percent of dependent workers and 86 percent of independent 
workers are vulnerable. Th ese percentages mask huge diff erences between the 
formal private and informal sectors, where 98 percent of dependent and 87 
percent of independent workers are vulnerable. Among workers in the private 
sector, 85 percent meet at least one criterion for vulnerability. 
Th e quantitative analysis fi nds that the impact of vulnerability on earnings is 
negative for an average level of vulnerability (except in Dakar, where it is slightly 
positive). In the formal private sector, income losses associated with vulnerabil-
ity are lower for high levels of vulnerability. In Cotonou, for example, the level 
of earnings for average vulnerability is close to the level of earnings obtained 
for zero vulnerability. In the informal sector, however, the average predicted 
earnings for workers with high vulnerability scores are higher than the aver-
age predicted earnings for workers with relatively low vulnerability scores. In 
Cotonou, the average predicted earnings for level 5 vulnerability (on a scale of 
1–8) is even higher than the average predicted earnings for workers who are not 
vulnerable. Th e assumption that average earnings may compensate for a certain 
level of vulnerability is thus confi rmed in the informal sector. Th is compensa-
tion or lesser-loss mechanism for high levels of vulnerability aff ects a signifi cant 
share of workers. Average vulnerability is not compensated for; it is an inherent 
characteristic of the job markets in these cities.
Th e marginal eff ect is estimated through regressions on the earnings average, 
which conceal variations in the magnitude of the impact of vulnerability along 
the earnings distribution. Quantile regressions fi nd evidence that the impact of 
vulnerability on earnings is not uniform, particularly in the informal sector. For 
example, in the informal sectors of Dakar, Cotonou, and Bamako, the marginal 
eff ect of average vulnerability is positive for the upper deciles of the earnings 
distribution. Dakar, Cotonou, and, to a lesser extent, Bamako display both the 
highest compensation for high levels of vulnerability and the positive eff ects of 
average vulnerability on earnings among the highest earnings.
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For average levels of vulnerability, compensating wage diff erentials are 
found at the upper tail of the distribution. However, the compensating mecha-
nism does not concern the poorest workers. Although the poorest dependent 
workers should be the most forceful in wage bargaining in an endeavor to earn 
a living wage, they have less bargaining power because of the urgent nature of 
their needs. Urban labor market imbalances could also explain this absence 
of compensating wage diff erentials at the lower tail of the distribution, where 
labor supply probably far exceeds demand. Similarly, the poorest indepen-
dent workers suff er more from their vulnerability and do not adopt strategies 
to compensate for it by increasing their profi ts (raising receipts or reducing 
expenditure). An independent worker at the upper tail of the earnings dis-
tribution could more easily make trade-off s between working conditions and 
earnings.
Notes
 1. Th e still-developing economic literature on vulnerability includes a range of defi ni-
tions. Wilson and Ramphele (1989) defi ne vulnerability as the risk of destitution, 
famine, or death. Th e concept of vulnerability moved forward with Sen’s capabil-
ity approach (1992, 1999). Cheli and Lemmi (1995) refer subsequently to exposure 
to the risk of poverty. Qizilbash (2003, 2006) views vulnerability as an individual’s 
distance from an unambiguous state of poverty. Dubois and Rousseau (2001) view 
vulnerability in terms of the structure of “capabilities” that enables individuals to 
replace (or not) one capability with another in the event of an exogenous shock. Th e 
loss of a job would therefore have a greater impact on an individual with less leeway 
to work in diff erent occupations and a low level of economic and social capital. Th e 
notion of vulnerability adopted in this chapter is similar to that developed by Cheli 
and Lemmi (1995) and Qizilbash (2006), as it remains vague about the exact level of 
the state of poverty and its multidimensional aspect. 
 2. Health hazards are not considered, because the data used did not include them. 
 3. However, there is not a great deal of empirical evidence to support this point. See in 
particular Poggi (2007) and Fernández and Nordman (2009).
 4. In the more developed version of this chapter (Bocquier, Nordman, and Vescovo 
2010), we used a qualitative approach, conducting a principal component factor 
analysis on the diff erent aspects of vulnerability. Th e main components were then 
used as vulnerability variables. We thus relaxed the assumption that all the criteria 
involved in vulnerability have the same weight. Technical details on our econometric 
procedure, additional tables, and results are also reported in this version. 
 5. Although Abidjan and Cotonou are not administrative capitals, we refer to them as 
capitals because they are the most important economic centers in their countries 
(Cotonou is also the seat of government).
 6. See Katz (1986) for a review of effi  ciency wage theories, Lindbeck and Snower 
(1989) for a review of insider-outsider models (labor market segmentation the-
ory), and Akerlof and Yellen (1990) for an extended version of effi  ciency wage 
theory.
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 7. Th e studies on this issue reach confl icting conclusions. See, for example, French and 
Dunlap (1998); Groot and Maassen van den Brink (1998); Lanfranchi, Ohlsson, and 
Skalli (2002); Magnani (2002); Clark and Senik (2006); Bockerman and Ilmakunnas 
(2006); and Poggi (2007).
 8. Not all second-job holders are vulnerable. Public and private sector wage-earners 
sometimes work second jobs to earn money for retirement or for their children.
 9. Th e status hierarchy is as follows: senior executives, engineers, or equivalent; mid-
dle managers and supervisors and skilled and semi-skilled nonmanual and manual 
employees; unskilled workers; apprentices and family workers.
 10. See Bocquier, Nordman, and Vescovo (2010) for further discussion of our identifi ca-
tion strategies.
 11. Detailed regression tables are available from the authors.
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5Chapter
Education and Labor Market 
Outcomes in Urban West Africa
Mathias Kuépié, Christophe J. Nordman, and François Roubaud
Education in Sub-Saharan Africa is oft en seen as the main policy instrument in 
the fi ght against poverty. In practice, however, although education is an intrinsic 
component of development and well-being, its economic value is not clear, as 
urban unemployment in Sub-Saharan Africa is rising, especially among edu-
cated workers. 
Th e mismatch between (increasing) investment in schooling on the one 
hand and actual labor market opportunities on the other represents a major 
challenge for policy makers. For years, the existence of signifi cant rents in the 
formal sector (especially in the dominant public sector) were so high that it 
made sense for individuals to “queue” and to undervalue returns in the informal 
sector. Today, education no longer seems to guard against poverty and social 
exclusion. It is therefore critical to reappraise the external effi  ciency of invest-
ment in schooling in these countries.
Traditional studies of the external effi  ciency of education systems look at the 
impact of education on individuals aft er they leave school.1 Th ey examine two 
types of impacts, economic and social, which can be interpreted either from 
the individual or the collective standpoint. Th is chapter focuses solely on the 
economic and private dimensions of the effi  ciency of education. 
Th e analysis of private returns to education is based on standard human 
capital theory, according to which earnings diff erentials between individu-
als result from diff erences in wage compensation for diff erent human capital 
endowments. Th is theory suggests that investment in education is an explana-
tory factor in the distribution of individual earnings. 
Th is principle has substantial implications for low-income countries, because 
it explains the existence of earnings diff erences between individuals in the labor 
market. From a policy viewpoint, if returns to education are high for individuals 
from poor households, poverty reduction policies designed to promote equal 
opportunities in access to schooling would be appropriate. 
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Numerous objections and criticisms have been made regarding the assump-
tion that education—and hence productivity—is the main determinant of dif-
ferences in individuals’ earnings. Many authors have shown that traditional 
theories postulating the leveling of income levels by individuals with identical 
levels of human capital do not describe reality when markets are imperfect or 
segmented. 
Markets in African countries are imperfect, and the nature of work contracts 
interferes signifi cantly in the relationship between human capital endowments 
and earnings. Th ere are four types of labor markets in developing countries: 
rural, public, private formal, and informal. Each type of market has its own char-
acteristics, such as job seasonality and uncertainty about the level of demand, 
the nature of contracts, and the structure of wages and earnings. However, many 
studies on the link between education and labor market outcomes in Africa 
overlook the fact that the existence of diff erent employment segments, espe-
cially in the rural and informal sectors, may have major implications regarding 
the role of education in labor market integration.2 
Th is chapter analyzes the eff ects of education on remuneration in seven cities 
in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).3 Using Phase 1 
of the 1-2-3 surveys in these capitals, we broaden the scope and refi ne the 
indicators generally used to assess the effi  ciency of education for labor market 
integration in Sub-Saharan Africa, using the same method for each city.4 In 
particular, we estimate the determinants of earnings, especially the eff ect of 
education. Th e data allow us to compare the returns to vocational versus general 
education at diff erent levels of the schooling path, shedding light on the debate 
over whether general education or vocational training yields higher returns. 
Th e household survey data enable us to account for two persistent economet-
ric problems: the possible sample selectivity biases introduced by endogenous 
sector choices and the possible endogeneity of the education variable in the 
earnings function. 
Th e results show that returns to schooling generally increase once an endog-
enous education variable is accounted for. Th is eff ect is particularly strong in 
the informal sector. In most cities in the sample, the returns to education are 
highest in the public sector, followed by the formal private sector and then the 
informal sector. We also shed light on the fi nding that returns to education are 
convex in all cities and sectors, including the informal sector. We provide evi-
dence of signifi cant eff ects of education on individual earnings in the informal 
sectors of the major WAEMU cities, even at high levels of schooling.
Th e chapter is organized as follows. Th e fi rst section describes the econo-
metric models. Th e second section analyzes and discusses the fi ndings. Th e 
last section presents the conclusions and off ers some policy recommendations.5 
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Econometric Methods
Our methodological approach consists of estimating diff erent models to evalu-
ate the impact of education (years of education, type of education [general ver-
sus vocational], level reached, and qualifi cations obtained) on earnings. Th e 
surveys enable us to estimate Mincer-type earnings models, taking account of 
the sample selection eff ects associated with individuals’ participation and sec-
tor choices. In addition, the data allow us to address the possible endogeneity 
of the education variable in the earnings function using alternative techniques 
that make use of information on family background. 
Earnings Equations with Selection Bias Correction
Let Sj be the sectoral situation (j = 0–3), where S0 = no work, S1 = public sector, 
S2 = formal private sector, and S3 = informal private sector. We can view Sj as a 
“response function” to a set of latent continuous variables S*j that measure the 
propensities to have the sectoral situations Sj:
 S*ij = bj’ Xi + eij  (5.1)
and 
 Yij = zj’ Zi + hij, (5.2)
where S*ij measures the propensities of individual i to have the sectoral situation 
Sj; Yij denotes the income individual i earns by working in sector j, where j = 1 
(public sector), 2 (formal sector), and 3 (informal sector); Xi and Zi are vectors 
of observable individual characteristics (including education); bj and zj are vec-
tors of parameters to be estimated; and ejj and hij are error terms. Th e aim is to 
estimate the coeffi  cients zj for each sector. Yj is observed only if sector j is chosen; 
hj and ej are therefore not independent. As a result, the ordinary least squares 
estimator is potentially biased. 
In the fi rst stage, multinomial logit models are used to compute the correc-
tion terms lij from the predicted probability of individual i working in sector j. 
Th e generalized forms of the inverse Mills ratios are then introduced into the 
earnings equation for each sector j, yielding consistent estimators of bj. Lee’s 
method has been criticized because it relies on a strong assumption regarding 
the joint distribution of error terms of the equations of interest (see Vijver-
berg 1993; Dahl 2002; Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand 2007). However, 
the alternative methods we tried (Dubin and McFadden 1984; Dahl 2002) did 
not appear more effi  cient given the small size of the sectoral subsamples.6 We 
166  URBAN LABOR MARKETS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
therefore chose Lee’s correction method, which has the advantage of providing 
an easier interpretation of the correction terms.
Another potential problem is that the multinomial logit may suff er from the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption, which in most cases 
is questionable. Th e Hausman-type tests performed for each city and sector pro-
vide overwhelming evidence that the IIA assumption was not violated, except 
in the informal sector in Bamako.7 
In both Heckman’s and Lee’s procedure, identifi cation is achieved using 
exclusion restrictions (that is, by the inclusion of additional regressors in the 
fi rst-stage selection equations). In order to preserve comparability across coun-
tries as much as possible, we rely on the same exclusion restrictions for each city. 
However, aft er considering tests of appropriateness of the exclusion restrictions, 
we relaxed such constraints at the sector level (that is, we use diff erent sets of 
identifying variables for selection into the informal sector and the formal sec-
tors [public and private]).8 In the formal sectors, we use six dummy variables 
describing the individual’s relationship to the household head (child, spouse), 
together with the household’s inverse dependency ratio (the number of working 
individuals divided by the total number of people in the household). For the 
informal sector, we excluded only the dependency ratio from the second-step 
regressions, where the individual’s situation in the household oft en appeared 
signifi cant. We tested the appropriateness of this identifi cation strategy using 
Wald tests of joint signifi cance of the identifying variables in the fi rst stage and 
insignifi cance in the second stage for each sector in all cities (21 cases). Th e tests 
highlighted the appropriateness of this choice in 19 cases.9 However, bearing 
i n mind the methodological controversies surrounding the choice of identify-
ing variables in general, we report summary results from uncorrected earnings 
functions (ordinary least squares) as well, which makes it easier to compare our 
results with the results of other studies. 
Endogenous Education
It is widely recognized in the literature that using ordinary least squares to 
estimate the returns to education from cross-sectional data is potentially 
problematic. Th e standard concern is that education may be an endogenous 
variable—that is, correlated with the residual of the earnings function because 
of unobserved individual heterogeneity. To address this issue, researchers com-
monly use instrumental variables techniques, which involve fi nding variables 
that are uncorrelated with the individuals’ unobserved heterogeneity but cor-
related with their education. Th e instrumentation is oft en based on household 
and demographic characteristics that are assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
error term of the earnings equation. Th ese instruments, which are popular in 
analyses of developing country data, may capture various genetic and environ-
mental infl uences (Sahn and Alderman 1988).10 
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We tackle the issue of endogeneity using various techniques. First, we use 
father’s schooling and main occupation as instruments and adopt a control 
function approach (Garen 1984; Wooldridge 2005; Söderbom and others 2006). 
Th is method is adopted when the earnings-education profi le is nonlinear in the 
estimated parameters. As our results show, the marginal eff ects of education are 
nonconstant (for details and discussion of the implementation of this method, 
see Kuépié, Nordman, and Roubaud 2009). 
Following Blackburn and Neumark (1995), Lam and Schoeni (1993), and 
Ashenfelter and Zimmerman (1997), we also use family background informa-
tion diff erently, introducing it directly into the earnings functions. Doing so is 
another way of applying the control function procedure (see Kuépié, Nordman, 
and Roubaud 2009). 
All of these techniques are interesting, because the diff erent hypotheses 
behind them may lead to common features in the results that can be considered 
relatively robust. Th us, even if endogeneity issues are not perfectly corrected, 
the similarity of results from the diff erent methods should help convince read-
ers of their soundness. 
Impact of Education on Labor Market Outcomes
Th is section examines the eff ect of education on labor market insertion and inter-
individual earnings diff erentials. In the fi rst subsection, we present some fi gures 
on the link between labor market integration (unemployment, sector choice) 
and education. In the second subsection, we report results from pooled and 
sectoral earnings functions and examine summary results obtained with diff er-
ent econometric methodologies, considering in particular selectivity- corrected 
earnings functions and the education variable as an endogenous regressor. In 
the third subsection, we focus on the cross-country comparison, using a set of 
estimates deemed most reliable for each city and sector. In the last subsection, we 
provide an overview of the marginal returns to diff erent qualifi cations. 
Education, Unemployment, and Labor Market Insertion
Th e subsection presents fi ndings on the effi  ciency of education in terms of 
exits from unemployment and integration into diff erent labor market segments 
(formal versus informal). For the seven cities, the unemployment rate is lowest 
(15 percent) among people with the least education. It rises to 20–21 percent 
for people with levels ranging from completed primary schooling to completed 
secondary schooling.11 It drops slightly (to 19 percent) for people who com-
pleted at least one year of higher education. 
Th e fact that human capital is thin on the ground does not appear to protect 
people who have it against unemployment. Th is is particularly true in Lomé, 
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where unemployment increases strictly with the level of education (from 8 percent 
among people with no education to 23 percent among people with higher educa-
tion). Th e trends are less linear in other cities. In most cases, unemployment tends 
fi rst to increase with the level of education, before decreasing with completion 
of secondary school and entry into higher education. Th is pattern is particularly 
strong in Cotonou, Dakar, and Ouagadougou, where higher education somewhat 
reduces the extent of unemployment.
Findings from a logit of the probability of being unemployed (controlling 
for individual and household characteristics such as age, gender, migrant sta-
tus, marital status, household per capita income, the individual’s relationship 
to the head of household, and the household’s dependency ratio) are similar to 
the fi ndings of the descriptive analysis.12 All else equal, individuals with little 
or no education appear to be less exposed to unemployment than individu-
als who have at least completed primary school, probably indicating lower job 
aspirations. Lomé shows a strong positive relation between unemployment and 
education. Abidjan and Cotonou also follow this trend. In the other cities, the 
link between unemployment and the level of education takes the bell shape 
observed previously. 
Th e fact that investment in human capital does not always open the door to 
employment refl ects deterioration of African urban labor markets, the result of 
the failure (or absence) of urbanization policies to set in motion a drive to cre-
ate skilled jobs. It is also a consequence of structural adjustment policies that 
reduced staff  in the civil service. Evidence of the eff ect of these policies is found 
in the fact that among people 45–59, who entered the labor market before the 
urban boom and the full force of the structural adjustment plans was felt, higher 
education is associated with a low risk of unemployment in all seven cities.
Although being unemployed is an indicator of exclusion from the labor mar-
ket, having a job does not always guard against precariousness (see chapters 1, 2, 
and 4). In the following subsections, we look at the link between education and 
the quality of the job held in addition to its impact on unemployment. 
A quantitative analysis of the balance in the labor markets reveals the exis-
tence of signifi cant unemployment against which human capital accumulation 
is no shield, especially among young people. An analysis of external effi  ciency 
should consider the correspondence between the level of education and job 
quality. Job quality is studied here in terms of the employment sector: public 
formal, private formal, and informal (for another approach, see chapter 2).
Th ere is a very close link between the level of education and the employ-
ment sector. For the sample as a whole, 91 percent of employed workers who 
did not start or complete primary school work in the informal sector. Com-
pleted primary schooling brings the proportion in the informal sector down to 
75 percent; completed middle school reduces it to 50 percent. Only 19 percent of 
people who entered higher education work in the informal sector. Th is pattern 
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holds for all cities except Lomé. In Lomé, the formal sector clearly supplants the 
informal sector as the level of education rises, but the correlation is weaker than 
in the other cities and a signifi cant proportion of people with higher education 
(39 percent) work in the informal sector (95 percent of people who did not start 
or complete primary school work in the informal sector). 
We decompose the formal sector into public and private formal sectors and 
then run a multinomial logit model to measure the net infl uence of education 
on sector allocation (table 5.1).13 Th e results show that for all cities and school 
grades, an additional year of education tends to yield the maximum impact 
for integrating the public sector, followed by the private formal sector. In three 
cities (Bamako, Lomé, and Ouagadougou), additional years of higher educa-
tion (more than 13 years of schooling) have no infl uence on the probability of 
integrating into the formal private sector. Th is result may refl ect the incapacity 
of formal private fi rms to create highly qualifi ed jobs for people with higher 
education.
Th e type of education also plays an important role in providing access to the 
formal sector. Only 37 percent of individuals who complete at least four years 
of vocational education—aft er which they receive an occupational profi ciency 
certifi cate (the Certifi cat d’aptitude professionnelle [CAP])—work in the informal 
sector, as opposed to nearly 50 percent of individuals who reached an equivalent 
level in the secondary school system (that is, completed middle school without 
starting secondary school). Vocational education is more eff ective for integrat-
ing people into the formal sector than general education in Niamey, Dakar, 
Bamako, Cotonou, and Lomé. Th e share of workers with vocational training 
who work in the formal sector is 82 percent in Niamey, 71 percent in Dakar and 
Bamako, 58 percent in Cotonou, and 50 percent in Lomé. By way of comparison, 
the proportion of individuals who completed general studies at middle school 
and worked in the formal sector stood at 68 percent in Niamey, 55 percent in 
Dakar, 41 percent in Bamako, 44 percent in Cotonou, and 30 percent in Lomé. 
In Abidjan and Ouagadougou, vocational education shows no advantage over 
general education in terms of the chances of entering the formal sector.
Specifi cations of Earnings Functions 
Th e earnings regressions assess the seven cities separately. Th e estimates are 
obtained using the log of hourly rather than monthly earnings to take account of 
the heterogeneity of working hours in diff erent sectors. Th e additional explana-
tory variables in the models are migrant status (dummies for rural, urban, and 
foreign migrants); marital status (dummies for single, monogamous married, 
polygamous married, widowed, free union, divorced); and religion (dummies 
for Muslim and Christian). 
In most studies, log earnings are assumed to be linear or quadratic in years of 
education. Here we seek to document the shape of the entire earnings-education 
Table 5.1 Multinomial Logit Models of Impact of Education on Allocation of Labor to Public or Formal Private Sector in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
Variable
Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Public
Formal 
private Public
Formal 
private Public
Formal 
private Public
Formal 
private Public
Formal 
private Public
Formal 
private Public
Formal 
private
Years of education
0–6 (primaire) 0.266*** 0.165*** 0.259*** 0.102*** 0.305*** 0.183*** 0.328*** 0.190*** 0.265*** 0.204*** 0.267*** 0.195*** 0.320*** 0.215***
(3.36) (6.04) (5.65) (3.21) (4.98) (4.36) (8.32) (8.79) (4.44) (3.83) (7.31) (5.84) (8.80) (6.24)
7–9 (collège) 0.558*** 0.243*** 0.489*** 0.195*** 0.417*** 0.282*** 0.409*** 0.250*** 0.333*** 0.220*** 0.518*** 0.242*** 0.573*** 0.374***
(6.74) (5.63) (6.36) (2.92) (6.72) (5.59) (8.46) (7.01) (5.64) (4.16) (8.54) (4.07) (11.14) (6.87)
10–13 (lycée) 0.449*** 0.183** 0.593*** 0.445*** 0.335*** 0.327*** 0.365*** 0.235*** 0.525*** 0.382*** 0.343*** 0.331*** 0.383*** 0.265***
(4.51) (2.38) (6.54) (4.84) (3.98) (4.35) (5.09) (3.72) (6.46) (4.89) (4.05) (3.57) (4.62) (2.76)
13+ 0.402*** 0.326*** 0.179** 0.076 0.420*** 0.305*** 0.319*** 0.280*** 0.132** 0.070 0.158** 0.121* 0.159** 0.096
(4.70) (4.18) (2.28) (0.91) (7.03) (5.34) (4.67) (4.30) (2.10) (1.08) (2.39) (1.72) (2.33) (1.22)
Potential experience
Potential 
experience 
0.210*** 0.096*** 0.208*** 0.088*** 0.125*** 0.040** 0.169*** 0.077*** 0.148*** 0.068*** 0.100*** 0.056*** 0.155*** 0.139***
(6.14) (5.73) (8.84) (4.48) (5.45) (2.20) (8.14) (6.11) (5.67) (3.16) (5.24) (2.83) (7.75) (6.36)
(Potential 
experience)2/100
–0.297*** –0.129*** –0.244*** –0.132*** –0.129*** –0.038 –0.197*** –0.081*** –0.157*** –0.069* –0.109*** –0.092*** –0.169*** –0.179***
–(4.35) –(4.37) –(6.61) –(4.34) –(3.36) –(1.27) –(5.64) –(4.24) –(3.51) –(1.85) –(3.88) –(3.02) –(5.23) –(5.04)
Gender
Woman –0.701*** –1.058*** –0.536* –1.319*** –0.508*** –0.550*** –0.395** –0.768*** –0.743*** –1.010*** –0.299 –0.633*** –0.405** –0.541**
–(2.86) –(8.11) –(1.94) –(5.38) –(2.74) –(3.71) – (2.50) –(7.22) –(3.57) –(5.12) –(1.37) –(3.20) –(1.97) –(2.55)
Pseudo R 2 0.285 0.287 0.268 0.231 0.227 0.259 0.289
Number of 
observations 4,259 4,015 4,397 5,291 3,911 3,575 4,192
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) conducted in 2001/02 by the Observatoire économique et 
statistique d’Afrique Subsaharienne (AFRISTAT); Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation (DIAL); and national statistics institutes.
Note: The base category is the informal sector. The additional explanatory variables are migrant status (dummies for rural, urban, or foreign migrants); marital status (dummies for single, 
monogamous married, polygamous married, widowed, free union, divorced); and dummies for religion (Muslim, Christian). Figures in parentheses are student statistics. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
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profi le. We therefore adopt a more fl exible approach, specifying education as 
a piecewise linear spline function (see below) that allows the strength of the 
relationship between education and earnings to vary across diff erent parts of 
the educational distribution. We distinguish four levels of education: primary, 
lower secondary (collège), upper secondary (lycée), and tertiary. Th e education 
variables introduced have the form sk(e), where e is years of completed school-
ing at the k level (k: 1,…,4):
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Table 5.2 reports the pooled earnings functions estimates across sectors 
using Heckman’s two-step approach and endogenous education with the control 
function method. Th e use of a single model for all gainfully employed individu-
als provides only the average eff ect of education on earnings, masking specifi c 
education eff ects in each employment sector. Where diff erences in these eff ects 
across sectors are small, a pooled model is suffi  cient to be able to draw conclu-
sions about each labor market segment. Where these eff ects vary widely, the 
returns to education must be estimated separately for each sector. 
Tables 5.3–5.5 report the estimates corrected for potential endogenous sector 
selection (using Lee’s method).14 To ease reading, given the number of coun-
tries studied and the set of alternative estimation techniques, we also present a 
synthesis table (table 5.6) reporting the average marginal returns to schooling 
using diff erent methods.15 Before turning to the comments on the returns to 
human capital, we briefl y discuss the results obtained with diff erent estimation 
strategies.16
Ordinary least squares versus selectivity-corrected earnings functions. Using 
a pooled population of paid-work participants across the three sectors, the 
selection-correction terms stemming from a probit equation of paid-work 
 participation in the fi rst stage are generally insignifi cant, except in Abidjan 
at the 1 percent level (this fi nding means that the mechanism of allocation 
of paid-work participants versus nonparticipants is not random and aff ects 
earnings signifi cantly). Paid-work participation is associated with unobserved 
 characteristics that are negatively correlated with earnings. If sample selectiv-
ity is not accounted for, ordinary least squares estimates would yield biased 
estimates of the returns to observed characteristics, notably human capital. 
Table 5.2 Earnings Functions with Endogenous Education and Selectivity Correction in All Sectors in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
(dependent variable: log of hourly earnings)
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Years of education
0–6 (primaire) 0.037*** 0.058*** 0.080*** 0.092*** 0.064*** 0.052*** 0.103***
(3.44) (5.34) (9.24) (9.00) (4.82) (4.23) (9.66)
7–9 (collège) 0.112*** 0.104*** 0.077*** 0.106*** 0.102*** 0.158*** 0.182***
(6.92) (4.78) (5.42) (6.92) (5.80) (7.44) (11.55)
10–13 (lycée) 0.187*** 0.171*** 0.174*** 0.134*** 0.215*** 0.182*** 0.201***
(7.62) (6.13) (7.98) (5.85) (8.41) (6.21) (8.76)
13+ (higher education) 0.166*** 0.138*** 0.141*** 0.166*** 0.154*** 0.103*** 0.157***
(7.99) (6.44) (8.46) (8.80) (4.90) (6.23) (8.42)
Experience
Potential experience 0.014** 0.029*** 0.011* 0.033*** 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.044***
(2.31) (5.10) (1.78) (5.65) (3.80) (4.47) (7.73)
Potential experience squared/100 –0.002 –0.036*** –0.008 –0.040*** –0.030*** –0.030*** –0.052***
(0.22) (4.33) (0.81) (4.59) (2.79) (3.44) (6.34)
Seniority in current job 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.030***
(4.76) (5.03) (4.87) (5.65) (5.76) (5.60) (5.82)
Seniority in current job squared/100 –0.058*** –0.033** –0.040** –0.041*** –0.053*** –0.047*** –0.040**
(2.94) (2.23) (2.43) (2.96) (2.83) (2.88) (2.49)
Gender
Woman –0.325*** –0.190*** –0.330*** –0.264*** –0.229*** –0.249*** –0.210***
(7.48) (3.49) (8.92) (6.69) (4.42) (4.81) (5.20)
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Sector
Public sector 0.675*** 0.281*** 0.383*** 0.469*** 0.610*** 0.420*** 0.640***
(14.24) (5.75) (9.13) (11.14) (10.99) (9.41) (15.83)
Formal private sector 0.476*** 0.229*** 0.229*** 0.407*** 0.418*** 0.397*** 0.591***
(15.03) (4.59) (5.64) (11.83) (7.39) (8.49) (13.16)
Corrections
Control variable (residuals of education regression) –0.007 –0.030*** –0.028*** –0.037*** –0.023* –0.015 –0.038***
(0.74) (3.70) (3.81) (4.02) (1.90) (1.60) (4.79)
Inverse Mills ratio –0.240*** 0.058 –0.092 0.004 –0.026 0.035 0.055
(3.86) (1.06) (1.49) (0.07) (0.36) (0.58) (1.03)
Constant –2.023*** –2.480*** –2.296*** –2.506*** –2.967*** –2.759*** –3.214***
(19.41) (23.18) (21.30) (20.02) (24.76) (20.51) (28.63)
Number of observations 4,011 3,821 4,184 4,364 3,496 3,069 3,665
Pseudo R 2 0.51 0.38 0.41 0.42 0.38 0.46 0.55
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 5.1 for details).
Note: The additional explanatory variables in the models are migrant status (dummies for rural, urban, and foreign migrants); marital status (dummies for single, monogamous 
married, polygamous married, widowed, free union, divorced); and religion (dummies for Muslim and Christian). The inverse Mills ratio is derived from a probit estimation of labor 
market participation for each city (with a dummy variable of strictly positive earnings as the dependent variable) comprising age and its square, gender, years of education, migrant 
status, marital status, religion, and one identifying variable (the dependency ratio). The reference category is a man working in the informal sector. Figures in parentheses are 
 student statistics. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 500 replications. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent, *** level significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 5.3 Earnings Functions with Endogenous Education and Selectivity Correction in the Public Sector in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
(dependent variable: log of hourly earnings)
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Years of education
0–6 (primaire) 0.090** 0.085** 0.063 0.069* –0.016 0.031 0.095***
(1.97) (2.32) (1.44) (1.72) (0.21) (1.10) (3.08)
7–9 (collège) –0.048 0.131*** 0.125** 0.034 –0.024 0.127*** 0.139***
(0.81) (2.58) (2.28)v (0.74) (0.35) (3.42) (3.51)
10–13 (lycée) 0.138** 0.157*** 0.182*** 0.112** 0.094 0.148*** 0.141***
(2.43) (3.50) (3.56) (2.41) (1.21) (3.91) (3.86)
13+ (higher education) 0.099*** 0.135*** 0.141*** 0.127*** 0.075* 0.094*** 0.124***
(2.80) (5.33) (3.76) (3.89) (1.82) (4.37) (5.75)
Experience
Potential experience –0.012 0.069*** 0.041 0.015 –0.022 0.058*** 0.058***
(0.45) (3.59) (1.33) (0.59) (0.62) (5.36) (3.50)
Potential experience 
squared/100
0.064 –0.091*** –0.017 0.007 0.062 –0.078*** –0.063**
(1.25) (2.76) (0.31) (0.18) (1.04) (4.39) (2.25)
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Gender
Woman –0.017 –0.072 –0.003 –0.105 0.281* –0.081 –0.058
(0.20) (1.07) (0.03) (1.19) (1.88) (1.37) (0.97)
Corrections
Control variable (residuals 
of education regression)
–0.006 –0.015 –0.008 –0.015 0.033 0.011 –0.007
(0.26) (1.04) (0.51) (0.97) (1.13) (0.86) (0.59)
Inverse Mills ratio 0.493** –0.184 –0.100 0.249 0.711* 0.016 0.003
(2.42) (1.03) (0.29) (0.92) (1.88) (0.12) (0.01)
Constant –0.176 –3.235*** –2.679** –1.089 0.253 –2.427*** –2.716***
(0.21) (4.77) (2.00) (1.09) (0.18) (5.79) (3.95)
Number of observations 306 459 411 483 313 597 595
Pseudo R 2 0.44 0.38 0.46 0.38 0.45 0.47 0.53
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 5.1 for details).
Note: The additional explanatory variables in the models are migrant status, marital status, and religion. The Lee ratio is derived from a multinomial logit model of sector 
choices (with, as reference category, nonpaid work participation) comprising age and its square, gender, years of education, migrant status, marital status, religion, and 
identifying variables (namely, dummies on the individual’s relationship to the head of household and the dependency ratio). Figures in parentheses are student statistics. 
Standard errors are bootstrapped with 500 replications. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 5.4 Earnings Functions with Endogenous Education and Selectivity Correction in the Formal Private Sector in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
(dependent variable: log of hourly earning)
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Years of education
0–6 (primaire) 0.040* 0.101*** 0.057 0.084*** 0.070 0.094*** 0.127***
(1.72) (2.88) (1.57) (3.58) (1.17) (2.61) (3.86)
7–9 (collège) 0.116*** 0.184*** 0.139*** 0.089*** 0.050 0.182*** 0.114***
(4.32) (3.38) (3.93) (3.39) (0.91) (3.51) (2.66)
10–13 (lycée) 0.218*** 0.113 0.124** 0.141*** 0.260*** 0.171** 0.247***
(5.84) (1.45) (2.54) (4.18) (3.55) (2.52) (4.79)
13+ (higher education) 0.214*** 0.261*** 0.175*** 0.169*** 0.184*** 0.115** 0.205***
(6.83) (5.44) (6.06) (5.94) (3.17) (2.41) (3.66)
Experience
Potential experience 0.040*** 0.020 0.019 0.032** 0.041* 0.053*** 0.042**
(3.26) (0.98) (1.51) (2.39) (1.76) (3.05) (1.97)
Potential experience 
squared/100
–0.027 0.012 0.011 –0.022 –0.026 –0.045 –0.036
(1.26) (0.34) (0.50) (1.04) (0.62) (1.48) (1.06)
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Gender
Woman –0.083 0.036 –0.039 –0.058 0.031 –0.422** –0.016
0.040* 0.101*** 0.057 0.084*** 0.070 0.094*** 0.127***
Corrections
Control variable (residuals 
of education regression)
–0.008 –0.068*** –0.021 –0.029* 0.015 0.009 –0.042**
(0.53) (2.98) (1.31) (1.88) (0.39) (0.39) (2.07)
Inverse Mills ratio 0.070 0.345 –0.093 0.203 –0.122 –0.328 0.050
(0.62) (1.18) (0.56) (1.04) (0.44) (1.38) (0.21)
Constant –1.930*** –2.081*** –2.362*** –1.778*** –3.186*** –3.491*** –2.708***
(5.77) (3.02) (4.64) (3.39) (3.75) (5.48) (3.30)
Number of observations 854 455 529 957 307 414 346
Pseudo R 2 0.46 0.32 0.36 0.32 0.35 0.46 0.48
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 5.1 for details).
Note: The additional explanatory variables in the models are migrant status, marital status, and religion. The Lee ratio is derived from a multinomial logit model of sector 
choices (with nonpaid work participation as the reference category) comprising age and its square, gender, years of education, migrant status, marital status, religion, and iden-
tifying variables (namely, dummies on the individual’s relationship to the head of household and the dependency ratio). Figures in parentheses are student statistics. Standard 
errors are bootstrapped with 500 replications. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 5.5 Earnings Functions with Endogenous Education and Selectivity Correction in the Informal Sector in Seven Cities in West Africa, 
2001/02
(dependent variable: log of hourly earnings)
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Years of education
0–6 (primaire) 0.029* 0.050*** 0.081*** 0.090*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.093***
(1.88) (3.92) (7.66) (7.26) (3.96) (3.36) (6.26)
7–9 (collège) 0.122*** 0.067** 0.073*** 0.093*** 0.110*** 0.138*** 0.167***
(4.64) (2.55) (4.54) (3.99) (5.49) (4.07) (6.67)
10–13 (lycée) 0.122*** 0.184*** 0.205*** 0.130*** 0.196*** 0.208*** 0.231***
(2.74) (3.75) (5.43) (2.88) (5.13) (3.44) (4.63)
13+ (higher education) 0.225*** 0.036 0.144*** 0.151** 0.144** 0.141** 0.194***
(4.10) (0.49) (3.40) (2.31) (2.39) (2.44) (3.54)
Experience
Potential experience 0.022*** 0.031*** 0.012* 0.044*** 0.030*** 0.023*** 0.046***
(3.00) (5.32) (1.93) (7.78) (4.80) (3.15) (7.47)
Potential experience 
squared/100
–0.011 –0.034*** –0.008 –0.051*** –0.031*** –0.015 –0.048***
(1.01) (4.24) (0.89) (6.43) (3.24) (1.49) (5.69)
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Gender
Woman –0.491*** –0.254*** –0.442*** –0.320*** –0.331*** –0.269*** –0.310***
(8.57) (4.34) (10.09) (7.82) (5.86) (4.27) (5.49)
Corrections
Control variable (residuals 
of education regression)
0.006 –0.020* –0.031*** –0.033*** –0.027** –0.029* –0.032**
(0.39) (1.74) (3.43) (2.67) (2.01) (1.80) (2.38)
Inverse Mills ratio 0.233*** –0.062 0.125* –0.018 0.047 0.054 –0.049
(3.08) (1.06) (1.77) (0.29) (0.59) (0.78) (0.72)
Constant –1.778*** –2.256*** –2.101*** –2.386*** –2.811*** –2.483*** –2.995***
(13.61) (17.81) (17.60) (19.14) (20.07) (13.96) (21.99)
Number of observations 2,859 2,929 3,250 3,423 2,930 2,233 2,771
Pseudo R 2 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.31
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 5.1 for details).
Note: The additional explanatory variables in the models are migrant status; marital status; the individual’s relationship to the head of household (dummies for head of house-
hold, spouse, son/daughter, father/mother, other relatives); and religion. The Lee ratio is derived from a multinomial logit model of sector choices (with nonpaid work participa-
tion as the reference category) comprising age and its square, gender, years of education, migrant status, marital status, the individual’s relationship to the head of household, 
religion, and one identifying variable (namely, the dependency ratio). Figures in parentheses are student statistics. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 500 replications. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent, *** level significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 5.6 Marginal Returns to Education in Seven Cities in West Africa, Using Alternative Estimation Techniques, 2001/02
Sector Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
All sectors
Ordinary least squares 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.044*** 0.038*** 0.069***
Selectivity corrected (Lee’s method) 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.045*** 0.039*** 0.070***
Selectivity corrected + father’s characteristics 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.041*** 0.035*** 0.065***
Selectivity corrected + control function 0.037*** 0.058*** 0.080*** 0.092*** 0.064*** 0.052*** 0.103***
Number of observations 4,011 3,821 4,184 4,364 3,496 3,069 3,665
Public sector
Ordinary least squares 0.206*** 0.114*** 0.163*** 0.118*** 0.245*** 0.142*** 0.136***
Selectivity corrected (Lee’s method) 0.133** 0.145*** 0.175*** 0.094** 0.129* 0.140*** 0.136***
Selectivity corrected + father’s characteristics 0.144*** 0.154*** 0.178*** 0.093** 0.120* 0.139*** 0.137***
Selectivity corrected + control function 0.138** 0.157*** 0.182*** 0.112** 0.094 0.127*** 0.141***
Number of observations 306 459 411 483 313 597 595
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Formal private sector
Ordinary least squares 0.112*** 0.143*** 0.104** 0.077*** 0.056 0.181*** 0.075**
Selectivity corrected (Lee’s method) 0.108*** 0.138*** 0.111** 0.065*** 0.063 0.191*** 0.065*
Selectivity corrected + father’s characteristics 0.107*** 0.115** 0.099** 0.063*** 0.064 0.195*** 0.069*
Selectivity corrected + control function 0.116*** 0.184*** 0.124*** 0.089*** 0.050 0.182*** 0.114***
Number of observations 854 455 529 957 307 414 346
Informal sector
Ordinary least squares 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.054*** 0.062*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.067***
Selectivity corrected (Lee’s method) 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.057*** 0.061*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.066***
Selectivity corrected + father’s characteristics 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.052*** 0.059*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.061***
Selectivity corrected + control function 0.029* 0.050*** 0.081*** 0.090*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.093***
Number of observations 2,859 2,931 3,250 3,423 2,930 2,233 2,771
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 5.1 for details).
Note: Earnings functions include the set of characteristics reported in tables 5.3–5.5. Estimates are computed at the sample mean using the piecewise linear spline earnings function 
in tables 5.2–5.5. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Th e same picture emerges from the sectoral estimates, which also report only 
a few signifi cant selectivity terms (Abidjan and Lomé for the public sector, 
 Cotonou and Abidjan for the informal sector; see tables 5.3–5.5). 
Exogenous versus endogenous education. We use the father’s characteristics 
as instruments by means of the control function method. Using the fi rst-stage 
regressions, in which education is regressed on all exogenous variables, we test 
for the joint signifi cance of the coeffi  cients of father’s characteristics, a necessary 
condition for consistency of the estimates. For all cities, we can safely reject the 
hypothesis that these coeffi  cients are jointly zero.17  Several interesting patterns 
emerge from the control function estimates of the returns to schooling (see 
tables 5.2–5.5).
Using the control function approach, we can directly identify the correlation 
between the endogenous variable (education) and its unobserved determinants. 
A signifi cant parameter estimate of the control variable (residuals of the educa-
tion regression) means that the unexplained variation in the education variable 
also aff ects variation in earnings. An insignifi cant parameter means that we 
cannot accept the hypothesis of endogeneity. Table 5.7 presents the p-values 
for t-tests associated with each control variable in the diff erent specifi cations.
For all cities, we cannot reject the hypothesis of exogeneity of education in 
the public sector.18 By contrast, we reject exogeneity in the informal sector in 
all cities except Abidjan. In the formal private sector, we obtain mixed results, 
rejecting exogeneity in Bamako, Dakar, and Ouagadougou (instrumentation for 
the private sector in Bamako appeared dubious, however). In Abidjan, the unex-
plained variation of schooling never signifi cantly aff ects variation in earnings. 
When exogeneity of education is rejected, we place more confi dence in the 
instrumental variables estimates, at least the ones based on the control function 
Table 5.7  Endogeneity Tests of Education in the Earnings Functions in Seven Cities 
in West Africa, by Sector, 2001/02
City All sectors Public sector Formal private sector Informal sector
Abidjan 0.46 0.80 0.60 0.69
Bamako 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.08
Cotonou 0.00 0.61 0.19 0.00
Dakar 0.00 0.33 0.06 0.01
Lomé 0.06 0.26 0.70 0.04
Niamey 0.11 0.39 0.70 0.07
Ouagadougou 0.00 0.56 0.04 0.02
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 5.1 for details).
Note: The null hypothesis is that education is exogenous in the earnings function. Figures show p-values of 
the t-test.
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approach. Motivations for this choice can be found in Kuépié, Nordman, and 
Roubaud (2009).
Cross-Country Comparison
Chow tests for the joint equality of coeffi  cients across sectors show that the 
decomposition by institutional sector is justifi ed. Indeed, we fi nd highly con-
trasting confi gurations. As expected, the models’ explanatory power declines as 
one moves from the public sector (pseudo R2 = 0.44 to the formal private sector 
[0.39] and the informal sector [0.23]). Th is hierarchy is consistent with the pre-
dictions of the standard human capital model, which is better suited to account-
ing for the heterogeneity of earnings in the public sector, where wages are based 
on a set scale that takes education and experience explicitly into account. In 
the informal sector, apart from the probability of greater measurement errors, 
factors not taken into account in our equation, such as the amount of physical 
capital, are likely to have a signifi cant impact on earnings.
To synthesize the results for education, we present histograms of the mar-
ginal returns to education by sector and city at the sample means of education 
(fi gure 5.1). In six out of seven cities, the return to education is highest in the 
public sector, with a marginal return ranging from 9.4 percent (in Dakar) to 
17.5 percent (in Cotonou). Th is fi nding refl ects, to a great extent, the salary 
scales for civil servants, which are determined based on diploma and length 
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 5.1 for details).
Note: Returns are calculated at the sample mean. Estimates are based on results reported in table 5.6. Returns are 
for the exogenous education variable for the public sector of all cities and for the private sectors of Abidjan and 
Bamako.
Figure 5.1 Marginal Returns to Education in Seven Cities in West Africa, by Sector, 2001/02
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of service. Th e formal private sector comes next (except in Niamey, where it 
ranked fi rst), followed by the informal sector (except in Lomé, where returns to 
education are higher in the informal sector [6 percent] than in the formal pri-
vate sector [5 percent], and in Dakar, where the marginal returns across sectors 
are roughly the same in the two sectors). 
Convexity of returns. Th e results show strong evidence that earnings are non-
linear in education, with a convex profi le. For all the regressions reported in 
tables 5.3–5.6, we can reject the linear model at the 10 percent level or lower.19 
Convex marginal returns mean that education has a growing impact on remu-
neration. In almost all cases, a completed year of lycée (10–13 years completed) 
provides a greater return than a year of collège (7–9 years), especially in the 
private sectors. 
In fi gure 5.2, we present predicted earnings in each sector based on years of 
completed schooling. For all sectors, earnings are roughly constant until about 
the 8th year of education and sharply increase around the 11th year, with small 
diff erences across cities. Th is rise in earnings occurs slightly earlier for informal 
sector workers (about the eighth year of schooling). Th ese patterns indicate that, 
to a large extent, the convex profi le refl ects the surge in income observed when 
individuals make the transition from secondary to higher education in the for-
mal sectors and the completion of collège in the informal sector. 
Th ese results are inconsistent with the traditional model of human capital 
accumulation, in which the marginal return to education is assumed to be con-
stant or decreasing. Schultz (2004) highlights this convexity, using household 
surveys for six African countries (Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, 
Nigeria, and South Africa); Söderbom and others (2006) observe it in samples 
of employees of manufacturing fi rms in Kenya and Tanzania. To our knowledge, 
this feature of Africa’s labor markets has not been documented before at the 
sectoral level using representative samples from urban Africa. 
Th is result is important, because it has been advocated that not accounting 
for the high proportion of workers in the informal sector may lead to overes-
timates of the returns to primary education and underestimates of the returns 
to higher education (Bennell 1996). Convexity is revealed here in all sectors, 
including the informal sector. In our estimates, the marginal return to pri-
mary education is lower than the returns to secondary and higher education in 
all sectors, and the return to primary school is lower in the informal sector 
(6.6 percent) than in the formal private sector (7.2 percent). Similarly, the aver-
age return to a year of lycée is higher in the informal sector (18.3 percent) than 
in the formal (public and private) sector (on average, 15.5 percent). Hence, not 
accounting for earnings in the informal sector indeed yields an overestimation 
of the returns to primary education, as Bennell (1996) predicted, as well as pos-
sibly an underestimation of returns to higher levels of education.20
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Figure 5.2 Estimated Hourly Earnings in Seven Cities in West Africa, by Sector, 2001/02
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Figure 5.2 (continued)
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Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 5.1 for details).
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Observing increasing returns to education by levels is important, because 
the idea that primary education is an eff ective instrument for fi ghting poverty 
is based partly on the hypothesis of a concave earnings function—that is, the 
notion that investing in education is more profi table during the fi rst years of 
schooling. Recommendations for policies aimed at promoting primary educa-
tion in Sub-Saharan Africa were drawn up on the basis of this premise, among 
others (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004). 
Various arguments have been posited to explain convexity in the returns to 
schooling (Bennell 1996, 2002; Schultz 2004). One is that primary education 
has been overexpanded, reducing the returns relative to higher levels. Another 
is that over time the quality of primary school has declined, reducing returns 
(Behrman, Ross, and Sabot 2008). Th e slowdown in formal sector growth, 
which may have reduced the demand for educated labor and perhaps aff ected 
less educated individuals more strongly, has also been mentioned. 
Returns to Qualifi cations
Th e fact that the earnings function is convex prompted us to make more detailed 
analyses, measuring the returns to diff erent levels of qualifi cation and not just to 
average years. To do so, we estimated the marginal returns to holding a diploma, 
thus accounting for the quality of the school career. In the private sector, we 
controlled for the endogeneity of schooling using the control function method 
(except in Abidjan and Bamako). 
Returns to qualifi cations can be studied in at least two ways. One way is to 
directly consider the regression model coeffi  cients. In this case, the coeffi  cient 
associated with each qualifi cation dummy is interpreted as the rate of increase 
in earnings between individuals with no qualifi cations (the reference) and indi-
viduals with a particular qualifi cation. Another way is to calculate the marginal 
returns obtained by subtracting from the considered qualifi cation’s coeffi  cient 
(qualifi cation d) the value of the coeffi  cient for the qualifi cation immediately 
below it (qualifi cation d – 1). For example, the marginal return to a baccalauréat 
plus two years of higher education (BAC+2) is the diff erence between the coef-
fi cient for the BAC+2 and the coeffi  cient for the baccalauréat alone. Th e return 
to a primary certifi cate (Certifi cat d’études primaires [CEP]) is the diff erence in 
average earnings between someone with a CEP and someone with no diploma, 
the return to the middle school certifi cate (Brevet d’études du premier cycle du 
second degré [BEPC]) is the diff erence in average earnings between someone 
with a BEPC and someone with a CEP, and so forth. Marginal returns hence 
correspond to the increases in earnings generated by the acquisition of the next 
level of qualifi cations. In this study, we rely on marginal returns, because they 
measure the additional value of each qualifi cation rather than the value com-
pared with “no qualifi cations” which is almost always positive. 
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Kuépié, Nordman, and Roubaud (2009) report the results of this exercise 
using histograms of the marginal returns to various qualifi cations for each sec-
tor. Not surprisingly, the eff ect of each qualifi cation on earnings is positive over-
all, with a huge quantitative leap for secondary and higher education, as already 
shown using continuous variables for schooling. Th e most striking result is that, 
depending on the city, some diplomas (such as the baccalauréat) do not yield 
positive marginal returns. Th is situation refl ects either the inadequacy of the 
training considered with respect to the labor market or the fact that certain 
diplomas have no value in the labor market but are aimed solely at provid-
ing access to higher levels of education. Th is hypothesis might explain the low 
marginal profi tability of some diplomas in the public sector. But the fact that 
for many diplomas, additional earnings are nil or negative in the formal private 
sector suggests that many training schemes do not correspond to the needs of 
the labor market in this sector.
Th is lack of connection between the level of training revealed by a diploma 
and the remuneration obtained in the formal private labor market is evident in 
all of the cities studied. Marginal earnings seem to correspond more closely to 
the level of training in the informal sector than in the formal private sector (but 
less than in the public sector). Th is result is inconsistent with the idea that the 
informal sector does not value educational capital. Th e profi tability of education 
in the informal sector is illustrated by the earnings premium received by indi-
viduals with vocational diplomas (in particular the Brevet d’études profession-
nelles [BEP]). In fact, returns to vocational training in the informal sector oft en 
exceed returns in the formal private sector. Vocational education qualifi cations 
are also oft en more profi table than general education qualifi cations, which take 
longer to obtain. For example, although it generally takes one year less to obtain 
a BEP (on average 11.6 years) than to obtain the baccalauréat (on average 13.0 
years), the BEP is oft en more profi table than the baccalauréat, especially in the 
informal sector. Th e returns to the BEP are more than 40 percent higher than 
the returns to the baccalauréat in the formal private sector of Cotonou and in 
the informal sectors of Ouagadougou, Bamako, Niamey, and Lomé. Th e same 
result holds if we compare the premium for obtaining the CAP (a vocational 
certifi cate equivalent to completed primary school) versus the BEPC (a general 
certifi cate of completed primary education).
Conclusion
Using a series of comparable labor force surveys in urban West Africa, we esti-
mate the impact of education on labor market outcomes among representative 
samples of workers in seven economic capitals. Th e data provide a unique cross-
country comparison using the same variables and methodology for each city.
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We tackle two recurrent econometric issues that arise in assessing the eff ect 
of education on individual earnings. First, we address the issue of endogenous 
sector allocation (public, formal private, and informal sectors) in the earn-
ings functions estimates and provide evidence that correcting for this sample 
selectivity refi nes the returns to education in all cities and sectors. Second, for 
most cities, we reject the assumption of exogeneity of the education variable, 
except in the public sector. Using the workers’ family background as an instru-
ment for education, we fi nd that the returns to schooling usually increase once 
endogeneity is accounted for. Th is eff ect is particularly strong in the informal 
sector. 
Traditional theories assume constant or concave marginal returns to educa-
tion, which ensure immediate, high profi tability from the fi rst years of school-
ing. Th e data from the 1-2-3 surveys of West Africa reveal convex returns 
in all sectors, including the informal sector. Th is fi nding casts doubts on the 
suitability of estimating average marginal returns and calls for disaggregated 
estimates at each level of the educational path. We provide evidence that the 
convex profi le refl ects the surge in income observed when individuals make 
the transition from secondary to higher education in the formal sectors; for 
informal sector workers, it mainly refl ects completion of the fi rst secondary 
cycle. In Abidjan, Bamako, Dakar, and Lomé, the earnings-education profi le 
observed is particularly convex for young workers, especially in the informal 
sector. 
Even at high levels, education substantially increases earnings in informal 
sector jobs in most of the cities studied.21 To our knowledge, these features of 
Africa’s labor markets have never before been documented at the sectoral level 
using representative samples of urban areas. 
Convexity of the returns to schooling means that stimulating access to pri-
mary education is eff ective in reducing poverty only if primary school graduates 
can continue their studies in order to take full advantage of the high marginal 
returns associated with many years of education. Management of the fl ows of 
students completing general secondary and higher education could benefi t from 
an in-depth review of the (too) general content of schooling programs, with an 
eye toward adapting it to the needs of the labor market. In the meantime, to 
increase the returns to low levels of schooling, improving primary school qual-
ity should remain at the top of any agenda for education. 
Th at said, unemployment is growing in West African cities, especially 
among educated workers. Th is mismatch between (increasing) investment in 
schooling and actual labor market opportunities represents a major challenge. 
Would an increase in education generate its own demand? Or would more 
educated people simply add to the pool of disenfranchised and disillusioned 
workers, whose only hope is to migrate and fi nd employment elsewhere? If 
our fi ndings provide insight into the question of where specifi c bottlenecks 
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arise on the labor demand side, they also provide evidence of the existence of 
signifi cant returns to education in the informal sector that may counterbalance 
the incentive for job queuing. More specifi cally, if schooling helps workers in 
the informal sector be more productive (probably thanks to innovation and 
adaptability), then household and government investments in their education 
are not being made in vain. Given that the informal sector has created more 
than 80 percent of urban jobs in West Africa in recent years, concentrating 
public investments in employment in this sector with attractive policies for 
the most qualifi ed people could represent a serious alternative to the lack of 
employment observed in the formal sectors, at least in the short term. Coupled 
with continued support to primary school quality and postprimary education, 
such a policy could also pay off  in the medium to long term by generating the 
human capital accumulation required for the modern economy to take off  in 
African cities. 
Notes
 1. By way of comparison, analyses of the internal effi  ciency of education systems con-
cern school processes and the way the teaching establishments operate: generally 
speaking, they compare the schools’ activities and organizational methods with the 
results obtained by pupils while they are still in the system, looking for the most 
cost-eff ective situations (Mingat and Suchaut 2000). 
 2. See Kuépié, Nordman, and Roubaud (2009) for further development of this point 
and for additional or more complete analyses of the fi ndings presented in this 
chapter. 
 3. Th e cities are Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire; Bamako, Mali; Cotonou, Benin; Dakar, Senegal; 
Lomé, Togo; Niamey, Niger; and Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Although Abidjan 
and Cotonou are not administrative capitals, we refer to them as capitals because 
they are the most important economic centers in their countries (Cotonou is also 
the seat of government).
 4. For a description of the 1-2-3 surveys, see box O.1 in the overview.
 5. For a presentation of descriptive statistics (education, earnings, and so forth), see 
chapter 1.
 6. Based on Monte Carlo simulations, Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2007) 
conclude that Lee’s method is adapted to small samples. 
 7. Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2007, p. 192) argue that correcting for selec-
tion bias based on the multinomial logit model is a “reasonable alternative to mul-
tinomial normal models when the focus is on estimating an outcome over selected 
populations rather than on estimating the selection process itself. Th is seems true 
even when the IIA hypothesis is severely at odds.” As we are interested primarily 
in results in the second-stage regression, this argument allows us to be confi dent 
regarding the choice of a multinomial logit.
 8. Th e results of the probits and multinomial logits are not reported, in order to save 
space. Th ey are available on request from the authors.
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 9. Th e exceptions were the formal private sectors in Niamey and Dakar, where the 
appropriateness of the excluding conditions in the second stage was rejected (at the 
10 percent level in Niamey and the 1 percent level in Dakar). In these two cases, 
we then tried to restrict the number of exclusions, using as identifying variables 
only a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was the household head 
(together with the dependency ratio). Th e test was satisfi ed, and the results in the 
second step did not diff er from the results obtained previously. We hence report the 
results including the full set of exclusions in order to ensure perfect comparability 
across countries. For all cities and sectors, Wald tests of joint signifi cance of the 
instruments in the fi rst stage never rejected the null hypothesis at the 1 percent 
level. Th e second-stage equation is still identifi ed without excluding conditions for 
the need of the tests, as identifi cation relies on the distributional assumption of Lee’s 
model (see Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand 2007).
 10. For example, Ashenfelter and Zimmerman (1997) use parental education, Butcher 
and Case (1994) exploit the presence of any sister within the family, and Card (1995) 
draws on proximity to a four-year college as instruments.
 11. Th ese fi gures are slightly diff erent from the fi gures presented in chapter 1 because of 
changes in education brackets.
 12. Th ese fi ndings are available from the authors upon request.
 13. Th e same set of control variables used for the analysis of unemployment is used here. 
 14. We drop the tenure variable from the set of covariates in the sectoral estimates, 
because seniority in the current job makes less sense in the informal sector. 
 15. Assuming that the marginal return to education varies across educational levels but 
is constant within each cycle, the marginal return to education around the sample’s 
education mean is defi ned as follows:
  R I(= ∈
=
∑ak
k
keduc C
1
4
),  where αk is the estimated coeffi  cients of the k education 
  variables corresponding to the four cycles, I(.) is the indicator function, educ is the 
average years of schooling, and C is the educational group.
 16. Interested readers should see Kuépié, Nordman, and Roubaud (2009).
 17. In 18 out of 21 cases, Sargan tests on overidentifying restrictions cannot reject at 
the 10 percent level the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. Th e three 
cases where validity is not supported are the formal private and informal sectors 
of Bamako and the public sector of Niamey, suggesting that uncorrected education 
returns be considered in these cases. Th e results of these tests are available upon 
request.
 18. Tests for exogeneity based on Hausman tests confi rm these fi ndings.
 19. We investigated whether our fi ndings are sensitive to functional form by consider-
ing the eff ects of modeling the earnings-education profi le as second- and third-order 
polynomials. Th e quadratic function systematically produced signifi cant squared edu-
cation coeffi  cients; the cubic form appeared less appropriate in the majority of cases. 
 20. Th ese cross-country averages mask some country specifi cities.
 21. Th e heterogeneity of the informal sector in this respect, notably the possible coex-
istence of diff erent employment segments with specifi c features, deserves consider-
ation (see chapter 4). 
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Chapter 6
195
Urban Labor Market Segmentation 
in West Africa 
Muriel Barlet
Most developing countries have large informal sectors: according to one study, 
the informal economy produces 39 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) 
in developing countries, 40 percent in transition economies, and 16 percent 
within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
(Schneider 2004). A better understanding of this sector is therefore critical.
Th is chapter examines the informal sector through the lens of the urban 
labor market in seven capitals in the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU): Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Lomé, Niamey, and 
Ouagadougou.1 Th e chapter describes labor market segmentation—the phe-
nomenon in which some individuals are prevented from working in the most 
fi nancially rewarding sector, usually the formal sector. It examines the heteroge-
neity of the informal sector by splitting it into two segments, dependent workers 
and workers who are self-employed, including workers who work alone and 
workers who employ others.
Th e literature provides two divergent points of view on the informal sector 
(Fields 2005). On the one hand, it is regarded as a subsistence sector without 
entry costs that is attractive for individuals while they search for more reward-
ing work (Tokman 2007). On the other hand, it is viewed as a rewarding sector 
with many advantages and opportunities (fl exibility, self-employment). Th e fi rst 
view is supported by the existence of poor working conditions and low wages, 
which suggest low-quality jobs. Supporters of the second view claim that the 
social protection provided by the formal sector does not outweigh the oppor-
tunities provided by the fl exibility aff orded by the informal sector (Bromley 
1990; Maloney 1999, 2004). Th e two views highlight the heterogeneity of the 
informal sector, which pools badly paid employees with no protection and suc-
cessful employers. 
Taking this heterogeneity into account is essential to provide relevant results. 
We thus divide workers into three groups: formal sector workers, informal 
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sector employers, and informal sector workers (including the self-employed). 
We test whether individuals choose their working sector. If they do not, labor 
market segmentation exists. Th e results suggest that all labor markets examined 
are segmented.
Why is it important to divide the informal sector when testing for seg-
mentation? When informal workers and informal employers are pooled, pre-
dicted earnings for the sector are low, suggesting that the informal sector is less 
attractive than the formal sector. Observing a large informal sector can thus 
be explained only by the rationing of jobs in the formal sector.2 When only 
informal sector employers are examined, predicted earnings are rather high. 
Th us, two sectors appear attractive, the formal sector and the sector of informal 
employers. A large number of informal sector workers may thus refl ect barriers 
to entry in entrepreneurship, not only the rationing of formal sector jobs. Split-
ting up the informal sector does not change the conclusion regarding segmen-
tation (at least in our samples). However, it highlights two diff erent rationing 
processes and consequently implies diff erent public policies (increasing access 
not only to formal sector jobs but also to entrepreneurship, for instance).
Several studies divide the informal sector into two segments (Alderman and 
Kozel 1989; Azevedo 2005; Günther and Launov 2006). We go a step farther, by 
precisely identifying both segments of the informal sector. In our set-up, infor-
mal workers comprise wage workers and self-employed workers working alone. 
Günther and Launov (2006) establish the existence of two segments but do not 
defi ne them. Our division is more relevant than the one proposed by Alderman 
and Kozel (1989) or Azevedo (2005). Th ey separate wage workers from all own-
account workers (self-employed and employers), whereas we separate employers 
from other workers. Our choice is supported by the work of De Mel, McKenzie, 
and Woodruff  (2008) and Parga and Mondragn-Vlez (2008), who show that 
self-employed workers with no employees are closer to employed workers than 
to employers. One of our robustness checks also supports our choice.
We simulate a labor market in which individuals are allocated to the sector 
that is most rewarding for them. We then predict the size of each sector under 
the assumption of a competitive labor market and compare it to what is observed. 
In order to provide relevant predictions, we need accurate earnings equation 
estimation. Estimating earnings equations for the diff erent working sectors is 
tricky, because a rational self-selection process, as in the model developed by 
Roy (1951), may bias the coeffi  cients. Th e main challenge is to correctly take 
this selection bias into account. Our estimations rely mainly on the selection 
bias correction method proposed by Lee (1983). We test the robustness of our 
results by also applying the method proposed by Dubin and McFadden (1984). 
We pay particular attention to the identifi cation problem, suggesting several 
excluding variables (that is, variables that explain sector choice but not earn-
ings) and testing each of them for each city and gender.
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We apply our methodology to the seven comparable data sets from the 1-2-3 
surveys (for a description of these surveys, see box O.1 in the overview). Th e 
results are for countries on which the literature is very thin.3 We show that 
for all seven cities, the lower informal sector segment (wage workers and self-
employed workers working alone) is signifi cantly larger than predicted by our 
simulations of competitive labor markets; the employment shares of the formal 
sector and the sector of informal employers are generally smaller than pre-
dicted. Th ese results suggest that labor markets are segmented. Th is conclusion 
is robust to the empirical strategy and the distribution of unobserved abilities. 
Th e rest of this chapter is organized as follow. Th e fi rst section describes the 
empirical method. Th e second section provides details on the data used. Th e 
third section presents the results and some robustness checks. Th e last section 
summarizes the conclusions and draws some policy implications.
Empirical Strategy: Predicting Sector Shares in a 
Hypothetical Competitive Labor Market
Th is section compares the observed shares of individuals in each sector (formal 
sector, informal sector workers, and informal sector employers) and the shares 
predicted by a model simulating a hypothetical competitive labor market. To 
simulate these shares, we allocate each individual to the sector that yields the 
highest predicted income, given the individual’s characteristics. If at least one 
of the observed shares is outside the confi dence interval of the corresponding 
simulated share, we can claim that some individuals are prevented from work-
ing in the sector that is most fi nancially rewarding. We then conclude that labor 
market segmentation exists.4 
Providing an unbiased prediction of income in each sector is tricky. Indeed, 
as individuals probably try to work in their favorite sector, the distribution of 
individuals across sectors may be far from random. Th e decision to participate 
in the labor market also aff ects earnings in the diff erent sectors. We thus need to 
correctly take into account selection biases. To do so, we rely on the selection bias 
correction methods proposed by Lee (1983) and Dubin and McFadden (1984).
Sector-Choice Equation
We fi rst estimate a sector choice equation, in order to calculate the correction 
terms for the earnings equation estimation. Th e equation is estimated with a 
multinomial logit. Individuals face four possible choices: not working, working 
in the formal sector, working in the informal employer sector, or working in the 
informal worker sector. Th e selection equation is
 Si = g Zi + mi (6.1)
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where Si is the segment of individual i (nonworking, formal, informal sector 
workers, or informal employers); Zi is a set of explanatory variables listed below; 
and mi is a residual term.
Th e explanatory variables in the fi rst step are age; education; reading and 
writing French; reading and writing another language; father’s sector when the 
individual was 15 years old; father’s education (years); migrant status; belonging 
to the dominant religious community; belonging to the dominant ethnic group; 
total nonlabor income of the household; number of children in the household 
(for women only); and number of women older than 13 in the household (for 
women only). 
Th ese variables are gender but not city specifi c. Age and education (mea-
sured by years of schooling) are the usual determinants of sector choices. To 
complete the information on education, we add two measures of literacy. As 
most West Africans spend only few years in school, the years of schooling may 
be a weak determinant of the level of education (see chapter 5). 
We also control for several other features that could aff ect sector choice. 
We fi rst control for social and family background. Th e variables regarding the 
father, migrant status, religious community, and ethnic group are proxies that 
describe the individuals’ social networks. Th ese social networks are of primary 
interest here because they may ease access to some segments of the labor market 
(see chapters 9 and 10). As one of the working sectors is entrepreneurship, we 
then add a measure of the wealth of the household (total nonlabor income). It 
can be a strong determinant for entrepreneurship, as the credit market is poorly 
developed in the cities studied. It is also a determinant for inactivity. Finally, for 
women only, we know that there is a trade-off  between working and performing 
household chores (see chapters 9 and 13). Th e number of children may increase 
the burden of household chores, whereas the number of adult women in the 
household may reduce it. 
We run estimations separately for each city and gender. Th e sample consists 
of all individuals between the ages of 15 and 64.
Th e multinomial logit estimator relies on the assumption of independence of 
irrelevant alternatives. Th is assumption may be violated, especially if the choices 
under scrutiny are not simultaneous. However, Bourguignon, Fournier, and 
Gurgand (2007) use Monte Carlo simulations to show that the results of the 
second step are robust to the violation of that assumption.
Earnings Equation
For the second step, we estimate an earnings equation for each sector (except 
inactive). To correct for the selection bias, we mainly use Lee’s methodology. 
Th e earnings equation can be written as follows:
 lnwis = as.Xi + as.mi + ei (6.2)
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where wis the income of individual i in sector s; Xi is a set of explanatory vari-
ables listed below; mi is the selection term calculated from the fi rst-step esti-
mation; and εi is a residual error from a normal distribution with zero mean 
and a variance σs. Th e common explanatory variables in the second step are 
potential experience (age minus education minus 7); education; reading and 
writing French; and reading and writing another language.
For each city and gender, we test whether the other explanatory variables of 
the fi rst step (father’s sector and education, nonlabor income, number of chil-
dren, number of women older than 13, and so forth) are signifi cantly diff erent 
from zero. We test each variable separately. When a test is rejected, we add the 
variable to the set of explanatory variables of the second step and rerun the test 
for all other variables. We carry out this procedure until all tests are accepted.5 
Consequently, the set of explanatory variables of the second step is city-gender 
specifi c. Th e variables for which the test is accepted are considered excluding 
variables. If such variables exist, the model is nonparametrically identifi ed, as 
some variables appear only in the fi rst step of the estimations. (In the last sec-
tion, we discuss the validity of the excluding variables and present the most 
reliable results.)
Other methodologies could have been used to correct for selection bias 
(Dahl 2002; Dubin and McFadden 1984). However Bourguignon, Fournier, 
and Gurgand (2007) show that Lee’s methodology performs best on very small 
samples. For women, the samples are relatively small (about 200 in the formal 
or informal entrepreneur sector). Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2007) 
conclude that Lee’s methodology is more effi  cient on samples with 50 observa-
tions but that the methodology of Dubin and McFadden should be used on 
samples with 500 observations or more. As the number of observations here lies 
between these two bounds, we tested both strategies, using Lee’s methodology 
for the main results and a variant of the Dubin and McFadden methodology 
proposed by Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2007) as a robustness check.
Predicting the Share of Each Sector
From the earnings function estimation, we compute a potential income wis*  for 
each individual in each sector. We add to the mean predicted income a random 
term, uˆis, drawn from the estimated distribution of the residuals (N (0, σˆs2)). We 
then match each individual is with the sector that yields the highest potential 
income, Si* = arg maxs    {wis
* + uˆis}, and calculate the share of workers predicted in 
each sector. To obtain a confi dence interval, we compute those shares with 20 
drawings of random terms and 200 diff erent sets of parameters. Th e diff erent 
parameter sets are obtained by bootstrapping the observation sample. We then 
compare observed shares and simulated confi dence intervals. If, for example, 
the formal sector share is outside its confi dence interval (probably smaller than 
the prediction), we conclude that the labor market is segmented.
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We adopt the following restrictive assumption: we consider that utility 
depends only on income. Th is restrictive assumption, which is standard in the 
literature on segmentation, results from the lack of adequate data to account for 
nonmonetary determinants of preferences. 
Disaggregating the Informal Sector and 
Descriptive Statistics 
Th e data are taken from Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys conducted in the French-
speaking countries of the WAEMU zone. Th ese data allow the precise identifi ca-
tion of the employment sector of the surveyed individuals. For people who work 
in the informal sector, it is also possible to distinguish between wage workers, 
self-employed workers working alone, and informal employers (the head of an 
independent production unit with at least one worker). We explain below the iden-
tifi cation criteria in the informal sector and provide the main descriptive statistics. 
Sorting informal sector workers between an upper and a lower segment is 
tricky. Th e underlying idea is that some informal sector workers benefi t greatly 
from informality and thus belong to an upper segment. We assume that infor-
mal fi rm managers who employ at least one person (paid or unpaid) benefi t 
from informality. Th ey do not have to provide social security coverage or formal 
employment contracts, they are not required to pay the minimum wage, and 
they can hire and fi re employees whenever they need to.
Th ere are at least two other ways of dividing the informal sector. A more 
restrictive defi nition of the upper segment would include only employers of 
paid workers. Doing so reduces the sample too much, however, as employers 
of paid workers represent less than 10 percent of the labor force. A less restric-
tive defi nition would allocate self-employed workers with no employees to the 
upper segment. Th is solution is less appealing, as the advantage of informality 
is lower for such workers than it is for people with employees. Moreover, the 
studies by De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff  (2008) and Parga and Mondragn-
Vlez (2008) lend support for excluding self-employed workers from the upper 
segment. Based on Colombian data, Parga and Mondragn-Vlez (2008) conclude 
that employers (defi ned as business owners) diff er from self-employed workers 
(who work for themselves). Th ey fi nd an earnings premium for employers (over 
wage workers) but not for self-employed workers. Th ey also suggest that self-
employment does not lead to entrepreneurship. Based on data from Sri Lanka, 
De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff  (2008) show that self-employed workers are 
closer to wage workers than to employers. One of our robustness checks is to 
modify the defi nition of the upper segment by adding self-employed workers. 
Th e results change dramatically, suggesting that employers and self-employed 
workers are too diff erent to be pooled. Th is test provides additional justifi cation 
for including only employers in the upper informal sector segment. 
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Th e classifi cation can be summed up as follows:
1. Formal sector: civil servants and employees and owners of registered fi rms
2. Informal sector: employees and owners of unregistered fi rms (or associations)
• upper informal sector segment (informal employers sector): own-account 
workers employing at least one other person (paid or unpaid)
• lower informal sector segment (informal workers sector): informal sector 
workers and self-employed workers working alone
3. Inactive sector: people out of the labor force or unemployed.
Table 6.1 shows the distribution of men and women across sectors in each city.
Th e most striking fact about urban labor markets in the WAEMU countries 
is the gap between mean incomes in the formal and informal sectors, especially 
for women. Th e distribution for informal employers lies between the distribu-
tions of the formal sector and the informal workers sector. As an example, fi gure 
6.1 displays the density distribution of earnings in Cotonou.6 
Table 6.2 presents summary statistics on individual characteristics for 
Cotonou. As expected, workers’ abilities explain much of the income gap 
across sectors. Relative to workers in other sectors, workers in the formal sec-
tor are more educated and are more likely to have fathers who worked in the 
formal sector and had more education. Formal workers also are more likely 
to practice the dominant religion (Catholicism in Cotonou). Women in the 
formal sector also have fewer young children at home. 
Table 6.1 Distribution of Labor Force across Sectors in Seven Cities in West Africa, 
by Gender, 2001/02
(percent)
Gender/sector Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Men
Inactive 31 30 30 30 36 37 33
Formal workers 24 22 20 19 19 21 22
Informal workers 34 34 35 37 34 33 32
Informal sector employer 11 14 14 14 10 9 13
Women
Inactive 42 49 31 30 60 68 52
Formal workers 7 5 7 5 6 6 8
Informal workers 43 40 51 52 31 21 34
Informal employer 8 5 11 12 4 5 6
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected cities in the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU) conducted in 2001/02 by the Observatoire économique et statistique d’Afrique Subsaharienne 
(AFRISTAT); Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation (DIAL); and national statistics institutes.
Note: Figures are for working individuals 15–65.
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Figure 6.1 Hourly Wage Densities of Men and Women in Cotonou, by Sector, 2001/02
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected cities (see table 6.1 for details).
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Table 6.2 Summary Statistics on Men and Women in Cotonou, by Sector, 2001/02
(percent, except where otherwise indicated)
Variable Inactive sector Formal sector
Informal sector
Employers Workers
Men
Hourly income (1,000 CFAF) n.a. 2.08 1.46 1.16 
Age (years) 26 38 36 30 
Education (years) 9.43 11.29 6.65 5.78 
Writes and reads French 94 94 78 70 
Writes and reads other language 48 47 24 22 
Belongs to dominant religion 69 71 59 58 
Belongs to dominant ethnic group 59 61 55 57 
Inactive father 23 26 26 25 
Father worked in informal sector 34 35 48 47 
Father worked in formal sector 42 40 27 28 
Father’s education (years) 6.77 4.84 3.05 3.33 
Household nonlabor income 
(1,000 CFAF a month) 63.1 34.2 12.2 11.8 
Women
Hourly income (1,000 CFAF) n.a. 1.87 0.81 0.52 
Age (years) 28 37 39 31 
Education (years) 6.61 11.54 3.99 3.32 
Writes and reads French 72 95 51 44 
Writes and reads other language 33 60 13 10 
Belongs to dominant religion 68 78 66 64 
(continued next page)
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More education may contribute to higher income and thus explain a large 
part of the income gap between sectors. Th ese diff erences are observed for both 
men and women, but they are larger for women, probably because their par-
ticipation rate in the labor market is lower and the selection process is more 
stringent than it is for men. 
Econometric Results 
We fi rst apply our methodology without dividing the informal sector into seg-
ments, in order to obtain a benchmark for our full four-sector model. People 
are allocated to the inactive, formal, or informal sectors. We present only the 
fi nal results: the share of people predicted by the model in the formal sector. 
Th e steps of the estimation (estimation of a sector choice model, estimation of 
earnings functions) are detailed in the section on the model with four sectors.
Th e Th ree-Sector Model
We match individuals to the sector that is most lucrative for them in order to 
predict the size of the formal sector. We compute the 2.5 percentile and the 97.5 
percentile of the predicted size in order to obtain the 95 percent confi dence 
interval (in brackets in table 6.3). We then check whether the observed shares 
fall within the confi dence interval.7
None of the observed values falls within the 95 percent confi dence interval, 
indicating that the labor market is segmented and formal jobs are rationed in 
all cities. If active people worked in the sector in which they would earn the 
Belongs to dominant ethnic group 58 68 55 59 
Inactive father 21 21 25 25 
Father worked in informal sector 40 23 43 51 
Father worked in formal sector 40 56 32 23 
Father’s education (years) 5.69 7.27 3.43 2.93 
Household nonlabor income 
(1,000 CFAF a month) 62,400 12,400 30,800 26,500 
Children less than 1 year 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.18 
Children 1–3 0.14 0.12 0.16 0.17 
Children 4–9 0.51 0.48 0.55 0.62 
Women 13 or older 2.57 2.21 2.31 2.32 
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected cities (see table 6.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for individuals 15–65. n.a. = not applicable.
Table 6.2 (continued)
Variable Inactive sector Formal sector
Informal sector
Employers Workers
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highest income, they would work mainly in the formal sector. In fact, most men 
and women work in the informal sector. For all cities, the confi dence intervals 
are smaller for men than women. Relevant determinants of both earnings and 
sector choice are harder to identify for women. Consequently, estimations for 
men are more accurate. 
Th e Four-Sector Model
Some authors believe that the informal sector consists of two distinct segments: 
disadvantaged workers and prosperous employers. If this is the case, agglomer-
ating the two segments is misleading. For instance, if the nonemployers segment 
of the informal sector is a kind of subsistence sector, the predicted size of the 
overall informal sector will be relatively small even if informal entrepreneur-
ship is very lucrative. In this case, pooling employers and nonemployers may 
underestimate the attractiveness of entrepreneurship. In what follows, we show 
the diff erent steps in the estimation for our model with four sectors (inactivity, 
formal, informal sector workers, and informal employers). 
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show the sector choice estimations for men and women. 
Th e reference category is informal sector workers. Concerning age and educa-
tion, the results are relatively consistent with what has been reported in the 
literature. Th e older a worker is, the more likely he or she is to belong to the for-
mal or informal employers sector. Age has a signifi cant impact on sector choice. 
Young people are more likely to be inactive, probably because many of them are 
looking for their fi rst job. Aft er entering the labor market, young people have a 
greater probability of working in the informal workers sector than in the formal 
sector or the informal employer sector. Th is fi nding suggests that the informal 
workers sector is a waiting sector before entry into a more desirable sector.
Th e number of years of education increases the probability of accessing the 
formal sector or remaining inactive. It does not seem to aff ect the probability 
of being an informal employer (rather than working in the informal worker 
Table 6.3 Observed and Predicted Shares of Men and Women Working in Formal 
and Informal Sectors in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
(percent)
Gender/sector Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Men
Formal sector 35 [60–67] 32 [54–62] 29 [43–51] 30 [57–66] 28 [48–60] 33 [56–66] 32 [66–74]
Informal sector 65 [33–40] 68 [38–46] 71 [49–57] 70 [34–42] 72 [40–52] 67 [34–44] 68 [26–34]
Women
Formal sector 12 [52–80] 11 [24–79] 10 [66–88] 14 [47–77] 8 [48–83] 19 [47–85] 16 [78–92]
Informal sector 88 [20–48] 89 [21–76] 90 [12–34] 86 [23–53] 92 [17–52] 81 [15–53] 84 [8–22]
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected cities (see table 6.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for individuals 15–65. Figures in brackets are 95 percent confidence intervals. 
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Table 6.4 Sector Allocation Equation Results for Men in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Inactive versus informal workers
Age (years) –0.356*** –0.370*** –0.557*** –0.235*** –0.407*** –0.311*** –0.241***
Age squared 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.003***
Education (years) 0.188*** 0.143*** 0.234*** 0.127*** 0.148*** 0.143*** 0.169***
Reads and writes French –0.168 0.216 0.374** 0.196 0.211 –0.261* –0.034
Reads and writes another language 0.342*** 0.132 0.295** 0.407*** 0.192 0.416*** 0.485***
Father worked in informal sector –0.087 –0.091 0.118 –0.334*** –0.394*** –0.267** –0.300***
Father worked in formal sector 0.124 0.081 –0.078 0.218 –0.015 0.364** –0.071
Father’s education (years) 0.044*** 0.032** 0.062*** 0.026*** 0.011 –0.002 0.018
Belongs to dominant religion –0.391*** 0.423 0.002 –0.639*** 0.108 0.249 –0.060
Belongs to dominant ethnic group 0.195 –0.215 –0.042 0.019 –0.018 0.004 –0.112
Migrant –0.271** –0.160 –0.127 –0.275** –0.301*** –0.227** –0.082
Household nonlabor income 0.085*** 0.057*** 0.079*** 0.049*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.04***
Intercept 4.191*** 4.429*** 5.768*** 3.053*** 4.728*** 4.233*** 2.904***
Formal employees versus informal workers
Age (years) 0.303*** 0.275*** 0.296*** 0.309*** 0.227*** 0.292*** 0.384***
Age squared –0.003*** –0.003*** –0.003*** –0.003*** –0.002*** –0.003*** –0.004***
Education (years) 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.229*** 0.163*** 0.169*** 0.176*** 0.22***
Reads and writes French 0.314* 0.037 0.21 0.522*** 0.165 0.385** 0.179
Reads and writes another language –0.009 0.315** –0.018 0.081 0.163 0.26* 0.334**
Father worked in informal sector 0.403*** 0.089 –0.089 –0.123 –0.054 –0.059 –0.347***
Father worked in formal sector 0.398** 0.376** –0.004 0.441*** 0.049 0.326* –0.168
(continued next page)
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Father’s education (years) 0.024* 0.013 0.038*** 0.028*** –0.002 0.008 –0.002
Belongs to dominant religion –0.301** 0.166 0.34*** –0.239 0.326*** 1.464*** –0.256**
Belongs to dominant ethnic group 0.213 0.021 –3.000 –0.090 –0.129 0.138 –0.142
Migrant 0.025 –0.041 0.405*** 0.033 0.393*** –0.032 0.297**
Household nonlabor income 0.017 –0.026 –0.017 0.002 –0.022 –0.002 0.006
Intercept –8.359*** –7.581*** –9.708*** –8.557*** –7.842*** –9.504*** –9.222***
Informal employers versus informal workers
Age (years) 0.211*** 0.207*** 0.261*** 0.247*** 0.113*** 0.116*** 0.302***
Age squared –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.003*** –0.003*** –0.001* –7* –0.003***
Education (years) 0.009 –0.033 0.032* –0.027 0.034* –0.007 –0.030
Reads and writes French 0.279 0.449** 0.229 0.235 0.132 0.252 0.547***
Reads and writes another language 0.333** 0.216 –0.054 0.289* 0.201 0.339** 0.247
Father worked in informal sector 0.139 –0.094 0.028 –0.106 0.271* 0.125 –0.457***
Father worked in formal sector 0.457** –0.217 –0.100 –0.078 0.058 –0.090 –0.564***
Father’s education (years) –0.012 0.042*** 0.008 0.006 –0.004 0.09 0.04**
Belongs to dominant religion 0.043 0.057 0.071 –0.017 –0.220* 0.361 0.210*
Belongs to dominant ethnic group –0.138 0.053 –0.089 0.161 –0.075 –0.178 0.443***
Migrant –0.080 –0.309** 0.174 –0.548*** –0.157 –0.445*** –0.045
Household nonlabor income –0.024 0.009 –0.005 0.032* –0.016 –0.028 –0.049**
Intercept –5.948*** –5.140*** –6.569*** –5.981*** –3.831*** –4.677*** –7.420***
Number of observations 3,606 3,013 3,438 3,179 2,763 3,428 3,787
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected cities (see table 6.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for individuals 15–65.
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 6.4 (continued)
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
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Table 6.5 Sector Allocation Equation Results for Women in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Inactive versus informal workers
Age (years) –0.169*** –0.142*** –0.240*** –0.131*** –0.267*** –0.080*** –0.134***
Age squared 0.243*** 0.196*** 0.311*** 0.17*** 0.372*** 0.079*** 0.179***
Education (years) 0.151*** 0.103*** 0.178*** 0.099*** 0.172*** 0.111*** 0.135***
Reads and writes French –0.354*** –0.143 –0.181 –0.070 0.036 –0.355** –0.126
Reads and writes another language 0.628*** 0.166 0.507*** 0.126 0.238** 0.011 –0.075
Father worked in informal sector –0.091 –0.065 0.208* –0.201** –0.182 –0.023 –0.191**
Father worked in formal sector –0.102 –0.100 0.209* 0.069 –0.052 –0.364*** –0.130
Father’s education (years) 0.035*** 0.041*** 0.032*** 0.02*** 0.004 0.035** 0.028**
Belongs to dominant religion 0.055 0.092 –0.138 0.221 0.046 0.849*** 0.116
Belongs to dominant ethnic group –0.069 –0.044 –0.141 0.0005 –0.083 0.273*** –0.304***
Migrant –0.181** –0.201** –0.202** –0.242*** –0.167* –0.060 –0.087
Household nonlabor income 0.021** –0.009 0.031*** 0.014 0.007 0.019 0.014
Children less than 1 year 0.47*** 0.151** 0.071 0.159 0.393*** 0.287*** 0.122
Children 1–3 0.122 0.081 0.132 0.099 0.112 0.327*** –0.020
Children 4–9 –0.057 0.027 0.015 0.056 –0.137** 0.075** 0.052
Women 13 or older 0.015 –0.008 –0.032 –0.051*** 0.091*** –0.027 –0.027
Intercept 1.887*** 2.037*** 2.416*** 2.423*** 2.451*** 1.403*** 2.406***
Formal employees versus informal workers
Age (years) 0.396*** 0.388*** 0.373*** 0.339*** 0.186*** 0.486*** 0.464***
Age squared –0.401*** –0.400*** –0.419*** –0.392*** –0.166*** –0.551*** –0.510***
Education (years) 0.319*** 0.443*** 0.402*** 0.316*** 0.315*** 0.33*** 0.391***
Reads and writes French 0.749** –0.114 –0.090 –0.322 0.482 1.329*** 0.547
Reads and writes another language 0.637*** –0.022 0.663*** 0.053 –0.007 0.407* 0.107
Father worked in informal sector –0.110 0.195 –0.016 0.079 –0.134 –0.350 –0.428*
Father worked in formal sector –0.160 0.492 0.321 0.278 0.004 –0.433 –0.079
Father’s education (years) 0.061*** 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.013 0.027 0.030
Belongs to dominant religion –0.013 0.215 0.165 –0.212 –0.173 1.319*** –0.331*
(continued next page)
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Table 6.5 (continued)
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Belongs to dominant ethnic group 0.370* 0.062 0.353* –0.073 0.007 0.196 –0.116
Migrant –0.150 –0.068 0.193 0.016 0.170 0.311 –0.246
Household nonlabor income
Children less than 1 year –0.040** –0.021 0.070 0.004 –0.026 –0.015 –0.007
Children 1–3
Children 4–9 0.428 0.100 0.172 0.095 0.217 0.308 –0.266
Women 13 or older –0.645** –0.308 –0.154 –0.254 0.092 –0.012 –0.016
Intercept –0.356*** –0.035 –0.136 –0.197* –0.224 –0.075 –0.057
Informal employers versus informal workers
Age (years) 0.237*** 0.241*** 0.239*** 0.148*** 0.122*** 0.28*** 0.289***
Age squared –0.214*** –0.280*** –0.238*** –0.151** –0.104** –0.315*** –0.330***
Education (years) 0.030 0.045 0.018 0.053 0.096*** –0.028 0.040
Reads and writes French 0.243 0.083 0.133 –0.195 –0.243 0.091 0.012
Reads and writes another language 0.282 –0.543 0.092 –0.096 0.074 0.136 0.355
Father worked in informal sector 0.065 –0.118 –0.122 0.299 0.224 0.314 0.155
Father worked in formal sector –0.125 –0.160 0.285* 0.454* –0.002 0.156 0.407
Father’s education (years) 0.029 0.031 0.018 0.0005 –0.016 –0.010 0.003
Belongs to dominant religion 0.169 –0.476 –0.019 –0.317 –0.327*** –0.718** 0.207
Belongs to dominant ethnic group 0.382** –0.042 –0.255** –0.098 –0.053 –0.251 –0.206
Migrant 0.089 –0.375** 0.19 –0.408** 0.010 –0.268 –0.392**
Household nonlabor income –0.050*** 0.0009 0.009 0.021 –0.003 –0.003 –0.004
Children less than 1 year –0.046 0.142 –0.044 –0.094 0.073 0.419** –0.595***
Children 1–3 0.142 –0.197 0.219 0.452** –0.008 0.315** –0.046
Children 4–9 0.010 –0.154* –0.071 0.023 0.080 –0.010 0.033
Women 13 or older 0.035 0.025 0.065* 0.029 0.201*** –0.003 0.035
Intercept –7.482*** –5.916*** –6.987*** –5.206*** –4.925*** –6.386*** –7.390***
Number of observations 3,600 3,166 3,724 3,363 3,029 3,757 3,754
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 6.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for individuals 15–65. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
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sector). Educated workers who do not fi nd jobs in the formal sector prefer to 
stay inactive. Writing and reading French or another language may reinforce 
the eff ect of education, although it does not do so in all cities. For men, educa-
tion in years (Cotonou and Lomé), writing and reading French (Bamako and 
Ouagadougou), and writing and reading another language (Abidjan, Dakar, 
and Niamey) have a positive impact on the probability of being an informal 
employer. Education thus seems to matter, but in a way that is not as clear as 
it is in the choice between the formal sector and the informal workers sector.
Other explanatory variables in the sector choice model are proxies of house-
hold wealth (household nonlabor income); household composition (for women 
only); and social and family networks captured by variables such as father’s 
occupation, religious and ethnic community, and migrant status. Th ese vari-
ables can aff ect sector choice by increasing the opportunity of working in a sec-
tor without necessarily infl uencing earnings. Th ey are of interest here because 
they provide evidence that the labor market is not competitive, yield insights on 
the rationing process, and are necessary for the model to be nonparametrically 
identifi ed. 
In contrast to some other authors, we do not impose a fi xed set of exclusion 
variables. For each city and gender group, we test whether the coeffi  cients of 
the potential exclusion variables are signifi cant in the earnings equation. If they 
are, we use the variable as an explanatory variable; if they are not, we use them 
as exclusion variables. 
Several variables aff ect sector choice but have no infl uence on earnings:
• Having a father who worked in the formal sector increases the probability of 
working in the formal sector (relative to the informal workers sector) in four 
of seven cities (see the results at the bottom of table 6.4). Father’s education 
increases the probability of working in the formal sector in three cities. Th e 
probability of working in the formal sector also increases for men belonging 
to the dominant religious community. Th is variable is not really discrimina-
tory in most cities, however, as the dominant group represents more than 
90 percent of the population. 
• Migrant status increases the probability of working in the informal workers 
sector or the formal sector. Th is result may hide two diff erent phenomena. 
Some people migrate because they are transferred to the economic capital 
(in which case they are most likely employed in a formal fi rm or the public 
sector) or because they are in school and then fi nd a job in the formal sec-
tor. Others migrate to fi nd better opportunities, but lacking valuable social 
networks they are unable to access the most profi table sectors. 
• Household nonlabor income has a positive eff ect on the probability of being 
inactive but not on the probability of becoming an informal employer, except 
in Dakar, where the positive eff ect is marginal. 
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For women, the results are less clear. Belonging to the dominant ethnic group 
or religious community increases the probability of working in the formal sec-
tor. Belonging to a household with children increases the probability of being 
an informal sector worker. Th is result can be explained by the fact that the 
workplace for some informal jobs is the home.
Th e model is always identifi ed because of the nonlinearity of the correction 
term in Lee’s methodology. However, a nonparametric identifi cation with an 
exclusion variable is more convincing. Such an identifi cation implies that some 
variables determine sector choice but not earnings. Such variables always exist 
for men. Th e models are less reliable for women, mainly because few women 
work in some cities and even fewer work in the formal sector. However, we 
believe it is meaningful to separate men and women in our estimations, because 
the sector choice and income determinants are not the same, especially with 
respect to inactivity.
Estimation of Earnings 
We estimate earnings using the method proposed by Lee (1983). For each vari-
able in the sector choice equation, we test whether the corresponding coef-
fi cients are signifi cantly diff erent from zero. We also report the p-values of the 
test. If a p-value is greater than 0.05, we add the corresponding variable to the 
set of explanatory variables. We apply this procedure for each city-gender pair, 
yielding a set of explanatory variables that is city and gender specifi c.
Regarding the usual variables of the Mincer equation (experience and educa-
tion), the returns diff er across cities (tables 6.6 and 6.7). However, the general 
pattern is almost always similar. Th e returns to experience are positive, signifi -
cant, and decreasing for formal and informal workers sectors. In the informal 
employers sector, most of the returns to experience are not statistically signifi -
cant. Th e returns to education are almost always signifi cantly positive. Th ese 
returns are usually higher in the formal sector than in the informal workers 
sector, and they diff er for men and women. For the informal workers sector, 
the returns to education are greater for men. When signifi cant, migration has a 
negative impact on earnings in the informal workers sector. 
Are Labor Markets Segmented?
We are now able to allocate each individual to the sector that provides him or 
her with the highest predicted earnings, under the hypothesis that labor mar-
kets are competitive and the assumption that only income diff erences matter 
in sector choice. We compute earnings for each sector (formal workers, infor-
mal workers, informal employers) by adding a random term to the expected 
value given by the estimated earnings equation. We then allocate individuals to 
the sector in which their earnings are highest. We repeat this procedure 4,000 
Table 6.6 Estimation of Men’s Earnings in Seven Cities in West Africa, by Sector, 2001/02
Variable
Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
FW IW IE FW IW IE FW IW IE FW IW IE FW IW IE FW IW IE FW IW IE
Experience (years) 0.045*** 0.058*** 0.108*** 0.030* 0.076*** 0.069* 0.048*** 0.035*** 0.015 0.022 0.074*** 0.023 0.057** 0.035*** 0.039 0.019 0.061*** 0.039 0.029** 0.082*** 0.034
Experience² –0.025 –0.060*** –0.149*** 0.006 –0.083*** –0.080 –0.037 –0.014 0.015 0.013 –0.091*** –0.008 –0.045 –0.018 –0.032 0.015 –0.056** –0.032  0.011 –0.112*** –0.019
Education (years) 0.141*** 0.100*** 0.072*** 0.110*** 0.099*** 0.020 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.066*** 0.095*** 0.088*** 0.051*** 0.152*** 0.135*** 0.108*** 0.116*** 0.168*** 0.057** 0.138*** 0.080*** 0.095***
Reads and writes 
French –0.285*** –0.051 –0.189 –0.051 –0.136 0.228 –0.207 –0.044 –0.005 0.091 –0.132 0.098 –0.041 –0.169 –0.276 0.083 –0.450*** –0.181 –0.081 –0.095 –0.123
Reads and writes 
another language 0.107** 0.172** 0.075 0.116 0.160 0.465*** 0.117** 0.157** 0.120 0.177** 0.046 0.151 0.021 –0.036 –0.178* 0.187*** –0.029 –0.066 0.137** 0.063 0.162
Father worked in 
informal sector
                                   
–0.051 0.141* –0.034
Father worked in 
formal sector
                                   
0.099* 0.287 0.159
Father’s education       0.014** 0.013 0.005                              
Belongs to 
dominant religion 0.026 0.147 0.145
                                   
Belongs to 
dominant ethnic 
group 0.059 0.228 0.102             0.125** –0.010 –0.168       0.018 0.030 0.247** 0.047 0.117 –0.125
Migrant –0.014 –0.129* –0.047                   –0.035 –0.161** –0.053            
Household 
nonlabor income
                       
0.029 0.019 0.010 0.020** 0.031** –0.004*** 0.016** –0.007 0.027*
Lee’s correction 
term –0.126 0.117 0.371 –0.378** 0.146 0.185 0.086 0.282 0.103 –0.244 –0.037 –0.118 –0.103 0.504* –0.234 –0.517*** 0.277 0.191 –0.534*** –0.573* –0.236
Father’s sector test 1 0.382 0.431 0.981 0.316 0.053 0.312 0.543 0.284 0.925 0.703 0.473 0.704 0.409 0.340 0.133 0.962 0.676      
Father’s education 
test 0.21 0.908 0.747       0.990 0.787 0.999 0.618 0.890 0.950 0.758 0.779 0.656 0.556 0.979 1 0.464 0.893 1
Household 
nonlabor income 
test 0.783 0.460 0.235 0.145 0.070 0.810 0.673 0.292 0.451 0.232 0.499 0.337                  
Religion test       0.524 0.646 0.092 0.149 0.699 0.118 0.157 0.300 0.929 0.316 0.466 0.366 0.416 0.162 0.532      
Ethnic group test       0.116 0.802 0.337 0.256 0.361 0.582       0.642 0.455 0.792       0.175 0.127 0.829
Migrant test       0.333 0.636 0.311 0.984 0.573 0.470 0.444 0.355 0.735       0.204 0.328 0.577 0.466 0.295 0.891
Number of 
observations 864 1,061 378 673 947 429 679 925 487 590 791 314 534 844 375 727 976 312 808 1,003 478
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected cities (see table 6.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for individuals 15–65. FW = formal worker; IW = informal worker; IE = informal employer. 
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Table 6.7 Estimation of Women’s Earnings in Seven Cities in West Africa, by Sector, 2001/02
Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Variable FW IW IE FW IW IE FW IW IE FW IW IE FW IW IE FW IW IE FW IW IE
Experience (years) 0.022 0.045*** 0.003 0.108*** 0.063*** 0.016 –0.010 0.037*** 0.041 0.055** 0.067*** 0.101** 0.035 0.030*** 0.042 0.055** 0.050*** –0.062 0.043** 0.075*** 0.130**
Experience² 0.015 –0.047*** 0.021 –0.144** –0.081*** –0.025 0.083** –0.055*** –0.054 –0.084 –0.085*** –0.116 0.012 –0.026 –0.040 –0.044 –0.052** 0.078 –0.022 –0.106*** –0.220***
Education (years) 0.176*** 0.093*** 0.034 0.172*** 0.042** 0.051* 0.096*** 0.027 0.040** 0.103*** 0.048*** 0.059* 0.147*** 0.054*** 0.099*** 0.130*** 0.144*** –0.014 0.107*** 0.096*** 0.112**
Reads and writes 
French –0.302 –0.115 0.114 –0.345 0.291** –0.202 0.213 0.025 –0.058 –0.035 0.099 0.141 0.292 –0.007 –0,006 0.352 –0.416** –0.050 0.534** –0.159 –0.582**
Reads and writes 
another language 0.240** 0.324*** 0.172 0.026 0.236* 0.167 0.142 –0.143 –0.130 –0.008 0.013 –0.685** 0.167 0.054 0.016 0.004 0.20 –0.301 0.144 0.123 0.267
Father worked in 
informal sector –0.113 –0.047 –0.028 0.178 0.016 0.130 0.041 0.178*** 0.351**
Father worked in 
formal sector –0.035 –0.078 0.240* 0.318 –0.031 0.053 0.017 0.213** –0.001
Father’s education 0.015 0.018 –0.020
Women 13 and 
older 0.013 –0.035*** –0.055* –0.021 –0.035** 0.037 –0.007 –0.031** 0.074** –0.087*** –0.012 0.008
Children less 
than 1 year 0.012 –0.086 –0.182 0.238** –0.117** –0.008
Children 1–3 0.189** 0.079 0.192 0.076 –0.0007 0.117
Children 4–9 0.009 –0.057* –0.126 0.086* –0.025 –0.031
Belongs to 
dominant religion 0.047 0.039 –0.244** –0.098 0.077 1.138** 0.076 0.124** –0.319*
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Belongs to dominant 
ethnic group 0.021 –0.120** –0.124 0.127 0.132 0.228 0.011 –0.043 0.363**
Migrant –0.055 –0.112** –0.017 –0.005 –0.266*** –0.048 0.319** –0.134* –0.108
Household 
nonlabor income –0.006 –0.005 –0.038**
Lee’s correction 
term –0.302 0.191 0.003 0.387 0.097 –0.531 –0.297 –0.605*** 0.160 0.089 –0.289 1.145 –0.299 0.134 –0.035 0.149 –0.044 –0.421 –0.490** –0.745*** 2.082***
Father’s sector test 0.904 0.872 0.604 0.278 0.36 0.996 0.512 0.554 0.616 0.985 0.675 0.976
Father’s education 
test 0.787 0.983 1 1 0.712 0.874 0.176 0.442 0.891 0.967 0.780 0.996 0.640 0.131 0.920 0.616 0.997 0.981
Children test 0.575 0.470 0.629 0.709 0.447 0.881 0.152 0.807 0.410 0.867 0.449 0.638 0.155 0.716 0.114
Women test 0.800 0.285 0.446 0.88 0.084 0.120 0.874 0.974 0.886
Household 
nonlabor income 
test 0.676 0.486 0.755 0.697 0.688 0.130 0.996 0.668 0.309 0.442 0.849 0.588 0.06 0.295 0.984 0.947 0.327 0.861
Religion test 0.708 0.636 0.548 0.576 0.458 0.667 0.461 0.919 0.297 0.066 0.130 0.612
Ethnic group test 0.915 0.890 0.690 0.147 0.356 0.617 0.670 0.309 0.740 0.155 0.171 0.220
Migrant test 0.390 0.780 0.274 0.441 0.317 0.351 0.154 0.624 0.230 0.875 0.170 0.945
Number of 
observations 1,299 252 271 174 1,232 156 254 1,493 396 177 939 134 160 1,344 376 224 686 186 278 1,115 215
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected cities (see table 6.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for individuals 15–65. FW= formal worker; IW = informal worker; IE = informal employer. 
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times in order to account for the multistep estimation procedure and to ensure 
that the results do not depend on a particular draw of the residuals. For each 
allocation, we compute the share of the three sectors. For each sector, we then 
calculate the mean share and the 95 percent confi dence interval. We then check 
whether the observed shares fall within the confi dence interval of the predicted 
shares. If they do not, we reject the competitive assumption.
For men, the overall picture is fairly clear: labor markets are segmented 
(table 6.8). Th e formal sector and the informal employers sector appear to be 
sectors of choice: except for Cotonou, the observed shares are smaller than the 
predicted and fall outside the confi dence interval. In contrast, the observed 
sizes of the informal workers sector are about twice the predicted sizes and fall 
outside the confi dence interval. Th ese fi gures mean that if people were free to 
enter the sector that provides them with the highest income, the share of the 
informal workers sector would be smaller.
For women, the observed size of the informal workers sector (about 
75 percent) is always larger than the upper bound of the confi dence interval 
(which never exceeds 35 percent), and the employment share of the formal 
sector is below the predicted one. Th e observed size of the informal employ-
ers  sector falls within the confi dence interval in three of seven cities (Lomé, 
 Niamey, and Ouagadougou). Th e confi dence intervals are very large for 
women, because most of the earnings estimations are based on very small 
samples. 
To sum up, the labor markets in all seven cities are segmented. Th e informal 
sector workers segment is larger than it would be in a competitive labor market, 
because jobs in both the formal and informal employers sector are rationed. For 
Table 6.8 Simulation Results of Four-Sector Model of Sector Allocation in Seven Cities in 
West Africa, 2001/02
(percent)
Gender/sector Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Men
Formal workers 35 [43, 48] 32 [33, 44] 29 [25, 34] 30 [36, 44] 28 [31, 41] 33 [38, 48] 32 [42, 55]
Informal workers 49 [22, 27] 48 [22, 29] 51 [29, 36] 54 [16, 21] 53 [24, 31] 52 [22, 30] 49 [14, 19]
Informal employers 15 [27, 32] 20 [32, 39] 21 [36, 41] 16 [37, 44] 19 [33, 40] 14 [28, 37] 19 [28, 44]
Women 
Formal workers 12 [32, 64] 11 [15, 66] 10 [46, 78] 14 [29, 59] 8 [34, 74] 19 [30, 74] 16 [53, 84]
Informal workers 74 [13, 28] 79 [14, 35] 74 [7, 19] 76 [15, 29] 75 [10, 29] 66 [11, 28] 72 [5, 15]
Informal employers 14 [22, 43] 10 [20, 52] 16 [15, 37] 10 [26, 45] 18 [16, 38] 16 [14, 44] 12 [10, 33]
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected cities (see table 6.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for individuals 15–65. Figures in brackets are 95 percent confidence intervals of the predicted 
share under the competitive model assumptions. Results falling within the confidence interval are in bold. 
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Table 6.9 Simulation Results of Sector Allocation in Seven Cities in West Africa Using the 
Dubin and McFadden Method, 2001/02
Gender/
model/sector Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Men, four-sector model
Formal workers 35 [33, 46] 32 [28, 42] 29 [23, 32] 30 [32, 45] 28 [30, 39] 33 [33, 48] 32 [41, 55]
Informal workers 49 [24, 34] 48 [24, 32] 51 [31, 40] 54 [16, 24] 53 [24, 30] 52 [21, 30] 49 [13, 23]
Informal employers 15 [26, 37] 20 [33, 43] 21 [32, 42] 16 [36, 46] 19 [35, 41] 14 [25, 40] 19 [29, 40]
Men, three-sector model 
Formal workers 35 [55, 68] 32 [43, 60] 29 [41, 53] 30 [54, 67] 28 [46, 59] 33 [51, 66] 32 [63, 75]
Informal workers 65 [32, 45] 68 [39, 57] 71 [47, 59] 70 [33, 46] 72 [41, 54] 67 [34, 48] 68 [25, 37]
Women, four-sector model
Formal workers 12 [28, 62] 11 [12, 53] 10 [38, 83] 14 [23, 65] 8 [28, 73] 19 [33, 79] 16 [46, 86]
Informal workers 74 [13, 30] 79 [17, 38] 74 [6, 24] 76 [13, 34] 75 [11, 32] 66 [10, 28] 72 [5, 20]
Informal employers 14 [25, 48] 10 [28, 57] 16 [10, 40] 10 [21, 46] 18 [15, 44] 16 [10, 41] 12 [8, 34]
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected cities (see table 6.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for individuals 15–65. Figures in brackets are 95 percent confidence intervals of the predicted 
share under the competitive model assumptions. Results falling within the confidence interval are in bold. 
women, in some cities (Abidjan, Dakar, and Lomé), only formal jobs seem to 
be rationed.
How Robust are the Results? 
We provide three robustness checks. We fi rst compute our results with another 
form for the correction terms in the earnings equation estimation. Instead of 
using the empirical strategy developed by Lee (1983), we use the strategy devel-
oped by Dubin and McFadden (1984).
For men, the broad picture of segmentation remains unchanged (table 6.9). 
For each city, the observed share of informal sector workers lies outside the con-
fi dence interval, and the observed share of informal employers is smaller than 
predicted. However, the formal sector appears less attractive than previously. 
In four of seven cities (Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, and Niamey), the observed 
share of formal workers is consistent with the predictions of our model. When 
properly taken into account, the informal employers sector reduces the attrac-
tiveness of the formal sector. With the Dubin and McFadden strategy, in a three-
sector model, the formal sector is always smaller than predicted (as with Lee’s 
strategy). With a four-sector model, however, this conclusion is challenged. Th e 
most rationed sector becomes the informal employers sector. For women, the 
results are perfectly robust to the empirical strategy.
Th e second assumption we want to relax is the independence of random 
terms across sectors, which may represent unobserved skills of individuals in 
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each sector. We previously assumed that unobserved skills were not correlated 
across sectors. Th is assumption may be too strong, as some abilities may be 
valuable in all sectors. 
To test the robustness of our results to this assumption, we now assume 
that random terms are perfectly correlated across sectors. If the random term 
increases potential earnings in the formal sector, it will also positively aff ect 
potential earnings of informal employers and informal sector workers. Th e 
results do not dramatically change with this extreme assumption (table 6.10). 
Regarding men, the formal sector remains signifi cantly smaller and the infor-
mal workers sector larger than predicted. Th e informal employers sector is 
smaller than predicted in three of seven cities; in four cities, it lies within the 
confi dence interval. As a consequence, the overall picture is still segmentation, 
but the insuffi  cient size of the informal employers sector may be questioned 
in some cities (Abidjan, Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou). However, the 
assumption of perfect correlation is extreme, and the fact that the results are 
fully robust for some cities is striking.
For women, the informal workers sector remains larger and the formal sec-
tor signifi cantly smaller than predicted in all cities; the size of the employers 
sector falls within the confi dence interval. Th e results are less accurate than the 
results obtained with other models (independent random terms, Dubin and 
McFadden methods). Th e largest confi dence interval is [13, 97] for the formal 
sector in Bamako. Th ese fi ndings reinforce the fact that the results for women 
are less reliable than the results for men.
Table 6.10 Observed and Predicted Sector Shares in Seven Cities in West Africa When 
Random Terms Are Positively Correlated, 2001/02
(percent)
Gender/sector Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Men
Formal workers 35 [60, 83] 32 [38, 73] 29 [9, 36] 30 [39, 72] 28 [37, 77] 33 [41, 82] 32 [61, 96]
Informal workers 49 [0, 10] 48 [0, 19] 51 [0, 35] 54 [0, 2] 53 [0, 17] 52 [1, 19] 49 [0, 4]
Informal employers 15 [14, 37] 20 [20, 55] 21 [53, 70] 16 [28, 60] 19 [23, 54] 14 [6, 48] 19 [3, 38]
Women
Formal workers 12 [36, 96] 11 [13, 97] 10 [55, 100] 14 [25, 90] 8 [40, 100] 19 [29, 97] 16 [66, 100]
Informal workers 74 [0, 10] 79 [0, 18] 74 [0, 7] 76 [0, 17] 75 [0, 19] 66 [0, 17] 72 [0, 2]
Informal employers 14 [4, 59] 10 [2, 74] 16 [0, 43] 10 [10, 63] 18 [0, 51] 16 [0, 52] 12 [0, 33]
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected cities (see table 6.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for individuals 15–65. Figures in brackets are 95 percent confidence intervals of the predicted 
share under the competitive model assumptions. Results falling within the confidence interval are in bold. 
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For women, all tests fi nd evidence of a segmented labor market. However, 
small sample sizes cast some doubt on the reliability of the results. For men, all 
labor markets are also segmented. Th e overly large informal workers sector is 
robust to all specifi cations. However, except in Dakar and Lomé, the tests are 
not consistent, and all of them do not conclude that both the formal sector and 
the informal employers sector are too small. Because of the size of the samples 
and following Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2007), the preferred test is 
the one based on the Dubin and McFadden strategy with uncorrelated residu-
als (see table 6.9). Th is test supports the hypothesis that the informal employer 
sector would be larger in a competitive labor market but rejects the hypothesis 
that formal jobs are rationed for some cities.
Th e last robustness check consists of modifying the defi nition of the informal 
employers sector. We previously argued that self-employed workers working 
alone should be excluded from that sector, because they benefi t less from infor-
mality than people who employ others (employers and self-account workers 
employing at least one person). Here we modify the defi nition of the infor-
mal employers sector by including self-employed workers working alone (table 
6.11). Pooling men and women, the results are striking. For all city-gender 
couple (except men in Lomé), the observed size of the newly defi ned infor-
mal employer sector lies above the upper bound of the confi dence interval. 
Th e informal employer sector appears far less attractive than previously. Self-
employed workers working alone represent the majority of the sector. Th ese 
Table 6.11 Observed and Predicted Sector Shares in Seven Cities in West Africa When 
Definition of Informal Employers Sector Is Broadened, 2001/02
(percent)
Gender/sector Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Men
Formal workers 35 [42, 50] 32 [36, 45] 29 [27, 34] 28 [34, 45] 30 [40, 50] 33 [39, 50] 32 [49, 59]
Informal workers 30 [22, 28] 19 [24, 31] 23 [29, 34] 25 [24, 31] 34 [19, 24] 28 [21, 28] 29 [16, 21]
Informal employers 35 [26, 32] 49 [29, 36] 48 [35, 40] 48 [30, 37] 36 [30, 38] 39 [26, 36] 39 [23, 32]
Women
Formal workers 12 [37, 71] 11 [18, 73] 10 [49, 81] 14 [32, 63] 8 [36, 72] 19 [33, 78] 16 [66, 88]
Informal workers 31 [12, 28] 15 [12, 38] 21 [9, 25] 31 [16, 30] 20 [13, 30] 20 [12, 32] 22 [6, 17]
Informal employers 57 [16, 35] 74 [14, 45] 68 [10, 27] 55 [21, 39] 73 [14, 34] 62 [10, 35] 62 [5, 18]
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected cities (see table 6.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for individuals 15–65. Figures in brackets are 95 percent confidence intervals of the predicted 
share under the competitive model assumptions. Results falling within the confidence interval are in bold. 
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results thus confi rm that self-employed workers working alone should be allo-
cated to the lower segment of the informal sector. If self-employment status 
were as attractive as employer status, adding self-employed workers working 
alone to the defi nition of entrepreneurs would not have changed the results.
Conclusion
Th is chapter provides a test for labor market segmentation based on the idea 
that the informal sector should be divided into two subsectors. In our set-up, 
the lower informal sector consists of informal sector dependent workers and 
self-employed workers working alone; the upper sector comprises informal 
employers. Applying our test to seven cities in WAEMU, separately for men 
and women, leads to the conclusion that the labor market is segmented for the 
14 city-gender groups examined. 
Th e lower informal sector is always larger than it would have been in a com-
petitive labor market. Th is conclusion is remarkably robust to diff erent speci-
fi cations. Th e fi nding is particularly important because few studies have been 
conducted in West Africa, where labor markets are very diff erent from those in 
Latin America or Asia, the site of most studies.
Within the informal sector, pooling self-employed workers working alone 
with employees rather than employers makes sense, as only entrepreneur-
ship appears to be a desirable situation in this sector. Th e policy implications 
are clear: eff orts to reduce poverty in the informal sector should target both 
employees and self-employed workers working alone; they should not target 
informal employers. 
We test three cases regarding the rationing process. Where the informal 
sector is not divided, the labor market is segmented if formal sector jobs are 
rationed. In our set-up, segmentation means that formal jobs are rationed, that 
informal employers are rationed, or both. If formal jobs are rationed, a policy 
that aims to reduce labor costs will probably be effi  cient. If the employers sector 
is rationed, a more meaningful approach will be to improve access to capital, 
management skills, and accounting literacy.
Notes
 1. Although Abidjan and Cotonou are not administrative capitals, we refer to them as 
capitals because they are the most important economic centers in their countries 
(Cotonou is also the seat of government).
 2. Rationing can occur because of the burden of formal labor market regulations, 
which impose high minimum wages and high taxes. Alternatively, high wages paid 
by formal employers may prevent their employees from quitting their job—the so-
called effi  ciency wage hypothesis (Krebs and Maloney 1999).
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 3. Most studies examine India (Banerjee 1983); Latin America (Pratap and Quintin 
2006; Pagès and Stampini 2007); or South Africa (Badaoui, Strobl, and Walsh 2008).
 4. If all observed and simulated shares are equal, our test is inconclusive. Indeed, our 
model could reproduce the observed shares by allocating a large share of the infor-
mal sector worker segment to the informal employers segment or vice versa. In this 
case, the observed shares would be consistent with a competitive labor market, but 
the way workers are allocated to each sector would not. Fortunately, this never hap-
pens in our results: in all cases, at least one observed share lies outside its simulated 
confi dence interval.
 5. We are aware that the result of our test procedure may be path dependent, but as 
there is no natural order between the variables, we did not see a preferable procedure.
 6. Results for other countries, available in the full version of this chapter (http://www
.dial.ird.fr/publications), are similar.
 7. Th ese shares are diff erent from the ones in table 6.1, because the fi gures in table 6.1 
are shares of the labor force, not the population as a whole.
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7
Domestic Work and Employment 
in Africa: What Is the Trade-Off for 
Women?
Javier Herrera and Constance Torelli
One of the keys to understanding the low labor force participation rate among 
women and their weaker ties with the labor market is the breakdown of domes-
tic work and market-related work by gender. How do inequalities in the distri-
bution of domestic work aff ect the type of employment integration (informal) 
for women and their level of participation (number of hours worked) on the 
labor market?1 What are the links between inequalities in the distribution of 
domestic work time and employment in the informal sector? Th is chapter 
addresses these questions.
As domestic work is not considered work in offi  cial labor force indicators, 
activity rates are underestimated, especially for women. As defi ned by Inter-
national Labour Organization (ILO) standards, the labor force participation 
rate covers only work associated with the production of goods and services 
included in the system of national accounts. Domestic work to produce services 
consumed by the household is not included; an individual in full-time domestic 
work is therefore considered “inactive.” Th e time spent producing goods for 
domestic consumption (gathering fi rewood, fetching water, caring for the sick, 
and performing voluntary community services) is not generally considered to 
be work either.
Th is chapter focuses on the links between domestic labor and labor mar-
ket participation. Th e fi rst section reviews the literature on the distribution 
of domestic time and market time by gender in developing countries. Th e 
second section describes the databases in the 10 Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries included in the study. Th e third section presents the main stylized facts 
derived from a number of comparative fi ndings and analyzes the determinants 
of the allocation of time between domestic activities and market work within 
the framework of family reproduction. It concludes by briefl y examining the 
222  URBAN LABOR MARKETS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
eff ects of the distribution of domestic work on labor market participation and 
household incomes. Th e fourth section puts forth hypotheses, describes the 
econometric models employed to test them, and analyzes the results of the 
estimates. Th e last section draws conclusions and discusses implications for 
future research.
To our knowledge, no other study has conducted a comparison of this kind 
across a large number of Sub-Saharan African countries. Th is study is also the 
fi rst to link inequalities in the distribution of domestic work time and employ-
ment on the labor market (especially the informal sector). 
Review of the Literature
Empirical studies of household allocations of time are based on Becker (1965, 
1981) and Gronau (1977), who propose a unitary model of the household in 
which the ratio of each member’s relative productivity to his or her expected 
wage dictates specialization in domestic or market activities. Th e variables con-
sidered are the individuals’ human capital and the opportunity cost of domestic 
activities (generally measured by proxies such as the number of children, house-
hold wealth, and spouse’s level of education). 
Most empirical studies examine developed countries and focus on the intra-
household division of labor and its link with the determinants of the labor sup-
ply (of married women, for example). One of the focal points of this literature is 
to test the hypothesis of the unitary household, which posits that the cross-eff ect 
of a balanced increase in income from the wife’s wage on the husband’s labor 
supply is identical to the eff ect of an increase in the husband’s wage on the wife’s 
labor supply (see, for example, Browning and others 1994; Alderman and others 
1995; Browning and Chiappori 1998; Bourguignon and Chiuri 2005).
Empirical studies reject the “shared or common preferences” hypothesis 
underlying the unitary model of the household (Ilahi 2000). Quisumbing and 
Maluccio (2000) show the importance (to varying extents) of women’s bargain-
ing power in the allocation of household spending in four developing countries 
(Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and South Africa). But very few studies have 
looked into intrahousehold time use. 
In developing countries, a major feature of the studies based on surveys com-
bining time use with labor market participation is the exploration of the links 
between child labor (domestic and market work) and children’s education (see 
chapter 12). Th is work has qualifi ed the idea that work and education are two 
incompatible activities. Canagarajah and Coulombe (1998) do not include the 
time children spend on domestic work in their econometric estimates (a bivari-
ate probit model) of the probability of children working as opposed to studying. 
As Ilahi (2001) shows in his panel study of Peruvian households, failing to do so 
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underestimates the time children, especially girls, spend working. He shows that 
changes in the household’s level of wealth (ownership of assets), the employ-
ment of women, and sickness of a household member have a stronger impact on 
time spent at school and work for girls than for boys (Ilahi 2001). Ritchie, Lloyd, 
and Grant (2004) consider the impact of adolescents’ schooling on the gender 
division of labor in India, Kenya, Pakistan, and South Africa. 
A number of authors point out that part of the household production (mainly 
produced by women) is not counted. Th ey seek to include domestic work in the 
system of national accounts and to incorporate female participation in domestic 
production into the measurement of the labor force participation rate in order 
to accurately measure women’s economic contribution. 
Diff erent classifi cations and breakdowns of working time have been pro-
posed, but the distinction between work and nonwork remains hazy. For 
example, Kes and Swaminathan (2006) posit that individuals’ time use can be 
classifi ed as market and nonmarket work. Nonmarket work covers subsistence 
production, reproductive work, and volunteer work. Reproductive work com-
prises domestic work and care work. Domestic activities include activities such 
as preparing meals, doing laundry, cleaning, maintaining the household, and 
providing personal care. Th is misclassifi cation clearly illustrates the confusion 
over the distinction between work and nonwork: although personal care is an 
essential activity, like leisure and sleep, none of these activities is defi ned as 
work for the purpose of national accounts.2
Few empirical household time use studies have been conducted on develop-
ing countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa, surveys do not collect enough economic 
and demographic data for an in-depth analysis of time use by men and women. 
Kes and Swaminathan (2006) update the review by Brown and Haddad 
(1995) to summarize the fi ndings of 17 studies on time use by gender. Th ey 
fi nd that diff erent instruments are used to collect the data (simplifi ed diaries, 
prelisting of 77 activities classifi ed and not classifi ed as in a system of national 
accounts, participant observation, seven-day recall, two-day recall, 24-hour 
diary, and so forth). Sample sizes range from 44 women to 5,938 households 
and cover diff erent age ranges.
In a move to overcome these shortcomings, the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP) supported four surveys on time use in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, in Benin (1998), South Africa (2000), Madagascar (2001), and Mauri-
tius (2003). Th e fi ndings are summarized in a report titled Gender, Time Use 
and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2006). Th is report merely 
describes the working time included in and excluded from the system of 
national accounts. Except for gender and country variables, the fi ndings are 
not broken down by age bracket, level of education, household demographic 
structure, household poverty status, income level, occupational status, or type 
of employment.3 
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Empirical studies agree on three stylized facts: 
• Women spend more time working than men in nearly all regions.4 
• Th e distribution of tasks is very diff erent for men and women, with women 
performing virtually all domestic tasks and men specializing in income-
earning activities (Ilahi 2000).
• Th ere is very little total specialization. Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2003) 
show that less than 2 percent of people in Pakistan perform all the domestic 
work in their household and less than 8 percent perform no work at all.
Description of the Data
Th e data used in this chapter combine samples from 1-2-3 surveys conducted 
in seven West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) capitals; 
Antananarivo, Madagascar; Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo; Douala 
and Yaoundé, Cameroon (for a description of these surveys, see box O.1 in the 
overview).5 Th e sample covers 95,220 individuals 10 and older, including 68,428 
in WAEMU cities (table 7.1). Th e 1-2-3 surveys share the same methodological 
Table 7.1 Sample Characteristics and Descriptive Statistics
(percentage of total, except where indicated otherwise)
Variable All countries
West African 
Economic and 
Monetary Union 
(WAEMU) subtotal 
Gender
Women 50.8 50.8
Men 49.2 49.2
Number of people (thousands)
Number of people in areas sampled 18,880.8 9,216.0
Number of people in sample 127.4  91.8 
Age bracket    
<6 15.1 14.4
6–9 10.7 10.6
10–14 11.6 11.8
15–24 23.0 24.2
25–64 37.5 37.3
65+ 2.1 1.8
Total 100 100 
Household size (thousands) 
Total number of people 10 and older in cities sampled 14,009.1 6,920.3 
Number of people 10 and older in sample  95.2  68.4
(continued next page)
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Household type    
One person 12.4 14.4
Couple without children 4.3 4.4
Couple with children 32.6 27.5
Nuclear single parent 8.4 7.9
Extended single parent 9.9 10.7
Extended household 32.4 35.1
Total 100 100 
Number of households (thousands)
Number of households in cities sampled 3,635 1,770
Number of households in sample 25.5 17.8
Percentage of households headed by a woman 20.5 20.5
Average household size 5.1 5.1
Relation to head of household    
Head of household 19.3 19.2
Spouse 12.4 12.3
Child 47.5 45.3
Father/mother 0.6 0.5
Other relative 18.5 19.9
Other unrelated member 1.1 1.7
Servant 0.6 1.1
Institutional sector    
Administration 8.3 6.7
Public enterprise 2.6 1.8
Formal private sector 16.4 14.1
Informal sector 71.0 76.2
Association, nongovernmental organization 1.7 1.2
Religion
Muslim 28.7 58.7
Catholic 32.4 24.4
Protestant 16.8 5.0
None 2.7 3.6
Other 19.4 8.3
Number of years of education (people 10 and older)    
Women 6.3 4.3
Men 7.8 6.3
All 7.0 5.3
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries in the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU) conducted in 2001/02 by the Observatoire économique et statistique d’Afrique Subsaharienne 
(AFRISTAT); Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation (DIAL); and national statistics institutes.
Table 7.1 (continued)
Variable All countries
West African 
Economic and 
Monetary Union 
(WAEMU) subtotal 
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approach to their measurement of working weeks for people 10 and older in the 
11 cities. Th is means that the harmonized data taken from these surveys can be 
used to conduct the fi rst ever rigorously comparable assessment. 
Household members were asked to recall the time spent on each activity over 
the reference period. Th e information obtained is not as accurate as the infor-
mation obtained from journals fi lled in by household members. Th is method 
was used because it is less expensive and because the one-week period has the 
advantage of covering activities that are not daily, which prevents underestima-
tion of their weight.
Six types of activities are defi ned: 
• Studying
• Unpaid domestic work in own house and caring for children, the elderly, 
and the sick
• Fetching water or wood and going to the market
• Building own house
• Performing voluntary community services
• Spending time in employment (in main and second job). 
Time spent on leisure, family time, and sleeping was not collected directly 
but can be estimated residually (table 7.2). Th e sample covers urban households 
only; it thus largely avoids seasonality issues. 
Th e other recurring problem with empirical studies on time use is that the sum 
of the time spent on diff erent activities is sometimes greater than the maximum 
number of hours available in a day (because two activities, such as caring for 
children and performing domestic tasks and even market activities, can be per-
formed simultaneously). In our sample, this risk is limited (albeit not eliminated) 
because caring for children, the elderly, and the sick is grouped with domestic 
activities. In order to correct for the overestimation of time spent on diff erent 
activities and hence deal with the double counting problem, we placed a ceiling 
on the maximum time individuals could spend on activities, so that the sum of 
weekly activity time does not exceed 112 hours ([24–8] * 7). When the total time 
individuals reported spending on diff erent activities exceeded the maximum, we 
applied a correction factor (total time/112) to each of the components, so that 
the sum does not exceed 112 hours.6 
Stylized Facts on Time Use by Gender
We fi rst look at the breakdown of working time spent producing domestic 
goods and services, in order to examine the links between the distribution of 
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Table 7.2 Allocation of Time in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Type of Activity 
(weekly hours, except where otherwise indicated)
City
Domestic 
work and 
caring for 
children
Gathering wood, 
fetching water, 
and shopping Building home Studying
Performing 
voluntary 
community 
services
Working in 
main job
Working in 
second job Total
Abidjan 5.8 1.6 0.0 5.0 0.1 26.9 0.4 39.8
Antananarivo 6.1 4.0 1.3 9.9 0.1 24.1 0.8 46.4
Bamako 7.3 1.7 0.1 0.4 0.1 21.3 0.7 31.5
Cotonou 8.3 3.1 0.0 3.5 0.1 26.0 1.0 42.1
Dakar 7.5 1.3 0.1 1.6 0.2 19.9 0.3 30.9
Douala 9.9 3.3 0.2 3.6 0.3 24.3 1.0 42.6
Kinshasa 6.4 2.5 0.1 2.9 0.3 16.5 0.4 29.1
Lomé 11.5 3.9 0.1 2.1 0.4 30.3 0.9 49.2
Niamey 9.1 1.7 0.1 2.0 0.1 19.3 0.7 33.0
Ouagadougou 7.3 2.0 0.0 1.1 0.1 23.0 0.7 34.2
Yaoundé 9.0 3.3 0.1 4.7 0.5 22.5 0.9 41.1
West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU) 7.4 1.9 0.1 2.8 0.1 24.1 0.6 37.0
WAEMU countries 7.4 2.5 0.2 3.6 0.2 21.9 0.6 36.4
Distribution of time (percentage of total)
WAEMU 20.1 5.2 0.2 7.5 0.4 65.2 1.5 100
All 20.4 6.8 0.5 9.9 0.6 60.2 1.7 100
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 7.1 for details).
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domestic and market time and the female labor market participation rate and 
defi ne the relative weight of the activities not counted by the national accounts. 
We then focus on the extent and determinants of intrahousehold inequalities, 
an aspect rarely studied in the developing countries.
Time Spent on Domestic and Market Work 
One of the keys to understanding low female labor force participation rates and 
the marginal nature of female employment on the labor market (mainly in the 
informal sector) is the allocation of time between domestic and market work. 
Th e more women are taken up with domestic tasks, the less time they spend 
on the labor market (fi gure 7.1). Th is notion suggests that a trade-off  exists 
between domestic and market-based work. A diff erent picture emerges from 
examination of the cities individually.
Time Spent on Domestic Work as a Percentage of 
Total Working Time
Across all 11 cities, nearly one-third (31 percent) of total working time is spent 
performing domestic activities not included in national accounts (28 percent for 
WAEMU cities) (fi gure 7.2). Offi  cial per capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
fi gures therefore underestimate the real standard of living. It is impossible to 
quantify the amount by which GDP is underestimated without assigning a 
monetary value to the time spent on domestic work. Imputing such a value is 
diffi  cult, however, because there is little if any market for household services in 
Figure 7.1 Female Labor Force Participation Rate and Share of Working Time Spent on 
Domestic Activities in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 7.1 for details).
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Sub-Saharan Africa. However, given that productivity for domestic production 
tasks is probably lower than it is for market-based work, GDP cannot be under-
estimated by more than 30 percent. 
Working in the formal sector (oft en the only working time visible to labor 
market statistics) accounts for just one-quarter of “market-based” work in both 
the WAEMU cities and all 11 cities in the sample (the other three-quarters is 
in the informal sector).7 On average, more time is spent on domestic activi-
ties than on production-related activities in the formal sector. Th e time-use 
survey approach provides another way of assessing the extent to which activi-
ties outside the formal sector are excluded from both GDP and labor market 
indicators. 
Th e populations studied spend nearly 70 percent of their time on leisure, 
sleep, studying, and other activities counted as nonwork. In the WAEMU cit-
ies, the time spent studying (2.5 percent) is below the average for all 11 cities 
(Antananarivo, 7.9 percent; Yaoundé, 4.2 percent; Douala, 3.3 percent). 
Figure 7.2 Allocation of Time in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 7.1 for details).
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Cross-Country Diff erences 
Th e cities display sharp variations around an average working week of 34.2 
hours within WAEMU and 32.8 hours for all 11 cities considered. In the capitals 
of Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo; Cameroon’s two main cities; and Madagas-
car’s capital, people spend more time working (domestic or market-based) than 
do people in the capitals of Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Mali, Niger, and Senegal (fi gure 7.3).
One explanation for the diff erences in time allocation across cities could be 
diff erences in demographic structures and household types. Extended house-
holds, polygamy, and the prevalence of child labor may all have an impact on 
the observed heterogeneity in working hours across countries.
For the sample as a whole, women account for 56 percent of the household’s 
total working time (fi gure 7.4). Domestic working time is more unevenly spread 
by gender than market-based work. Women perform 82 percent of domestic 
work in the household. Th ey also account for 42 percent of the household’s 
market-based working time.
In every city considered, women account for more than half of the house-
hold’s working time, but there are large diff erences across countries. Gender dif-
ferences are greatest in Cotonou and Lomé, where the rates of female specializa-
tion in domestic activities are lowest. Gender inequalities occur not principally 
because women specialize in domestic work but rather because they perform 
both domestic and market work (fi gure 7.5).
Figure 7.3 Time Spent on Domestic Work, Market Work, and Studying in 11 Cities in 
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 7.1 for details).
Note: WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union.
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Figure 7.4 Division of Labor within Households by Gender in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 7.1 for details).
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Figure 7.5 Percentage of Total Working Time Men and Women in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan 
Africa Spend Performing Domestic and Market Work 
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 7.1 for details).
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Given the small contribution to domestic work by men and the sizable 
participation of women in market work, it comes as no surprise to fi nd that 
inequalities (measured by the Gini coeffi  cient) are greater in domestic work 
than in market work, although both are signifi cant (table 7.3). Th is result holds 
when individuals who do not take part in domestic tasks or market tasks are 
excluded. However, the inequalities are sharper for women in the distribution of 
market work and for men in the distribution of domestic work. Inequalities in 
the breakdown of domestic working time are largest for both men and women 
when zero values are excluded. When we decompose the Th eil inequality index, 
intragroup (male/female) inequalities account for virtually all the inequalities in 
the distribution of working time (88.7 percent for domestic work, 98.3 percent 
for market work, and 99.9 percent for total working time).
Women’s Double Days
Th e data in table 7.4 bluntly refute the notion that inequality in domestic work 
refl ects specialization, in which women who participate in the labor market spe-
cialize solely in market work, leaving the domestic workload to women defi ned 
by the International Labour Organization as economically inactive. Women 
employed in the labor market spend an average of 16.6 hours a week on domes-
tic tasks, compared with 14.9 hours for women out of the labor force (11 percent 
more time). Th is domestic working time is in addition to their market work-
ing time. Many African women thus work a double day. Th eir involvement in 
domestic work does not appear to be an obstacle to their participation in the 
labor market. 
Th ese average fi gures mask cross-county diff erences. Th e double day is a 
signifi cant phenomenon in the capitals of Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Mada-
gascar, and Togo; the time working women spend on domestic tasks does not 
diff er greatly among women out of the labor force in the other African capitals 
in our sample. 
Table 7.3 Gini Coefficients for Differences in Working Time by Men and Women in 
11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Hours
Including individuals with 
zero hours
Excluding individuals with 
zero hours
Total Women Men Total Women Men
Total working hours 0.520 0.500 0.539 0.389 0.413 0.356
Hours spent on 
domestic work 0.701 0.571 0.809 0.483 0.444 0.496
Hours spent on market 
work 0.642 0.696 0.586 0.223 0.240 0.206
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 7.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for individuals 10 and older.
DOMESTIC WORK AND EMPLOYMENT IN AFRICA  233
Table 7.4 Employment, Unemployment, and Inactivity of Women in 11 Cities in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, according to Different Definitions
(weekly hours)
City Employed
Unemployed
Inactive All
International Labour 
Organization (ILO) 
deﬁ nition
Broad 
deﬁ nitiona
Abidjan 13.4 16.6 21.7 11.6 13.3
Antananarivo 16.4 21.2 30.5 14.0 15.6
Bamako 18.2 20.8 18.5 15.1 16.7
Cotonou 20.4 18.1 27.7 13.6 17.8
Dakar 13.5 20.5 23.8 15.8 15.9
Douala 20.5 24.6 30.8 19.0 20.6
Kinshasa 14.4 17.5 16.7 13.8 14.3
Lomé 25.1 26.3 27.9 20.3 23.7
Niamey 19.7 18.7 23.2 18.7 19.4
Ouagadougou 16.6 21.8 24.6 16.1 17.5
Yaoundé 18.2 25.5 27.1 16.4 18.3
West African Economic 
and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 16.7 18.9 23.2 14.9 16.4
Average all countries 16.6 20.3 22.1 14.9 16.3
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 7.1 for details).
a. Includes workers defined by the International Labour Organization (ILO) as unemployed and discouraged.
Th is observation comes with two reservations. First, unemployed women 
spend more time than working women on domestic work (3.7 hours more 
a week using the ILO defi nition of unemployment, 5.5 hours more using 
a broader defi nition of unemployment). Th e gap in time devoted to domes-
tic activities between inactive and active women narrows when unemployed 
women (broadly defi ned) are included (17.5 versus 14.9 hours per week). 
Second, the diff erences between employed and economically inactive 
females occur mainly because of large diff erences among girls 10–14: girls 
10–14 who work devote very little time (1.5 hours a week) compared with 
economically inactive girls the same age (8.5 hours a week). In fact, working 
girls perform more domestic work (16.1 hours) a week than girls who are 
not in the labor force (9.4 hours). Th e diff erences are insignifi cant among 
women 15 and older (0.3 hours). All in all, however, working women work 
fi ve hours more on average (market and domestic working time) than their 
male counterparts.
Th e explanatory models of Becker and Gronau focus on economic factors 
(the opportunity cost associated with diff erent human capital endowments). 
Another approach concentrates on the importance of social standards. In this 
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approach, the household is seen as a unit in which members share the same 
preferences or as a group led by a “benevolent dictator” (Ilahi 2000). 
Many authors have pointed to the importance of social standards and roles, 
overlooked by the Becker-Gronau approach. Women, they suggest, specialize 
in domestic activities and men in market activities because of culturally deter-
mined social standards and roles rather than economic factors. Th ese social 
standards depend on religion, ethnicity, position in the household hierarchy, 
and other factors. For example, in their study on Pakistan, Fafchamps and 
Quisumbing (2003) highlight the importance of the position in the household 
hierarchy. Th ey fi nd that the wife accounts for the bulk of domestic work and 
that daughters-in-law take on a heavier load in the domestic activities than the 
daughters of the head of household. If social standards predominate, diff erences 
in human capital may have a minor eff ect on the gender-based division of labor.
A higher level of education is associated with a larger male contribution to 
domestic work (table 7.5). Women’s contribution, however, remains virtually 
the same for both domestic tasks and market work regardless of their level of 
education. Th is fi nding tends to support the hypothesis of the minor role played 
by economic factors in the gender-based division of labor between market and 
domestic work.
One of the distinguishing factors in the cities in the sample is the pre-
dominance of Islam in some and Christianity in others. Religion aff ects the 
demographic composition of households; in some countries, it dictates a more 
 traditional role for women. Islam is associated with greater task specializa-
tion by gender (table 7.6). Th e proportion of hours devoted to market work is 
slightly lower for Muslim women; much larger inequalities are found in the tiny 
contribution made by Muslim men to domestic activities, an area “reserved” for 
Muslim women. 
Table 7.5 Weekly Hours Men and Women in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa Spend 
Performing Domestic and Market Work, by Level of Education
(percent)
Years of education
Domestic work/total 
household working hours
Market work/total household 
working hours
Men Women All Men Women All
None 2.8 27.5 30.3 42.3 27.4 69.7
1–5 5.8 27.5 33.3 37.6 29.1 66.7
6–10 7.4 28.1 35.5 36.9 27.5 64.5
11 or more 8.9 27.4 36.4 37.0 26.7 63.6
All 6.7 27.7 34.4 37.9 27.7 65.6
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 7.1 for details).
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Social standards are also expressed through the roles assigned to individuals 
at diff erent stages in their lives. School-age (10–14) children concentrate mainly 
on their studies, while providing considerable assistance with domestic tasks 
and working in the labor market. Th e gender-based division of labor is forged 
from a very young age: girls spend twice as much time on domestic activities as 
boys. Although the domestic work time curve is relatively fl at for men over their 
life cycle (it dips slightly when they marry, before stabilizing), it takes the form 
of a bell curve for women, reaching its peak in the 26–35 age bracket before 
gradually falling off  as the household grows and children are able to contribute 
(fi gure 7.6).
Th e market work curve is more concave for men than for women. Gender 
diff erences start to widen in adolescence, reaching their peak in adulthood, the 
most productive period (36–45). Women withdraw more gradually from work-
ing life than men. Entry into the labor market is problematic for young people 
(16–25), judging from the small number of hours of market work. Schooling 
beyond secondary education accounts for only a smart part of the low level of 
market work (the average number of years of education for this age bracket is 
just eight for all 11 cities and six for the WAEMU cities). 
Two factors are probably at work here, in diff erent proportions for men and 
women. Men suff er from a lack of wage employment opportunities because 
of the low level of private and public sector recruitment and their low skill 
levels. Women are held back by domestic tasks, related in part to the presence 
of young children, who are cared for exclusively by women in the household. 
Table 7.6 Weekly Hours Men and Women in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa Spend 
Performing Domestic and Market Work, by Religion
(percent)
Religion
Hours domestic work/total 
household working hours
Hours market work/total 
household working hours
Men Women Total Men Women Total
Muslim 3.1 28.0 31.1 43.7 25.2 68.9
Catholic 8.3 28.0 36.3 34.7 29.1 63.7
Protestant 9.0 27.2 36.2 35.5 28.4 63.8
No religion 5.9 20.8 26.7 44.0 29.4 73.3
Other 7.3 28.5 35.7 35.4 28.8 64.3
West African Economic 
and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU) 3.7 26.6 30.3 39.9 29.8 69.7
All 6.7 27.8 34.5 37.7 27.8 65.5
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 7.1 for details).
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When domestic working time is added to market working time, the inequali-
ties narrow for the population over 25. Th ese fi gures indicate that women work 
more than men at all ages.
Th e position in the household plays a minor role in women’s specializa-
tion in domestic activities (fi gure 7.7). Female heads of household, wives, and 
daughters all spend more of their working time on domestic activities than 
their male counterparts. Household position comes into play for women only 
marginally, in the breakdown of domestic and market working time. Other rela-
tives, who are more specialized in domestic work, make signifi cant contribu-
tions to the household’s market and domestic work. Th is category may include 
disguised forms of forced labor, such as foster children acting as servants for 
the households.
Table 7.7 sums up the diff erences found in the female participation rate; 
women’s contribution to total working time; and their contribution to house-
hold income, with and without the inclusion of domestic work. Th e fi rst two 
Figure 7.6 Average Weekly Hours Worked by Men and Women in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, by Age
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 7.1 for details).
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Figure 7.7 Household Position and Division of Time between Domestic and Market Work in 
11 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 7.1 for details).
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indicators were built using data collected in the 1-2-3 surveys; values had 
to be imputed for the contribution of domestic work to household incomes. 
Given the absence of markets for goods and services to substitute for domestic 
work, we imputed the equivalent of each country’s minimum hourly wage for 
domestic work. 
If account were taken of hours worked producing domestic goods and ser-
vices, the female labor force participation rate would increase 70 percent (from 
52 percent to 88 percent) on average, and the wide disparities in female par-
ticipation rates across cities would narrow considerably. Female participation 
would be higher than male participation in all 11 cities (13 percent higher in 
WAEMU cities and 11 percent higher across the full sample). Th is fi nding 
holds when considering women’s contribution to total working time. Inclu-
sion of domestic working time in total household working time reveals the 
predominant contribution of women to working hours in the African cities 
in the sample.
If total income from the main and second job alone is considered, women 
account for 28 percent of total household income. Imputing a wage for domes-
tic work (based on the minimum hourly wage) raises women’s contribution to 
38 percent. Looking at absolute amounts, the potential income from domestic 
activity is greater than the income from market activity in all WAEMU coun-
tries but not in Cameroon and Madagascar. 
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Model and Econometric Estimation of Determinants of 
Allocation of Time
Th is section examines the breakdown of time spent on domestic and market 
work. We postulate that the division of labor within the household (domestic 
work versus market work) is determined more by social standards than economic 
factors. Economic factors related to human capital play a marginal role because 
of the very low level of formal education and lack of formal job opportunities.
We adopt the approach proposed by Hersch and Stratton (1994) in their 
study of working couples in the United States, used by Anxo, Flood, and Koco-
glu (2002) in their comparative study of couples in France and Sweden. One 
important diff erence between our analysis and these studies is that we focus on 
the gender-based division of labor of all household members, not just adults, as 
children in developing countries perform domestic work and sometimes par-
ticipate in the labor market. Th e prevalence of extended families (42 percent of 
households in our sample) and the existence of polygamy (3 percent of house-
holds) also justifi es considering all members 10 and older in the analysis.8
Table 7.7 Women’s Economic Contribution to Economic Activity in 11 Cities in Sub-Saharan 
Africa
(percent)
City
Labor force 
participation rate
Total working time 
of household Household income
Without 
domestic 
work
With 
domestic 
work
Without 
domestic 
work
With 
domestic 
work
Without 
domestic 
work
With 
domestic 
work
Abidjan 62.1 84.4 43.7 53.7 26.7 35.2
Antananarivo 54.5 94.6 44.2 52.3 35.9 41.9
Bamako 49.0 79.7 35.2 51.7 23.0 34.1
Cotonou 61.1 89.4 51.0 59.8 30.9 42.9
Dakar 48.0 82.8 35.5 52.7 26.9 42.6
Douala 57.6 96.2 37.2 49.5 26.7 34.7
Kinshasa 41.0 86.5 43.1 55.9 33.1 45.3
Lomé 69.1 95.3 49.8 59.3 32.1 43.2
Niamey 43.7 83.2 30.1 51.6 22.5 38.1
Ouagadougou 57.2 84.6 37.6 52.8 25.7 42.1
Yaoundé 51.2 95.7 37.2 49.0 30.6 37.1
West African Economic 
and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU) 56.4 84.9 41.5 54.4 26.7 38.2
All 51.5 88.0 41.2 53.5 27.9 38.1
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 7.1 for details).
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Th e dependent variable in the fi rst equation is women’s relative contribu-
tion to domestic (market) work. Th e dependent variable in the next two equa-
tions is total working time for men and working time for women in domestic 
(market) activities. Th e values of the dependent variables (relative male/female 
share and weekly working hours in domestic and market work) are left  censored 
and range from 0 to 100 percent and 0 to 113 hours (leisure time is estimated 
residually). Hence the ordinary least squares (OLS) procedure produces biased 
results.9 
A more suitable approach would therefore appear to be left - and right-cen-
sored Tobit estimates. Th e Tobit model assumes that the same variables deter-
mine both the probability of an observation being censored and the values of 
the noncensored observations. Moreover, the marginal eff ect of a variable is 
constrained to the same sign for both types of observations. Given that indi-
viduals with a zero value present particular characteristics (their nonparticipa-
tion is not random), the estimated coeffi  cients present biases, even when taking 
account of the censored values.
Heckman’s model (“Heckit”) relaxes these assumptions by taking account 
of the possible selection bias (estimating the probability of observing a value 
diff erent from zero) and the determinants of values above zero. In the model 
estimated below, the number of young children in the household is negative 
correlated with participation in market activities (and positively correlated with 
hours of domestic work); it is not necessarily correlated with the number of 
hours of market work. Th e merits of the Heckit model can be appreciated from 
the value of the Mills ratio coeffi  cient. A value statistically diff erent from zero 
indicates the presence of a selection bias that invalidates the Tobit estimation.
Th ree equations are estimated for each work aspect (domestic and market 
based). In the fi rst equation, the dependent variable is the relative contribu-
tion of each woman (man) to domestic work. Th e other two equations seek 
to identify the determinants of domestic (market) working time separately for 
men and women. Th e fi rst equation hence explains the gender-based division 
of labor; the other two equations are required to interpret how this division 
varies depending on the characteristics of individuals and their households. For 
example, an increase in the contribution to domestic work by the most educated 
men could refl ect a decrease in absolute time spent on domestic work by edu-
cated women, without an increase in total domestic working time.
Table 7.8 reports the marginal eff ects estimated using the Tobit model. 
Although the residual normality and heteroskedasticity tests reject the residual 
normality hypothesis, and the Mills ratio coeffi  cients are signifi cant in most 
cases, our comments concern only the results of the Tobit model, because of 
problems encountered with the specifi cation of the selection equation and 
implausible estimated coeffi  cient values. Th ese results should therefore be seen 
as initial estimations only. 
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Table 7.8 Determinants of Time Use (Domestic and Market Work) in 10 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa
Variable
Percentage of 
women’s domestic 
working hours/total 
household domestic 
working hours
(1)
Women’s 
domestic 
working hours
(2)
Men’s domestic 
working hours
(3)
Percentage of 
men’s market 
working hours/
total household 
market working 
hours
(4)
Women’s market 
working hours
(5)
Men’s market 
working hours
(6)
Age (reference = 26–45)
10–15 –3.92*** –3.27*** 1.17*** –21.48*** –19.44*** –28.71***
16–25 6.24*** 0.78*** 0.94*** –9.16*** –7.71*** –9.01***
46–55 –10.06*** –2.41*** –0.28*** –0.79** –0.35 –2.56***
56+ –19.33*** –7.12*** –0.11 –12.44*** –9.63*** –18.88***
Relation to head of household (reference = head of household)
Spouse 6.43*** 3.37*** 1.86*** –11.41*** –1.99*** –3.39*
Son or daughter –17.08*** –2.19*** 0.16 –15.74*** –5.37*** –11.07***
Father or mother –15.22*** –5.66*** –1.53** –16.64*** –8.63*** –17.26***
Other relative –10.93*** –0.64** 0.45*** –11.97*** –3.07*** –6.96***
Unrelated person –1.52 1.86*** 1.00*** –9.51*** –0.43 –4.16***
Level of education (reference ≥11 years)
No education 2.42*** 3.30*** –0.45*** 0.33 3.23*** 8.54***
1–5 years 2.08*** 2.33*** –0.22*** 0.74** 2.64*** 8.73***
6–10 years 1.51*** 1.53*** –0.15** –1.16*** 0.12 3.36***
Labor market
Predicted hourly earnings 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Employed worker (equations 1–3)
Domestic worker (equations 4–6)
–3.05*** –1.61*** –0.31*** –0.71*** –1.01*** –1.93***
Religion (reference = other religion)
Muslim 1.17** –0.01 –0.70*** –1.40*** –0.76** 1.76***
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Catholic –0.18 –0.03 –0.01 –0.32 –0.25 –0.56
Protestant –0.27 0.31 0.03 –0.46 –0.44 –0.67
No religion –1.72 –0.85 –0.02 0.09 0.67 1.55**
Dominant ethnic group –0.22 –0.19 –0.23*** 0.12 0.25 0.39*
Household’s demographic structure
Number of children 0–5 1.03*** 0.41*** 0.00 –0.29*** –0.39*** 0.64***
Number of children 6–9 0.30** 0.15** –0.02 0.18 0.03 0.07
Number of male children 10–17 –2.09*** 0.05 0.03 –0.19* 0.12 –0.30***
Number of female children 10–17 –5.49*** –0.40*** –0.14*** –0.26*** 0.31*** –0.03
Number of men 18–25 –0.68*** –0.07 –0.15*** –0.97*** 0.06 0.68***
Number of women 18–25 –5.24*** –0.89*** –0.21*** –0.10 0.88*** –0.21*
Number of men 26–55 0.09 0.18** 0.04 –1.90*** –0.30*** –0.32***
Number of women 26–55 –3.70*** –0.62*** –0.22*** –1.31*** –0.03 –0.65***
Number of men 56+ 1.01*** 0.28* 0.10 1.57*** 0.26 1.68***
Number of women 56+ –0.58* –0.13 –0.10 0.72*** 0.20 –1.45***
Household type (reference = couple with children)
Couple without children 18.19*** –0.63* –0.04 0.18 –1.32*** 0.90*
Nuclear single parent 1.75*** 0.27 –0.09 5.91*** 0.97** 0.64
Extended single parent –6.28*** 0.18 –0.11 –0.49 0.37 1.08**
Extended couple –6.63*** –0.15 0.16** 0.55** 1.31*** 0.38
Number of spouses in the 
household
–2.69*** –0.51*** –0.47*** –0.95*** –1.04*** –0.06
With servants –0.22 –2.25*** –0.65*** 1.44*** 1.10*** –0.77
Access to public services (reference = has access)
Electricity 0.08 –0.31** –0.24*** –1.05*** –1.25*** –0.81***
Water –0.01 –0.53*** –0.23*** –0.33 –1.13*** –1.53***
(continued next page)
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Electric, gas, or oil stove 0.07 0.09 0.11 –0.34 –0.62*** –0.48*
Number of rooms in dwelling –0.06 0.01 0.04*** –0.06 –0.16*** –0.13**
Household with car –0.41 –1.51*** –0.52*** –1.58*** –1.13*** 0.65**
Household with bicycle or 
motorbike
–0.13 0.21 0.09 –0.28 0.92*** 1.43***
Household with refrigerator –0.61* –0.48*** –0.08 0.41* 0.20 –0.75***
City (reference = Antananarivo)
Abidjan 5.92*** –3.33*** –4.72*** 0.95* 0.20 –3.67***
Bamako 5.61*** –2.73*** –4.80*** –1.25** –4.30*** –6.08***
Cotonou 5.67*** 0.46 –2.01*** 2.88*** 1.99*** –2.92***
Dakar 2.66*** –0.96*** –4.09*** –3.74*** –6.23*** –2.97***
Douala 1.95*** 2.37*** –0.27* –0.60 –1.05** 0.76
Kinshasa 2.43*** –2.06*** –2.73*** –0.26 –2.25*** –10.66***
Lomé 4.90*** 3.98*** –0.79*** 2.85*** 2.51*** –1.13**
Niamey 3.86*** –0.58* –3.80*** –5.00*** –8.26*** –5.60***
Ouagadougou 4.22*** –1.60*** –4.54*** –1.79*** –4.72*** –5.62***
Yaoundé 1.89** 1.84*** –0.10 –1.67 –2.51*** –0.44
Number of observations 42,522 45,311 42,980 42,189 45,311 42,980
Number of uncensored observations 28,359 34,247 14,346 15,984 18,323 22,746
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 7.1 for details).
Note: Figures show results of right- and left-censored Tobit models (marginal effects evaluated with respect to the average value for the explanatory variables). 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 7.8 (continued)
Variable
Percentage of 
women’s domestic 
working hours/total 
household domestic 
working hours
(1)
Women’s 
domestic 
working hours
(2)
Men’s domestic 
working hours
(3)
Percentage of 
men’s market 
working hours/
total household 
market working 
hours
(4)
Women’s market 
working hours
(5)
Men’s market 
working hours
(6)
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Eff ect on Domestic Labor
Age has a strong impact on the division of domestic labor by gender. Women 
16–25 work 0.8 hours a week more than women 26-45, a period during which 
they have left  school, married, and have young children. Women 46–54 
reduce the time spent on domestic work slightly (2.4 hours less than women 
24–45); women 56 and older spend 7.1 hours less a week than women 26–45. 
Aft er 55, women are oft en heads of their household or members of extended 
households. 
Th e relative contribution of women to domestic work is similar to the 
absolute number of domestic working hours. Men perform very few hours of 
domestic work throughout their life cycle. Th ey perform the most domestic 
work when they are children (10–15). Th e reverse is true of women, who put in 
fewer hours of domestic work at each end of their life cycle. 
Position in the household also plays a very important role in the division 
of labor by gender. Women who are married to the household head devote 
the most time to domestic work; daughters and mothers contribute less time. 
Th is pattern would seem to suggest a hierarchy in which domestic working 
time decreases from the outer rim of the household circle (nonrelatives) inward 
toward the center (children). Consequently, the daughters and mother of the 
head of household spend fewer hours on domestic work (2.2 fewer for daugh-
ters and 5.7 fewer for mothers) than other female relatives (0.64 hour less) and 
nonrelatives (1.9 more hours). Sons contribute virtually as much time (0.16 
hours) as household heads; other male relatives spend half an hour more on 
domestic work than the household head (males nonrelatives dedicate one 
hour more than the household head to domestic work). Qualitative studies are 
needed to determine whether this work is being performed by foster children 
or refl ects payment for accommodations (see chapter 12). 
Th e type of household also plays an important role in the division of labor 
within the household. Women make smaller contributions in extended house-
holds than in other types of households, probably because domestic work is 
distributed among a larger number of people and individuals on the outer rim 
of the household circle make a larger contribution to domestic tasks. Women in 
polygamous households also make smaller relative and absolute contributions 
to domestic working time. Th e presence of servants in the household signifi -
cantly decreases the number of domestic working hours performed by women 
(–2.3 hours) and moderately reduces the number worked by men (–0.65 hour). 
Th e decrease in women’s contribution to domestic work compared with the 
share of men (–0.22 percentage points) is small and not signifi cant.
Having a larger number of women in the household reduces the contribu-
tion of each woman, especially for women 10–25. Having a larger number of 
children under 10 increases women’s contribution to domestic work; it has no 
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eff ect on the domestic workload of men. Th e division of domestic labor by gen-
der changes very marginally with the arrival of adult men in the household.
Relative to non-Muslim women, Muslim women account for a larger share 
of the household’s total time spent on domestic activities, because Muslim men 
spend less time on domestic activities. Islam therefore appears to be one of the 
channels, albeit a secondary one, through which social standards and practices 
concerning men’s role are crystalized.
Belonging to the dominant ethnic group has no eff ect on either the division 
of domestic labor by gender or the time women spend on domestic work. How-
ever, it contributes to a modest reduction (0.21 hour) in the time men spend on 
domestic work. Th e ethnic group variable could be said to be a proxy for social 
standards, already partly taken into account by religion. Men in the dominant 
ethnic group may therefore be thought to have more power in the household, 
enabling them to reduce the time spent on domestic work.
Contrary to expectations, access to public services has no signifi cant eff ect 
on the domestic division of labor by gender. Th is result can be explained by the 
fact that access to water and electricity reduces the domestic tasks performed by 
men and women in similar proportions. Access therefore reduces total domestic 
working time for the household as a whole rather than redistributing labor by 
gender. 
Household appliances do not change the household’s division of labor by 
gender or aff ect the absolute working time of men or women. Household 
wealth, measured by vehicle ownership and the number of rooms in the dwell-
ing, also has no impact on the division of labor. Dwelling size has a positive 
eff ect on the time men spend working, as they generally are responsible for 
house repairs, but no impact on women’s working time. However, ownership 
of a car reduces women’s domestic working time by 1.5 hours and men’s by 
0.5 hour. Th e eff ect gives rise to a slightly more female-friendly division of 
domestic labor (0.4 percentage point reduction in women’s share of domestic 
labor), but the impact is not statistically signifi cant.
Women’s education increases equality in the division of domestic work, tip-
ping the balance more than proportionally in women’s favor at each level of 
education. However, as with religion, the reduction in inequalities in the distri-
bution of domestic work comes from adjustment in the hours of domestic work 
by women only. Women with higher education spend 2.4 hours less on domes-
tic work than women who did not attend school; this reduction narrows to 
2.1 hours for women with 1–5 years of education and 1.5 hours for women 
with 6–10 years of education. Th e opposite trend is observed for men: the more 
educated they are, the more they participate in domestic tasks. However, the 
marginal eff ects are fairly small: men with no education perform less than half 
an hour less domestic work a week than men with more than 10 years of educa-
tion (0.22 hour less for men with primary education and 0.15 hour less for men 
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with secondary education). Education thus makes only a modest contribution 
to improving equity in the division of labor by gender, and its eff ect works more 
by reducing women’s working time than by increasing men’s working time. 
Labor market participation implies a decrease in the share of domestic work 
performed by women, because of fewer hours of domestic work performed by 
women (–1.61) and men (–0.31). Households in which women participate in 
the labor market post lower total domestic working time. Th e predicted level of 
hourly earnings has no signifi cant impact on the division of domestic labor by 
gender or the domestic working time worked by men and women.
Eff ect on Market Labor
Th e results on the division of market work are similar to the results for labor. 
Larger deviations are found for women 10–15 and 56 and older (that is, at the 
two ends of the life cycle). Spouses of the household head contribute just two 
hours less than the head of household to market work; nonrelatives come in 
third place aft er household heads and spouses, making a valuable contribution 
to the household’s income. 
Th e gradient for the level of education is always negative: the higher the level 
of education, the fewer hours people work in the market. Men with no educa-
tion work 3.2 hours more and women work 8.5 hours more than people with 11 
years or more of education. Th e level of education therefore has a strong eff ect 
for men and a moderate impact for women. Participation in domestic work 
reduces the relative participation of women in total market hours worked as 
well as the absolute number of market hours worked by men and women (–1.0 
hour for men and –1.9 hours for women).
Muslim women contribute less than non-Muslim women to the house-
hold’s market work, both because they work fewer hours than non-Muslims 
and because Muslim men work more hours. Belonging to the dominant ethnic 
group has no signifi cant eff ect on the division of labor.
Th e household’s demographic structure aff ects the gender-based division 
of market work. An increase in the number of young dependent household 
members (children under fi ve) reduces women’s relative and absolute contri-
bution to market work. An increase in the number of dependent elderly mem-
bers (people 56 and over) is associated with an increase in working hours for 
elderly men and a decrease for elderly women. Th e number of hours worked 
in the market decreases for both men and women as the number of male 
adults in the household increases. Th e increase in the number of adult women 
and adolescent girls enables women to increase the number of market hours 
worked, probably as a result of the lightening of their domestic workload. At 
the same time, the increase entails a very slight reduction in hours worked in 
the market for adult men (0.2 hour less for men 18–25 and 0.7 hour less for 
men 26–55). 
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Turning to specifi c geographic eff ects, Cotonou and Lomé stand out for the 
much larger contribution of women to market work. Men in these cities work 
more hours than men in the other cities (except in Cameroon and Madagascar).
Conclusion
On average, domestic work—which remains invisible in national accounts and 
labor market indicators—represents nearly one-third of total working time in 
the 11 cities examined. It consumes more time than employment in the formal 
sector. Large diff erences are observed across cities in both total working time 
and the breakdown between domestic and market work. Despite their lower 
labor market participation rate, women account for 56 percent of household 
working time (62 percent in WAEMU cities). 
Unlike in other regions, women in Sub-Saharan Africa do not “specialize” 
in domestic activities. Women account for 43 percent of household hours spent 
working in the labor market (as well as 89 percent of hours spent on domestic 
work). Women spend 60 percent of their working hours in the labor market and 
the remaining 40 percent on domestic work. 
A number of factors are correlated with gender-based inequalities in the 
division of labor. Social standards appear to play a decisive role: relative posi-
tion in the household, age, and Muslim religion all have a signifi cant impact 
on the gender-based division of both domestic and market-based work. Dif-
ferences in education are also signifi cant, but their impact is modest and the 
gradient by level of education is not very steep. Extended households, polyga-
mous households, and households with a large number of adults have a dif-
ferent gender-based division of labor than households made up of couples 
with young children and monogamous households. Contrary to expectations, 
access to public services (electricity, water) has no apparent eff ect on the divi-
sion of domestic labor by gender. Diff erences across cities remain signifi cant 
when account is taken of the observable characteristics of individuals and their 
households.
Th e analysis presented in this chapter takes a fi rst step toward including 
domestic work in GDP estimates and labor market indicators. It sheds light 
on the question of intrahousehold inequalities, a central aspect in the role and 
place of women in African societies. Other aspects of intrahousehold inequali-
ties have not yet been explored. Future research could examine time use and 
other aspects of intrahousehold inequalities, such as gender diff erences in edu-
cation and healthcare. It could also take individual heterogeneity into account. 
Another interesting avenue would be to link the perception of well-being with 
intrahousehold inequalities in the division of working time, in order to shed 
light on why such inequalities persist.
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Notes
 1. Th e level of household welfare is underestimated when the production of goods 
and services produced and consumed by the household is not taken into account. 
As cities and incomes grow, these goods and services are increasingly incorporated 
into the market sphere, causing gross domestic product (GDP) growth to be overes-
timated (Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2010). In addition to this material welfare dimen-
sion, some authors have defi ned a new form of poverty among households that 
spend an excessive number of hours working: time poverty (Blackden and Wodon 
2006). Although work (market and nonmarket) is the main source of household 
income and hence welfare, too much time spent working takes away from leisure, 
rest, family life, and studying and therefore reduces quality of life.
 2. Th e United Nations Statistics Division defi nes “nonwork” as time spent in “per-
sonal care and free time,” which includes “bathing, sleeping, eating, time related to 
personal medical attention, resting, organizational participation, sports and games, 
socializing and media related activities (reading, television…” UN 1991). All other 
activities are classifi ed as work. Th is classifi cation attempts to make visible the eco-
nomic value of unpaid work in society and to capture the relative work burdens of 
men and women” (Whitehead 1999, p. 52). 
 3. Th e references include administrative reports published by statistics institutes, 
sometimes jointly with UNDP. 
 4. Working time is defi ned here as the counterpart to leisure time. It does not take into 
account productivity diff erences, which would have to be considered if the pur-
pose were to study gender-based income disparities. Th e focus is the distribution of 
domestic and market time by diff erent household members and its implications for 
the labor market participation rate.
 5. Although Abidjan and Cotonou are not administrative capitals, we refer to them as 
capitals because they are the most important economic centers in their countries 
(Cotonou is also the seat of government).
 6. Th is correction aff ected less than 1 percent of individuals.
 7. Th is term actually covers production for the market and for own consumption (in 
agricultural produce). It would be more relevant to talk about activities included in 
the System of National Accounts.
 8. Skoufi as (1993) also adopts this approach, in a study of the determinants of the divi-
sion of labor in rural households in India.
 9. Nearly half (52 percent) of individuals declare zero market working hours, 
44 percent declare zero domestic working hours, and 22 percent declare zero 
total working hours.
References
Alderman, H., P. A. Chiappori, L. Haddad, J. Hodinott, and R. Kanbur. 1995. “Unitary 
Versus Collective Models of the Household: Time to Shift  the Burden of Proof?” World 
Bank Research Observer 10 (1): 1–19.
Anxo, D., L. Flood, and Y. Kocoglu. 2002. “Off re de travail et répartition des activités 
domestiques et parentales au sein du couple: une comparaison entre la France et la 
Suède.” Economie et Statistique (352–53): 127–50.
248  URBAN LABOR MARKETS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Becker, G. S. 1965. “A Th eory of Allocation of Time.” Economic Journal 75: 493–517.
———. 1981. Treatise on the Family. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Blackden, C. M., and Q. Wodon. 2006. Gender, Time Use, and Poverty in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Bourguignon, F., and M. C. Chiuri. 2005. “Labor Market Time and Home Production: A 
New Test for Collective Models of Intra-Household Allocation.” CSEF Working Paper 
131, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance, Naples.
Brown, L., and L. Haddad. 1995. “Time Allocation Patterns and Time Burden: A Gen-
dered Analysis of Seven Countries.” International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI), Washington, DC.
Browning, M., F. Bourguignon, P. A. Chiappori, and V. Lechene. 1994. “Income and Out-
comes: A Structural Model of Intrahousehold Allocation.” Journal of Political Economy 
102 (6): 1067–96. 
Browning, M., and P. A. Chiappori. 1998. “Effi  cient Intra-Household Allocations: A Gen-
eral Characterization and Empirical Tests.” Econometrica 66 (6): 1241–78.
Canagarajah, S., and H. Coulombe. 1998. “Child Labor and Schooling in Ghana.” Policy 
Research Working Paper 1844, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Fafchamps, M., and A. Quisumbing. 2003. “Social Roles, Human Capital, and the Intra-
household Division of Labor: Evidence from Pakistan.” Oxford Economic Papers 55 
(1): 36–80. 
Gronau, R. 1977. “Leisure, Home Production and Work: Th e Th eory of Time Allocation 
Revisited.” Journal of Political Economy 85 (6): 1099–123. 
Hersch, J., and L. Stratton. 1994. “Housework, Wages, and the Division of Housework 
Time for Employed Spouses.” American Economic Review 84 (2): 120–25.
Ilahi, N. 2000. “Th e Intra-household Allocation of Time and Tasks: What Have We 
Learnt from the Empirical Literature?” Policy Research Report on Gender, and Devel-
opment, Working Paper 13, World Bank, Washington, DC.
———. 2001. “Gender and the Allocation of Adult Time: Evidence from the Peru 
LSMS Panel Data.” Policy Research Report Working Paper 2744, World Bank, 
 Washington, DC.
Kes, A., and D. Swaminathan. 2006. “Gender and Time Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa.” 
In Gender, Time Use, and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa, ed. C. M. Blackden and 
Q. Wodon, 13–32. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Quisumbing, A., and J. Maluccio. 2000. “Intrahousehold Allocation and Gender Rela-
tions.” FCND Discussion Paper 84, International Food Policy Research Institute, 
Washington, DC.
Ritchie, A., C. Lloyd, and M. Grant. 2004. “Gender Diff erences in Time Use Among Ado-
lescents in Developing Countries: Implications of Rising School Enrollment Rates.” 
Working Paper 193, Population Council, Policy Research Division, New York.
Skoufi as, E. 1993. “Labor Market Opportunities and Interfamily Time Allocation in 
Rural Households in South Asia.” Journal of Development Economics 40 (2): 277–310.
Stiglitz, J. E., A. Sen, and J.-P. Fitoussi. 2010. Mismeasuring Our Lives: Why GDP Doesn’t 
Add Up. New York: New Press.
DOMESTIC WORK AND EMPLOYMENT IN AFRICA  249
UN (United Nations). 1991. Th e World’s Women: Trends and Statistics. New York: Centre 
for Social Development and Humanitarian Aff airs.
Whitehead, A. 1999. “‘Lazy Men,’ Time Use, and Rural Development in Zambia.” Gender 
and Development 7 (3): 49–61.
World Bank. 2006. Gender, Time Use and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, 
DC: World Bank. 

Chapter
251
8
Reducing Inequality of Opportunities 
in West African Urban Labor Markets: 
What Kinds of Policy Matter?
Laure Pasquier-Doumer
African labor markets are compartmentalized into segments with diff erent 
structures and mechanisms in terms of wages, job prospects, and job security 
(Brilleau, Roubaud, and Torelli 2005; Kuépié, Nordman, and Roubaud 2009; see 
chapter 6 of this book). For on understanding of the dynamics of the African 
labor market, it is therefore vital to understand what determines access to the 
diff erent segments.
Th e more labor market positioning depends on social origin, the less the prin-
ciple of equal opportunities defi ned by Rawls (1971) is respected. Th is principle 
reads as follows: “Assuming there is a distribution of natural assets, those who are 
at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, 
should have the same prospect of success regardless of their initial place in the 
social system” (p. 104). In addition to meeting a social justice goal, equality of 
opportunity in the labor market fulfi lls an economic effi  ciency function. Indeed, 
the World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development (World Bank 2005) 
identifi es the reduction of unequal opportunities as a core development policy 
issue. Reducing inequalities of opportunity in the labor market improves the 
allocation of human capital, directing it to where its returns are highest.
Th e economic and sociological literature fi nds a number of mechanisms at 
work behind the intergenerational transmission of labor market position. Par-
ents’ occupational status can directly aff ect their children’s occupational status 
through the transmission of physical capital, human capital, and social capital. 
In a credit-constrained environment, the inheritance of physical capital 
increases access to socioeconomic groups that require an initial investment 
(Banerjee and Newman 1993). Human capital can take various forms. One is 
knowledge of a trade (know-how). Another is information, including knowl-
edge of a professional environment, knowledge of the optimal actions to take 
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within it, and knowledge of one’s ability to work in certain occupations. Trans-
mission of this human capital can lead individuals to choose the same occupa-
tion as their parents (Galor and Tsiddon 1997; Hassler and Mora 2000; Sjögren 
2000). Parents also build social capital in the course of their work, in particular 
a social network and professional values that they can pass on to their children, 
making it easier for them to enter the profession in question (Lin, Vaughn, and 
Ensel 1981).
Parents’ occupational status can also indirectly infl uence their children’s 
position in the labor market by aff ecting the children’s level of education. Many 
studies show that social origin is decisive in the acquisition of education, par-
ticularly as a result of capital market imperfections and the intergenerational 
transmission of abilities (see Haveman and Wolfe [1995] for a review of the 
literature on this subject). Parents’ occupational status can condition both the 
resources they have available to educate their children and their children’s moti-
vation to study and the returns expected from that education.
Th e purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it compares the extent of 
inequality of labor market opportunities in seven West African commercial 
capitals: Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Lomé, Niamey, and Ouagadougou. 
Th e extent of inequality of opportunities is defi ned here as the net association 
between individuals’ labor market positions and their fathers’ positions, irrespec-
tive of structural labor market eff ects. Th is comparison identifi es the character-
istics of the cities with the highest levels of inequality of opportunity, providing 
a basis for assessing theories explaining these diff erences.
Second, for each city, the chapter estimates the extent to which the eff ect of 
fathers’ occupational status is direct or indirect (through education). Th e public 
policy implications are extremely diff erent in the two cases. In the fi rst case, 
opportunity leveling policies need to focus directly on the labor market. In the 
second case, they need to focus upstream, on the education system.
Comparative studies of the inequality of opportunities and social mobility 
take a quantitative sociology approach, seeking to evaluate which factors explain 
cross-country diff erences. Because data are thin on the ground, there are almost 
no comparative studies of developing countries. Most studies look at devel-
oped countries (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). Only a few include develop-
ing countries in their databases (Grusky and Hauser 1984; Ganzeboom, Luijkx, 
and Treiman 1989), and the studies that do include them apply the same social 
stratifi cation used for developed countries. As numerous authors show, this 
stratifi cation does not consider the particularity of labor markets in developing 
countries, where the informal sector predominates (Benavides 2002; Pasquier-
Doumer 2005). Specifi c studies of developing countries are therefore needed to 
take account of the labor market structure in these countries. 
Although Africa has the largest income inequalities in the world aft er Latin 
America (World Bank 2005), to our knowledge, only three comparative studies 
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of the dynamics of these inequalities have been conducted in Africa (Bossuroy 
and Cogneau 2008; Cogneau and others 2007; Cogneau and Mesplé-Somps 
2008). All draw on the same data, from representative surveys of fi ve African 
countries: Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, and Uganda. Th e fi rst 
two studies look at social mobility; the third focuses on inequality of income 
opportunity. All run up against a comparability problem, because diff erent sur-
veys use diff erent occupational classifi cations, forcing the authors to aggregate 
occupations into just two groups, agricultural and nonagricultural activities. 
Lack of comparability is a major problem in most comparative studies of this 
kind, as Björklund and Jäntti (2000) show.
Th e 1-2-3 survey data (described in box O.1 in the overview) off er both 
highly detailed information on fathers’ occupational status and excellent com-
parability. Th ey can therefore be used to conduct a detailed analysis of the 
inequality of opportunities, incorporating a number of labor market aspects, 
including institutional sector and socioeconomic group.
Th is chapter is organized as follows. Th e fi rst section describes the data. Th e 
second section compares the degree of inequality of opportunities in access to 
institutional sectors in seven cities. Th e third section examines the role of edu-
cation in inequality of opportunities. Th e last section draws some conclusions.
The Data
Th is study examines the commercial capitals of the seven French-speaking 
countries in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU): 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Benin, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Senegal, and Togo are coastal countries, with a higher level of wealth 
on the whole than the landlocked countries of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. 
Th e human development index draws an even sharper distinction between the 
two groups of countries (see annex table 8A.1).
Th e data used for each country are drawn from Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys 
conducted in the commercial capitals of the WAEMU countries in 2001 and 
2002. Th e surveys indicate the level of education of each respondent’s mother 
and father, along with the father’s socioeconomic group, business type, and 
business sector when the respondent was 15.1 It is rare to fi nd such detail on the 
father’s occupational status in developing countries. Th e wording of the ques-
tions and the response options are identical in all surveys, making a robust and 
highly detailed comparison possible. Most studies on unequal opportunities 
have to make a trade-off  between detail and comparability. 
Th e data do not paint a representative picture of the labor market struc-
ture for the entire generation of fathers, as they include the occupational status 
only of fathers whose children were working in one of the seven West African 
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commercial capitals at the time of the survey. Nevertheless, they allow for anal-
ysis and cross-country comparison of the professional trends of families cur-
rently living in the main urban centers. In particular, they reveal the strength 
of the association between the labor market situation of these cities’ inhabit-
ants and their fathers—the measure of inequality of opportunities used in this 
study.2
Inequality of Opportunities across Cities
Th is section evaluates the extent to which one’s father’s institutional sector access 
conditions one’s own access to an institutional sector. Th e more conditioned the 
access is, the higher the degree of inequality of opportunities. Th e section then 
compares cities on the basis of this criterion, in order to understand what dif-
ferentiates cities with the least inequality of opportunities from other cities. 
Th e defi nition of institutional sectors used here is designed to refl ect the 
phenomenon of labor market segmentation (see chapter 6 of this book) in the 
WAEMU capitals, distinguishing between the formal and informal sector. Indi-
viduals are considered part of the informal sector if they work in an unreg-
istered business. We do not know whether the business in which the father 
worked was registered or not. We therefore consider fathers to have worked in 
the informal sector if they worked in a very small business, an association or 
other nonprofi t institution, a household, or self-employment. We then separate 
public and semi-public workers from private sector workers to test the assump-
tion that access to the public sector is more conditioned by social origin than 
is access to the formal private sector. Th e three sectors considered are therefore 
the public and semi-public sector, the formal private sector, and the informal 
sector.
Inequality of opportunities is defi ned as the link between the respondent’s 
institutional sector and his or her father’s institutional sector, irrespective of the 
distributions of respondents and fathers. Th is link captures net social mobility, 
also known as social fl uidity. Social fl uidity measures the change in the relative 
chances of individuals from diff erent social origins attaining a given social sta-
tus. An odds ratios analysis compares cities by level of social fl uidity.
Odds ratios refl ect the outcome of competition to enter one rather than 
another sector by individuals whose fathers worked in diff erent institutional 
sectors. More precisely, they represent the relative inequality between two indi-
viduals whose fathers worked in sector i and sector i’ in their chances of attain-
ing group j’ rather than j. Th e odds ratio is defi ned as 
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where nij is the number of observations in the cell (i, j) of the transition matrix, 
where row i represents the fathers’ three institutional sectors and column j the 
respondents’ institutional sectors. Th e odds of attaining sector j’ rather than j are 
OR i i
j j
−
−
’
’
times higher for an individual whose father worked in sector i’ than for an 
individual whose father worked in sector i. An odds ratio of 1 indicates 
that having a father in sector i’ secures no comparative advantage over hav-
ing a father in sector i when it comes to entering j’. Th e further the odds 
ratio is from 1, the lower the social fl uidity between two institutional sec-
tors. Th e particularity of odds ratios is that they provide a measurement 
of the statistical association between two variables regardless of the mar-
ginal distributions. Figure 8.1 presents the odds ratios for the seven cities. 
Comparison of the fi rst three panels of fi gure 8.1, summarized in the last 
panel, reveals that in most cities, the transition between the public sector and 
the informal sector is the least socially fl uid: the social distance between these 
sectors is generally much larger than the social distance between the public sec-
tor and the formal private sector or between the formal private sector and the 
informal sector. In most cities, the social distance between the formal private 
sector and the public sector is roughly the same as the social distance between 
the formal private sector and the informal sector. In Bamako, for example, an 
individual whose father worked in the public sector is about six times more 
likely to enter the public sector than an individual whose father worked in 
the informal sector and twice as likely as an individual whose father worked 
in the formal private sector; an individual whose father worked in the formal 
private sector is about twice as likely to work in the formal private sector as 
one whose father worked in the informal sector. Th e social distances between 
the formal private sector and the informal sector are not signifi cantly diff erent 
across cities, with the exception of Ouagadougou, where the social distance is 
signifi cantly larger than in Abidjan or Dakar. 
In terms of social fl uidity between the public sector and the formal private 
sector, two contrasting groups of cities are found: Niamey and Ouagadougou 
post signifi cantly higher social rigidity than Cotonou, Abidjan, and Dakar. In 
Niamey, having a father who worked in the public sector increases the chance 
that an individual works in the public sector by four times as much as having a 
father in the formal private sector. Th is ratio is a mere 1.1 in Abidjan, indicating 
virtual equality of opportunities of entering the formal private sector among 
individuals of public sector and private sector “origin.” Lomé and Bamako stand 
at the boundary between the two groups. 
Th e same groups are found when looking at fl uidity between the public 
sector and the informal sector, except in Bamako, which joins the group of 
least fl uid cities. In Cotonou, Lomé, and Dakar, the odds ratio averages 2.4; in 
 Niamey, Ouagadougou, and Bamako, it averages 5.3. 
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Uniform diff erence log-multiplicative (unidiff ) modeling, developed by Erik-
son and Goldthorpe (1992) and Xie (1992), is used to summarize these fi ndings 
and propose an ordering of the cities covering all three dimensions. Th is model-
ing provides a composite measure of how the association between two qualita-
tive variables—the respondent’s sector and the father’s sector—diff ers depending 
on a third variable, the city, regardless of the categories of the two qualitative 
variables considered. Th is composite measure is called the b, or intensity, param-
eter.3 Th e change in the intensity parameter therefore represents the intercity 
variation in social inequalities in access to an institutional sector. 
Th e parameter value for Dakar is set at 1. A parameter above (below) 1 repre-
sents a stronger (weaker) intensity of unequal opportunities. All the odds ratios 
between Dakar and the other city considered and for the three institutional 
d. Overall odds ratios
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c. Odds ratios between formal private
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Figure 8.1 Odds Ratios for Three Institutional Sectors in Seven West African Cities
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries in the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU) conducted in 2001/02 by the Observatoire économique et statistique d’Afrique Subsaharienne 
(AFRISTAT); Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation (DIAL); and national statistics institutes.
Note: Figures are for individuals 35 and older. For each city, the median, represented by a diamond, corresponds 
to the odds ratio. The lower and upper limits, represented by the horizontal bars, correspond to the limits of a 
90 percent confidence interval. Ouaga. = Ouagadougou.
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sectors are assumed to increase with the same intensity bj. Th e signifi cance of 
the diff erences between each of the parameters was systematically tested and 
used to defi ne groups of cities. 
Inequality of opportunity in access to institutional sectors diff ers widely 
across the seven cities (fi gure 8.2). Two groups of cities emerge. Th e fi rst is 
made up of the coastal cities of Abidjan, Cotonou, Dakar, and Lomé. Th e sec-
ond comprises Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou.4 Th e level of inequality of 
opportunity in these cities is nearly two-thirds higher than in the cities in the 
fi rst group. Abidjan and Bamako form a grey area between the two groups.5 
Th e cities in the group with the least social fl uidity are the capitals of coun-
tries that share certain characteristics (see annex table 8A.1). Burkina Faso, Mali, 
and Niger are landlocked countries. Th ey have the lowest human development 
index rankings of the seven countries studied, the lowest levels of education and 
literacy, and the highest rates of mortality and malnutrition. Urbanization is 
lower in these countries, and their fertility index rankings are at least one point 
higher than the other four countries. 
Th ese fi ndings are consistent with the liberal theory of social mobility, which 
states that the more industrialized a society, the more meritocratic the labor 
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 8.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for individuals 35 and older. The circles aggregate cities’ intensity parameters that are not 
 significantly different from one another. 
Figure 8.2 Parameters of Intensity of Link between Institutional Sector of Individuals and 
Their Fathers
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market selection criteria, because the increase in the demand for skilled labor 
and urbanization prompt geographic mobility and reduce the feeling of com-
munity (Parsons 1960; Blau and Duncan 1967; Treiman 1970). 
The Role of Education in Inequality of Opportunities
Th e above analysis provides no information on the causal link between the 
father’s institutional sector and his children’s sector. Is the eff ect direct, or does 
the father’s occupation aff ect other characteristics, such as the children’s level of 
education, which in turn infl uences access to an institutional sector?
Th is section considers a broader defi nition of social origin that includes 
place of birth and ethnic group and takes into account the individual’s level 
of education. It seeks to clarify the channel through which social origin aff ects 
access to an institutional sector.
We start by estimating a logit model for each city to explain the probability 
of entering one institutional sector rather than the two others based on four 
aspects of social origin (father’s institutional sector, whether the father went to 
school, individual’s place of birth, and individual’s ethnic group) while control-
ling for gender. Model 1 describes access to the public sector, model 3 access 
to the formal private sector, and model 5 access to the informal sector. Ethnic 
group is measured as membership in the city’s majority ethnic group, except in 
Abidjan, where we look at membership in the Akan, Krou, and Southern Man-
ding ethnic groups, in order to test the hypothesis of a social division of labor 
based on “ivoirité” (see chapter 9).6 We then estimate the same models including 
the respondents’ levels of education (models 2, 4, and 6). If social origin still 
has a signifi cant eff ect in these models, we conclude that it has a direct eff ect 
on access to the institutional sectors. If the eff ect is no longer signifi cant, we 
conclude that the eff ect of social origin is indirect. Table 8.1 presents the odds 
ratios obtained from estimation of the 42 (6 × 7) models.
Access to the Public Sector
In the least fl uid cities (Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou), the father’s insti-
tutional sector has an eff ect on entry into the public sector, irrespective of its 
impact on the level of education (model 2). In these cities, other things equal, 
having a father who worked in the public sector rather than the informal sector 
increases the chances of working in the public sector by a factor of 2.2 in Bamako, 
1.6 in Ouagadougou, and 1.5 in Niamey. In the capitals of the three landlocked 
countries, the father’s occupational status thus has a direct eff ect on access to the 
public sector through a mechanism other than education (knowledge of the pro-
fessional environment, know-how, penchant for the public sector, and so forth).
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Table 8.1 Logit Estimation of Effects of Social Origin on Access to Public, Formal Private, 
and Informal Sectors in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
Variable/city
Public sector Formal private sector Informal private sector
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Father in public or semi-public sector (reference = informal sector)
Abidjan 2.5* 1.6 1.0 0.8 0.6* 1.0
Bamako 4.0* 2.2* 1.0 0.8 0.3* 0.6*
Cotonou 1.2 0.8 2.9* 2.5* 0.4* 0.6*
Dakar 2.1* 1.1 1.8* 1.6* 0.4* 0.6*
Lomé 2.3* 1.4 1.8* 1.4 0.4* 0.6*
Niamey 3.0* 1.5* 2.2* 1.5 0.3* 0.5*
Ouagadougou 3.5* 1.6* 1.8* 1.3 0.3* 0.6*
Father in formal private sector (reference = informal sector)
Abidjan 2.0* 1.8* 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.0
Bamako 2.3* 1.9* 1.0 0.9 0.6* 0.7
Cotonou 0.9 0.6 1.8* 1.4 0.8 1.3
Dakar 1.4* 1.1 1.5* 1.2 0.6* 0.8
Lomé 1.1 0.8 1.7 1.5 0.7 0.9
Niamey 0.8 0.4* 2.8* 2.5* 0.6 1.0
Ouagadougou 1.5 0.6 2.0* 1.5 0.5* 1.2
City of birth
Abidjan 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.2 0.9 0.9
Bamako 1.0 0.8 1.7* 1.6* 0.8* 0.8
Cotonou 0.5* 0.5* 1.0 1.2 1.6* 1.4*
Dakar 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.2
Lomé 0.6* 0.7* 0.9 0.8 1.5* 1.5*
Niamey 0.9 0.7 1.4 1.3 1.0 1.1
Ouagadougou 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1
Member of majority ethnic group
Abidjan (membership in the 
Akan, Krou, or Southern 
Manding ethnic group) 4.4* 2.2* 2.0* 1.4* 0.3* 0.5*
Bamako 1.0 1.2 0.7* 0.7 1.3* 1.1
Cotonou 1.4* 1.3* 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9
Dakar 0.9 0.9 0.7* 0.7* 1.4* 1.4*
Lomé 0.7* 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1
Niamey 1.2 1.4* 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8*
Ouagadougou 0.5* 1.0 0.5* 0.6* 2.5* 1.5
(continued next page)
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Gender (reference = female)
Abidjan 2.3* 1.2 4.6* 3.6* 0.2* 0.3*
Bamako 1.6* 1.1 6.8* 6.2* 0.3* 0.3*
Cotonou 3.1* 1.6* 4.8* 3.0* 0.2* 0.3*
Dakar 2.0* 1.6* 4.1* 4.2* 0.2* 0.2*
Lomé 3.4* 1.8* 5.8* 4.0* 0.2* 0.3*
Niamey 1.8* 1.3 4.6* 3.8* 0.3* 0.4*
Ouagadougou 2.1* 1.6* 2.9* 2.6* 0.3* 0.4*
Father attended school
Abidjan 1.2 0.7 2.0* 1.7 0.5* 0.7
Bamako 1.5* 0.9 1.3 1.2 0.6* 0.9
Cotonou 2.1* 1.2 1.2 0.7 0.5* 1.1
Dakar 1.6* 1.4* 1.8* 1.5 0.5* 0.6*
Lomé 1.1 0.6* 1.6* 1.3 0.7* 1.2
Niamey 1.7* 0.9 1.3 1.0 0.5* 1.1
Ouagadougou 1.1 0.7 1.6 1.3 0.7* 1.3
Completed primary school or incomplete lower-secondary school 
(reference = less than completed primary school)
Abidjan — 5.5* — 2.6 — 0.3*
Bamako — 3.4* — 1.4 — 0.5*
Cotonou — 5.1* — 2.2 — 0.3*
Dakar — 5.2* — 2.0 — 0.3*
Lomé — 3.4* — 2.5 — 0.3*
Niamey — 4.8* — 2.8 — 0.2*
Ouagadougou — 6.3* — 2.7 — 0.2*
Completed lower-secondary school or above 
(reference = less than completed primary school)
Abidjan — 25.0* — 2.8 — 0.9*
Bamako — 19.9* — 2.3 — 0.1*
Cotonou — 17.2* — 7.4 — 0.0*
Dakar — 13.2* — 2.9 — 0.1*
Lomé — 13.5* — 3.4 — 0.1*
Niamey — 18.1* — 3.3 — 0.0*
Ouagadougou — 24.5* — 3.5 — 0.0*
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see figure 8.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for individuals 35 and older. The interpretation of a cell is the following: In model 1, for Dakar, 
having a father in the public sector increases the odds of working in the public sector by 2.1 compared with 
having a father in the informal sector. This means that other things equal, the probability of working in the pub-
lic sector divided by the probability of not working in the public sector increases by 110 percent when the father 
worked in the public rather than the informal sector. — = not available.
* significant at the 10 percent level. 
Table 8.1 (continued)
Public sector Formal private sector Informal private sector
Variable/city Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
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In the more fl uid cities (Abidjan, Cotonou, Dakar, and Lomé), having a father 
who worked in the public sector has no direct eff ect on access to the public sec-
tor: once its eff ect on the level of education has been taken into account, the 
father’s institutional sector is no longer a determinant of entry into the public 
sector.7 We can therefore conclude that in Abidjan, Cotonou, Dakar, and Lomé, 
the father’s institutional sector plays an indirect role in providing access to the 
public sector by determining the level of education. However, other aspects of 
social origin also come into play.
In Bamako and Niamey, having a father in the formal private sector also 
has a signifi cant eff ect on accessing the public sector compared with having a 
father in the informal sector, but the eff ect is positive in Bamako and negative 
in Niamey. Th ese fi ndings refl ect the short social distance between the formal 
private and informal sectors in Niamey and between the public sector and the 
formal private sector in Bamako (see panel d in fi gure 8.1). Th is distance is also 
apparent when considering other aspects of social origin, level of education, 
and gender. 
In Niamey, inequality of opportunity is exacerbated by the signifi cant role 
played by ethnicity in access to the public sector. Everything else equal, belong-
ing to the Djerma ethnic group increases the probability of entering the public 
sector and signifi cantly decreases the probability of entering the informal sector 
(model 6). Although the Djerma are a minority in Niger, they live in the western 
part of the country and are consequently the majority ethnic group in Niamey. 
Th e Djerma are also the fi rst to have taken up senior positions in the colonial 
administration and army. Moreover, the leaders of Niger from independence 
through 1993 came from this ethnic group.
Ethnic group also has a signifi cant eff ect on access to the public sector in 
Abidjan: members of the Akan, Krou, and Southern Manding ethnic groups 
are 2.2 times as likely to work in the public sector as members of the Northern 
Manding or Voltaic ethnic groups. Th ey are also more likely to work in the for-
mal private sector and less likely to work in the informal sector (models 4 and 6, 
respectively). Th ese fi ndings are consistent with the theory of a social division of 
labor based on ivoirité, which separates the “native” ethnic groups of the south 
from the “nonnative” ethnic groups of the north of CÔte d’Ivoire.8 
Th e public sector in Cotonou and Lomé is more open to migrants (defi ned 
here as people born outside the city) than to nonmigrants, other things equal. 
Th is fi nding runs counter to the expectation that being born in the city gener-
ates social capital that fosters entry into the public sector. It could be interpreted 
as favoritism toward people from certain regions. People from Kozah, the home 
prefecture of presidents Gnassingbé Eyadéma and Faure Gnassingbé (presidents 
of Togo since 1967), are overrepresented in Togo’s public sector, and people 
from Natitingou, the department where Mathieu Kérékou (president of Benin, 
1972–91 and 1996–2006) was born, are overrepresented in the public sector in 
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Benin. In Cotonou, the inequality of opportunities by region of birth is com-
pounded by a signifi cant ethnic group eff ect on access to the public sector: other 
things equal, members of the Fon, the majority ethnic group in Cotonou, are 1.3 
times as likely as members of other ethnic groups to work in the public sector.
In four of the seven cities—Cotonou, Dakar, Lomé, and Ouagadougou—
women are less likely to work in the public sector than men, other things equal. 
Access to the Formal Private Sector
Among the least fl uid cities (Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou), only Nia-
mey reveals the direct eff ect of the father’s labor market position on access to 
the formal private sector: having a father who worked in the formal private sec-
tor increases the chances of working in it oneself by a factor of 2.5 (model 4). 
In Bamako and Ouagadougou, other aspects of social origin condition access 
to the formal private sector. In Bamako, being born in the city signifi cantly 
increases access to the formal private sector. One interpretation of this fi nding 
is that being born in Bamako—and implicitly having spent most of one’s life 
there—promotes the development of the social network required to enter the 
formal private sector. In Ouagadougou, everything else equal, the Mossi have 
less chance of entering the formal private sector than other ethnic groups, and 
they are overrepresented in the informal sector (model 6).
Among the most fl uid cities (Abidjan, Cotonou, Dakar, and Lomé), the 
father’s institutional sector has no direct eff ect on access to the formal private 
sector in Abidjan and Lomé. Th is result does not hold in Cotonou and Dakar: 
everything else equal, people whose fathers worked in the public sector are 
2.5 times more likely to work in the formal private sector in Cotonou and 1.6 
times more likely to do so in Dakar. Th is fi nding suggests the presence of an 
intergenerational bridge from the public to the private sector. No signifi cant 
eff ect is found for the other aspects of social origin, except in Dakar, where, as in 
Ouagadougou, belonging to the majority ethnic group reduces the probability 
of entering the formal private sector and increases the chances of working in 
the informal sector.
Women in all seven cities are at a disadvantage relative to men when it comes 
to entering the formal private sector.
Access to the Informal Sector
Irrespective of the level of education, having a father who worked in the informal 
sector increases the probability of doing so oneself, except in Abidjan, where it 
has no signifi cant direct eff ect. Th e eff ect of ethnicity diff ers across countries: it 
has no eff ect in Bamako, Cotonou, and Lomé; is signifi cantly positive in Dakar 
and Ouagadougou; and is signifi cantly negative in Abidjan and Niamey. Being 
born in the city increases the probability of working in the informal sector in 
Cotonou and Lomé. Th is eff ect is the counterpart of the negative eff ect of birth 
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in the city on access to the public sector. In all cities, everything else equal, 
women have a higher probability of working in the informal sector than men. 
Conclusion
Th is study uses perfectly comparable data to show that social origin in the seven 
West African capitals considered plays a decisive role in determining the sec-
tor of the labor market in which individuals work. Not all cities present the 
same level of inequality of opportunities: cities in the three landlocked countries 
with the lowest levels of human development and wealth (Bamako, Niamey, and 
Ouagadougou) have higher levels of inequality of opportunity than the coastal 
cities (Abidjan, Cotonou, Dakar, and Lomé). On average, the level of inequality 
of opportunity in access to an institutional sector is nearly two-thirds higher 
in Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou than in Cotonou, Dakar, Lomé, and 
Abidjan. Th is ordering of cities into two groups is robust to the choice of the 
outcome variable considered (institutional sector, socioeconomic group, and 
level of education).9
For the four coastal cities, the intergenerational channels for the transmission 
of inequality are mainly indirect. Entering the public or the formal private sec-
tor depends crucially on the level of education, which is aff ected by the fathers’ 
occupational status. In Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou, fathers’ occupa-
tional status also has a direct eff ect on the probability of working in the public 
sector (in Niamey it also aff ects entry into the formal private sector). Th is direct 
intergenerational transmission could refl ect the existence of inheritable social 
or information capital that parents have built up as a result of their position in 
the labor market. In all cities, the likelihood of working in the informal sector is 
much greater, other things equal, if one’s father worked in the informal sector.
A policy to reduce inequality of educational opportunities in Cotonou, 
Dakar, Lomé, and Abidjan would greatly reduce the inequality of opportunities 
in access to diff erent institutional sectors. In Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadou-
gou, however, such a policy would fall short of the mark if the observed direct 
eff ect of the father’s position refl ects inheritable social or information capital 
that parents build up as a result of their position in the labor market. In the 
long run, leveling the educational playing fi eld through extensive changes to 
society’s standards and values could reduce the direct eff ect of fathers’ status on 
labor market position.
Occupational status is not the only aspect of social origin that aff ects labor 
market position. In Abidjan, Dakar, Niamey, and Ouagadougou, ethnicity 
aff ects labor market position, even aft er controlling for migrant status. Belong-
ing to the Djerma group in Niamey and the Akan, Krou, and Southern Manding 
groups in Abidjan signifi cantly raises the chances of entering the public sector 
264  URBAN LABOR MARKETS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
or being a wage earner and reduces the probability of working in the informal 
sector. In Dakar and Ouagadougou, belonging to the largest ethnic group in 
the city reduces the chances of entering the formal private sector or being a 
wage earner and increases the likelihood of working in the informal sector. 
In Bamako, Cotonou, and Lomé, migrant status aff ects labor market position. 
Relative to nonmigrants, migrants are more likely to work in the public sector 
and wage jobs in Cotonou and Lomé; in Bamako, they are less likely to work in 
the formal private sector. 
Policies in three areas could increase equality of opportunity in the choice 
of sector: improving the supply of education, increasing demand for education, 
and developing the labor market. Specifi c policies are identifi ed below.
Improving the Supply of Education 
1. Prioritize the poor in public education spending. Public education spending 
in Africa does not prioritize the disadvantaged (Boudon 2006). To remedy 
this situation, some countries, such as Burkina Faso, have defi ned school 
catchment areas to identify areas and populations not served by school ser-
vices and then made more equitable investment choices in terms of new 
establishments and teacher allocations. Th is practice is far from widespread, 
however. Other countries—including many English-speaking countries as 
well as Benin, Madagascar, and Rwanda—have adopted new methods of 
allocating educational resources, such as providing subsidies per pupil to 
cover nonwage expenses. In South Africa, a higher per pupil subsidy is allo-
cated to schools educating poor children or located in poor areas, and the 
teacher-to-pupil ratio is higher in disadvantaged schools. Th ese measures 
have helped reduce the huge inequalities that existed under apartheid
2. Make school more aff ordable by phasing out fees in primary school. One of 
the fi rst African countries to eliminate primary school fees was Malawi, in 
1991. Th e eff ects were immediate: school enrollment rose from 1.9 million in 
1993/94 to 2.9 million in 1999/2000 (Al-Samarrai and Zaman 2007). Uganda 
followed suit in 1997, posting a comparable increase in enrollment. Many 
countries have followed their lead since, including Cameroon in 1999, 
Tanzania in 2001, Zambia in 2002, Madagascar in 2003, and Burundi in 
2005. Th is reform has increased school enrollment rates in all these coun-
tries, particularly among the poorest children and children in rural areas. It 
has not had a positive impact on pupil retention among the poor, however, 
mainly because of a sharp downturn in the quality of education (Oketch and 
Rolleston 2007), highlighting the importance of implementation. 
3. Make the education supply more fl exible and tailor it to the needs of poor pupils 
by relaxing regulations that impede enrollment (requirement to present a birth 
certifi cate on fi rst registration or to be registered by the parents, exclusion of 
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pregnant girls and girls who have given birth); changing the school calendar 
to bring it into line with the agricultural calendar; and developing specifi c 
programs for certain disadvantaged groups, including AIDS orphans, child 
soldiers, disabled children, and others.
4. Ensure access to good education for the most gift ed poor children. Some 
countries encourage the highest-achieving children to enroll in good schools 
that will prepare them to enter higher education. Many African countries 
have prestigious establishments for this purpose—boarding schools and 
selective middle/secondary schools that groom the best pupils for higher 
education. Th e fairness of these programs depends on the selection process 
and whether disadvantaged children and rural children are equitably repre-
sented in these establishments. Attempts to introduce quotas (in Tanzania, 
for example) have rarely been eff ectively or fairly implemented in the long 
run. Some countries have introduced measures targeting underrepresented 
groups. India has set up special boarding schools for underrepresented castes. 
It also runs free boarding schools for girls in rural areas, to encourage them 
to graduate to secondary education. Cost considerations keep this type of 
measure thin on the ground in Africa, but eff orts could be made to develop it.
Increasing Demand for Education 
1. Reduce the indirect costs of education. A number of programs reduce the 
indirect costs of education for the poor, in order to stimulate demand for 
education. Among the most popular are conditional cash transfers and 
school meal programs. Conditional cash transfers are highly developed in 
Latin America. Th ey pay a monthly allowance to poor families on the con-
dition that they send their children to school. Impact assessments of these 
programs generally conclude that they signifi cantly raise school enrollment 
and retention in the school system among the poor (IEG 2011). Projects of 
this kind are being pilot tested in some African countries, including Ghana, 
Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Yemen, 
 Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
   Numerous African countries operate school meal programs. Many studies 
have highlighted the positive impact of this type of action on pupil partici-
pation and attendance (Kremer 2003). School meals improve the neediest 
pupils’ learning capacities and provide an incentive for families to send and 
keep their children in school. Th ese programs are especially eff ective because 
they are applied early in the course of education and target schools teaching 
the largest numbers of very poor and vulnerable children.
2. Improve children’s educability. Th e early childhood years are key to the 
development of the human brain. Poor hygiene, malnutrition, and abuse in 
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infancy and early childhood can permanently impair physical, mental, cog-
nitive, and emotional development. Programs combining health care, vac-
cination, nutrition, and stimulation actions for infants and children under 
three can help reduce inequalities in cognitive development. Th e earlier 
these programs begin, the better. 
Developing the Labor Market 
1. Improve access to information on employment opportunities. Little use is 
made of formal job-seeking channels in Africa: in the WAEMU capitals, only 
10 percent of workers fi nd their jobs through formal job-seeking channels. 
Th e rate of job-seeker registration with employment agencies is very low, 
mainly because of the low profi le of such agencies: 65 percent of job- seekers 
not registered with these agencies are simply unaware of their existence. 
Making employment agencies more effi  cient and raising their profi le would 
improve equity of access to the labor market.
2. Help the poor access the credit market. If the direct intergenerational trans-
mission of labor market position works through the transmission of physical 
capital, improving access to the credit market should make for more equal 
opportunities on the labor market.
3. Help the poor create social networks that will serve job-seeking. More than 
60 percent of workers in the WAEMU capitals used their social network to 
fi nd their job. A policy to develop the poor’s social network would prob-
ably reduce the inequality of opportunities in the labor market. One  possible 
course of action would be to develop partnerships between private and pub-
lic enterprise and the training bodies that cater to the disadvantaged.
Annex: Economic and Social Statistics on Seven Countries in West Africa
Table 8A.1 Economic and Social Statistics on Seven Countries in West Africa
Statistic Benin Burkina Faso Côte d’Ivoire Mali Niger Senegal Togo
Per capita GDP (constant dollars) 313 230 623 208 153 424 248
Gini coefﬁ cent 0.53 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.54 0.57
Rural population (percentage of total 
population) 58 83 56 70 79 53 67
Human development indicator (rank) 0.420 (158) 0.325 (169) 0.428 (156) 0.386 (164) 0.277 (172) 0.431 (154) 0.493 (141)
Malnutrition weight for age (percentage of 
children under 5) 23 34 21 33 40 23 25
Fertility index (births per woman) 6 7 5 7 8 5 6
Mortality rate (per 1,000 inhabitants) 13 18 17 18 22 12 12
Literacy rate (percentage of children 15 and 
older) 35 22 49 19 29 39 53
Primary completion rate (percent) 53 27 48 27 27 51 78
Gross intake rate (percent) 99 50 78 61 64 85 100
Sources: Data on GDP, rural population, malnutrition, fertility, and mortality are from World Bank 2000. Data on the Gini coefficient are from Amegashie and others 2005. Data on 
human development indicator are from UNDP 2002. Data on literacy are from World Bank 2004. Data on primary completion and gross intake are from UNESCO/BREDA 2005. 
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.
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Notes
 1. Age 15 was chosen to ensure that all fathers were more or less in the same part 
of their life cycle, particularly their working life cycle, and that their job was the 
one they held just before their children entered the labor market. Comparability 
between individuals’ work and their fathers’ work is guaranteed when individuals are 
examined in the same part of their life cycle as their fathers. We therefore removed 
from the sample all individuals under 35, on the assumption that they had not 
yet reached the level of professional maturity their fathers had achieved when the 
individuals were 15. Retaining only the employed workers whose father worked 
leaves some 1,500 observations per city. Th e nonresponse rates are presented on the 
companion site to this book, http://www.dial.ird.fr/publications.
 2. It would have been useful to compare women’s occupations with their mothers’ 
occupations, as the mother is potentially the main reference for women. However, 
too many observations are lost because of mothers’ low labor force participation. Th e 
methodological choice to use fathers as the benchmark consequently underestimates 
the mobility of women on the whole.
 3. More details on this modeling can be found on the book’s companion site, http://
www.dial.ird.fr/publications. 
 4. Th is coastal/landlocked city division is robust to the change in the defi nition of the 
informal sector: if we defi ne the informal sector for respondents in the same way it 
is defi ned for their fathers (that is, working in a very small business, an association 
or other nonprofi t institution, a household, or self-employment), Bamako, Niamey, 
and Ouagadougou still reveal high levels of unequal opportunities compared with 
Cotonou, Dakar, and Lomé, with Abidjan forming a gray area. 
 5. In the study by Cogneau and others (2007), Côte d’Ivoire, the only country featured 
in both that study and this one, has a much higher level of inequality than the two 
English-speaking countries studied (Ghana and Uganda).
 6. Th e Akan are made up mainly of the Baoulé, Agni, and Ebrié. Th e Krou comprise 
primarily the Bété, Krou, and Bakoué groups. Th e Southern Manding comprises 
the Guro, Dan, and Gagu groups. Other ethnic groups are the Northern Manding 
groups (Dioula, Malinké, Koro, and others) and the Voltaic ethnic groups (Kulango, 
Lobi, Birifor, and others).
 7. In Cotonou, however, having a father who worked in the private sector reduces 
the chances of working in the public sector; in Abidjan, it increases the chances 
compared with individuals whose fathers worked in the informal sector. Th ese fi nd-
ings refl ect more than the intergenerational transmission of labor market position, 
however. Th ey are a sign of the social distance between sectors, especially the short 
distance between the public and formal private sectors in Cotonou and the long 
social distance between the public and informal sectors in Abidjan, where the public 
and formal private sectors are very close (see panel d in fi gure 8.1).
 8. According to Banégas (2007, p. 28), under the fi rst president of Côte d’Ivoire, Felix 
Houphouët-Boigny, “the economic and social integration of foreigners in urban 
areas came about relatively easily in the form of a social division of labor, a legacy of 
the colonial buy-in policy, which could be summed up by the following formula: to 
the people of Ivoirian ‘extraction’ (the term in use today to describe the populations 
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of the South) go the salaried jobs in the administration and the large public and 
semi-public corporations…; to foreigners and Northerners (especially Dioula) go 
small trade, transport and casual jobs in the informal sector.”
 9. Th ese robustness checks are presented on the companion site to this book, http://
www.dial.ird.fr/publications.
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Decomposing Gender and Ethnic 
Earnings Gaps in Seven Cities 
in West Africa 
Christophe J. Nordman, Anne-Sophie Robilliard, 
and François Roubaud
Women and certain ethnic groups oft en face unequal treatment in labor mar-
kets, in both developed and developing countries. Many studies examine ethnic 
and gender wage gaps in developed countries (Altonji and Blank 1999; Blau and 
Kahn 2000). In contrast, only 3 percent of the studies on the gender wage gap 
draw on African data (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer 2005). As a result, 
little is known about inequalities in labor market outcomes in Africa.
Enhancing the literature on the gender and ethnic gap in the poorest coun-
tries is important for several reasons. First, there are manifest shortcomings of 
studies on African countries, particularly because of the thinness of the data 
(Bennell 1996). Second, gender and ethnic inequalities are likely to be greater 
where markets do not function effi  ciently and the state lacks the resources to 
introduce corrective policies. Th ird, understanding the roots of gender and 
ethnic inequalities and narrowing these gaps could help policy makers design 
poverty-reduction policies. 
Under the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) initiative, which con-
cerns more than 60 of the world’s poorest countries, policies designed to counter 
gender discrimination are among the recommended solutions to reduce poverty.1 
Goal 3 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is specifi cally aimed at 
reducing gender inequalities. In order to put this recommendation into practice, 
policy makers need to understand whether diff erences in labor outcomes stem 
from diff erences in individual characteristics or diff erences in the returns to these 
characteristics. Diff erent sets of policies are called for in each case. 
Th e literature on gender gaps confi rms the presence of gender inequali-
ties for both wage-earners and self-employed workers. In Guinea, diff erences 
in individual characteristics account for only 45 percent of the gender gap in 
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earnings from self-employment and 25 percent of the diff erences in earnings 
from public sector employment; in the private sector, women earn more than 
men (Glick and Sahn 1997). Armitage and Sabot (1991) fi nd gender inequal-
ity in the public sector of Tanzania; they fi nd no evidence of gender discrimi-
nation in Kenya’s labor market. Glewwe (1990) fi nds no wage discrimination 
against women in Ghana. On the contrary, women in the public sector seem 
to earn more than men.2 Siphambe and Th okweng-Bakwena (2001) show that 
in the public sector of Botswana, most of the wage gap refl ects diff erences in 
individual characteristics between men and women rather than discrimination. 
In contrast, most of the wage gap in the private sector refl ects discrimination. 
Appleton, Hoddinott, and Krishnan (1999) fi nd evidence that the public sector 
of Côte d’Ivoire and Uganda practices less wage discrimination than the pri-
vate sector. Nordman and Roubaud (2009) fi nd a similar result for Madagascar, 
where a gender gap in the public sector favors women. 
Th e magnitude of gender wage gaps in the public and private sectors var-
ies across countries. However, the main reason for this diversity may be in 
the  heterogeneity of the data sources used by diff erent authors (labor force 
or household surveys undertaken for purposes other than studying the labor 
 market), in the period they consider, and in the methodology they implement. 
Concerning the ethnic wage gap, the literature is even scarcer. Barr and 
Oduro (2000) fi nd that standard observed diff erences in workers’ characteris-
tics explain much of the earnings diff erentials across ethnic groups in Ghana. 
Th e role of ethnolinguistic fractionalization in development has received much 
more attention. Easterly and Levine (1997) conclude that “Africa’s growth trag-
edy” is in part related to its high level of ethnic diversity, resulting in poor insti-
tutional functioning. 
Th is chapter casts light on these issues by using the set of 1-2-3 surveys con-
ducted in the capital cities of the seven French-speaking countries of the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) (for a description of these 
surveys, see box O.1 in the overview). Th is approach is important for two reasons. 
First, the data used were collected using the same sampling method and virtually 
identical questionnaires in each city in the same period of time (2001–02), mak-
ing for totally comparable results. Second, the chapter analyzes both gender and 
ethnic gap issues using the same methodological approach for each city. 
Th e chapter is organized as follows. Th e fi rst section discusses the data, con-
cepts, and econometric methods used. Th e second section analyzes the results. 
Th e last section summarizes the main fi ndings and draws conclusions.
Data, Concepts, and Methodology
Th is section presents the data and concepts used. It then discusses the meth-
odology of earnings decompositions, an essential aspect of the investigation. 
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Data and Concepts
Th e data are taken from Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys conducted in the seven 
French-speaking capitals of the WAEMU countries. Th e sample surveyed in 
Phase 1 included 93,213 individuals (17,841 households). All respondents were 
asked about their ethnic group. Th e nonresponse rate was very low, with just 
665 respondents failing to identify their ethnic group. 
When restricted to working individuals with nonzero earnings, on whom 
our estimations are based, the sample size is reduced to 20,878 observations 
(table 9.1), with a minimum of 2,294 observations in Niamey and a maximum 
of 3,575 observations in Dakar. Th is sample is still large enough to allow disag-
gregation of the data by sector (public sector, formal private sector, and infor-
mal sector) and gender. 
Th e number of ethnic groups listed in the questionnaire ranged from 9 in 
Benin and Niger to 40 in Togo. In order to harmonize the data and the number 
of categories considered, we collapsed the 40 Togolese groups and 18 Ivorian 
groups into 6 groups. 
Wage Gap Decomposition Techniques
Traditional gender earnings decompositions rely on estimations of Mincer-type 
earnings functions for men and women of the form
lnwi = axi + εi (9.1)
where lnwi is the natural logarithm of the observed hourly earnings for indi-
vidual i; xi is a vector of observed individual characteristics; a is a vector of coef-
fi cients; and εi is a disturbance term with an expected value of zero. Earnings 
Table 9.1 Number of Working Individuals in Sample with Nonzero Earnings in Seven Cities 
in West Africa, by Sector and Gender
Public sector Formal private sector Informal sector
City Men Women Men Women Men Women
Abidjan 221 85 679 177 1,358 1,543
Bamako 336 126 389 71 1,462 1,558
Cotonou 296 115 387 142 1,389 1,881
Dakar 356 147 738 245 1,760 1,815
Lomé 238 78 250 60 1,252 1,727
Niamey 427 174 326 95 1,316 978
Ouagadougou 404 191 260 88 1,534 1,305
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries in the West African Economic and 
 Monetary Union (WAEMU) conducted in 2001/02 by the Observatoire économique et statistique d’Afrique 
Subsaharienne (AFRISTAT); Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation (DIAL); and national statistics 
institutes.
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functions are fi rst estimated separately for men and women and for the diff erent 
sectors. 
Th ere is no universally accepted set of conditioning variables that should be 
included in describing the causes of gender diff erentials, although the consensus 
seems to be that controls for productivity-related factors such as education, labor 
market experience, and marital status should be included. It is debatable whether 
job characteristics, occupation, and industry should be taken into account: if 
employers diff erentiate between men and women by tending to hire into certain 
occupations, then occupational assignment is an outcome of employer practices 
rather than an outcome of individual choice or productivity diff erences.3 
It was not possible to account for workers’ actual experience in the labor 
market; potential experience, which can be viewed as refl ecting the “gross” time 
individuals have spent while in the labor force (measured as age minus years of 
schooling minus six, the legal age at school entry), was therefore used. Use of 
potential rather than actual experience represents a possible limitation of the 
study, because diff erences in labor force attachment by gender are important 
in explaining the size of the gender wage gap. Indeed, measures of women’s 
work experience are particularly prone to errors given the discontinuity of 
women’s labor market participation (women oft en leave the labor force to 
bear and raise children, for instance). Using proxy measures such as potential 
experience may thus overestimate experience for women; it may be a good 
approximation of experience for men with greater labor force attachment 
(Nordman and Roubaud 2009).4 
Concerns arise over possible sample selection biases in the estimations. One 
source is the fact that earnings are observed only when people work, and not 
everyone is working. Th e second source is the selective decision to work in the 
public sector rather than the private or informal sectors. 
We address both issues using Lee’s two-stage approach to take account of the 
possible eff ect of endogenous paid-work participation and sector allocation on 
earnings (Lee 1983).5 In the fi rst stage, multinomial logit models of individual 
i’s participation for pay in sector j are used to compute the correction terms kij 
from the predicted probabilities Pij. Th e sectors considered in the multinomial 
logit are the public sector, the formal private sector, and the informal sector. Th e 
reference category includes all other working-age individuals (inactive, unem-
ployed, and unpaid workers). 
A potential problem is that the multinomial logit may suff er from the inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption, which in most cases is 
questionable. Hausman-type tests (Hausman and McFadden 1984) for each city 
and sector provide massive evidence that the IIA assumption is not violated, 
except in the informal sector of Bamako. In Lee’s procedure, identifi cation is 
achieved by including additional individual variables in the fi rst-stage selec-
tion equations that are omitted in the second-stage earnings regressions: a set 
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of dummies indicating relationship to the household head, the dependency 
ratio (number of non-working-age individuals divided by the total number of 
individuals in the household), and the household size.6 We assume that these 
variables do not infl uence earnings. 
Oaxaca and Neumark’s traditional earnings decompositions. Th e most com-
mon approach to identifying sources of gender wage gaps is the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition (based on the seminal work of Oaxaca 1973 and Blinder 1973). 
In this approach, two separate standard Mincerian log earnings equations are 
estimated for men and women: 
lnwm − lnwf = am (xm − xf) + (am − af)xf (9.2)
where wm and wf are the means of earnings by men and by women; xm and xf are 
vectors containing the means of the independent variables for men and women; 
and am and af are the estimated coeffi  cients. Th e fi rst term on the right-hand 
side captures the earnings diff erential caused by diff erences in the individual 
characteristics of men and women. Th e second term is the earnings gap attrib-
utable to diff erent returns to those characteristics or coeffi  cients.
It can be argued that, under discrimination, men are paid competitive wages 
and women are underpaid. If this is the case, the coeffi  cients for men should be 
taken as the nondiscriminatory wage structure, as in equation (9.2). Conversely, 
if employers pay women competitive wages but pay men more, then the women’s 
coeffi  cients should be used as the nondiscriminatory wage structure. Th e issue is 
thus how to determine the wage structure a* that would prevail in the absence 
of discrimination. Th is choice poses the well-known index number problem. A 
priori neither appears preferable, but the decomposition can be quite sensitive 
to the selection made. Th e literature proposes diff erent weighting schemes to 
deal with the underlying index problem (Neumark 1988). We rely on the general 
decomposition proposed by Neumark, which can be written as follows:
lnwm − lnwf = a* (xm − xf) + [(am − a*)xm + (a* − af) xf]. (9.3)
Th is decomposition can be reduced to Oaxaca’s two special cases if it is assumed 
that there is no discrimination in the wage structure for men (that is, a* = am) or 
for women (a* = af). Neumark shows that a* can be estimated using the weighted 
average of the wage structures of men and women and advocates using the pooled 
sample to estimate a*. Th e fi rst term is the gender wage gap attributable to diff er-
ences in individual characteristics. Th e second and third terms capture the diff er-
ence between the actual and pooled returns for men and women. 
Earnings decompositions with sample selectivity. Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) 
show that sample selection complicates the interpretation of earnings decom-
positions. Th ey off er several alternative decompositions, each based on diff er-
ent assumptions and objectives. We use one of them that considers selectivity 
as a separate component. Th is technique has the advantage of not calling for 
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any prior hypothesis regarding the links between individual characteristics and 
selectivity. An additional term in the decomposition measures the contribution 
of selection eff ects to the observed gender earnings gap, qmlm − qflf , where 
l and q denote the mean correction term (generalized Mills ratio) and its esti-
mated coeffi  cient from each regression by gender. Hence, in the full sectoral 
decomposition that follows, when trying to account for sample selectivity, we 
consider the decomposition of off ered instead of actual earnings (that is, earn-
ings net of the selection eff ects ql) (see Reimers 1983).
Full sectoral decomposition. Although the improvement proposed by 
Neumark’s decomposition is attractive, it is not immune from criticisms of 
decomposition methods in general. One of them is that without evidence that 
employers care only about the proportion of each type of labor employed, it is 
not clear that the pooled coeffi  cient is a good estimator of the nondiscrimina-
tory wage structure. Th e full sectoral decomposition of Appleton, Hoddinott, 
and Krishnan (1999) takes into account diff erences in sectoral structures by 
gender by using an approach similar to Neumark’s and decomposing the gender 
earnings gap into three components. 
Let W—m and W
—
f be the means of the natural logs of men’s and women’s earn-
ings and pmj and pfj  the sample proportions of men and women in sector j. Earn-
ings can be written as the sum of sectoral earnings weighted by the proportion 
of workers in each sector: 
W W pm mj mj
j
=
=
∑
1
3
 (9.4)
W W pf fj fj
j
=
=
∑
1
3
 (9.5)
One can decompose the diff erence in mean earnings into intrasectoral earn-
ings diff erences and diff erences in proportions employed in the diff erent sectors. 
In order to overcome the index problem, Appleton, Hoddinott, and Krishnan 
(1999) assume the sectoral structure that would prevail in the absence of gender 
diff erences in the impact of individual characteristics on sectoral choice. 
Let p*j be the proportion of workers in sector j under this assumption. Appleton, 
Hoddinott, and Krishnan decompose the diff erence in mean earnings as follows:
W W p W W W p p W p pm f j
j
mj fj mj mj j fj j fj
jj
− = − + − + −
= ==
∑ ∑* * *( ) ( ) ( )
1
3
1
3
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3
∑  (9.6)
Th e fi rst term can be decomposed using the Neumark decomposition pre-
sented earlier. Th e second and third terms can be decomposed further, in order 
to distinguish diff erences arising from diff erences in individual characteristics 
from diff erences arising from diff erences in returns to these characteristics. 
One can derive the average probability of being employed in a given sector for 
men and women from the estimation of pooled and separate multinomial logit 
models for each gender. Th ese mean probabilities are denoted by p*mj and p*fj . 
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Embedding the self-selection process in equation (9.6) allows the full decom-
position to be written as follows:
W W p x x p x p xm f j mj fj j
j
j mj mj j
j
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(9.7)
Th e fi rst three terms are similar to Neumark’s decompositions of within-
sector earnings gaps. Th e fourth and fi  fth terms measure the diff erence in earn-
ings caused by diff erences in the distribution of men and women in diff erent 
sectors. Th e last two terms account for diff erences in earnings resulting from 
the deviations between predicted and actual sectoral compositions of men and 
women not accounted for by diff erences in individual characteristics. 
Earnings gap decomposition for ethnic groups. Extending decomposition 
methods developed and traditionally used to analyze possible discrimination 
against women to the study of earnings diff erentials between ethnic groups 
is not straightforward. One of the main problems is related to the defi nition 
and measurement of ethnicity: what defi nes an ethnic group? In developed 
countries, there exist confl icting views and diff erent traditions regarding the 
collection of data on ethnic origin. Anglo-Saxon societies are accustomed to 
measuring and analyzing data on so-called racial and ethnic groups; many 
other countries refuse to categorize individuals using ethnic or racial criteria 
and, as a result, do not collect statistical data on ethnic origin.7 
In Africa, the notion of ethnicity also raises a number of questions that social 
scientists have debated extensively (Bayart 1989). Anthropologists have shown that 
ethnic groups are not characterized by genetic homogeneity. Depending on coun-
tries and contexts, the constitution of ethnic groups appears to be more or less recent 
and their defi nition malleable. Some groups have their origin in a common myth 
or ancestor; others share only a language and culture. Some “ethnic groups” have 
been constructed by other groups, following migration, invasion, or colonization. 
Th ese various origins notwithstanding, ethnicity plays an important role in 
social relations in many African countries. Th ere is, for instance, strong evi-
dence of high levels of endogamy (marriage within a specifi c group, as required 
by custom or law), not only in rural areas, where ethnic homogeneity is oft en 
observed, but also in urban areas, where diff erent ethnic groups cohabit. In 
recent years, economists have examined the importance of ethnicity to develop-
ment and growth. Th e seminal paper is the study by Easterly and Levine (1997), 
who conclude that “Africa’s growth tragedy” is in part related to its high level of 
ethnic diversity, which results in poor institutional functioning. Th is conclusion 
remains a subject of debate (see Bossuroy 2007 for a discussion). 
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Th is chapter focuses on the impact of ethnicity on labor market outcomes mea-
sured through earnings. To apply the methods developed for the analysis of the 
gender earnings gap, one is inclined to construct a dichotomous variable identify-
ing either a possibly favored or discriminated-against ethnic group. Data collec-
tion on ethnicity at the household or individual level is common in Africa: most 
household and employment surveys include a variable indicating ethnic group. 
However, given the diversity of national contexts, two diffi  culties arise. Th e fi rst 
is related to identifying a priori a discriminated-against ethnic group. Should one 
consider the majority ethnic group as favored? Or should one consider instead 
the group to which the head of state belongs? Th e second diffi  culty arises because 
of our comparative framework. How does belonging to diff erent groups compare 
across countries? For instance, is being a Mossi in Ouagadougou (77 percent of the 
population) comparable to being a Bambara in Bamako (34 percent of the popu-
lation). We consider various aspects of possible ethnic discrimination on urban 
labor markets while keeping in mind the diff erent national contexts.
Results
We now turn to the presentation and analysis of results obtained using the dif-
ferent approaches presented above.
Neumark Decomposition of Gender and Ethnic Earnings Gaps
Th is section analyzes gender and ethnic earnings gaps using traditional 
decomposition approaches. We identify the largest ethnic group in each city 
(table 9.2). Th ese groups represent a majority of the population in three of 
seven cities (Cotonou, Lomé, and Ouagadougou; see the annex for details). 
In six of the seven cities, the largest ethnic group corresponds to the majority 
group at the national level. Th e sole exception is Niamey, where the Djerma are 
the largest ethnic group but the Haoussa represent 54 percent of the population of 
Niger. Figure 9.1 reports two Herfi ndhal concentration indices for ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization (ELF) in each country.8 Th e fi rst is computed at the national 
Table 9.2 Largest Ethnic Group in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
City Ethnic group Percentage of population
Abidjan Akan 34.2
Bamako Bambara 34.4
Cotonou Fon 60.9
Dakar Wolof 40.4
Lomé Ewe-Mina-Wachi 74.2 
Niamey Djerma 49.5
Ouagadougou Mossi 78.2
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 9.1 for details). 
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level; the second is computed for the seven cities, using the 1-2-3 survey data. 
Levels are similar across all countries except Burkina Faso, where the ELF index 
appears to be much lower in the capital than at the country level. Th is diff erence 
stems from the fact that the ethnic majority group (Mossi) represents 78 percent 
of the population in Ouagadougou and only 50 percent at the national level.
Table 9.3 reports the decomposition of earnings gaps based on Neumark’s 
approach. A number of results are worth emphasizing. Raw gender earnings 
gaps are large and signifi cant, and they range widely across cities (from 50.0 in 
Niamey to 79.2 in Abidjan). Th ese fi gures indicate that, on average, women’s 
earnings in Abidjan are 20.8 percent of men’s earnings. Raw gender earnings 
gaps are positive by construction, because they are computed as the diff erence 
between a “high group” and a “low group.” In the sample of countries, women 
always correspond to the low group. In contrast, the largest ethnic group cor-
responds to the high group in Abidjan, Dakar, and Niamey and to the low group 
in Bamako, Cotonou, Lomé, and Ouagadougou.9 
Figure 9.1 Herfindhal Concentration Indices of Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization in Seven 
Countries in West Africa, 2001/02
Sources: Soviet Atlas data are from Fearon 2003; survey data are from Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected 
countries (see table 9.1 for details).
Note: The ELF measure, available for 129 countries, captures the likelihood that two people chosen at random 
will be from different ethnic groups. It is calculated using a simple Herfindahl concentration index. The Herfind-
ahl concentration formula is ELF si
n
= −
=
∑1 2
1 1
, where si is the share of group i (i = 1, . . . , n). The Soviet Atlas data 
were compiled by Soviet ethnographers in the early 1960s and published in the Atlas Narodov Mira in 1964. 
ELF = ethnolinguistic fractionalization; PARSTAT = Programme d'Appui Régional à la Statistique.
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Table 9.3 Neumark Decompositions of Gender and Ethnic Earnings Gaps in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
Without occupation or sector dummies With occupation dummies With occupation and sector dummies
Type of gap/city
Raw earnings 
gap Explained Unexplained
Unexplained 
(percent) Explained Unexplained
Unexplained 
(percent) Explained Unexplained
Unexplained 
(percent)
Gender earnings gaps
Abidjan 0.792*** 0.337 0.455 57.4 0.396 0.396 50.0 0.420 0.372 47.0
Bamako 0.736*** 0.301 0.435 59.2 0.283 0.452 61.5 0.306 0.430 58.4
Cotonou 0.779*** 0.339 0.439 56.4 0.355 0.423 54.3 0.361 0.418 53.7
Dakar 0.556*** 0.194 0.361 65.0 0.203 0.353 63.5 0.246 0.309 55.7
Lomé 0.787*** 0.427 0.360 45.7 0.481 0.306 38.9 0.482 0.305 38.7
Niamey 0.500*** 0.196 0.304 60.9 0.197 0.303 60.6 0.195 0.305 61.0
Ouagadougou 0.754*** 0.248 0.506 67.1 0.305 0.449 59.5 0.305 0.448 59.5
Ethnic earnings gaps
Abidjan 0.279*** 0.225 0.054 19.4 0.253 0.027 9.5 0.255 0.025 8.8
Bamako –0.182*** –0.103 –0.079 43.4 –0.109 –0.073 40.1 –0.111 –0.071 39.0
Cotonou –0.015 0.040 –0.055 369.7 0.048 –0.062 421.5 0.050 –0.065 441.1
Dakar 0.068** –0.001 0.069 101.9 0.024 0.044 65.2 0.022 0.046 68.1
Lomé –0.113*** –0.055 –0.059 51.7 –0.066 –0.047 41.3 –0.081 –0.032 28.3
Niamey 0.019 –0.034 0.053 278.8 –0.022 0.041 216.8 –0.024 0.043 226.7
Ouagadougou –0.537*** –0.430 –0.107 20.0 –0.463 –0.074 13.8 –0.461 –0.076 14.2
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 9.1 for details).
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Gender diff erences in the distribution of individual characteristics related to 
productivity—such as education and experience—explain less than half of the 
raw gender gap in six of the seven cities. Lomé is an exception, with diff erences 
in individual characteristics explaining almost 55 percent of the gap. Including 
variables related to the type of occupation decreases somewhat the unexplained 
share of the raw gender gap. Th is decrease appears to be substantial in Abidjan, 
Lomé, and Ouagadougou.
Men are systematically favored over women in all cities in the sample. In 
contrast, the largest ethnic groups do not appear to have a systematically favor-
able position in the urban labor markets. Only in Abidjan and Dakar is the 
gap both signifi cant and favorable for the largest ethnic group (in Abidjan, the 
Akan earn 28 percent more than other ethnic groups; in Dakar, the Wolof earn 
7 percent more than other ethnic groups). In Bamako, Lomé, and Ouagadou-
gou, members of the largest ethnic group earn signifi cantly less than members 
of other ethnic groups. In Ouagadougou, lower average earnings by the Mossi 
could be related to their spatial distribution: they represent 78 percent of the 
population of the capital city but just 50 percent of the population of Burkina 
Faso. It could be that only better-performing non-Mossi migrate to the capital. 
Th e decomposition of ethnic earnings gaps reveals markedly diff erent results 
across cities. In Abidjan, diff erences in the distribution of individual characteris-
tics explain more than 85 percent of the gap, leaving little room for discrimination 
(the unexplained share). In Bamako, the unexplained share of the gap is 43 percent 
(39 percent once occupational and sector dummies are included in the regres-
sions). In Dakar, 100 percent of the gap is left  unexplained until job characteris-
tics related to occupation and sector are introduced. In Ouagadougou, where the 
majority ethnic group (Mossi) earns less than other groups, the gap is also in large 
part explained by diff erences in the distribution of individual characteristics, such 
as education and experience; just 20 percent of the diff erential is unexplained. 
Full Decomposition of Gender Earnings Gap
Th ere are at least four types of labor markets in most developing countries: rural 
(or agricultural), public, formal private, and informal. Each of these markets has its 
own characteristics, such as job seasonality, uncertainty of demand, the nature of 
contracts, and the structure of wages and earnings. As a result, gender and ethnic 
labor allocation across these sectors can be expected to contribute to earnings gaps. 
Following Appleton, Hoddinott, and Krishnan (1999) and Nordman and 
Roubaud (2009), we provide comparable estimates of the size and determinants 
of gender earnings gaps using the full decomposition method described previ-
ously. Given that we are analyzing urban labor markets, only three types of 
labor markets are examined: public, formal private, and informal. Th e results 
are reported without (table 9.4) and with (table 9.5) correction for selectivity of 
participation and sectoral allocation.
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Table 9.4 Full Decomposition of Gender Earnings Gap in Seven Cities in West Africa without Correction for Selectivity, 2001/02
Raw earnings 
gap
Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
0.792*** Percent 0.736*** Percent 0.779*** Percent 0.556*** Percent 0.787*** Percent 0.500*** Percent 0.754*** Percent
Within-sector differences attributable to
Characteristics 0.099 12.5 0.133 18.1 0.166 21.3 0.043 7.7 0.240 30.5 0.060 12.1 0.092 12.3
Differences in 
men’s returns 0.192 24.3 0.199 27.0 0.238 30.6 0.143 25.8 0.191 24.2 0.110 22.1 0.210 27.9
Differences in 
women’s returns 0.185 23.4 0.209 28.4 0.178 22.9 0.161 28.9 0.122 15.5 0.164 32.7 0.250 33.1
Subtotal 0.476 60.2 0.541 73.5 0.582 74.8 0.347 62.4 0.553 70.2 0.334 66.9 0.552 73.3
Sectoral location differences attributable to
Characteristics 0.245 30.9 0.165 22.4 0.167 21.4 0.136 24.4 0.182 23.2 0.126 25.1 0.170 22.5
Differences 
in effect of 
characteristics 
on men’s 
location 0.022 2.7 0.009 1.3 0.010 1.3 0.028 5.0 0.018 2.3 0.012 2.5 0.010 1.3
Differences 
in effect of 
characteristics 
on women’s 
location 0.049 6.2 0.021 2.8 0.020 2.5 0.045 8.2 0.033 4.2 0.027 5.5 0.023 3.0
Subtotal 0.316 39.8 0.195 26.5 0.197 25.2 0.209 37.6 0.233 29.7 0.165 33.1 0.203 26.8
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 9.1 for details).
Note: The raw earnings gap is defined as log(men’s earnings) – log(women’s earnings). 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 9.5 Full Decomposition of Gender Earnings Gap in Seven Cities in West Africa with Correction for Selectivity, 2001/02
Raw earnings 
gap
Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
0.970*** Percent 2.050*** Percent 1.060*** Percent 1.361*** Percent 361*** Percent 0.885*** Percent 1.237*** Percent
Within-sector differences in earnings attributable to
Characteristics 0.107 11.1 0.198 9.7 0.205 19.3 0.053 3.9 0.250 29.2 0.074 8.4 0.144 11.7
Differences in 
men’s returns 0.204 21.0 0.729 35.6 0.343 32.3 0.408 30.0 0.163 19.0 0.245 27.6 0.423 34.2
Differences in 
women’s returns 0.235 24.2 0.956 46.6 0.334 31.5 0.547 40.2 0.009 1.0 0.355 40.2 0.490 39.6
Subtotal 0.546 56.3 1.883 91.9 0.882 83.1 1.008 74.1 0.422 49.2 0.674 76.2 1.057 85.5
Differences between sectoral locations attributable to
Characteristics 0.319 32.9 0.150 7.3 0.154 14.5 0.212 15.6 0.331 38.6 0.162 18.3 0.151 12.2
Differences 
in effect of 
characteristics 
on men’s 
location 0.042 4.4 0.015 0.7 0.012 1.1 0.065 4.8 0.032 3.8 0.013 1.5 0.004 0.3
Differences 
in effect of 
characteristics 
on women’s 
location 0.062 6.4 0.002 0.1 0.013 1.3 0.076 5.6 0.072 8.4 0.036 4.1 0.024 2.0
Subtotal 0.423 43.7 0.167 8.1 0.179 16.9 0.353 26.0 0.435 50.8 0.211 23.9 0.179 14.5
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 9.1 for details).
Note: The earnings gap is defined as log(men’s earnings) – log(women’s earnings). Decomposition is based on observed earnings. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Within-sector diff erences in earnings account for the largest share of the gen-
der gap, with contributions ranging from 60 percent in Abidjan to 75 percent 
in Cotonou. Th e remaining diff erence can be attributed to gender diff erences 
in the proportions of workers in each sector. Th e positive sum of these three 
terms for all cities implies that the diff erences in sectoral locations favor men. 
For instance, the gender earnings gap would have been 40 percent smaller 
in Abidjan if men and women had been equally distributed across the three 
sectors, because fewer women work in the higher-paying sectors. 
Diff erences attributable to individual characteristics account for a relatively 
small share of within-sector diff erences in earnings, ranging from 10 percent in 
Dakar to 41 percent in Lomé (not shown in the table). Diff erences attributable 
to individual characteristics account for a very large share of the sectoral loca-
tion diff erences between men and women, ranging from 65 percent in Dakar to 
85 percent in Bamako and Cotonou. 
Diff erences attributable to diff erences in the returns of men and women are of 
the same order of magnitude, indicating that both “discrimination” against women 
and “nepotism” in favor of men contribute to the gender earnings gap. Both fac-
tors also contribute to diff erences in sectoral location but at a much lower level.
Taking into account selectivity leads to analyzing the decomposition not 
of actual earnings but of off ered earnings, computed using the coeffi  cients 
of the selection term in the earnings equations. Th e results in table 9.5 show 
that off ered earnings gaps are much higher in Cotonou, Bamako, and Dakar 
and lower in the other cities. Higher earnings gaps when sectoral selectivity 
is accounted for are not systematically associated with a larger contribution of 
sectoral location diff erences, however; except in Niamey, within-sector earnings 
diff erences remain the main contributor to gender gaps. 
Ethnic Earnings Diff erentials
Concerning ethnic earnings gaps, the results in table 9.6 (without correcting for 
selectivity) indicate that the contribution of sectoral location to explaining the 
gap varies markedly between cities. In Abidjan, diff erences in sectoral location 
explain 86 percent of the gap, of which 75 percent is accounted for by diff erences 
in individual characteristics. In Bamako, within-sector diff erences in earnings 
account for 77 percent of the earnings gap, of which 33 percent is attribut-
able to diff erences in individual characteristics; both nepotism (16 percent) and 
discrimination (28 percent) signifi cantly contribute to the gap through their 
contribution to within-sector diff erences in earnings. In Ouagadougou, the gap 
can be attributed almost evenly to diff erences in sectoral location (53 percent) 
and within-sector earnings (47 percent).
Sectoral location diff erences are almost entirely explained by diff erences 
in individual characteristics. In Lomé, in contrast to Bamako, the deviation in 
the eff ect of individual characteristics on location explains a large share of sec-
toral location diff erences. In contrast to the results obtained for gender, where 
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Table 9.6 Full Decomposition of Ethnic Earnings Gap in Seven Cities in West Africa without Correction for Selectivity, 2001/02
Raw earnings 
gap
Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
0.279*** Percent –0.182*** Percent –0.015 Percent 0.068** Percent –0.113*** Percent 0.019 Percent –0.537*** Percent
Within-sector differences in earnings attributable to
Characteristics 0.004 1.5 –0.061 33.3 0.014 –96.0 0.021 31.6 0.009 –8.0 –0.049 –258.9 –0.156 29.0
Differences in 
majority group 
returns 0.011 3.9 –0.029 15.9 –0.039 262.9 0.034 49.9 –0.023 19.9 0.019 102.8 –0.076 14.2
Differences in 
minority group 
returns 0.024 8.5 –0.051 28.2 –0.027 179.3 0.051 75.3 –0.009 7.8 0.024 125.1 –0.019 3.5
Subtotal 0.039 13.9 –0.141 77.4 –0.052 346.2 0.106 156.8 –0.023 19.7 –0.006 –31.0 –0.251 46.7
Differences between sectoral location attributable to
Characteristics 0.181 64.7 –0.050 27.4 0.018 –120.0 –0.009 –13.7 –0.015 13.2 –0.008 –41.8 –0.250 46.5
Differences in effect 
of characteristics 
on majority group 
location 0.017 5.9 0.003 –1.7 0.012 –78.1 –0.012 –17.0 –0.053 47.2 0.017 88.0 –0.028 5.2
Differences in effect 
of characteristics 
on minority group 
location 0.043 15.5 0.006 –3.1 0.007 –48.2 –0.018 –26.0 –0.022 19.8 0.016 84.9 –0.008 1.5
Subtotal 0.241 86.1 –0.041 22.6 0.037 –246.3 –0.039 –56.7 –0.090 80.2 0.025 131.1 –0.286 53.2
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 9.1 for details).
Note: The earnings gap is defined as log(majority group earnings) – log(minority group earnings). Decomposition is based on observed earnings.
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
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sectoral location systematically increases the gap in favor of men, in some cities 
sectoral location plays a compensating role in observed earnings gaps. 
Taking selectivity into account changes some measures of the gaps (table 
9.7). Th e gap decreases in Abidjan, Dakar, and Ouagadougou and increases in 
Bamako. In Lomé, the gap is actually reversed, possibly indicating that on average 
the off ered earnings of the largest ethnic group are higher than they are for other 
ethnic groups. Th is puzzling result requires further investigation (for instance, 
in order to understand the features of earnings negotiations, one would need to 
know the ethnic group of the employer).
Th e largest number of ethnic groups is in Bamako and Ouagadougou (10), fol-
lowed by Dakar (9); Lomé and Niamey (7); and Abidjan and Cotonou (6) (table 
9A.2). Table 9.8 reports the coeffi  cients of the dummies indicating each ethnic 
group in regressions of city-level earnings equations. In the fi rst column, ethnic 
group dummies are the only regressors. A set of usual controls is introduced in 
the specifi cation reported in the second column (table 9.9 reports the coeffi  cients 
for these variables). 
Two results are evident from these regressions. First, there is at least one 
signifi cant coeffi  cient on ethnic dummies in all cities, indicating diff erences in 
average earnings of diff erent ethnic groups.10 Second, most of these diff erences 
diminish—and in some cases vanish—once other individual characteristics are 
controlled for. Overall, dominant ethnic groups do not seem to be favored on 
the labor market once one controls for productivity-related individual charac-
teristics. On the contrary, in Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali, some nondomi-
nant groups have higher earnings than the dominant group aft er controlling for 
other factors. Moreover, none of the favored groups seems to be related to the 
ethnicity of the head of state at the time of the survey.11 
Conclusion
Th e fi ndings in this chapter are important for two main reasons. First, interna-
tional comparisons of earnings gaps are still rare in Africa. Th e 1-2-3 surveys 
used here rely on identical methodologies and virtually identical questionnaires 
in each city, making for totally comparable results. 
Second, we address the issue of sample selectivity associated with endog-
enous sector choices, because gender and ethnic labor allocation between these 
sectors can be expected to contribute to earnings gaps. Following Appleton, 
Hoddinott, and Krishnan (1999), we then provide comparable estimates of the 
size and determinants of gender and ethnic earnings gaps using decomposition 
methods that address the sectoral allocation issue.
Th e results show that gender earnings gaps are large in all seven cities in our 
sample and that gender diff erences in the distribution of individual character-
istics usually explain less than half of the raw gender gap. In contrast, dominant 
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Table 9.7 Full Decomposition of Ethnic Earnings Gap in Seven Cities in West Africa with Correction for Selectivity, 2001/02
Raw earnings 
gap
Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
0.254*** Percent –0.224*** Percent 0.021 Percent 0.048 Percent 0.127*** Percent –0.003 Percent –0.403*** Percent
Within-sector differences in earnings attributable to
Characteristics 0.020 –7.8 –0.042 18.8 0.013 64.1 0.022 45.9 0.021 16.6 –0.043 1335.8 –0.091 22.7
Differences in 
majority group 
returns 0.016 –6.3 –0.042 18.5 –0.036 –169.6 0.020 42.5 0.110 86.9 0.000 14.2 –0.029 7.1
Differences in 
minority group 
returns 0.001 –0.4 –0.078 34.6 –0.024 –113.4 0.042 88.3 0.090 70.8 –0.012 376.7 0.021 –5.1
Subtotal 0.037 –14.5 –0.162 71.9 –0.047 –218.9 0.084 176.7 0.221 174.3 –0.055 1726.7 –0.099 24.7
Sectoral location differences attributable to
Characteristics 0.213 84.2 –0.080 35.8 0.029 140.8 –0.009 –19.0 –0.010 –7.9 –0.016 492.6 –0.266 66.1
Differences in effect 
of characteristics 
on majority group 
location 0.027 10.6 0.004 –2.0 0.023 109.6 –0.007 –15.2 –0.030 –23.5 0.025 –770.0 –0.028 6.9
Differences in effect 
of characteristics 
on minority 
group location 0.050 19.8 0.013 –5.7 0.014 68.6 –0.020 –42.5 –0.055 –42.9 0.043 –1349.2 –0.010 2.4
Subtotal 0.290 114.6 –0.063 28.1 0.066 319.0 –0.036 –76.7 –0.095 –74.3 0.052 –1626.6 –0.304 75.4
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 9.1 for details).
Note: The earnings gap is defined as log(majority group earnings) – log(minority group earnings). Decomposition is based on observed earnings.
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 9.8 Ethnic Earnings Differentials in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
City/ethnic group
Earnings gaps 
Ordinary least squares 
estimate
Raw earnings 
differential
Standard 
error Coefﬁ cient
Standard 
error
Abidjan
Akan (largest ethnic group) Reference n.a. Reference n.a.
Krou 0.020 0.061 –0.025 0.045
Mande North –0.268*** 0.054) –0.013 0.042
Mande South –0.112 0.090 –0.035 0.067
Native of Burkina Faso –0.414*** 0.045 –0.124*** 0.037
Voltaic –0.300*** 0.069 –0.086* 0.052
Missing –0.333 0.250 0.084 0.186
Bamako
Arab 0.450*** 0.149 0.078 0.122
Bambara (largest ethnic group) Reference n.a. Reference n.a.
Bobo 0.006 0.107 –0.069 0.087
Dogon –0.042 0.091 0.009 0.074
Haoussa 0.303*** 0.102 0.126 0.083
Malinke 0.057 0.052 0.039 0.043
Peul 0.220*** 0.054 0.081* 0.044
Sarakole 0.245*** 0.060 0.182*** 0.049
Senoufo 0.398*** 0.093 0.051 0.077
Songhai 0.436*** 0.104 0.110 0.085
Missing 0.109 0.115 0.126 0.094
Cotonou
Adja –0.077* 0.039 0.035 0.031
Dendi 0.373*** 0.135 0.467*** 0.107
Fon (largest ethnic group) Reference n.a. Reference n.a.
Yoa –0.498*** 0.147 –0.213* 0.116
Yoruba 0.193*** 0.051 0.102** 0.040
Other 0.033 0.009
Dakar
Diola –0.088 0.068 –0.103* 0.054
Lebou 0.032 0.063 0.034 0.050
Manding 0.009 0.081 –0.020 0.064
Mandjag –0.073 0.102 –0.005 0.081
Peul –0.016 0.044 –0.032 0.035
Sarakole 0.117 0.101 –0.054 0.080
Serere –0.271*** 0.046 –0.190*** 0.036
Wolof (largest ethnic group) Reference n.a. Reference n.a.
Other 0.075 0.065 –0.024 0.052
(continued next page)
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Lomé
Akposso-Akebou 0.121 0.136 –0.003 0.111
Ana-Ife 0.126 0.107 0.005 0.087
Ewe-Mina-Wachi (largest ethnic group) Reference n.a. Reference n.a.
Kabye-Tem 0.058 0.055 0.001 0.045
Para-Gourma-Akan 0.068 0.092 0.028 0.075
Other Togolese –0.042 0.191 0.062 0.156
Other non-Togolese 0.297*** 0.081 0.276 0.066
Niamey
Djerma (largest ethnic group) Reference n.a. Reference n.a.
Gourma 0.542* 0.285 0.240 0.223
Haoussa –0.004 0.044 –0.068* 0.035
Peul 0.167** 0.083 0.041 0.065
Touareg –0.237*** 0.089 –0.102 0.070
Other –0.143* 0.075 –0.046 0.059
Missing –0.259 0.199 –0.075 0.156
Ouagadougou
Bissa 0.379*** 0.095 0.093 0.070
Bobo 0.561*** 0.165 0.168 0.120
Dagari 0.474*** 0.155 0.083 0.113
Gourmantche 0.781*** 0.178 0.197 0.130
Gurunsi 0.613*** 0.099 0.073*** 0.099
Mossi (largest ethnic group) Reference n.a. Reference n.a.
Other Manding 0.555*** 0.092 0.136** 0.068
Peul 0.552*** 0.137 0.161 0.100
Senoufo 1.335*** 0.203 0.370** 0.149
Other 0.498*** 0.117 0.109 0.086
Missing –0.141 0.209 –0.130 0.152
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 9.1 for details).
Note: n.a. = Not applicable. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
Table 9.8 (continued)
Earnings gaps 
Ordinary least squares 
estimate
City/ethnic group
Raw earnings 
differential
Standard 
error Coefﬁ cient
Standard 
error
ethnic groups do not appear to have a systematically favorable position in the 
urban labor markets in our sample, and observed gaps are small relative to gen-
der gaps. Moreover, “favored” minority groups do not seem to be related to the 
ethnicity of the head of state at the time of the survey.
Whatever the sign of the gap, the contribution of diff erences in the distri-
bution of individual characteristics varies markedly across cities. Taking into 
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Table 9.9 Control Variables for Ethnic Earnings Differentials in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Gender (1 = women ) –0.507 –0.464 –0.495 –0.370 –0.425 –0.314 –0.525
(0.028)*** (0.030)*** (0.026)*** (0.025)*** (0.033)*** (0.031)*** (0.028)***
Education 0.028 0.045 0.046 0.066 0.030 0.077 0.100
(0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)***
Education squared 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.004
(0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Potential experience 0.051 0.062 0.038 0.066 0.052 0.052 0.067
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Potential experience squared –0.049 –0.065 –0.039 –0.073 –0.057 –0.047 –0.073
(0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)***
Marital status (1 = married) 0.120 0.093 0.043 0.059 0.032 0.067 0.160
(0.029)*** (0.031)*** (0.026)* (0.028)** (0.032) (0.032)** (0.031)***
Constant –2.568 –3.013 –2.725 –2.769 –3.311 –3.086 –3.549
(0.066)*** (0.063)*** (0.060)*** (0.053)*** (0.070)*** (0.069)*** (0.061)***
Number of observations 4,060 3,928 4,209 4,929 3,600 3,295 3,774
R 2 0.47 0.35 0.39 0.37 0.34 0.40 0.50
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 9.1 for details).
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
DECOMPOSING GENDER AND ETHNIC EARNINGS GAPS IN SEVEN CITIES IN WEST AFRICA   291
account diff erences in sectoral locations in the decomposition of gender earn-
ings gaps provides evidence that within-sector diff erences in earnings account 
for the largest share of the gender gap and that diff erences in sectoral locations 
are always more favorable to men than to women. In contrast, full decomposi-
tion of ethnic earnings gaps indicates that sectoral location sometimes plays 
a “compensating” role. Looking at fi ner levels of ethnic disaggregation con-
fi rms that ethnic earnings diff erentials are systematically smaller than gender 
diff erentials.
Annex: Ethnicity in Seven West African Countries
Table 9A.1 Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization in Seven Countries in West Africa 
Country
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization
Description of largest ethnic group Soviet Atlas 1-2-3 surveys
Benin The Fon are a major ethnic and linguistic group in Benin and 
southwest Nigeria, made up of more than 2 million people. 
Their language, a member of the Gbe language group, is the 
main language spoken in southern Benin. Closely related 
cultures include the Ewe, Adja, and Guin. The Fon are said 
to originate from Tado, a village in southeast Togo, near the 
border with Benin.
0.6182 0.5742
Burkina 
Faso
The Mossi live in central Burkina Faso, mostly in the villages 
of the Volta River Basin. They are the largest ethnic group 
in Burkina Faso, constituting 40 percent of the population 
(about 6.2 million people). The other 60 percent of Burkina 
Faso’s population is composed of more than 60 ethnic 
groups, mainly the Gurunsi, Senufo, Lobi, Bobo, and Fulani. 
The Mossi speak the More language.
0.6783 0.3814
Côte 
d’Ivoire
The Akan are a linguistic group in West Africa that includes 
the Akuapem, Akyem, Ashanti, Baoulé, Anyi, Brong, Fante, 
and Nzema peoples of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. 
0.8593 0.8204
Mali The Bambara (Bamana or sometimes Banmana in their 
own language) are a Mande people living in West Africa, 
primarily in Mali but also in Burkina Faso, Guinea, and 
Senegal. Among the largest Mande ethnic groups, they are 
the dominant Mande group in Mali, where 80 percent of 
the population speaks the Bambara language, regardless of 
ethnicity.
0.7783 0.8254
Niger The Djerma (also spelled Zerma, Zarma, Dyerma, and 
Zaberma) live in western Niger and adjacent areas of 
Burkina Faso and Nigeria. Their language is one of the 
Songhai languages, a branch of the Nilo-Saharan language 
family. The Djerma are considered to be a branch of the 
Songhai people. 
0.7326 0.6401
Senegal The Wolof live in The Gambia, Mauritania, and Senegal. 
In Senegal, they form an ethnic plurality, with about 40 
percent of the population self-identifying as Wolof. They are 
the majority in the region stretching from Saint-Louis in the 
north, Kaolack in the south, and Dakar to the west. 
0.7228 0.7695
(continued next page)
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Table 9A.2 Ethnic Composition of Sample in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
City/ethnic group Sample size Extrapolated percentage of total
Abidjan
Akan 1,278 32.4
Krou 444 11.5
Mande North 631 16.3
Mande South 171 4.4
Native of Burkina Faso 1,188 26.9
Voltaic 328 8.2
Missing 20 0.5
Bamako
Arab 57 1.0
Bambara 1,382 35.7
Bobo 115 3.5
Dogon 163 4.4
Haoussa 128 2.8
Malinke 660 16.9
Peul 602 15.6
Sarakole 445 11.1
Senoufo 155 3.7
Songhai 123 2.9
Missing 98 2.3
Cotonou
Adja 889 21.5
Dendi 56 1.3
Fon 2,475 60.3
Yoa 47 1.1
Yoruba 447 9.9
Other 295 5.9
(continued next page)
Togo The Ewe live in southeastern Benin, Ghana, and Togo. They 
speak the Ewe language and are related to other speakers 
of Gbe languages, including the Fon and the Adja of Benin 
and Togo. Their original homeland is Oyo, in western Nigeria.
0.7107 0.8254
Sources: Soviet Atlas data are from Fearon 2003; survey data are from Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected 
countries (see table 9.1 for details). 
Note: The ELF measure, available for 129 countries, captures the likelihood that two people chosen at random 
will be from different ethnic groups. It is calculated using a simple Herfindahl concentration index. The Herfindahl 
concentration formula is ELF si
n
= −
=
∑1 2
1 1
, where si is the share of group i (i = 1, . . . , n). The Soviet Atlas data 
were compiled by Soviet ethnographers in the early 1960s and published in the Atlas Narodov Mira in 1964. 
ELF = ethnolinguistic fractionlization.
Table 9A.1 (continued)
Country
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization
Description of largest ethnic group Soviet Atlas 1-2-3 surveys
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Dakar
Diola 278 5.8
Lebou 337 9.1
Manding 191 3.9
Mandjag 115 2.3
Peul 822 16.0
Sarakole 118 2.4
Serere 747 16.0
Wolof 2,008 38.1
Other 313 6.3
Lomé
Akposso-Akebou 66 1.8
Ana-Ife 109 3.1
Ewe-Mina-Wachi 2,582 71.8
Kabye-Tem 467 13.1
Para-Gourma-Akan 148 4.2
Other Togolese 33 0.8
Other non-Togolese 195 5.2
Niamey
Djerma 1,542 46.6
Gourma 15 0.5
Haoussa 1,044 32.1
Kanouri 41 1.2
Peul 199 6.1
Touareg 170 5.4
Other 253 7.2
Missing 31 1.0
Ouagadougou
Bissa 155 4.1
Bobo 50 1.0
Dagari 57 1.4
Gourmantche 43 1.2
Gurunsi 142 4.1
Mossi 2,921 77.2
Other Manding 168 4.2
Peul 73 1.8
Senoufo 33 0.8
Other 101 3.1
Missing 31 1.4
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 9.1 for details).
Table 9A.2 (continued)
City/ethnic group Sample size Extrapolated percent of total
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Notes
 1. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are documents required before low-
income countries can receive aid from most major donors and lenders. Th e PRSP 
process encourages countries to develop more poverty-focused policies and to own 
their own strategies by developing the plan in close consultation with the population.
 2. See Siphambe and Th okweng-Bakwena (2001) on Botswana; Lachaud (1997) on 
Burkina Faso and Cameroon; Appleton, Hoddinott, and Krishnan (1999) on Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Uganda; Kolev and Suarez Robles (2007) and Temesgen 
(2006) on Ethiopia; Glewwe (1990) on Ghana; Glick and Sahn (1997) on Guinea; 
Kabubo-Mariara (2003), Milne and Neitzert (1994), and Agesa (1999) on Kenya; 
Armitage and Sabot (1991) on Kenya and Tanzania; Nordman and Roubaud (2009) 
and Nordman, Rakotomanana, and Robilliard (2010) on Madagascar; Nordman and 
Wolff  (2009b) on Morocco; Nordman and Wolff  (2009a) on the formal sectors of 
Madagascar and Mauritius; Isemonger and Roberts (1999) on South Africa; and 
Cohen and House (1993) on Sudan.
 3. Conversely, one can argue that analyses that omit occupation and industry may 
underestimate the importance of background and choice-based characteristics on 
labor market outcomes (Altonji and Blank 1999).
 4. Regan and Oaxaca (2006) show that using potential versus actual experience in 
earnings models is best viewed as a model misspecifi cation problem rather than 
a classical errors-in-variable framework. Instrumental variable techniques are the 
traditional approach used to correct classical measurement error. In the absence of 
actual experience measures, instrumenting potential experience does not solve the 
model specifi cation problem, as Regan and Oaxaca (2006) emphasize. 
 5. Following Tunali (1986), an alternative approach would be to employ a sequen-
tial selection rule (nested multinomial logit) rather than a combined one. Doing so 
would mean controlling for self-selection into the paid-work group and then dif-
ferent endogenous choices of the public, formal private, and informal sectors. Th is 
technique requires fi nding at least one variable aff ecting the decision to enter the 
paid-work group but not the sector choice in order to achieve identifi cation through 
the use of exclusion restrictions. It was impossible to fi nd variables that could be 
used in the fi rst-stage selection equation and arguably excluded from a second selec-
tion equation of sector allocation. 
 6. In the context of a two-step sectoral selection correction, Appleton, Hoddinott, and 
Krishnan (1999) use the proportion of children in the household as an identifying 
instrument. 
 7. In France, the collection of data on ethnic origin is subject to authorization by a 
government body and is not granted systematically.
 8. Easterly and Levine (1997) and Collier and Hoeffl  er (1998) defi ne ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization (ELF) as the probability of two randomly drawn individuals from 
the same country belonging to diff erent ethnic groups.
 9. Nordman, Robilliard, and Roubaud (2011) explore the factors likely to explain dif-
ferences in gender gaps across cities. Th eir fi ndings suggest that cities with large 
gender earnings gaps are characterized by high levels of female labor market par-
ticipation, large gender education gaps, and large shares of self-employment. Gen-
der earnings gaps are particularly large in the informal self-employment sector. Th e 
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diff erences in access to capital and the low productivity of activities engaged in by 
self-employed women may explain this fi nding.
 10. In some cities, the groups considered represent very small shares of the population 
(see annex table 9A.2). For this reason, we did not implement decomposition meth-
ods at this level of ethnic disaggregation.
 11. Data on the ethnicity of the head of state at the time of the survey are provided in 
the data set put together by Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin (2007).
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Why Do Migrants Migrate? 
Self-Selection and Returns to 
Education in West Africa 
Philippe De Vreyer, Flore Gubert, and François Roubaud
Migration from and to African countries is extensive, with estimates ranging 
from about 16 million international African migrants according to the Inter-
national Organisation for Migration (IOM 2003) to 50 million according to 
the African Union (African Union 2005). West Africa in particular has a long 
history of population mobility, both regionally and internationally. Linked to 
factors as diverse as long-distance trade, plantation agriculture, and urbaniza-
tion as well as armed confl ict, land degradation, and drought, migration in the 
region played and still plays a major part in shaping settlement patterns. At the 
political level, several initiatives, including the free movement of people insti-
tutionalized by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
have facilitated labor migration. With this background in mind, this chapter 
examines the locational choice of a large sample of Africans originating in seven 
cities in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).1 
Concern with migration emerged with the work of Sjaastad (1962). In the 
development literature, however, Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) 
were the fi rst to present a model in which the decision to migrate results from 
the rational comparison of the expected costs and benefi ts of migration. In 
both models, the diff erence in average expected earnings between countries or 
regions of destination and countries or regions of origin plays a key role and 
is predicted to have a positive eff ect on migration fl ows. Th is kind of model is 
unable to explain key stylized facts, however, such as migration fl ows from and 
to particular regions or countries. 
Borjas (1987) and Dahl (2002) adopt a diff erent approach, based on the semi-
nal paper of Roy (1951). In Roy’s framework, workers select into income-earning 
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activities on the basis of their comparative advantage. Applied to residential 
choice, this model explains migration not by average expected earnings diff er-
entials but rather by diff erences in individual expected returns to skills that are 
either observed or unobserved by the econometrician. As a result, migration 
fl ows are not necessarily one-sided. Th is literature argues that migrants’ self-
selection should be taken into account when estimating the returns to human 
capital in countries where the fl ow of migrants is signifi cant.
Estimation of this kind of model is usually very diffi  cult, however, because 
of the impossibility of gathering data on origin and destination labor markets 
at the same time. In this chapter, we take advantage of the fact that the 1-2-3 
surveys of the Programme d’Appui Régional à la Statistique (PARSTAT) project 
were conducted simultaneously, with the same questionnaire, thus providing 
the data needed to study migration choices in the region (for a description of 
these surveys, see box O.1 in the overview). Data on the country of birth and 
the last country of residence allow international migrants to be identifi ed within 
each national sample. 
Th is chapter is important for three reasons. First, it fi lls a gap in the knowl-
edge of cross-border migration within Africa. Second, it evaluates the extent of 
the bias in the estimated returns to education when international migration is 
not accounted for. Th ird, it determines whether earnings diff erentials matter in 
the choice of the country of residence. 
Th e model assumes that individuals are born randomly in one of the seven 
countries under review (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, 
and Togo) but rationally choose the country in which they reside by comparing 
the utility associated with each choice. Estimation of this model provides unbi-
ased estimates of the returns to education, together with the eff ect of expected 
earnings diff erentials on the probability of choosing a particular country. Given 
the data at hand, the universe of destination countries is restricted to countries 
that are close to one another geographically, legally, culturally, and economically. 
Th e seven countries studied share the same language (French), use a common 
currency (the CFA franc), and, most important, belong to ECOWAS, within 
which people are free to move and settle. 
We cannot account for migration movements outside the WAEMU region. 
Although this restriction is regrettable and constitutes a clear limitation of our 
study, it nevertheless makes sense to analyze migrants’ choice of destination in 
West Africa, where there are no legal barriers to migrate and most international 
migration takes place intraregionally. We fi nd that migration behavior plays 
an important role in determining earnings diff erentials between countries and 
between individuals with diff erent education levels. Our results also suggest that 
earnings diff erentials matter in locational choice.
Th is chapter is organized as follows. Th e fi rst section presents the data and 
some descriptive statistics. Th e second section specifi es the model and describes 
WHY DO MIGRANTS MIGRATE?  303
the estimation strategy. Th e third section discusses the model identifi cation and 
the choice of variables. Th e fourth section provides the estimation results. Th e 
last section summarizes the chapter’s main conclusions.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Movements of labor are not a new phenomenon in West Africa. For genera-
tions, people have migrated in response to demographic, economic, political, 
and other factors, such as population pressure, environmental disasters, pov-
erty, and confl icts. 
Despite their importance, little is known about these migrations. Th e infor-
mation provided by census data; immigration and emigration statistics; and 
a small number of ad hoc surveys on the number, identity, and motivations 
of both inter- and intracontinental African migrants is spotty and unreliable. 
Evidence is even scarcer concerning transborder migrations within the West 
African subregion. How many transborder migrants are there in each West 
African country? Who are these migrants? What are their main motivations? 
Th ese are some of the questions this chapter addresses.
Th e data used are a pooling sample of the seven 1-2-3 surveys of the PAR-
STAT project. All seven French-speaking members of WAEMU belong to 
ECOWAS. At the time of its creation, in 1975, one of the key objectives of 
ECOWAS was to remove obstacles to the free movement of goods, capital, and 
people in the subregion. In line with this objective, the Protocol on Free Move-
ment of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment was signed in 
May 1979; the right of entry was established in 1980 and the right of residence 
in 1986. In 2000, members of ECOWAS agreed to introduce a new passport 
for citizens of the subregion, which will gradually replace national passports. 
Although much remains to be done to achieve complete liberalization of labor 
migration within the community, these measures to create a borderless West 
Africa provide a good opportunity to study the residential choice of people 
within the community. 
We consider as migrants all individuals who meet the following three cri-
teria: they are not citizens of the country they reside in; they were not born 
in the capital city of the country they reside in; and they have not been resid-
ing continuously in the capital city since they were born.2 Individuals who are 
not migrants are considered natives. In the empirical analysis that follows, we 
restrict the sample to all active individuals 15–65 originating in one of the seven 
countries covered by the 1-2-3 surveys and residing in the capital city of one of 
these countries, either as natives or immigrants. 
As the fi gures in table 10.1 suggest, a wide variety of migration confi gurations 
is evident within WAEMU. Despite the severe sociopolitical crisis that started 
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Table 10.1 Composition of Samples Used to Analyze Migration in West Africa, 2001/02 
City
Number of immigrants from
Total number 
of immigrants
Total number 
of natives
Total sample 
sizeBenin Burkina Faso Côte d’Ivoire Mali Niger Senegal Togo Other No data
Abidjan 53 446 256 90 72 87 310 133 1447 5,974 7,416
Of which WAEMU 
nationals 52 428 231 85 65 79 120 124 1184  
Bamako 8 14 11 8 12 0 62 8 123 7,148 7,272
Of which WAEMU 
nationals 3 13 10 6 11 0 36 6 85
 
Cotonou 3 6 15 58 3 102 138 18 343 6,994 7,337
Of which WAEMU 
nationals 3 6 15 55 2 100 38 16 235  
Dakar 11 0 2 9 0 4 130 53 209 11,773 11,977
Of which WAEMU 
nationals 7 0 2 9 0 1 74 35 128  
Lomé 88 9 9 11 50 3 113 23 306 5,927 6,254
Of which WAEMU 
nationals 87 9 8 11 44 3 24 21 207    
Niamey 76 49 4 122 5 59 52 26 393 7,710 8,106
Of which WAEMU 
nationals 67 49 4 119 5 48 27 23 342
 
Ouagadougou 11 7 8 2 1 16 18 11 74 8,198 8,251
Of which WAEMU 
nationals 6 7 7 0 1 16 5 7 49  
Total 247 521 39 421 208 96 268 823 272      
Of which WAEMU 
nationals 222 502 37 392 190 87 244 324 232      
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) conducted in 2001/02 by the Observatoire 
économique et statistique d’Afrique Subsaharienne (AFRISTAT); Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation (DIAL); and national statistics institutes.
Note: All individuals 15–65 are considered as natives of country i if they always resided in country i, whether or not they identify themselves as citizens. Within the sample of immigrants 
coming from one of the six other WAEMU countries, some are not WAEMU nationals (for example, a French national who spent 10 years in Burkina Faso before moving to Benin is 
recorded as a migrant coming from Burkina Faso but is not Burkinabe). Groups considered in the analysis are in bold. WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union.
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with the military coup of 1999 and resulted in reverse fl ows of migrants, Côte 
d’Ivoire is still by far the most important immigration country in the WAEMU 
region.3 Although migration fl ows from Burkina Faso and Mali have been fl uc-
tuating since the beginning of the crisis, these two neighboring countries remain 
the main source of migrants to Côte d’Ivoire. About 15 percent of Abidjan’s popu-
lation between 15 and 65 are immigrants, among which 74 percent are citizens of 
a WAEMU country (table 10.2).
By contrast, immigrants from bordering WAEMU countries account for only 
a marginal share of the population in Dakar, the capital of Senegal. Less than 
2 percent of Dakar’s inhabitants are non-Senegalese, among which a large share 
comes from Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Th e Gambia, Mauritania, or Mali. Expa-
triates from Mali and Burkina Faso and living in the capital city of a WAEMU 
country largely outnumber the expatriates from WAEMU countries residing 
in Bamako or Ouagadougou, suggesting that the two countries remain major 
labor-exporting countries. By contrast, Benin, Niger, and Togo combine both 
emigration and immigration. 
Table 10.3 reports census statistics on immigrants by country of origin in 
each of the seven countries studied. Overall, the same general migration pat-
terns emerge: national data confi rm the position of Côte d’Ivoire as the main 
labor-importing country of the region, with most migrants coming from Mali 
or Burkina Faso. Th ey also confi rm the marginal participation of Senegal in 
 intraregional migration fl ows and the role of Benin, Niger, and Togo as both 
importers and exporters of labor. Th e picture for Burkina Faso, however, strongly 
diff ers from the one drawn based on data from Ouagadougou only. Rural Burkina 
Faso is indeed found to host a fairly large number of Malian migrants, who are 
not accounted for in our urban sample. Our inferences for Burkina Faso using 
data on Ouagadougou should thus be considered with caution. 
Table 10.2 Weighted Shares of Immigrants among Urban Residents in Seven Cities in West 
Africa, 2001/02
(percent)
Migrant status Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Natives 84.1 98.4 96.4 98.5 95.5 95.6 99.3
Immigrants 15.9 1.6 3.6 1.6 4.5 4.4 0.7
Of which:
From WAEMU 
country 73.5 43.8 60.6 13.0 60.7 85.7 70.7
From other 
developing country 25.2 43.4 36.4 83.9 38.8 12.2 23.9
From developed 
country 1.3 12.6 3.1 3.1 0.8 2.2 6.2
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 10.1 for details).
Note: WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union.
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Representativeness of Sample
It is likely that the migrants’ samples from the 1-2-3 surveys are not representa-
tive of the whole population of migrants, because they exclude individuals who 
moved out of their country to settle in a rural area of another WAEMU country. 
Th ese migrants may strongly diff er from the migrants recorded in our samples, 
especially with regard to their distribution by country of origin. 
Another issue possibly aff ecting the representativeness of our samples relates 
to the fact that immigrants are a relatively small share of the population and 
may cluster in some areas. Given the sampling frame of the 1-2-3 surveys, it is 
possible that such areas were missed when the census sectors were selected in 
the fi rst stage. Th is possibility cannot be ruled out in some cities. 
We believe our samples are representative in Abidjan, Bamako, and Lomé. 
In Lomé, where 125 of 129 census sectors were selected, the probability that we 
missed clusters of migrants is low. In Abidjan and Bamako, our estimates on 
the immigration rate at the level of the city and on the composition of migrants’ 
stocks by country of origin are very similar to the estimates obtained using 
census data. In addition, we used our representative samples of census sectors 
in each city to test the null hypothesis of random allocation of migrants across 
neighborhoods and rejected it in none of our samples. For other countries, the 
representativeness of the sample can be questioned.
Migrants’ Main Characteristics
Table 10.4 provides descriptive statistics on the main characteristics of 
natives and immigrants by city of residence. Several fi ndings are worthy 
of note. First, women are underrepresented in the immigrant populations of 
Abidjan, Ouagadougou, and Lomé but slightly overrepresented among the 
Table 10.3 Composition of Migrant Population in Seven Countries in West Africa, 2000
Country
Percentage of immigrants coming from
Total 
number of 
immigrantsBenin
Burkina 
Faso
Côte 
d’Ivoire Mali Niger Senegal Togo
Benin 4.7 20.0 5.1 25.3 0.4 44.5 57,971
Burkina Faso 10.2 4.9 61.1 19.3 1.9 2.7 717,271
Côte d’Ivoire 3.7 58.8 29.3 7.8 0.2 0.1 1,661,157
Mali 18.8 49.4 3.2 17.8 4.5 6.3 22,529
Niger 15.9 17.1 7.8 55.3 1.3 2.5 60,922
Senegal 4.8 12.2 1.0 76.1 4.4 1.5 31,077
Togo 77.8 0.8 0.1 2.9 18.1 0.3 92,234
Total number 
of emigrants 221,362 1,006,194 52,335 987,480 305,471 20,198 50,121 2,643,161
Source: National census data circa 2000.
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Table 10.4 Mean Characteristics of Natives and Immigrants in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
(percent, except where otherwise indicated) 
Variable
Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants
Men 47.6 61.5** 49.1 51.1 48.2 42.5 47.1 47.4 47.6 56.2** 48.6 43.5 50.7 54.1
Age (years) 29.0 34.6** 31.2 30.4 31.1 30.8 30.9 33.9 30.4 30.9 30.7 33.9** 30.2 30.4
Education and experience
Years of 
experience 16.4 26.6** 20.3 18.1 18.5 21.3 19.5 19.4 17.7 20.4** 19.6 25.5** 19.1 18.7
Years of 
schooling 6.6 2.0** 4.8 5.8 6.6 3.6** 5.3 8.6** 6.6 4.5** 5.1 2.3** 5.1 5.7
No diploma 44.7 83.5** 58.4 55.8 45.8 72.4** 60.2 31.6** 42.8 63.0** 60.9 81.5** 54.3 54.1
Completed 
primary 
education 27.6 10.2** 19.2 16.3 26.7 14.9** 18.5 15.8 31.9 24.7** 20.3 11.6** 24.6 13.5
BEPC (Brevet 
d’études du 
premier cycle du 
second degré) 10.4 2.7** 8.1 4.7 13.2 6.1** 11.0 21.1 14.7 5.6** 7.2 2.4** 11.3 18.9
Baccalauréat 4.8 0.6** 2.2 7.0** 4.0 3.9 3.8 5.3 3.2 1.2 2.6 0** 1.6 0
Can read and 
write in French 73.8 28.5** 49.2 51.2 71.6 37.0** 60.4 73.7 73.7 53.7** 56.5 29.8** 59.6 64.9
Can read and 
write in other 
language 25.0 10.9** 12.2 34.9** 24.5 26.5 19.3 47.4** 27.1 22.2 21.6 18.2 13.3 24.3**
Religion
Muslim 31.2 73.3** 97.2 79.1** 9.9 47.0** 93.3 57.9** 9.6 45.7** 98.2 76.4** 55.8 37.8** 
Catholic 35.9 17.8** 1.8 18.6** 67.2 31.5** 6.6 42.1** 47.6 24.7** 1.2 19.5** 36.2 18.9** 
Protestant 10.7 3.4** 0.5 2.3 5.2 3.9 0.1 0 10.2 0.6 0.4 3.4 ** 6.5 27.0** 
Number of 
observations 5,974 940 7,148 43 6,994 181 11,773 19 5,927 162 7,710 292 8,198 37
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 10.1 for details).
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level
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immigrant populations of Cotonou and Niamey. Traditional male-dominated 
short- to long-distance migratory streams in West Africa are thus becom-
ing feminized, suggesting a turnaround in traditional gender roles. Second, 
immigrants are signifi cantly older than natives in Abidjan, and Niamey but 
roughly of the same age as natives in the other cities. Th ird, immigrants 
appear to be less educated on average than natives in four cities (Abidjan, 
Cotonou, Lomé, and Niamey). Th e education gap is particularly large in 
 Abidjan, where immigrants have 2.0 years of schooling on average against 
6.6 years for natives. 
Th e statistics for natives were computed using data collected in capital cit-
ies only. Some of them are thus likely to be bad proxies for the situation at the 
national level (mean education levels, for example, are generally much higher in 
urban areas than in rural ones). It should consequently come as no surprise that 
immigrants in Abidjan, Cotonou, Lomé, and Niamey (a majority of whom may 
come from rural areas) are on average less educated than nationals in these cit-
ies. Th e fact that in Bamako, Dakar, and Ouagadougou, immigrants appear to be 
more educated on average than natives suggests that these cities attract mainly 
educated people or people from urban areas. Because of the small sample size, 
however, the fi gure for Dakar should be taken with caution.
As a complement to table 10.4, table 10.5 provides some descriptive statistics 
on the main characteristics of natives (“stayers”) and emigrants (“movers”), by 
country of origin. In all countries except Togo and, to a lesser extent, Benin, men 
are overrepresented in the emigrant population. Intraregional migratory fl ows 
from these two countries are motivated mostly by commercial purposes and have 
traditionally been dominated by women. In terms of education, emigrants appear 
much less educated than nonmigrant natives in all countries, suggesting that 
migration fl ows within the WAEMU region mainly involve low-qualifi ed workers. 
Migrants’ Employment Status
On average, labor force participation is higher for immigrants than for natives.4 
Th e diff erence is particularly large in Abidjan and Niamey, suggesting that 
migration streams to these cities are motivated mainly by labor market consid-
erations. Given the individual characteristics of immigrants, particularly with 
respect to their level of education, one would expect their employment situation 
to be less favorable than that of natives in Abidjan, Cotonou, Lomé, and Niamey 
and more favorable in Dakar. In developing economies, formal wage workers in 
the public or private sector are considered to have a favorable employment situ-
ation; informal sector workers are considered to have an unfavorable situation. 
Th e fi gures in table 10.6 indicate that this is indeed the case. Th e percentage 
of immigrants working in the informal sector is much higher than the percent-
age of natives in Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Lomé, and Niamey; it is lower in 
Dakar and Ouagadougou. 
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Table 10.5 Mean Characteristics of Natives and Emigrants in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
(percent, except where otherwise indicated)
Variable
Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Natives Emigrants Natives Emigrants Natives Emigrants Natives Emigrants Natives Emigrants Natives Emigrants Natives Emigrants
Men 47.6 54.1 49.1 57.4** 48.2 44.6 47.1 71.2** 47.6 38.5** 48.6 67.9** 50.7 58.4**
Age (years) 29.0 27.9 31.2 34.9** 31.1 32.8** 30.9 37.4** 30.4 30.2 30.7 31.7 30.2 34.7**
Education and experience
Years of 
experience 16.4 15.4 20.3 27.7** 18.5 21.5** 19.5 26.9** 17.7 20.0** 19.6 23.4** 19.1 27.0**
Years of 
schooling 6.6 6.5 4.8 1.2** 6.6 5.3** 5.3 4.1** 6.6 4.2** 5.1 2.3** 5.1 1.8**
No diploma 44.7 43.2 58.4 90.3** 45.8 55.9** 60.2 65.5 42.8 67.2 60.9 81.6** 53.3 86.5**
Completed 
primary 
education 27.6 21.6 19.2 6.4** 26.7 23.4 18.5 14.9 31.9 19.3** 20.3 11.6** 24.6 9.0**
BEPC (Brevet 
d’études du 
premier cycle du 
second degré) 10.4 8.1 8.1 1.0** 13.2 8.6** 11.0 6.9 14.7 7.0** 7.2 2.6** 11.2 2.2**
Baccalauréat 4.8 8.1 2.2 0.3** 4.0 0.9** 3.8 6.9 3.2 0.8** 2.6 1.1 1.6 0.4**
Can read and 
write in French 73.8 64.9 49.2 16.1** 71.6 57.2** 60.4 51.7 73.7 48.0** 56.5 27.9** 59.6 27.9**
Can read and 
write in another 
language 25.0 37.8** 12.2 13.3 24.5 18.9 19.3 21.8 27.1 18.0** 21.6 31.9** 13.3 8.2**
Religion
Muslim 31.2 51.4** 97.2 99.2** 9.9 25.2** 93.3 86.2 9.6 24.2** 98.2 96.3 55.8 69.5**
Catholic 35.9 16.2** 1.8 0.3** 67.2 38.7** 6.6 10.3 47.6 44.3 1.2 1.6 36.2 26.1**
Protestant 10.7 2.7 0.5 0.5 5.2 6.8 0.1 1.1** 10.2 12.3 0.4 0.5 6.5 2.2**
Number of 
observations 5,974 37 7,148 392 6,994 222 11,773 87 5,927 244 7,710 190 8,198 502
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 10.1 for details).
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 10.6 Employment Situation of Natives and Immigrants in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
(percent except where otherwise indicated)
Variable
Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants
Employment status
Employed 59.7 77.9 57.5 58.1 68.0 73.1 50.4 57.9 70.6 74.7 47.5 65.7 56.6 56.8
Unemployed 11.4 4.7 4.2 2.3 4.1 2.2 7.5 0.0 6.7 3.7 7.9 3.8 11.0 16.2
Inactive 28.8 17.5 38.4 39.5 27.9 26.5 42.1 42.1 22.6 21.6 44.6 30.5 32.3 27.0
Number of 
observations 5,974 940 7,148 43 6,994 181 11,773 19 5,927 162 7,710 292 8,198 37
Sector
Public sector 8.4 1.0 11.5 4.0 8.8 0.0 9.0 0.0 8.1 1.7 17.9 1.0 13.9 9.5
Formal 
private sector 21.4 12.7 11.7 8.0 11.6 10.9 17.6 36.4 8.2 12.4 13.6 10.4 9.0 19.1
Informal 
private sector 70.2 86.3 76.8 88.0 79.5 89.1 73.4 63.6 83.8 86.0 68.5 88.6 77.1 71.4
Wage
Hourly wage 
(CFA francs, 
purchasing 
power parity) 467 276 347 578 255 182 417 754 192 255 337 234 271 240
Number of 
observations 3,569 732 4,107 25 4,759 129 5,935 11 4,186 121 3,664 192 4,642 21
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 10.1 for details).
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Average hourly earnings follow roughly the same pattern. Compared with 
natives, immigrants earn much lower hourly wages in Abidjan (–41 percent), 
Niamey (–30 percent), and Cotonou (–29 percent); they earn much higher 
hourly wages in Dakar (91 percent), Bamako (67 percent), and Lomé (33 per-
cent).5 Lomé is an anomaly: although immigrants are less educated on average 
and more concentrated in the informal sector, they earn signifi cantly higher 
hourly wages than natives.
Model Speciﬁ cation and Estimation Strategy 
We take advantage of the simultaneity and strict comparability of the 1-2-3 
surveys to evaluate the impact of hourly wage diff erences in the seven cities 
on individuals’ residential choice. Th e econometric estimation is performed in 
three steps. First, using the pooled sample of 31,647 individuals observed in 
the seven cities, we estimate the determinants of individual residential choice, 
assuming that it refl ects comparison of the hourly wage that can be obtained in 
each destination city, together with other variables. More precisely, we assume 
that each individual i born in country j and living in city k derives utility from 
its choice of residence, written as 
 ui(j, k) = α.lnyik + z iʹ  fk + vi(j,k) (10.1)
with lnyik the logarithm of individual i hourly earnings in city k, and zi a vector 
of individual characteristics, such as religion. Individual i prefers to live in city 
k if doing so yields the highest utility: 
 ui(j, k) – c(j, k) ≥ ui(j, l) – c(j, l) for all l (10.2)
where c(j, k) is the cost of settling in city k when born in country j.6 Th ese costs 
cannot be observed. In the econometric estimation of the model, we use nation-
ality dummies to account for them, assuming that individuals originating from 
the same country face the same level of costs.
As individual hourly wages are observed only in the city of residence, equa-
tion (10.1) is estimated in a reduced form, obtained by replacing the logarithm 
of wage by a linear combination of its determinants:
 ui(j, k) = α  (xʹik  ak) + z iʹ  fk + ei(j, k) (10.3)
Under appropriate assumptions on the distribution of the error term, this 
model can be estimated as a multinomial logit. Th e estimated coeffi  cients can 
then be used to predict individual probabilities of residing in a given city.
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Second, we use the predicted probabilities computed in the fi rst step to cor-
rect for the self-selection of migrants in the hourly wage equation:
 lnyik = xʹik.ak + uik. (10.4)
Holding account of migrants’ self-selection is necessary because migrants 
could share some unobservable characteristics (such as motivation) that could 
be correlated with other observable determinants of wages (such as education). 
Following Dahl (2002), we correct for self-selection by adding to the wage equa-
tion a polynomial function of the choice probabilities computed in the fi rst 
step as a control for unobserved characteristics that would otherwise bias the 
estimates.
Th ird, we use hourly wages estimated for each individual in each country to 
evaluate the impact of expected wage diff erences on the probabilities of choice 
(that is, the value of coeffi  cient α in equation [10.1]).
Model Identiﬁ cation and Choice of Variables
In order to be identifi ed, our model relies on various assumptions, which need 
to be properly tested. In particular, in the second step of our procedure, in 
which we correct for individuals’ self-selection, it is important to include one 
or more variables that explain locational choice (that is, enter the fi rst-stage 
equation) but do not infl uence earnings. In what follows, we use dummies indi-
cating whether the individual’s father did not go to school or was absent when 
the individual was 15, together with dummies for the individual’s religion and 
nationality, as identifying variables. Religion is likely to have an infl uence on 
destination choice, given that the dominant religion is diff erent in diff erent cit-
ies. Nationality dummies are included to account for macro-level variables, such 
as average gross domestic product per capita, mortality rates, and the shares of 
immigrants from ECOWAS countries in the city’s population. Th ese variables 
also capture migration costs between the origin country and destination city. 
Any one of these exclusion restrictions could be violated. For example, if 
there is discrimination against people of a particular nationality or religion in 
a particular destination city, these variables would infl uence earnings. If the 
quality of education is diff erent for people from diff erent countries, nationality 
could also infl uence earnings by aff ecting schooling diff erences. We believe dis-
crimination on the basis of nationality or religion to be second-order concerns 
within the cities of our sample, and there is evidence that the quality of school-
ing does not diff er dramatically across countries of origin.7 
It could also be argued that father’s education and father’s presence in the 
household when individuals are 15 are correlated with household wealth, which 
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aff ects occupational choice and earnings. However, overidentifi cation tests do 
not reject the null hypothesis of zero correlation between our instruments and 
the principal equation error terms in fi ve of seven cities. 
In the third stage of our procedure, identifi cation of the log-earnings coef-
fi cient in the structural model of residential choice depends on the exclusion 
from equation (10.1) of at least one variable that enters in the log-earnings 
equation (10.3). We assume that gender, education, and employment sec-
tor explain log-hourly earnings but not residential choice, once earnings are 
accounted for. Th ere are some good reasons why education might determine 
residential choice, apart from its impact on potential earnings. One possibil-
ity is that well-educated individuals prefer cities in which the average level of 
education is high, not only because their own wages are more likely to be higher 
but also because they will benefi t from positive externalities related to the high 
average level of education (such as a richer supply of cultural goods). In our 
sample, however, movers appear much less educated on average than stayers, 
in both origin countries’ capitals and destination cities. We therefore believe 
this incentive to be low. 
It could also be argued that people moving abroad experience a loss in utility 
because of the remoteness of their home country, extended family, and friends. Th is 
loss could induce a direct eff ect of the gender variable on locational choice, in addi-
tion to its indirect eff ect through earnings, if men (women) experience a greater loss 
than women (men). However, it is not clear whether the diff erence between men 
and women in this utility loss should be large, as both rely on networks of family 
and friends and may have similar preferences to remain in their home country. 
Excluding the employment sector from the locational choice decision does 
not seem too heroic an assumption given the strong similarities in the structure 
of urban labor markets (and in the share of public versus private and formal 
versus informal jobs in particular) in the seven cities.
In the earnings equation, the dependent variable is the logarithm of total 
hourly earnings in CFA francs. All earnings are expressed in purchasing power 
parity (PPP). Th e conversion to PPP CFA francs is necessary in the third step of 
our estimation, where expected earnings in the seven cities are allowed to infl u-
ence the probability of choice.8 Independent variables in the earnings equations 
are gender, education (as measured by the last diploma obtained), potential 
labor market experience and its square, the ability to speak French, the ability 
to speak another foreign language, dummies for the public or private formal 
sectors, and a series of dummies for the father’s activity when the individual 
was 15. Th is last set of variables is included both as a determinant of migration 
behavior and as a proxy for the individual’s sector choice, to account for earn-
ings diff erentials between sectors. Th e reduced-form multinomial logit model 
includes these variables, together with dummies for the individual’s religion 
and nationality. 
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As our estimation strategy is a multistep procedure, we bootstrapped the 
entire process with 50 replications. Bootstrapped standard errors were used for 
hypothesis testing.
Estimation Results
We fi rst present the results of the multinomial logit model before turning to the 
earnings equations and the structural model of residential choice. Th e section 
ends with some robustness checks. 
Reduced-Form Multinomial Logit of Residential Choice
Tables 10.7–10.9 present the estimation results. Table 10.7 shows the results of 
the reduced-form multinomial logit estimation. Th ese results are diffi  cult to 
comment on, because only the diff erences in the coeffi  cients with respect to the 
reference city (Dakar) can be identifi ed. Th us, for instance, the positive coef-
fi cient of the gender variable in the equation for Cotonou indicates that being 
Table 10.7 Reduced-Form Multinomial Logit Estimates of Individual Residential Choice in 
Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Gender (1 = male) 1.35*** 0.20 0.97*** 1.14*** 0.34 0.76**
(0.29) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.31)
CEP (Certiﬁ cat 
d’études 
primaires)
–0.20 
(0.45)
–0.04
(0.51)
–0.67
(0.50)
–0.12
(0.49)
–0.35
(0.50)
0.43
(0.49)
BEPC (Brevet 
d’études du 
premier cycle du 
second degré)
–0.25
(0.58)
0.01
(0.71)
–1.06
(0.65)
–0.49
(0.65)
–0.79
(0.67)
0.87
(0.67)
CAP (Certiﬁ cat 
d’aptitude 
professionnelle)
0.60
(1.07)
1.77
(1.19)
–1.03
(1.17)
–1.04
(1.16)
0.08
(1.19)
1.73
(1.19)
BEP (Brevet 
d’études 
professionnelles)
–1.05
(1.95)
0.52
(1.91)
–3.20
(2.06)
–0.24
(2.00)
–0.81
(1.99)
1.09
(2.09)
Baccalauréat   1.10* 1.35 1.24 1.60** 1.37* 2.32***
(0.60) (0.88) (0.80) (0.77) (0.79) (0.89)
Foundation degreea  –0.43 0.21 –2.62 –1.49 –0.86 1.07
(1.77) (1.84) (1.82) (1.84) (1.85) (1.91)
Bachelor’s degree  –0.43 0.51 –1.53 –1.20 –0.07 0.84
(0.92) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.99) (1.03)
Postgraduate 
degree
–4.88*** –3.85*** –5.51*** –5.45*** –3.99*** –4.01***
(1.06) (1.07) (1.02) (1.07) (1.06) (1.17)
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Marital status 
(1 = married)
–0.83*** –0.08 –0.34 –0.45 –0.42 –0.65**
(0.30) (0.33) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33)
Speaks French 
(1 = yes)
–0.29 –0.05 –0.16 0.22 0.22 –0.08
(0.34) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39) (0.39) (0.37)
Speaks another 
language (1 = yes)
0.20 –0.08 1.19*** 1.06*** 0.23 0.07
(0.35) (0.39) (0.41) (0.41) (0.40) (0.41)
Experience (years) 0.16*** –0.04 0.04 0.04 0.08* 0.03
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Experience squared –0.002*** 0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Public sector –1.60*** 0.26 –0.18 –0.29 –0.16 0.52
(0.59) (0.63) (0.63) (0.62) (0.62) (0.66)
Private sector –0.17 0.28 0.14 –0.24 0.19 –0.84**
(0.35) (0.39) (0.42) (0.41) (0.40) (0.38)
Father in 
agricultural sector
0.72** –0.41 0.12 0.20 –0.02 –0.07
(0.35) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39) (0.38) (0.38)
Father in industrial 
sector
–0.05 –0.52 –0.85 –0.68 –0.40 –0.80
(0.52) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.62)
Father in 
commercial sector
1.38*** 0.97** 0.81 1.15** 0.63 1.20***
(0.35) (0.42) (0.43) (0.43) (0.41) (0.41)
Father was senior 
executive
1.20** 1.27* 0.34 0.67 1.07 1.99**
(0.59) (0.73) (0.72) (0.72) (0.73) (0.79)
Father was midlevel 
executive
0.02 0.61 0.48 –0.08 0.61 0.22
(0.58) (0.65) (0.64) (0.63) (0.64) (0.66)
Father was absent 
at age 15
1.01** 0.69 1.47*** 1.14** 0.63 0.35
(0.48) (0.53) (0.54) (0.54) (0.53) (0.53)
Father never went 
to school
–0.59* –0.69* –0.56 –0.91** 0.10 0.31
(0.34) (0.38) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.37)
Father schooling 
missing
–4.62*** –2.79*** –7.09*** –3.75*** –3.05*** –3.72***
(0.65) (0.65) (0.77) (0.70) (0.68) (0.69)
Muslim –5.74*** –5.72*** –6.00*** –6.88*** –3.18* –5.55***
(1.78) (1.84) (1.80) (1.79) (1.84) (1.82)
Catholic –4.97*** –4.97** –4.15** –5.37*** –3.20* –4.57**
(1.80) (1.88) (1.82) (1.81) (1.86) (1.84)
Protestant –1.93 –2.65 –2.47 –3.39 –0.83 –0.92
(2.15) (2.25) (2.17) (2.16) (2.22) (2.19)
Intercept –1.62 –0.92 –3.98*** –2.35*** –6.01*** –4.83**
(1.94) (2.03) (2.21) (2.03) (2.10) (2.23)
Number of 
observations 31,647 31,647 31,647 31,647 31,647 31,647
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 10.1 for details).
Note: The dependent variable takes the value 1 (Cotonou) to 7 (Lomé), with 6 (Dakar) used as the comparison 
category. Nationality dummies were included but are not shown. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
University system derives from the French system, in which, until recently, second-year students could receive a 
diploma. This diploma is referred to here as the foundation degree. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
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male has a larger eff ect on the utility resulting from choosing Cotonou than 
the utility resulting from choosing Dakar. Th e results suggest that, among the 
seven cities under review, holding a postgraduate degree or being Muslim or 
Catholic increases the utility of living in Dakar more than the utility of living in 
any other city. By contrast, holding a baccalauréat degree increases the utility of 
residing in Abidjan, Niamey, Ouagadougou, or Lomé by much more than that 
of residing in Dakar. Unsurprisingly, being of Senegalese nationality increases 
the utility of living in Dakar much more than that of living in any other city 
except Bamako, where the coeffi  cient is insignifi cant (results not shown).
Earnings Equation
Following Dahl (2002), we use the estimated coeffi  cients of the reduced-form 
multinomial logit to compute, for each observation of the sample, a polynomial 
of choice probabilities that was added to the set of explanatory variables in the 
earnings equations. Table 10.8 presents the ordinary least squares regression 
results. As the coeffi  cients of the polynomials of the selection probabilities have 
no interpretation, we limit the presentation to the coeffi  cients of the variables 
that have a direct interpretation. 
Th e fi rst column shows the estimated coeffi  cients when no correction for 
endogenous selection is made. Th e second column presents the corrected 
coeffi  cients. Th e results of a series of Wald tests are shown at the bottom of 
the table. 
We computed several test statistics. First, we tested whether the selection 
correction terms enter the earnings equation signifi cantly. Second, we tested 
the hypothesis that the excluded variables (father, religion, and nationality dum-
mies) make no signifi cant contribution to the explanation of the dependent 
variable.
Tests confi rm that the model is correctly identifi ed. With the exception of 
Bamako and Lomé and the father dummies, the Wald test statistics are insig-
nifi cant, indicating that the vector of variables used to instrument residential 
choice does not contribute to the determination of earnings once the correction 
terms are included. For Bamako and Lomé, including the father dummies as 
explanatory variables did not change the results signifi cantly. 
As for the correction functions, in four cities (Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, 
and Lomé), we can reject the hypothesis that the coeffi  cients of the polynomi-
als included to correct for endogenous selection are all zero, suggesting that 
holding account of migrants’ self-selection aff ects the estimation of earnings 
equations in these cities. In no case, however, does adjusting for self-selection 
change the returns to education enough that the adjusted coeffi  cients lie outside 
the confi dence intervals for the unadjusted estimates. Th is result suggests either 
that, given the relatively small number of migrants in our samples, selection 
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Table 10.8 Ordinary Least Squares Log-Earnings Regressions for Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Gender (1 = male) 0.40*** 0.44*** 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.46*** 0.45*** –0.15*** –0.18*** 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.23*** 0.28*** 0.41*** 0.31***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08)
CEP (Certiﬁ cat 
d’études 
primaires)
0.55*** 0.55*** 0.21*** 0.23** 0.54*** 0.50*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 0.44*** 0.45***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08)
BEPC (Brevet 
d’études du 
premier cycle du 
second degré)
1.17***
(0.10)
1.19***
(0.08)
0.53***
(0.11)
0.56***
(0.13)
1.00***
(0.09)
0.94***
(0.09)
0.58***
(0.09)
0.57***
(0.09)
1.11***
(0.10)
1.13***
(0.10)
1.07***
(0.14)
1.08***
(0.13)
1.31***
(0.11)
1.30***
(0.12)
CAP (Certiﬁ cat 
d’aptitude 
professionnelle)
1.21***
(0.20)
1.19***
(0.16)
0.48***
(0.12)
0.54***
(0.13)
1.17***
(0.15)
1.07***
(0.16)
0.72***
(0.25)
0.74***
(0.14)
1.10***
(0.23)
1.24***
(0.21)
1.48***
(0.23)
1.42***
(0.18)
1.18***
(0.18)
1.19***
(0.16)
BEP (Brevet 
d’études 
profesionnelles)
1.13***
(0.20)
1.03***
(0.14)
0.98***
(0.11)
1.03***
(0.12)
0.95**
(0.47)
0.74**
(0.35)
0.86***
(0.26)
0.85***
(0.20)
1.34***
(0.24)
1.31***
(0.18)
1.30***
(0.20)
1.22***
(0.20)
1.74***
(0.25)
1.76***
(0.25)
Baccalauréat 1.71*** 1.66*** 0.81*** 0.81*** 1.37*** 1.35*** 0.97*** 1.05*** 1.64*** 1.63*** 1.90*** 1.90*** 1.85*** 1.86***
(0.15) (0.11) (0.20) (0.24) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.16)
Foundation 
degreea
2.08*** 2.08*** 1.00*** 1.06*** 2.14*** 1.94*** 1.17*** 1.14*** 2.72*** 2.74*** 1.90*** 1.82*** 2.14*** 2.10***
(0.15) (0.12) (0.16) (0.14) (0.20) (0.21) (0.26) (0.22) (0.28) (0.19) (0.25) (0.22) (0.22) (0.24)
Bachelor’s degree 2.30*** 2.26*** 1.42*** 1.49*** 1.98*** 1.89*** 1.40*** 1.39*** 2.53*** 2.58*** 2.26*** 2.16*** 2.41*** 2.41***
(0.13) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14) (0.11) (0.16) (0.12)
Postgraduate 
degree
1.81*** 1.73*** 1.15*** 1.14*** 1.74*** 1.61*** 1.39*** 1.36*** 2.20*** 2.27*** 1.98*** 1.89*** 1.62*** 1.65***
(0.21) (0.18) (0.23) (0.22) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.13) (0.27) (0.21) (0.18) (0.15) (0.23) (0.22)
Marital status 
(1 = married)
0.28*** 0.25*** 0.43*** 0.47*** 0.65*** 0.63*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.48*** 0.49*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.36*** 0.41***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
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Speaks French 
(1 = yes)
0.06 0.06 0.21*** 0.21** 0.14** 0.15* 0.30*** 0.32*** 0.08 0.07 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.40*** 0.45***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Speaks another 
language (1 = yes)
0.19** 0.17*** 0.13** 0.08 0.36*** 0.41*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.17* 0.32*** 0.34***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Experience (years) 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.14***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Experience squared –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.002***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Public sector 0.69*** 0.50*** 0.33*** 0.38*** 0.27*** 0.32*** 0.78*** 0.84*** 0.64*** 0.65*** 0.49*** 0.46*** 0.66*** 0.76***
(0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
Private sector 0.67*** 0.65*** 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.32*** 0.34*** 0.81*** 0.83*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.42*** 0.47***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Father in 
agricultural sector
–0.08 –0.05 –0.11** –0.18*** –0.02 –0.06 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03 –0.01 –0.02 –0.21*** –0.29***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07)
Father in industrial 
sector
–0.22** –0.19** –0.06 –0.06 0.15 0.10 –0.11 –0.12 –0.04 –0.02 –0.19 –0.21 –0.32** –0.37*
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.14) (0.21) (0.16) (0.19)
Father in 
commercial sector
–0.05 –0.02 0.10* 0.11* 0.06 0.01 0.01 –0.02 0.10 0.08 –0.13 –0.11 0.01 –0.03
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.11)
Father was senior 
executive
0.35** 0.35** 0.41*** 0.43*** 0.28** 0.19 0.26** 0.27** 0.17 0.18 –0.20 –0.23 0.24 0.21
(0.14) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.24) (0.15) (0.16)
Father was 
midlevel executive
–0.12 –0.18* 0.15** 0.17*** 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.09 0.10 –0.01 –0.01 –0.05 –0.07 0.09 0.12
(0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13)
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Number of 
observations 4,239 4,239 4,052 4,052 4,736 4,736 5,430 5,430 4,245 4,245 3,701 3,701 4,471 4,471
R-squared 0.41 0.41 0.32 0.32 0.44 0.44 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.40
Wald test for 
selection correction 
terms 10.60* 11.00* 17.30*** 5.54 28.00*** 6.49 6.02
Overidentiﬁ cation Wald tests
Father dummiesb 3.86 8.07** 1.64 1.05 10.10** 2.03 1.63
Religion dummies 3.22 0.33 3.41 0.90 3.44 1.70 0.59
Nationality 
dummies 5.48 2.45 4.61 0.02 7.17 7.60 7.72
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 10.1 for details).
Note: Figures show uncorrected and corrected estimates. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
a. University system derives from the French system, in which, until recently, second-year students could receive a diploma. This diploma is referred to here as the foundation degree. 
b. Father was absent when individual was 15; father had no schooling; father schooling is missing.
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
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does not strongly bias the estimated returns to education or that our control 
functions do not do much to correct for the type of selectivity that matters. 
In Abidjan, Cotonou, and Niamey, the corrected coeffi  cients are lower than 
the uncorrected coeffi  cients, suggesting that migrants to these cities share unob-
served characteristics that make their earnings higher than the host city average. 
Th e opposite is found in Bamako and Lomé. Th ese results have no implications 
for migrants’ positive or negative selection. Indeed, migrants could have lower 
than average earnings in their host city but still earn more than they would 
have in the capital of their country of origin. In order to check whether earn-
ings diff erentials matter in locational choice, we need to estimate the model in 
its structural form.
Comparing returns to education shows large diff erences across cities. In 
Bamako, and to a lesser extent Dakar, returns to education seem much lower 
than in the other cities. Th e increase in returns by grades does not appear 
very steep either. In Bamako, having completed primary school yields an 
estimated increase in hourly earnings of only 23 percent over uneducated 
individuals, a much lower estimate than in Abidjan (about 55 percent). In 
all cities, the largest returns are for bachelor’s degrees. Th e smallest increase 
is in Bamako (114 percent over uneducated individuals) and the largest in 
Lomé (227 percent).
Structural Model of Residential Choice
Do earnings diff erentials aff ect locational choice? Table 10.9 presents the results 
of the conditional logit estimation (equation 10.1). With no correction for 
endogenous selection, the coeffi  cient is small and weakly signifi cant. Its size 
more than doubles and becomes very signifi cant when we correct for endog-
enous selection, bringing support to the idea that individuals tend to locate in 
countries where their expected earnings are higher. 
Table 10.9 Structural Model Estimates of Individual Residential 
Choice in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
Model Estimated value of `
Uncorrected 0.31*
(0.16)
Corrected 0.78***
(0.15)
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 
10.1 for details).
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, 
*** significant at the 1 percent level.
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A second assessment of this notion is given by simulations that compare 
wages between origin and destination countries. We simulated these diff erences 
using the following procedure:
• Step 1: For each individual, compute the predicted value of the (log) average 
hourly income in each city.
• Step 2: For each individual, draw a value in the standard normal distribution.
• Step 3: For ea ch individual i and city k, combine the results of steps 1 and 2 
to compute the predicted value of the individual’s (log) hourly income in city 
k, summing the predicted average with the random term multiplied by the 
estimated standard deviation of (log) wages in that city. 
• Step 4: Repeat steps 2 and 3 100 times. For “movers,” compute m, the pro-
portion of individuals for whom the predicted hourly income is higher in 
their current city than in the capital of their country of origin. For “stayers,” 
compute the average value of predicted hourly income in the cities in which 
they chose not to reside. Th en compute s, the proportion of individuals for 
whom the average value of predicted hourly income is lower in the cities in 
which they chose not to reside than in their country of origin.
Table 10.10 shows the results of this exercise. For movers (stayers) in each 
city, it reports the proportion of individuals for whom m (s) exceeds 50 percent. 
In Bamako, Cotonou, and Ouagadougou, our model does a good job of predict-
ing that movers live in cities in which their hourly income is higher than in 
their city of origin. In Bamako in particular, income diff erentials seem to play 
an important role. Th e model also does a good job of predicting stayers in Abi-
djan, Bamako, Dakar, and Niamey. Th e model fails to predict the destination of 
movers from Dakar and Lomé and of stayers in Cotonou. Th e fact that it fails 
Table 10.10 Model Simulation Results of Moving and Staying in Seven Cities in 
West Africa, 2001/02 
City
Percentage of movers 
for whom m > 50 
Percentage of stayers 
for whom s > 50
Cotonou 85 1
Ouagadougou 90 24
Abidjan 50 59
Bamako 81 63
Niamey 23 83
Dakar 7 68
Lomé 8 31
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 10.1 for details).
Note: m = proportion of individuals for whom predicted hourly income is higher in current city than 
in capital of country of origin. s = proportion of individuals for whom average value of predicted 
hourly income is lower in cities in which they chose not to reside than in country of origin.
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to predict the behavior of workers in some cities should not be surprising, as 
potential income diff erentials are not the only motive for migration. Given that 
income is just one factor among many, the ability of the model to predict work-
ers’ choice based on potential income diff erentials is surprisingly good. 
For movers, we computed the diff erence between the predicted value of hourly 
earnings in the origin country capital and destination city; for stayers, we com-
puted the diff erence between the predicted value of hourly earnings in the origin 
country capital and an average of the predicted value of hourly earnings that could 
be obtained in the six potential destination cities. We then computed the average 
value of these diff erences separately for movers and stayers. Th e diff erence is close 
to zero (–0.36) for stayers, suggesting that for these people there is no real gain of 
moving abroad. In contrast, movers earned much higher hourly earnings abroad 
(–3.99) than they would have earned had they stayed in their country of origin. 
Robustness Checks
We conducted several robustness checks. First, in the second stage of our estima-
tion procedure, we ran a Heckman selection model using data on labor market 
participants and nonparticipants instead of an ordinary least squares regression 
on participants only. In the early estimations, because of the diffi  culty of control-
ling for both the endogenous selection of locational choice and labor force partic-
ipation, we restricted the sample to labor market participants. Th is limitation is a 
potential source of bias in our estimates. Th e identifying variable in the Heckman 
selection model is whether the individual is married, which is assumed to infl u-
ence labor market participation but not earnings. Results obtained in the third 
stage were not aff ected by this change, suggesting negligible biases. Second, we 
checked whether self-selected internal migration aff ected the observed returns 
to education. We found no evidence of selection bias. Th ird, as our results might 
depend on the set of conversion factors used to convert current CFA francs into 
purchasing power parity values, we reran the model using World Bank (2003) 
conversion factors. Th is modifi cation did not change the results signifi cantly.
Conclusion
Our results shed light on migration fl ows within the WAEMU region. Despite 
the severe political crisis that began in 1999, Côte d’Ivoire remains the most 
important destination country in the subregion. Mali and Burkina Faso remain 
major labor-exporting countries, largely toward Côte d’Ivoire. Benin and Togo 
combine emigration and immigration. 
Migrants tend to be less educated than nonmigrants, in both their origin and 
destination countries. Cross-border migration within the subregion thus seems 
to concern mainly people with low levels of education, who are more likely than 
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natives to work in the informal sector and receive lower wages. Not accounting 
for international migration in estimating returns to education yields upward 
biased estimates in three of seven countries and downward biased estimates 
in two others. However, disparities in returns to education between cities do 
not vanish, suggesting that country-specifi c amenities and other unobservable 
nonwage variables play important roles in the locational choice of individuals 
with diff erent levels of education. 
We also fi nd that expected earnings diff erentials have a very signifi cant eff ect 
on choice probabilities: everything else equal, people tend to live in cities in 
which their expected earnings are higher than elsewhere. Our sample is not a 
random sample of individuals from the WAEMU region, and we do not include 
all potential destinations. Th ese caveats notwithstanding, our results on the 
locational choice of a large sample of West Africans suggest that individuals in 
developing countries do not always deviate from the predictions of the standard 
economic model.
Notes
 1. WAEMU includes eight countries: the seven under review in this chapter (Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo) and Cape Verde. 
ECOWAS is a larger group of countries. It includes all WAEMU countries as well as 
Th e Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone.
 2. Although Abidjan and Cotonou are not the administrative capitals of Côte d’Ivoire 
and Benin, we refer to them as capitals because they are the most important cities in 
economic terms (Cotonou is also the seat of government). 
 3. Th e civil war in Côte d’Ivoire started in September 2002, a few months aft er comple-
tion of the 1-2-3 survey.
 4. Th e unemployment rates reported in tables 10.6 and table 1.6 in chapter 1 diff er, 
for two reasons. First, table 1.6 covers only the active population, whereas table 
10.6 includes inactive individuals. Second, table 10.6 is restricted to people 15–65, 
whereas table 1.6 covers everyone 10 and older. 
 5. Figures for Bamako and Dakar should be considered with great care given the small 
sample size.
 6. All sampled individuals were born in one of the seven countries under review. 
We assume that they chose to live in one of the capitals of these countries; the 
model is built to analyze the determinants of this choice. Th roughout the rest of 
the chapter, we distinguish between countries of origin and cities of destination 
or residence.
 7. Indeed, according to UNESCO’s (2005) Education for All 2005 Monitoring Report, 
which provides various indicators of the quality of education, none of the seven 
countries of concern stands out from the crowd. For instance, Benin ranks fi rst when 
the quality of education is measured by the probability of being literate aft er six years 
of primary school but fourth when quality is measured by test scores and seventh 
when measured by the average teacher wage. 
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 8. Th e PPP conversion factors were computed in 1998 by the Agence pour la Sécurité 
de la Navigation Aérienne en Afrique (ASECNA) and updated through 2001 using 
national infl ation rates.
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Returns to Returning in West Africa
Philippe De Vreyer, Flore Gubert, and Anne-Sophie Robilliard
Although labor migration has attracted much attention among researchers and 
resulted in a sizable body of literature on the welfare implications of migration 
and the uses and impact of remittances, the determinants and impacts of return 
migration have been underresearched. Th is neglect is surprising, because a large 
proportion of migrants return home at some point in their life cycle, making 
many migrations temporary.1
In West Africa, subregional, interregional, and international migration is 
essentially temporary (although tighter immigration policies in Europe have 
lengthened the duration of migration there) (Adepoju 2005; Ba 2006). Accord-
ing to surveys conducted in 1993 by the Réseau Migrations et Urbanisation en 
Afrique de l’Ouest (REMUAO) in seven countries, 111,000 people ages 15 and 
older migrated from REMUAO countries to Europe between 1988 and 1992, 
and 33,000 migrants returned (Bocquier 1998).2 
Empirical evidence concerning the relationship between return migration 
and development is too fragmentary and contradictory to be used to draw clear 
conclusions or formulate concrete policy measures. Th e developmental impact 
of return migration is likely to vary signifi cantly depending on several critical 
factors, including its book, the characteristics of return migrants, the degree 
and direction of selectivity, the reasons for return, and the situation prevailing 
in the home country. For example, even when migrants acquire new skills and 
experience abroad, they may not be able to apply them back home. Indeed, it is 
diffi  cult for migrants who have acquired technical or industrial skills to apply 
them in rural settings, where the infrastructure needed to make eff ective use 
of new skills is lacking. In urban areas, where access to jobs is much easier for 
individuals with dense social or family networks, return migrants may fi nd it 
diffi  cult to get a job if they failed to maintain strong social ties with their family 
and friends in the home country while working abroad. 
We estimate the impact of return migration at the individual level. Our 
aim is to shed light on whether the fi nancial capital and new skills acquired 
abroad are used productively back home. We examine this issue by investigat-
ing whether return migrants’ experience abroad provides a positive earnings 
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premium for wage-earners, a productivity advantage for business owners, or 
both, upon returning.
Th e chapter is organized as follows. We begin by reviewing the empirical lit-
erature on the impact of return migration from sending countries’ perspective. 
In the second section, we describe the data and provide descriptive statistics 
on the characteristics of return migrants, which we compare with statistics on 
migrants and nonmigrants. In the third section, we analyze the labor market 
performance of return migrants by estimating earnings functions or produc-
tion functions. In the last section, we provide concluding remarks and suggest 
directions for future work.
Review of the Empirical Literature 
Empirical studies on the labor market performance of return migrants investi-
gate whether returnees are able to apply at home what they learned abroad by 
comparing the wages of return migrants with the wages of people who stayed 
in the home country (see, for example, Kiker and Traynham 1977; Enchautegui 
1993; Co, Gang, and Yun 2000; de Coulon and Piracha 2005; Rooth and Saarela 
2007). Contrasting results emerge from this literature. 
Using data collected in 1980 on a sample of Puerto Rican men who returned 
from the United States in the 1970s, Enchautegui (1993) fi nds that experience 
abroad is neither penalized nor rewarded. Th e explanation provided by the 
author is that Puerto Rican migrants in the United States are confi ned to low-
skilled jobs, where little human capital investment takes place. 
In contrast, using panel data on a large sample of Hungarian households, 
Co, Gang, and Yun (2000) fi nd that foreign experience matters and that a wage 
premium is paid for having gone abroad. Th eir results also suggest large diff er-
ences in the returns to foreign experience by gender and host country: foreign 
experience strongly matters for women but not for men. Women who migrated 
to countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) earn a 67 percent premium over women who have not been abroad. In 
contrast, the premium is insignifi cant for women who migrated to non-OECD 
countries. 
No such quantitative analysis has been conducted on African return 
migrants. However, a study of female migrants from Ghana argues that most of 
them did not learn anything new while working abroad, because they worked 
only in unskilled jobs (Brydon 1992). 
Potential selection biases are an important methodological issue in this 
strand of literature. In the case of return migration, individuals are self-
selected (see, for example, Nakosteen and Zimmer 1980; Borjas 1987; Borjas 
and Bratsberg 1996). Th e selective process is said to be positive if individuals 
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who choose to leave a country (and to return to their home country in the 
case of return migrants) are more able or more motivated than individuals 
who choose not to migrate. Ignoring self-selection in the process of return 
migration may result in biased estimates of the wage premium related to 
experience abroad. 
De Coulon and Piracha (2005) fi nd evidence that return migrants in Albania 
are negatively self-selected (that is, had they chosen not to migrate, their labor 
market performance would have been worse than that of nonmigrants). Using 
Hungarian data, Co, Gang, and Yun (2000) address the self-selection issue by 
estimating two types of earnings equations. Th ey fi rst estimate an earnings equa-
tion using a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression in which a dummy 
variable captures whether an individual has foreign experience or not. Th ey 
then estimate the same earnings equation using maximum likelihood estima-
tion (MLE) techniques to control for self-selection in the migration decision. 
For men, the MLE coeffi  cient on foreign experience is smaller than the OLS 
coeffi  cient. Th is result means that part of the positive eff ect on earnings of 
going abroad in the OLS estimate refl ects the eff ect of self-selection: men who 
migrated would have earned more whether or not they had gone abroad. Th e 
reverse holds true for women, who negatively select migration. 
A few empirical studies examine the impact of return migration on the 
development of small businesses in the home country (Ilahi 1999; McCormick 
and Wahba 2001; Ammassari 2003; Black, King, and Tiemoko 2003; Wahba 
2004; Mesnard 2004; Nicholson 2004). Experience abroad may enable migrants 
to contribute to small business development in two ways. First, savings accumu-
lated abroad may help alleviate domestic capital market imperfections. Second, 
migrants may develop new skills and form new ideas abroad. 
McCormick and Wahba (2001) explore the extent to which Egyptian 
returnees become entrepreneurs and the infl uence on this process of overseas 
savings, overseas work experience, and premigration formal education. Using 
data from the 1988 Labor Force Sample Survey, they estimate a simple model 
of the probability that a return migrant is an entrepreneur. Th eir fi ndings sug-
gest that among literate returnees, total savings accumulated overseas and the 
length of overseas employment positively and signifi cantly aff ect the probabil-
ity of becoming an entrepreneur. Longer periods overseas have no infl uence on 
this probability among illiterate returnees. Ilahi (1999) examines similar issues 
for Pakistan, providing some evidence that return migrants use their savings 
to invest in self-employment. 
A project by the Centre for Migration Research of the University of Sussex 
explores the relationship between migration, return, and development among 
both “elite” and less-skilled returnees to Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire (Black, King, 
and Litchfi eld 2003). Although the research is mostly qualitative and the small 
sample sizes caution against generalizations, the authors identify key variables 
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infl uencing the propensity of returnees to invest in businesses: the skill level 
of migrants, the length of time they spend abroad, the work experience they 
gain and working conditions they experience, and the contacts they have with 
friends and relatives back home. 
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Th e data are taken from phases 1 and 2 of the 1-2-3 surveys conducted in the 
seven capital cities of the French-speaking countries of the West African Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) (see box O.1 in the overview for a 
description of these surveys).3 We fi rst use the sample of all individuals 15 and 
older interviewed in Phase 1 to compare the characteristics of return migrants 
relative to nonmigrants and immigrants. Nonmigrants are defi ned as individu-
als who never left  the country in which they were born and interviewed. Immi-
grants are nonnative residents, defi ned as individuals who are not citizens of 
the country they currently reside in. Return migrants are defi ned as individuals 
who were born in the country of current residence (or who are citizens of that 
country) who lived abroad for some time and then came back. Th ree types of 
return migrants can be identifi ed: migrants who came back from a WAEMU 
country, migrants who came back from an OECD country, and migrants who 
came back from a country outside WAEMU or the OECD. As we show, the 
three types of return migrants have somewhat diff erent characteristics. 
Because the surveys were not designed to investigate migration, they pro-
vide very limited information on the migration experience of returnees. Th e 
database contains no information on the year of departure; the place of resi-
dence at the time of migration; the duration of the stay (that is, whether it was 
temporary, seasonal, circular, or longer term); family and labor status during 
migration; or parents’ migrant status. 
Th e total sample comprises 58,459 individuals 15 and older (table 11.1). 
Th e sample of return migrants includes 3,594 individuals, 88 percent of them 
returning from non-OECD countries. Return migrants represent a relatively 
small share of the population living in the seven cities. Th e average share is 
4.8 percent, but it ranges from 1.9 percent in Dakar to 13.3 percent in Lomé.4 
In fi ve out of seven cities, the share of return migrants in the population is 
actually higher than the share of immigrants. Th e exceptions are Abidjan, 
where the share of immigrants in the population is very high (15.4 percent) 
and the share of return migrants low (2.1 percent), and Niamey, where the 
shares of both immigrants (4.3 percent) and return migrants (3.2 percent) 
are relatively small.
Phase 2 of the 1-2-3 survey is restricted to small informal microenter-
prises whose owners were surveyed during Phase 1. Th is sample includes 
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6,619 microentreprises. Th e survey collected detailed information on pro-
duction and sales, expenses, employee characteristics, and physical capital. 
It also includes information on the founding of the enterprise and its sources 
of capital.
Are return migrants diff erent from nonmigrants in terms of their individual 
characteristics? How do they compare with immigrants? Migration theory sug-
gests that migrants and return migrants choose where to live by comparing 
the advantages of living in various places. Th e utility of living abroad or in the 
home country can depend on observed and unobserved characteristics. If self-
selection occurs, one would expect migrants to be diff erent from nonmigrants 
and, among migrants, return migrants to be diff erent from migrants who stay 
abroad. In fact, observable diff erences between nonmigrants, return migrants, 
and immigrants in the seven cities studied are signifi cant and informative; dif-
ferences between return migrants from OECD countries and return migrants 
from non-OECD countries (both WAEMU and non-WAEMU) are also quite 
important. 
We start by examining the distribution of four individual characteristics: age, 
gender, marital status, and education. Return migrants tend to be older and bet-
ter educated than nonmigrants, and they are more likely to be men and married 
(see table 11.1). On average, return migrants are fi ve years older than nonmi-
grants, and 51 percent are men (compared with 48 percent in the nonmigrant 
population). Return migrants from OECD countries are on average fi ve years 
Table 11.1 Descriptive Statistics of Sample of Seven Cities in West Africa, by Migration 
Status, 2001/02
Statistic Nonmigrants
Return migrants from
Immigrants Total
WAEMU 
country
OECD 
country
Other 
country
All 
countries
Sample size 52,267 2,162 390 1,042 3,594 2,598 58,459
Share of 
sample 
(percent) 88.5 2.8 0.6 1.4 4.8 6.7 100.0
Average age 
(years)
31.0 34.8 40.3 36.1 35.9 34.1 31.4
(13.7) (15.1) (14.6) (15.8) (15.3) (12.2) (13.7)
Men (percent) 48.1 50.3 62.0 47.3 50.8 58.6 49.0
Married 
(percent) 42.7 54.4 60.9 55.4 55.5 62.4 44.6
Years of 
education
5.6 5.6 11.1 5.5 6.3 3.0 5.5
(4.9) (5.2) (6.7) (5.0) (5.7) (4.6) (5.0)
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries in the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU) conducted in 2001/02 by the Observatoire économique et statistique d’Afrique Subsaharienne 
(AFRISTAT); Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation (DIAL); and national statistics institutes.
Note: Figures are for individuals 15 and older. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. WAEMU = West 
African Economic and Monetary Union, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
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older than return migrants from non-OECD countries, and the proportion of 
men is much larger (62 percent versus 49 percent). Th e fact that return migrants 
are on average older than nonmigrants is not surprising, as future emigrants 
and future return migrants are included in the population of nonmigrants. Th e 
same reasoning can explain why immigrants in WAEMU are on average older 
than nonmigrants but younger than return migrants from WAEMU. 
On average, return migrants are a bit more educated than nonmigrants. 
Large diff erences exist between the average level of education of return migrants 
from OECD countries (more than 11 years) and return migrants from WAEMU 
(5.6 years) or other developing countries (5.5 years). Th ese diff erences do not 
result from the demographic composition of the samples. As shown in table 
11.2, diff erences in education levels between the three groups of returnees 
remain aft er controlling for gender, age, and religion. 
Two factors may explain the high average level of education of return 
migrants from OECD countries. First, educated people may fi nd it more profi t-
able to migrate to a developed country, where the returns to their human capital 
are likely to be higher. Second, people may migrate to obtain an education, in 
Table 11.2 Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of Years of Education on Individual 
Characteristics in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
Variable Coefﬁ cient P > |t|
Gender and age
Male 2.242 0.000***
Age 0.085 0.000***
Age squared –0.002 0.000***
Religion (reference = Muslim)
Catholic 2.758 0.000***
Protestant 2.977 0.000***
Other religion 1.151 0.000***
Migration status (reference = nonmigrant)
WAEMU return migrant 0.555 0.000***
OECD return migrant 5.969 0.000***
Other return migrant 0.020 0.890
Immigrant –1.995 0.000***
Constant 2.621 0.000***
Number of observations 58,058
R2 0.1478
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 11.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for individuals 15 and older. City dummies were included but are now shown. 
WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union, OECD = Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development.
*** significant at the 1 percent level.
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which case it is not surprising to observe that return migrants have a higher level 
of education than nonmigrants.5 Th e policy implications of the two explana-
tions are very diff erent. If educated people move to developed countries to ben-
efi t from high returns, brain drain will reduce the chance of the home countries 
to develop (Bhagwati 1972; Bhagwati and Hamada 1974; Usher 1977; Blomqvist 
1986; Haque and Kim 1995), unless a large enough portion of migrants with 
enough experience from abroad returns to compensate for the original loss, or 
the possibility to migrate increases the number of individuals who decide to get 
an education, provided that only a smaller number of them succeed in leaving 
their country (Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz 1997; Beine, Docquier, and 
Rapoport 2001, 2003). 
Labor Market Performance of Return Migrants 
Th e labor market performances of return migrants can be assessed in vari-
ous ways. In what follows, we start by examining the labor market participa-
tion, sectoral allocation, and earnings of return migrants. We then investigate 
whether return migrants’ experience abroad provides an earnings premium for 
wage-earners, a productivity advantage for business owners, or both.
Employment Situation of Return Migrants
In developing economies, wage-earners in the public or formal private sector 
and entrepreneurs or business owners in both the formal and informal sectors 
are considered “favored” over workers in the informal sector.6 Given the indi-
vidual characteristics of return migrants, particularly with respect to their level 
of education, one would expect their employment situation to be more favorable 
than that of nonmigrants. Descriptive statistics from table 11.3 indicate that this 
is the case to some extent for all migrants and very much the case for return 
migrants from OECD countries.
On average, labor force participation is higher for return migrants than for 
nonmigrants, with large diff erences across cities. Th e labor force participation 
of returnees is much higher than that of nonmigrants in Abidjan, Dakar, and 
Niamey. It is lower than that of nonmigrants in Ouagadougou and comparable 
to that of nonmigrants in Bamako, Cotonou, and Lomé. In contrast, among 
return migrants from OECD countries, labor force participation with respect to 
nonmigrants is higher in all cities (substantially so in some cities). Labor force 
participation of return migrants from countries outside WAEMU and OECD 
is also very high. 
Sectoral diff erences are not signifi cant on average for active nonmigrants and 
active return migrants. Th ey are striking, however, among migrants returning 
from OECD countries. For example, the proportion of the labor force working 
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as wage-earners in the public sector is 18.1 percent among migrants return-
ing from OECD countries, 5.4 percent among nonmigrants, and 5.3 percent 
among migrants returning from WAEMU countries. Similar diff erences can 
be observed with regard to the percentage of individuals working as wage-
earners in the formal private sector (16.9 percent among migrants returning from 
OECD countries versus 7.8 percent among nonmigrants) and as entrepreneurs 
(11.2 percent among migrants returning from OECD countries versus 3.1 percent 
among nonmigrants). Overall, these fi gures suggest that individuals returning 
from OECD countries gain access to more protected jobs and that the labor status 
of return migrants from other countries resembles that of nonmigrants. 
Th e share of return migrants from OECD countries with formal sector and 
management jobs is relatively high (and share of informal sector jobs relatively 
low). Th e sectoral distribution of returnees from non-OECD countries is simi-
lar to that of nonmigrants. 
Th e high participation rate of return migrants from OECD countries in the 
formal sector can be explained by their high educational level. But it could also 
indicate that their education, work experience, or both in OECD countries—
if any—allowed them to gain specifi c knowledge that is valued in the formal 
Table 11.3 Labor Force Participation of Nonmigrants, Return Migrants, and Immigrants in 
Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
(percent, except where otherwise indicated)
Variable Nonmigrants
Return migrants from
Immigrants All
WAEMU 
country
OECD 
country
Other 
country
All 
countries
Labor force 
participation 57.2 59.3 63.8 68.2 62.4 74.5 58.6
Public sector 
wage workers 5.4 5.3 18.1 3.4 6.3 0.9 5.1
Private formal 
sector wage 
workers 7.8 6.6 16.9 5.1 7.4 8.5 7.8
Business owners 3.1 4.0 11.2 5.7 5.4 8.3 3.6
Informal sector 
workers 83.7 84.1 53.8 85.8 80.9 82.3 83.5
Earnings of 
active individuals 
(1,000 CFAF 
purchasing 
power parity) 55.9 54.7 227.1 46.0 73.4 57.6 56.9
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 11.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for individuals 15 and older. WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union, 
OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
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sector, such as an ability to deal with or knowledge of foreign regulations, which 
could be valued in export-oriented sectors. 
In order to examine more thoroughly this “specifi c knowledge” argument, 
we check whether the higher labor participation of return migrants from OECD 
countries in formal private, public, or management jobs holds aft er controlling 
for a number of individual characteristics. We do so by running a multinomial 
logit regression of labor status on a number of individual characteristics on 
the pooled sample of all active individuals in the seven cities (table 11.4). Th e 
results indicate that when other individual characteristics are controlled for, the 
probability of working as a wage-earner in the public sector is actually lower 
for all return migrants. Th us, return migrants from OECD countries appear 
better able to secure jobs in the public sector because they have, on average, 
Table 11.4 Multinomial Logit Regressions of Alternative Labor Statuses in Seven Cities in 
West Africa (Marginal Effects), 2001/02
Variable
Men Women
Coefﬁ cient P > |t| Coefﬁ cient P > |t|
Public sector wage-earner
Years of education 0.021 0.000*** 0.006 0.000***
Potential experience 0.011 0.000*** 0.002 0.000***
Potential experience squared 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000***
Migration status (reference = nonmigrant)
WAEMU return migrant –0.041 0.000*** –0.003 0.032**
OECD return migrant –0.029 0.004*** –0.004 0.147
Other return migrant –0.044 0.000*** –0.007 0.000***
Immigrant –0.075 0.000*** –0.011 0.000***
Private formal sector wage-earner
Years of education 0.025 0.000*** 0.011 0.000***
Potential experience 0.014 0.000*** 0.002 0.000***
Potential experience squared 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000***
Migration status (reference = nonmigrant)
WAEMU return migrant 0.005 0.784 0.004 0.507
OECD return migrant –0.007 0.821 0.021 0.236
Other return migrant –0.045 0.017** –0.018 0.002***
Immigrant –0.055 0.000*** –0.005 0.359
Entrepreneur
Years of education 0.005 0.000*** 0.004 0.000***
Potential experience 0.006 0.000*** 0.002 0.000***
Potential experience squared 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.011**
(continued next page)
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more education, not because they migrated. Th e fact that aft er controlling for 
education public sector employment is actually lower for return migrants could 
refl ect the loss in social capital that migrants incur while living abroad. 
Th e probability of working as a wage-earner in the private formal sector is 
also signifi cantly lower for migrants returning from non-WAEMU and non-
OECD countries, but except for them, returnees do not appear more or less 
able to work in the private sector. Th e probability of being an entrepreneur 
in the formal or informal sector is signifi cantly higher for migrants return-
ing from OECD countries, even aft er controlling for a number of individual 
characteristics. Th is result could refl ect the acquisition of specifi c knowledge or 
the fact that their migration spell allowed them to accumulate capital to start 
up a business. Experience abroad for returnees from elsewhere does not have a 
signifi cant impact on entrepreneurship.
Because return migrants from OECD countries have more favorable charac-
teristics and positions in the labor market, it is no surprise that their earnings 
are higher than those of nonmigrants (see table 11.3). Whether this fi nding 
holds true aft er controlling for individual characteristics and selection biases 
is examined together with the specifi c knowledge argument in the rest of the 
chapter.
Do return migrants access their employment through the same channels 
as nonmigrants? Statistics presented in table 11.5 suggest that they do not. 
Return migrants appear to rely less on personal relations than nonmigrants do 
(35 percent versus 42 percent for nonmigrants). Th e gap is even larger when 
the sample of returnees is restricted to migrants returning from OECD coun-
tries (23 percent versus 42 percent). Whether these diff erences hold when 
controlling for their individual characteristics and the types of positions they 
obtain remains to be investigated. 
Migration status (reference = nonmigrant)
WAEMU return migrant 0.002 0.862 –0.006 0.272
OECD return migrant 0.078 0.010** 0.115 0.007***
Other return migrant 0.009 0.487 0.000 0.977
Immigrant 0.002 0.769 0.016 0.019
Number of observations 18,436 14,806
Pseudo R 2 0.1823 0.2998
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 11.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for individuals 15 and older. City dummies are included but not shown. Reference status is 
informal sector worker. WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union, OECD = Organisation for 
 Economic Co-operation and Development.. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 11.4 (continued)
Variable
Men Women
Coefﬁ cient P > |t| Coefﬁ cient P > |t|
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Th e data used in this study are a sample of urban residents living in capital 
cities of WAEMU. As a result, only migrants returning from abroad to live in 
the seven cities surveyed are observed; this sample is likely not to be representa-
tive of the global fl ow of return migration, introducing at least two biases. First, 
on average, one would expect migrants returning to live in capital cities to be 
more educated/skilled than migrants returning to live in other cities or rural 
areas. Second, one would expect the share of migrants returning from OECD 
countries to be larger in capital cities. 
To be sure, return migrants’ choice to live in an urban or rural area upon 
returning is likely to be correlated with the residence they left  when they chose 
to migrate. It is therefore informative to compare the destination of migrants 
originating from diff erent locations. Th at information is available for Senegal 
(Ba 2006), where migrants originating in Dakar appear to be much more likely 
to migrate to an OECD country than migrants from elsewhere in Senegal: 
almost 75 percent of migrants originating from Dakar migrated to Europe, the 
United States, or Canada versus 55 percent of migrants originating in other cit-
ies and only 40 percent of migrants originating in rural areas. 
In what follows, we use phases 1 and 2 of the 1-2-3 surveys to examine the 
labor market performance of return migrants. Using data from Phase 1, we esti-
mate individual earnings functions to measure the impact of return migration 
on earnings. We then push the analysis further by investigating whether return 
Table 11.5 Route of Access to Current Employment by Nonmigrants, Return Migrants, and 
Immigrants in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
(percent)
Route Nonmigrants
Return migrants from
Immigrants All
WAEMU 
country
OECD 
country
Other 
country
All 
countries
Personal 
relations 42.1 36.2 22.8 37.9 35.0 38.7 41.4
Directly through 
employer 9.9 9.9 19.0 7.3 10.3 7.2 9.7
National 
employment 
agency or 
announcement 1.3 1.6 6.2 1.4 2.1 0.5 1.3
Competitive 
examination 
(concours) 13.5 7.9 16.8 7.5 8.9 2.9 12.3
Personal 
initiative 31.4 42.3 27.9 44.5 41.2 49.7 33.5
Other 1.9 2.1 7.4 1.5 2.6 1.0 1.8
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 11.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for individuals 15 and older. WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union, 
OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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migrants are more productive microentrepreneurs, using data on the sample of 
self-employed workers and small fi rm owners surveyed in Phase 2.7
Experience Abroad and Earnings
We consider a semi-log specifi cation for the earnings equation:
 lnYi = Xiβ + RMiα + ei (11.1)
where lnY is the natural-log of monthly earnings, β and α are coeffi  cient vectors, 
and e is the stochastic term. Matrix X includes variables on personal charac-
teristics; RM is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is a return 
migrant.
We restrict the estimation of equation (11.1) to the sample of workers who 
are wage-earners. (Th e impact of being a return migrant on the remunera-
tion of self-employed individuals and business owners is examined later in the 
chapter.)
In order to properly estimate the impact of return migration on earnings, 
one needs to control for the selection of return migrants. A treatment eff ect 
model in which return migrants constitute the treated population and non-
migrants the untreated (or control) population does so. However, the quality 
of the treatment depends on the migrants’ destination. Return migrants are 
not a homogeneous population; migrants returning from OECD countries 
diff er signifi cantly from other return migrants. As individuals self-select into 
the treatment they receive, we run separate regressions for each of the three 
groups (returnees from a WAEMU country, returnees from an OECD country, 
and returnees from elsewhere). In each regression, the treated sample includes 
return migrants and the untreated sample includes nonmigrants. Immigrants 
are excluded from the regressions.
Th e self-selection of return migrants is only one potentially endogenous selec-
tion. Co, Gang, and Yun (2000) control for a double process of self-selection: 
labor force participation and return migration. Th ey estimate their model using 
maximum likelihood, allowing for correlation between the earnings equation 
error term and the migration and participation equations. We would have liked 
to control for participation and, among participants, the self-selection of wage 
workers. However, such a model proved impossible to estimate given the data 
at hand, forcing us to forgo accounting for individuals’ self-selection into wage 
employment.
Th e treatment eff ect model we estimate is given by equation (11.1), to which 
we add a second equation describing the probability of being a return migrant:
 RMi * = Qi' ξ + ui (11.2)
where RM* is a latent unobservable variable measuring the propensity to be 
a return migrant. Vector Qi includes Xi, together with instrumental variables. 
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Assuming normality of the error terms, the model can be estimated by maxi-
mum likelihood (MLE) or in two steps.
Proper identifi cation of the full structural model requires valid instru-
ments for the migration model. Co, Gang, and Yun (2000) use the locality 
in which an individual was born to instrument the probability of being a 
return migrant. De Coulon and Piracha (2005) employ the number of depen-
dents in the household, the population of the town of residence, and religion. 
Th e number of dependents in the household can be a good instrument if a 
tighter budget constraint acts as a push factor of migration and has no direct 
impact on the earnings equation. Religion and the number of dependents 
in the household could not be used in this survey. In some countries (such 
as  Senegal), religion does not off er enough variation in the sample, weaken-
ing its ability to explain migration. As for the number of dependents, it is 
observed only at the time of the survey; it could be very diff erent when the 
migrant left  or returned. 
Th e locality in which an individual was born is a good instrument if there are 
spatial variations in the probability to migrate—as a result, for instance, of vari-
ations in the geographical environment or in attitudes toward migration. We 
cannot employ the locality in which an individual was born, however, because 
it cannot be precisely observed for all individuals. Instead, we use the propor-
tion of return migrants in the neighborhood, excluding the worker’s household, 
in the computation. Th is variable should capture the same kind of variations 
as the locality of birth. Our second instrument is the father’s occupation when 
the worker was 15. Both instruments are expected to explain migration while 
having no direct impact on the earnings equation.
In order to assess the magnitude and size of the biases resulting from the 
two selection processes, we also report estimates of the earnings equation using 
OLS. To validate our choice of instruments statistically, we examine the com-
bined explanatory power of both variables in the instrumental equation and run 
overidentifi cation tests. We also take advantage of the existence of two alterna-
tive estimators (two-step estimator and MLE) to estimate our model. Th e two 
estimators should give asymptotically equivalent results, provided the model is 
correctly specifi ed. We thus consider as valid and reliable those estimates that 
are found statistically identical using one estimator or the other.
Table 11.6 presents the estimated coeffi  cients of the return migrant variable 
estimated on the subsample of migrants returning from WAEMU countries, 
OECD countries, and other countries.
Controlling for self-selection in going abroad dramatically changes the 
estimations. Whatever the last country of residence or gender of the return-
ees, the OLS coeffi  cient estimate is systematically lower than the MLE and the 
two-step estimates, although the diff erence is not always signifi cant. Th is result 
suggests that migrants are negatively selected in their population of origin—in 
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Table 11.6 Coefficient Estimates for Return Migrants in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02 
Gender/coefﬁ cient
Return migrants from
WAEMU country OECD country Other country
OLS MLE
Two-step 
estimator OLS MLE
Two-step 
estimator OLS MLE
Two-step 
estimator
Men
Return migrant dummy 
coefﬁ cient
–0.0118 0.0625 0.185 0.166** 0.384** 0.396* –0.0631 0.0625 0.185
(0.0409) (0.140) (0.220) (0.0729) (0.193) (0.205) (0.0587) (0.140) (0.220)
Correlation coefﬁ cient –0.059 –0.190 –0.0590
Women
Return migrant dummy 
coefﬁ cient
0.0750 0.703*** 0.244 0.309*** 0.907*** 0.744*** 0.107 0.0206 0.0783
(0.0550) (0.119) (0.218) (0.106) (0.175) (0.238) (0.0961) (0.414) (0.396)
Correlation coefﬁ cient –0.540*** –0.572*** 0.0684
All
Return migrant dummy 
coefﬁ cient
0.0359 0.292** 0.367** 0.241*** 0.681*** 0.751*** –0.00904 0.0389 0.128
(0.0332) (0.143) (0.163) (0.0608) (0.122) (0.161) (0.0508) (0.150) (0.239)
Correlation coefﬁ cient –0.205* –0.380*** –0.0353
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 11.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for individuals 15 and older. Reference status is nonmigrant. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union, 
OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OLS = ordinary least squares, MLE = maximum likelihood estimation. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
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other words, they share unobserved characteristics that, everything else equal, 
lead them to earn less than nonmigrants. Th is interpretation is confi rmed by 
the negative value of the correlation coeffi  cient between the error terms of the 
earnings and migration equation (–0.38, signifi cant at the 1 percent level in 
the pooled sample). Th is result is unexpected, as it is generally assumed that 
migrants are positively selected. De Coulon and Piracha (2005) fi nd a similar 
result in their study of Albania. Th e fi nding suggests that individuals who have 
been abroad may lack some desirable unobserved earnings capabilities. How-
ever, by going abroad they acquire other characteristics that the labor market 
rewards in the form of a wage premium.
Results obtained when male and female workers are pooled suggest that 
migrants returning from OECD and WAEMU countries earn more than non-
migrants. Splitting men and women into separate samples reveals, however, that 
the results for WAEMU countries are driven exclusively by women. However, 
as the MLE and the two-step estimates diff er substantially, we suspect that our 
model is misspecifi ed for this sample and choose not to retain this result. Results 
for migrants returning from OECD countries appear much more robust, as no 
signifi cant diff erence is found between the MLE and the two-step estimates. As 
MLE is a more effi  cient estimator, we comment only on the results obtained 
using this method. 
When men and women are pooled, the average wage premium for return 
migrants is estimated to be as high as 68 percent. When the sample is split, 
however, the premium for women (91 percent) is much higher than the estimate 
for men (38 percent). 
Using the Hungarian Household Panel Survey, Co, Gang, and Yun (2000) 
obtain a similar result. Th ey fi nd that women returning from OECD countries 
earn a premium of 67 percent on the Hungarian labor market. According to 
the authors, skills acquired abroad may explain such a large premium. During 
their stay abroad, women learn how Western economies operate. Th is knowl-
edge is particularly valuable in a country undergoing transition toward a market 
economy, as Hungary was at the time the data were collected. 
A similar explanation can be found here. As diff erences in the level of devel-
opment of WAEMU and OECD countries are very large, one would expect 
workers with Western work experience to have acquired skills that are very 
valuable on African labor markets. Th is experience could explain the large wage 
premium received by return migrants. 
Why women receive much larger premiums than men is unclear. Mea-
surement errors in the experience variable could be a possible explanation. 
Measures of women’s professional experience are particularly prone to errors 
because of the discontinuity of their labor market participation. If nonmigrant 
women have given birth to a larger number of children (and therefore have had 
more career interruptions) than women who spent some time abroad, potential 
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experience as a proxy for actual experience is likely to be upwardly biased for 
nonmigrant women. Th e large size of the return migrant coeffi  cient could partly 
capture this bias.
All these results are conditioned on the validity of the instruments. In 
tables 11.7 and 11.8, we present the values of the Chi-square test for the 
father’s activity dummies and the proportion of return migrants in the neigh-
borhood in the migration equation, together with the values of these sta-
tistics when these variables are added in the earnings equation. Th e father’s 
activity variables are highly signifi cant in the migration equation, except for 
the regression on women migrants returning from OECD countries. For this 
sample, the model is identifi ed only by the proportion of return migrants in 
the neighborhood. 
Father’s activity variables and the proportion of migrants in the neighbor-
hood are never signifi cant when included among the list of regressors in the 
earnings equation or when men and women are split into separate samples 
(table 11.8). Using the pooled sample, the father’s activity variables are jointly 
Table 11.7 Test of Instrumental Variables in Migration Equation
Gender/variable
Return migrants from
WAEMU country OECD country Other countries
MLE
Two-step 
estimator MLE
Two-step 
estimator MLE
Two-step 
estimator
Men
Father’s activity 25.0 24.8 26.6 28.0 16.7 16.7
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0103) (0.0106)
Percent return 
migrants in 
neighborhood 
3.15
(0.076)
3.02
(0.0823)
10.3
(0.0013)
9.72
(0.0018)
5.49
(0.0191)
5.62
(0.0178)
Women
Father’s activity 23.4 26.2 6.16 6.96 14.6 14.6
(0.0007) (0.0002) (0.4057) (0.3246) (0.0235) (0.0235)
Percent return 
migrants in 
neighborhood 
14.2
(0.0002)
14.1
(0.0002)
17.3
(0.0000)
11.3
(0.0008)
0.31
(0.5780)
0.42
(0.5185)
Full sample
Father’s activity 54.5 51.6 23.8 24.8 24.3 24.3
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Percent return 
migrants in 
neighborhood 
14.23
(0.0002)
13.1
(0.0003)
23.2
(0.0000)
19.3
(0.0000)
2.68
(0.1017)
2.76
(0.0964)
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 11.1 for details).
Note: Figures are Chi-square values for individuals 15 and older. Figures in parentheses are p-values. MLE = maximum 
likelihood estimation. WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union, OECD = Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development.
RETURNS TO RETURNING IN WEST AFRICA  341
signifi cant in the earnings equation, but the proportion of return migrants in 
the neighborhood remains insignifi cant, meaning the model is still identifi ed. 
Moreover, the coeffi  cient of the return migrant dummy does not change when 
the father’s variables are added to the earnings regression. We are thus confi dent 
that our results do not suff er from omitted variable bias. 
Regarding the other coeffi  cient estimates, both the OLS and MLE coeffi  cients 
of human capital variables in the earnings equations are in line with expec-
tations: language skills, education, and experience all positively contribute to 
earnings. Men earn 25 percent more than women in the pooled sample. People 
working in the public sector earn 48 percent and people working in the private 
formal sector 42 percent more than people working in the informal sector. Th e 
returns to language skills and education are much higher for women than for 
men. Th is diff erence could be driven by workers’ unobserved heterogeneity. If 
workers self-select into education and selection occurs on unobserved charac-
teristics, then returns to education estimates could be upwardly biased if unob-
served heterogeneity is positively correlated with hourly earnings. As women 
are less likely than men to obtain a high level of education, then everything else 
equal, women are more self-selected than men, and larger biases in the returns 
to education can be expected.
Table 11.8 Overidentification Test of Instrumental Variables in Migration Equation
Gender/variable
Return migrants from
WAEMU country OECD country Other countries
Men
Father’s activity 7.43 8.38 8.37
(0.2826) (0.2115) (0.2125)
Percent return migrants in 
neighborhood 
1.32 0.53 0.52
(0.2502) (0.4674) (0.5692)
Women
Father’s activity 6.82 4.56 6.35
(0.3376) (0.6010) (0.3854)
Percent return migrants in 
neighborhood 
1.23 0.03 0.28
(0.2666) (0.8521) (0.5953)
Full sample
Father’s activity 14.6 15.6 16.8
(0.0234) (0.0158) (0.0102)
Percent return migrants in 
neighborhood 
1.68 0.97 0.51
(0.1953) (0.3247) (0.4747)
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 11.1 for details).
Note: Figures are Chi-square values for individuals 15 and older. Figures in parentheses are p-values. 
WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development.
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Experience Abroad and Profi ts
Th e production technology of a microenterprise is written as Y = F(K,L) where 
Y is the value added of the fi rm, K is the capital stock, and L is labor. 
Phase 2 of the 1-2-3 survey collects very detailed information on production 
levels, sales, and purchases of inputs by microenterprises in the past 12 months, 
as well as information on expenses such as rent for buildings; wages and sala-
ries; water, gas, electricity, and fuel; telephone; traveling expenses and insurance 
fees; maintenance and general repairs; rent for machinery and equipment; taxes; 
and interest. Th e survey records detailed information on the seasonal patterns 
of activity over a one-year period and on the timing of transactions, in order 
to account for potential lags between the time inputs are purchased and sold. 
Using these data, we compute a measure of value-added that we then regress 
on capital and labor inputs as well as on a vector of fi rm owner’s characteristics. It 
is very diffi  cult to obtain accurate data on value-added and profi ts of microenter-
prises in developing countries, because most of them do not keep fi nancial records. 
One has to rely on recall data, which generally lack precision given the fungibility 
of money and goods between the business and the household. Th e Phase 2 ques-
tionnaire is designed to obtain more precise information, but the gain over less 
detailed questionnaires has yet to be proved (for a detailed discussion, see De Mel, 
McKenzie, and Woodruff  2009).
To obtain a reliable estimate of K, we use information provided by fi rm 
owners on the replacement cost of the capital equipment used in their busi-
ness (tools, equipment, vehicles, real estate, and so on). For labor, we use the 
total number of hours of work performed by the business owner and his or her 
employees in the past 12 months.8
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function, the technology of a micro-
enterprise can be written as 
 logY = logA + αlogL + βlogK + ui (11.3)
where A is total factor productivity, α and β are output elasticities with respect 
to labor and capital, and u is an error term. Th is equation can be estimated 
using standard linear regression, using microenterprise data on value-added, 
defi ned as the annual value of production minus the cost of all intermediate 
inputs, capital, and the number of hours of work. In the regressions, additional 
variables are included to control for the business owner’s characteristics (level 
of education, age, potential experience, and so forth); sector of activity; and 
macroeconomic environment (through country dummies). A dummy vari-
able indicating whether the fi rm owner is a return migrant is included to test 
whether experience abroad makes individuals more productive.
In order to account for the self-selection of return migrants, we simultane-
ously estimate equation (11.3) with the return migrant equation (11.2) using 
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maximum likelihood on the sample of microenterprises. As for the earnings 
equation, migration is instrumented by the percentage of households with 
return migrants in the area of residence. We run regressions for each of the 
three groups of return migrants (migrants returning from a WAEMU coun-
try, migrants returning from an OECD country, and migrants returning from 
elsewhere).
Table 11.9 displays estimation results using the Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function specifi cation defi ned in equation (11.3) on pooled microen-
terprise data. Th e coeffi  cient of the dummy variable indicating whether the 
fi rm owner is a return migrant is positive and signifi cantly diff erent from 
zero in both  specifi cations. Th is result suggests that experience abroad gives 
 microentrepreneurs a productive advantage. Th is advantage could stem either 
from enhanced entrepreneurial skills or from specifi c knowledge acquired 
abroad. Th e OLS coeffi  cient estimate in the earnings equation is strongly biased 
downward,  however, because of a negative correlation between unobserved 
characteristics in the earnings and migration equations. Th e elasticity of value-
added is 0.17 with respect to capital and 0.47 with respect to labor. Th e higher 
the average level of education of employees, the higher the output, all else equal.
Conclusion
What are the consequences of international migration for home countries? Th is 
question attracted much interest in the 1970s, when economists such as Jadish 
Bhagwati viewed the out-migration of educated migrants as a loss of human 
capital for countries of origin. Even the migration of educated individuals could 
benefi t the origin country, however, if return migrants are suffi  ciently numerous 
and bring back enough capital, physical or human, to irrigate the economy. In 
this context, the characteristics, motivations, and economic impacts of return 
migrants on their native countries are crucial questions to address. 
Th is chapter examines the urban labor market performance of return 
migrants in seven French-speaking cities of West Africa. Th e review of the lit-
erature suggests three eff ects. First, return migrants may have higher levels of 
human capital, fi nancial capital, or both. Second, the education they received 
or the work experience they gained in destination countries may have allowed 
them to gain some specifi c knowledge that is valued in the labor market of their 
home country. Th ird, return migrants could suff er from a loss of social capital 
while they lived abroad. 
Results from our statistical and econometric analyses show that except 
for age and gender, return migrants from WAEMU countries have individ-
ual and labor participation characteristics that are very similar to those of 
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Table 11.9 Production Function Estimates for Return Migrants in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02 
Variable
Migrants returning from
WAEMU country OECD country Other countries
OLS MLE
Two-step 
estimator OLS MLE
Two-step 
estimator OLS MLE
Two-step 
estimator
Log(capital) 0.171 0.172 0.171 0.162 0.162 0.162 0.160 0.161 0.161
(12.82)*** (12.92)*** (12.91)*** (12.10)*** (12.00)*** (11.98)*** (12.04)*** (12.04)*** (12.04)***
Dummy = 1 if 
no capital
0.276 0.279 0.278 0.257 0.258 0.257 0.250 0.259 0.259
(3.85)*** (3.91)*** (3.90)*** (3.57)*** (3.55)*** (3.54)*** (3.51)*** (3.59)*** (3.59)***
Log(labor) 0.407 0.407 0.407 0.418 0.414 0.413 0.409 0.400 0.400
(20.21)*** (20.26)*** (20.27)*** (20.49)*** (20.20)*** (20.20)*** (20.40)*** (19.88)*** (19.88)***
Return migrant –0.007 0.136 0.643 0.605 1.094 2.034 0.283 0.293 0.277
(0.94) (0.52) (1.10) (2.58)** (2.32)** (2.22)** (2.36)** (0.81) (0.60)
Percent return 
migrants in 
neighborhood
0.292
(0.88)
0.427
(0.93)
0.411
(0.93)
Constant 2.488 1.496 1.469 3.599 1.486 1.497 3.634 1.622 1.622
(13.21)*** (9.37)*** (9.05)*** (10.36)*** (9.16)*** (9.20)*** (10.15)*** (8.88)*** (8.88)***
Percent return 
migrants in 
neighborhood
2.743
(6.18)***
2.727
(6.16)***
2.656
(2.68)***
2.573
(2.61)***
3.034
(6.13)***
3.034
(6.13)***
Rho –0.047 –0.155 0.008
(0.55) (1.23) (0.06)
Sigma 0.333 0.327 0.329
(34.60)*** (33.22)*** (33.97)***
Mills ratio –0.309 –0.608 0.018
(1.11) (1.64) (0.08)
Number of 
observations 5,438 5,438 5,438 5,214 5,214 5,214 5,323 5,323 5,323
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 11.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for individuals 15 and older. Figures in parentheses are p-values. WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union, OECD = Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, OLS = ordinary least squares, MLE = maximum likelihood estimation.
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nonmigrants. In contrast, return migrants from OECD countries are signifi -
cantly better educated, more likely to be active in the labor force, and wealthier 
than nonmigrants. Th e participation of return migrants from OECD countries 
in the formal sector (both public and private) is much higher than that of 
nonmigrants. However, aft er controlling for education, the advantage of return 
migrants vanishes, actually becoming negative in some countries. Experience 
abroad results in a substantial wage premium on average, but the level of the 
premium ranges widely across cities (it is high in Cotonou and Lomé and low 
in Bamako). Experience abroad is also associated with a productive advantage 
for entrepreneurs.
International migration experience can have important consequences for 
labor market performance upon return to the origin country, particularly if the 
host country belongs to the OECD. Th ese potential benefi ts notwithstanding, 
the small share of return migrants in WAEMU countries suggests that return 
migration is likely to have only a moderate eff ect on development, especially as 
local economic conditions and investment opportunities remain weak.
Notes
 1. For instance, labor migration from Southern to Central Europe in the 1950s and 
1970s was predominantly temporary, as suggested by Böhning (1984), who esti-
mates that “more than two thirds of the foreign workers admitted in Germany 
and more than four fi ft hs in the case of Switzerland have returned” (quoted by 
Dustmann 2000, p. 2). Glytsos (1988) reports that of the 1 million Greeks who 
migrated to the Federal Republic of Germany between 1960 and 1984, 85 percent 
returned home. Dustmann and Weiss (2007) fi nd that only about 68 percent of 
females and 60 percent of males admitted into Britain between 1992 and 1994 were 
still in the country fi ve years later. For the United States, Jasso and Rosenzweig 
(1982) report that of the 15.7 million people who immigrated between 1908 and 
1957, about 4.8 million returned home.
 2. Th e REMUAO countries are Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, and Senegal.
 3. Although Abidjan and Cotonou are not administrative capitals, we refer to them as 
capitals because they are the most important economic centers in their countries 
(Cotonou is also the seat of government).
 4. For disaggregated descriptive statistics by city, see De Vreyer, Gubert, and Robilliard 
(2009).
 5. Unfortunately, the surveys do not provide information on age at the time of migra-
tion. It is thus impossible to favor one explanation or the other.
 6. Entrepreneurs are people who declare that they hire employees, paid or unpaid. Th is 
category does not include self-employed workers without employees.
 7. Phase 2 of the 1-2-3 surveys covers only microenterprises in the informal sector. 
Formal sector microenterprises (that is, microenterprises with a registration number 
or bookkeeping) are excluded from the sample.
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 8. Th e Phase 2 survey provides data on the number of workers employed by each fi rm; 
the total number of hours worked by each worker during the month preceding the 
interview; and worker characteristics, including gender, age, education, relationship 
to the business owner, and remuneration.
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Chapter 12
The Work-School Trade-Off among 
Children in West Africa: 
Are Household Tasks More Compatible 
with School Than Economic Activities?
Philippe De Vreyer, Flore Gubert, and Nelly Rakoto-Tiana
Th eoretical and empirical studies of time allocation decisions for children in 
developing countries point to a number of determinants of the demand for 
education and the supply of child labor. Th ese studies can be grouped into two 
main schools of thought. Th e fi rst is in the vein of the theory of the demand 
for education, introduced by Becker (1964). Becker posited that parents’ deci-
sions about whether to send their children to school are the result of a trade-off  
between the expected returns to and the cost of education. Th is cost includes 
school-related monetary expenditures and the opportunity cost of forgone 
wages or other remuneration. If the returns to education are too low com-
pared with its cost, parents will choose not to send the children to school and 
will have them work instead. Child labor can also be considered as the best 
option when specifi c know-how and skills learned on the job are more profi t-
able than education (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1985; De Vreyer, Lambert, and 
Magnac 1999). 
Th e second school of thought focuses on the impact of various constraints 
aff ecting the supply of child labor, the demand for education, or both. A fi rst 
set of constraints stems from imperfections in the markets for labor and land 
(Bhalotra and Heady 2003). When a household does not have enough labor to 
work all the land it owns, it has two options: hire external labor (farm work-
ers) or rent out or sharecrop part of its land. If external labor is not available—
because of labor market imperfections (frequent in rural areas) or a weak or 
nonexistent land market—the household may put its children to work. Any 
factor that raises the opportunity cost of children’s time tends to increase their 
labor participation and reduce their attendance at school. Poverty-related 
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constraints (Basu and Van 1998) and credit market imperfections (Jacoby and 
Skoufi as 1997; Ranjan 1999; Baland and Robinson 2000; Skoufi as and Parker 
2002) may also explain the emergence of child labor and the concomitant 
 fall-off  in school attendance.
Many empirical studies set out to identify the factors involved in the work-
school trade-off . Many are based on the joint estimation of school attendance 
and labor participation equations using bivariate or sequential probit models. 
Th e defi nition of child labor diff ers somewhat across studies. Some studies—
including research by the International Labour Organization (ILO)—defi ne 
child labor as “any economic activity conducted by a child”; children whose only 
work is performing household tasks within the family sphere are considered 
economically inactive.1 Other studies adopt a broader defi nition, considering 
participation in household tasks to be a form of child labor. Although this more 
inclusive defi nition may seem preferable, grouping domestic and economic 
activities in the same category amounts to making the strong implicit assump-
tion that the same factors determine both. Analysis of the factors involved in the 
work-school trade-off  would probably be enriched if domestic and economic 
activities were considered as two distinct alternatives.
On the basis of this principle, we conduct a joint analysis of the determi-
nants of school and work among children 10–14, separating out activities con-
ducted in the household from economic activities. Using the approach adopted 
by Kis-Katos (2012), we estimate a trivariate probit model using simulated 
maximum likelihood in which participation in school, household tasks, and 
economic activities is explained by a vector of variables including the child’s 
characteristics (age, gender, relationship to household head, birth rank, reli-
gion, and so forth) and the characteristics of the child’s household (wealth, size, 
composition, activities, and so forth). Th e data used are drawn from Phase 1 of 
the 1-2-3 surveys conducted simultaneously in seven West African cities (for a 
description of these surveys, see box O.1 in the overview). 
Th e fi ndings show that the determinants of participation in the two types 
of activity are signifi cantly diff erent. For example, having a household head 
who is a self-employed entrepreneur increases the participation of children in 
economic activities in fi ve of the seven cities (all except Bamako and Ouaga-
dougou) but has no eff ect on their participation in domestic activities. Boys 
participate considerably less in domestic activities than girls, but they have a 
greater probability than girls of participating in economic activities in two of the 
seven cities (Dakar and Niamey). Th ere seems to be much more competition 
in the allocation of time between economic activity and school than between 
domestic activity and school.
Th is chapter is structured as follows. Th e fi rst section presents descriptive 
statistics drawn from the 1-2-3 survey data on schooling and child labor. Th e 
second section presents the empirical strategy for modeling the work-school 
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trade-off . Th e third section presents and comments on the results of the estima-
tions. Th e last section summarizes the main conclusions and draws some policy 
implications.
Work and School among Children in West Africa
Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys is an employment survey providing detailed 
information on economic and domestic activities (taking care of children, the 
elderly, and infi rm; fetching water and wood; and so forth) of all individuals 10 
and older. Th e following discussion concentrates on children 10–14.2
Table 12.1, which presents the work participation and school enrollment 
rates in each city, reveals wide disparities across cities. Th e percentage of 
Table 12.1 Work Participation and School Enrollment Rates for Children 10–14 in Seven 
Cities in West Africa, by Gender, 2001/02
(percent)
City
Performs 
domestic 
activities
Performs 
economic 
activities
Performs domestic 
or economic 
activities
Attends 
school Inactive
Number of 
(weighted) 
observations
Abidjan
Girls 51.6 20.2 58.0 57.5 5.7 177,888
Boys 17.6 8.9 24.3 80.7 7.7 142,312
All 36.5 15.2 43.0 67.8 6.6 320,200
Bamako
Girls 51.8 11.5 54.8 71.9 9.0 74,237
Boys 14.6 9.8 22.6 81.3 12.6 73,964
All 33.2 10.7 38.7 76.6 10.8 148,202
Cotonou
Girls 77.6 19.4 79.3 67.4 1.4 53,254
Boys 61.3 8.0 65.4 87.7 2.5 49,440
All 69.8 13.9 72.6 77.2 1.9 102,694
Dakar
Girls 58.8 6.8 61.7 65.9 7.9 124,088
Boys 19.5 10.8 27.9 72.5 15.3 117,458
All 39.7 8.7 45.3 69.1 11.5 241,546
Lomé
Girls 92.0 22.0 92.1 77.7 0.5 48,467
Boys 77.5 9.6 78.6 94.4 0.5 42,780
All 85.2 16.2 85.8 85.5 0.5 91,247
(continued next page)
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Niamey
Girls 64.4 10.3 66.3 71.3 5.5 45,831
Boys 23.8 14.3 32.5 74.4 13.3 40,660
All 45.3 12.1 50.4 72.8 9.2 86,491
Ouagadougou
Girls 60.6 9.0 63.5 74.1 4.8 58,187
Boys 21.0 6.8 26.2 85.0 8.4 54,889
All 41.4 7.9 45.4 79.4 6.5 113,076
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries in the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU) conducted in 2001/02 by the Observatoire économique et statistique d’Afrique 
Subsaharienne (AFRISTAT); Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation (DIAL); and national statistics 
institutes.
Note: Sample weights were used to obtain representative results for the underlying population. Percentages 
sum to more than 100 percent because children may both engage in economic or domestic activities and 
attend school.
Table 12.1 (continued)
City
Performs 
domestic 
activities
Performs 
economic 
activities
Performs domestic 
or economic 
activities
Attends 
school Inactive
Number of 
(weighted) 
observations
children 10–14 attending school is higher in Lomé (86 percent), Ouagadou-
gou (79 percent), and Cotonou (77 percent) than in the richer cities of Abi-
djan (68 percent) and Dakar (69 percent). In Abidjan, this situation refl ects 
discrimination against girls: the Gender Parity Index (GPI) (the ratio of girls’ 
enrollment to boys’ enrollment) is 71 percent in Abidjan and more than 
85 percent in the other cities (except Cotonou, where it is 77 percent). 
Lomé and Cotonou also have the highest rates of children 10–14 working 
and attending school (72 percent in Lomé, 52 percent in Cotonou) (table 12.2). 
Th ese fi gures are much higher than in Niamey (32 percent), Ouagadougou 
(31 percent), Bamako and Dakar (26 percent), and Abidjan (17 percent). Th e 
rate of participation in domestic activities varies widely across cities. In contrast, 
participation in economic activities is low in all seven cities (9–16 percent). 
Girls participate much more than boys in domestic and economic activities and 
attend school less than their male counterparts.
Table 12.3 provides information on the average number of hours worked by 
working children per week. Not surprisingly, children who work without going 
to school work longer hours on average than children who combine work and 
school. However, the observed diff erences are much larger for the number of 
hours spent on economic activities, suggesting that it is possible to combine 
domestic activities and school, at least up to a certain point. Th e number of 
hours spent on domestic activities is higher among girls not attending school 
than for girls attending school (this result does not hold for boys), Table 12.3 
also reveals that whether or not they are enrolled in school, girls spend much 
more time than boys on domestic activities.
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Table 12.2 Work-School Trade-Off for Children 10–14 in Seven Cities in West Africa, 
by Gender, 2001/02
City
Working 
only
Attending 
school only
Working and 
attending school Inactive
Number of (weighted) 
observations
Abidjan
Girls 36.8 36.4 21.2 5.7 177,888
Boys 11.6 68.0 12.7 7.7 142,312
All 25.6 50.4 17.4 6.6 320,200
Bamako
Girls 19.1 36.2 35.7 9.0 74,237
Boys 6.1 64.8 16.5 12.6 73,964
All 12.6 50.5 26.1 10.8 148,202
Cotonou
Girls 31.2 19.3 48.1 1.4 53,254
Boys 9.9 32.2 55.5 2.5 49,440
All 20.9 25.5 51.7 1.9 102,694
Dakar
Girls 26.2 30.4 35.5 7.9 124,088
Boys 12.2 56.8 15.7 15.3 117,458
All 19.4 43.2 25.9 11.5 241,546
Lomé
Girls 21.8 7.3 70.4 0.5 48,467
Boys 5.1 20.9 73.5 0.5 42,780
All 14.0 13.7 71.8 0.5 91,247
Niamey
Girls 23.2 28.2 43.1 5.5 45,831
Boys 12.3 54.2 20.2 13.3 40,660
All 18.1 40.4 32.4 9.2 86,491
Ouagadougou
Girls 21.2 31.7 42.3 4.8 58,187
Boys 6.7 65.5 19.5 8.4 54,889
All 14.1 48.1 31.3 6.5 113,076
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 12.1 for details).
Tables 12.4 and 12.5 show the nature of the work children perform and the 
type of remuneration they receive. Table 12.4 displays a wide range of activities 
across cities. Family worker status is dominant in six of the seven cities.3 Wide 
gender diff erences are apparent. Family worker is the dominant category for 
girls in all cities. Among boys, family worker is the dominant category only 
in Lomé and Niamey. In the other cities, more than 70 percent of boys who 
work are apprentices in Abidjan, Cotonou, and Dakar, and about 50 percent are 
apprentices in Bamako and Ouagadougou. 
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Table 12.3 Average Weekly Hours Worked by Children 10–14 in Seven Cities in West Africa, 
by Gender, 2001/02
Children who work 
and attend school
Children who work and 
do not attend school All children who work
City
Time 
spent on 
economic 
activities
Time 
spent on 
domestic 
activities
Time 
spent on 
economic 
activities
Time 
spent on 
domestic 
activities
Time 
spent on 
economic 
activities
Time 
spent on 
domestic 
activities
Abidjan
Girls 1.9 6.8 24.3 17.2 16.1 13.4
Boys 1.5 4.7 38.6 3.1 19.2 3.9
All 1.7 6.1 27.2 14.4 16.9 11.0
Bamako
Girls 5.4 17.4 14.4 22.0 8.5 19.0
Boys 13.1 9.2 36.4 7.3 19.4 8.6
All 7.8 14.8 19.8 18.4 11.7 16.0
Cotonou
Girls 0.4 11.0 28.0 22.0 11.3 15.3
Boys 0.2 8.8 42.8 6.9 6.6 8.5
All 0.3 9.8 31.4 18.6 9.3 12.4
Dakar
Girls 1.5 15.0 8.4 19.9 4.4 17.1
Boys 5.5 8.0 33.4 5.2 17.7 6.8
All 2.7 12.9 16.0 15.4 8.4 14.0
Lomé
Girls 5.0 18.3 29.9 27.1 10.9 20.4
Boys 3.2 11.6 27.7 14.5 4.7 11.8
All 4.1 15.1 29.5 25.0 8.3 16.7
Niamey
Girls 2.8 16.7 9.7 21.0 5.2 18.2
Boys 12.8 10.2 28.6 8.4 18.7 9.5
All 5.7 14.8 15.7 17.0 9.3 15.6
Ouagadougou
Girls 1.6 15.6 17.1 24.9 6.7 18.7
Boys 3.8 8.0 37.8 4.2 12.4 7.0
All 2.2 13.3 21.8 20.1 8.3 15.4
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 12.1 for details).
Gender diff erences are also apparent in the breakdown between unskilled 
and apprentice activities. Except in Lomé, girls have a much lower probability of 
being apprentices and are much more likely to be unskilled workers than boys. 
On the whole, these fi ndings suggest that when girls do not go to school, their 
THE WORK-SCHOOL TRADE-OFF AMONG CHILDREN IN WEST AFRICA  355
Table 12.4 Nature of Work Performed by Children 10–14 in Seven Cities in West Africa, 
by Gender, 2001/02
City
Unskilled 
worker Apprentice
Family 
workera Otherb
Number of 
observations
Abidjan
Girls 35.4 7.6 55.4 1.5 34,921
Boys 11.4 73.9 14.7 0.0 12,669
All 29.0 25.3 44.6 1.1 47,590
Bamako
Girls 24.1 2.7 70.2 3.0 8,257
Boys 7.4 48.0 44.7 0.0 7,022
All 16.4 23.5 58.5 1.6 15,279
Cotonou
Girls 22.9 11.3 65.9 0.0 10,332
Boys 4.6 81.1 14.4 0.0 3,928
All 17.8 30.5 51.7 0.0 14,260
Dakar
Girls 35.9 13.9 42.5 7.7 8,352
Boys 7.3 76.4 15.5 0.8 12,675
All 18.7 51.6 26.2 3.6 21,027
Lomé
Girls 11.3 3.9 84.1 0.7 10,710
Boys 30.5 21.2 48.3 0.0 4,123
All 16.7 8.7 74.1 0.5 14,834
Niamey
Girls 12.9 7.8 76.9 2.4 4,656
Boys 6.5 21.7 69.5 2.3 5,763
All 9.4 15.5 72.8 2.3 10,419
Ouagadougou
Girls 18.5 9.4 72.1 0.0 5,194
Boys 9.6 48.3 41.1 1.0 3,738
All 14.8 25.7 59.1 0.4 8,933
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 12.1 for details).
a. Includes mostly servants, maids, and vendors. 
b. Includes mostly servants and maids who report being paid wages in semi-qualified work. 
labor is used to provide the household with income or to perform domestic 
tasks. In contrast, boys continue to accumulate human capital. Th eir appren-
ticeships do not raise the household’s income, but they give boys the skills to 
increase their resources in adulthood. Gender inequality in access to education 
may therefore be coupled with inequality in access to vocational training. Th is 
conclusion is underpinned by the data in table 12.5, which show that girls in all 
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Table 12.5 Type of Remuneration Working Children 10–14 Receive in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
City Fixed wage Daily or hourly pay Piece-rate Commission Proﬁ ts In kind No remuneration No answer given Number of observations
Abidjan
Girls 16.0 4.3 4.3 12.2 13.6 18.1 30.9 0.7 34,921
Boys 2.5 4.9 0.0 7.1 1.5 1.5 82.4 0.0 12,669
All 12.5 4.4 3.2 10.9 10.4 13.8 44.3 0.5 47,590
Bamako
Girls 25.4 0.0 0.7 0.0 39.0 9.1 21.6 4.3 8,257
Boys 0.3 9.8 8.6 1.2 35.6 16.7 25.2 2.6 7,022
All 13.8 4.5 4.4 0.5 37.4 12.6 23.3 3.5 15,279
Cotonou
Girls 15.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.7 11.8 70.7 0.0 10,332
Boys 1.6 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.3 89.4 0.0 3,928
All 11.6 0.4 0.0 0.2 1.3 10.6 75.9 0.0 14,260
Dakar
Girls 44.6 0.0 2.6 4.9 8.9 4.2 31.3 3.5 8,352
Boys 7.1 3.5 10.6 10.9 5.5 2.0 58.9 1.6 12,675
All 22.1 2.1 7.4 8.5 6.9 2.9 47.9 2.3 21,027
Lomé
Girls 13.0 2.2 0.8 1.5 26.0 13.6 42.1 0.7 10,710
Boys 5.1 11.6 16.1 2.1 19.9 8.0 37.4 0.0 4,123
All 10.8 4.9 5.1 1.7 24.3 12.0 40.8 0.5 14,834
Niamey
Girls 16.4 0.0 1.8 0.0 13.5 1.3 63.6 3.4 4,656
Boys 2.3 6.6 18.1 2.2 14.6 2.7 50.8 2.8 5,763
All 8.6 3.6 10.8 1.2 14.1 2.1 56.5 3.1 10,419
Ouagadougou
Girls 21.9 1.1 2.1 0.0 15.8 20.3 38.3 0.4 5,194
Boys 7.4 9.8 11.4 0.0 26.3 17.9 27.2 0.0 3,738
All 15.9 4.7 6.0 0.0 20.1 19.3 33.7 0.2 8,933
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 12.1 for details).
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cities have a greater probability than boys of being paid a fi xed wage; boys have 
a higher probability of receiving no remuneration in four of the seven cities 
(Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, and Dakar).
Modeling the Trade-Off between Work and School 
Becker’s (1964) human capital model considers education as an investment 
made by autonomous individuals on the basis of their preferences and char-
acteristics (time preference, life expectancy, cognitive skills, and so forth) on 
the one hand, and the returns to education on the other. Individuals may be 
more or less constrained in their choices, depending on their capacity to borrow 
and to make a living while investing in education. In each period, individuals 
decide whether they continue to invest in education or enter the labor market 
to get a job based on their qualifi cations. Th e optimal level of investment in 
education is reached when the marginal cost of one additional year of school-
ing equals the marginal return to the additional year of schooling. Th is model 
has been extended to take the trade-off  between education and fertility into 
account (Becker and Lewis 1973), as well as the trade-off  in allocating invest-
ment in human capital among children within a household (Behrman, Pollak, 
and Taubman 1982).
Th is theoretical framework can be used to interpret some of the statistical 
and econometric results on the determinants of the demand for schooling and 
child labor. In this setting, it is assumed that the household head allocates the 
child’s time (excluding leisure). Time may be allocated to schooling, domestic 
tasks, and market work based on the household’s preferences, the immedi-
ate and future returns to each activity, and various constraints the household 
faces. Acquisition of specifi c skills while working may raise future returns 
on the labor market more than skills acquired at school. Parents may thus 
decide not to educate their child or to reduce the time they spend at school 
(De Vreyer, Lambert, and Magnac 1999). Poverty may be one of the constraints 
to schooling, whatever the household’s preferences and the size of the returns 
to education. All these factors are closely intertwined and determine, to vary-
ing degrees, the parents’ decision to send their children to school, make them 
work, or make them participate in domestic tasks. Our empirical strategy deals 
with this interdependence.
We model children’s allocation of time among economic (market) activities, 
domestic activities, and school, considering these choices to be interdependent 
and simultaneous. We do not observe the number of hours spent in each activ-
ity, but we know whether each child participates in each. We estimate a tri-
variate probit model in which three latent variables—participation in economic 
activities, L*; participation in domestic activities, D*; and school attendance, 
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S*—depend on a vector of explanatory variables X; a vector of parameters aL, 
aD, and aS; and error terms eL, eD, and eS, which are jointly normally distributed. 
Formally, we estimate the following system of equations (written for child i):
 
L
1 if Li = XlʹbL + eL > 0
= XlʹbD + eD > 0
= XlʹbS + eS > 0
D
1 if Di
i
*
i
*
=
⎧⎨⎪⎩⎪
=
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S
1 if Si
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Coeffi  cients r jk (with j ≠ k) refl ect the correlation that can exist between the 
errors of the three choice equations. Depending on whether the choices are 
independent or not, these coeffi  cients are zero or signifi cantly diff erent from 
zero. Th is model is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood using the GHK 
(Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane) method (Terracol 2002; Greene 2003). 
Th e vector of variables X includes individual characteristic variables (child’s 
age, gender, migratory status, status in relation to household head, and religion) 
and household characteristic variables (the household head’s gender, the pres-
ence or absence of a spouse, the level of education of the household head and his 
or her spouse, the employment status of the household head, the household size, 
the number of children, and the level of wealth). Child’s age is included to cap-
ture the fact that the probability of being in school between the ages of 10 and 14 
decreases with age, even in countries (such as Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, 
and Togo) where the age limit for compulsory attendance is higher than 14, the 
probability declines even more in countries where it is lower than 14 (such as 
Benin, Niger, and Senegal) (see note 2). 
Child’s gender is also included among the regressors. As suggested by the 
descriptive statistics, the allocation of time is likely to diff er for girls and boys, 
with girls having lower levels of schooling on average and being more involved 
in domestic and market work (except in Dakar and Niamey). 
Relationship to the household head is measured by a dummy variable taking 
the value 1 if the child is the son or daughter of the head (and 0 otherwise). It is 
included to capture the fact that household heads may be more likely to invest in 
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the education of their biological children, either for altruistic reasons or because 
they expect to receive greater support from them in the future. (In the absence 
of well-functioning insurance markets and retirement schemes, education may 
be part of an implicit contractual arrangement between parents and their chil-
dren whereby parents invest in their children’s education in order to receive 
support from their children when they are too old to work.)
Th e child’s migratory status (measured by a dummy taking the value 1 if 
the child originates from a rural area) is included to control for the impact of 
the child’s background on his or her allocation of time. Many children reside 
in households headed by adults who are not their biological parents, even if 
their parents reside in these households (the 1-2-3 surveys do not record such 
detailed information). Children born outside the capital city are likely to be 
foster children.4 Time allocation of these children depends partly on the reasons 
why they are in foster care. 
Variables for the gender and education of the household head and spouse 
are introduced to capture household preferences for sending children to school 
or work. Th e education variable also controls for the fact that highly educated 
adults may off er better learning conditions to children, choose better schools, 
and facilitate their insertion into the labor market. An increase in the level of 
education of the household head and his or her spouse is thus expected to result 
in a decrease in children’s participation in economic activity and an increase in 
their schooling. 
Th e household head’s self-employment status is included to control for the 
opportunity cost of attending school. Because children in households with self-
employed members can be easily employed in the family businesses, they bear 
a higher opportunity cost of attending school, which may negatively aff ect their 
schooling investment and increase their participation in market work. 
Household size and the number of children in the household may also aff ect 
a child’s time allocation. Th e presence of more children in the household may 
negatively aff ect schooling and increase participation in domestic tasks if older 
children take care of younger ones. By contrast, more adults in the household 
may allow a better allocation of tasks and relax the time constraint, which may 
positively aff ect schooling and reduce the likelihood of market work. 
Th e expected sign of the variable measuring household wealth is undeter-
mined a priori. On the one hand, richer households are less likely to be budget 
constrained, which should positively aff ect schooling and reduce child labor. On 
the other hand, richer households are more likely to possess productive assets. 
By increasing the returns to labor, those assets may increase child labor. As we 
control for the head’s self-employment status, this last eff ect should already be 
captured, so that the positive impact of wealth should dominate. 
Household wealth is measured by a composite standard-of-living indicator, 
built using the data on household assets and the characteristics of the dwelling. 
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Th is indicator provides a less cyclical measure of the household standard of 
living than income or per capita consumption. It is built from a principal com-
ponent analysis, which summarizes the information in 16 variables: (ownership 
or nonownership of a car, motorbike, bicycle, radio, television, hi-fi , refrigerator, 
and sewing machine; number of rooms in the dwelling; whether the dwelling is 
a private house; connection of the dwelling to the electricity grid; type of water 
supply (tap or standpipe); and type of toilet (private fl ush lavatory, shared fl ush 
lavatory, or latrine) (table 12.6).
Th e fi rst principal component accounts for 22–30 percent of the total vari-
ance. It is signifi cantly and positively correlated with most of the variables 
Table 12.6 Weights of Variables in the First Principal Component 
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Assets owned
Car (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.26 0.36 0.32 0.25 0.32 0.33 0.32
Motorbike (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.00 0.13 0.17 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.22
Bicycle (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.01 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.16 0.03
Radio (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.10
Television (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.27 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.33
Hi-ﬁ  (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.25 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.28 0.23 0.28
Refrigerator 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 0.25 0.37 0.31 0.20 0.33 0.29 0.32
Sewing machine 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.13
Dwelling characteristics
Number of rooms 0.34 0.22 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.15
Connected to the electricity 
grid (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.11 0.32 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.30 0.32
Private house (yes = 1; 
no = 0) 0.25 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.32 0.31 0.31
Connected to running 
water (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.37 0.31 0.30 0.39 0.30 0.36 0.34
Water access via a 
standpipe (yes = 1; no = 0) –0.35 –0.19 –0.28 –0.37 –0.22 –0.31 –0.32
Private lavatory 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 0.40 0.30 0.36 0.33 0.34 0.28 0.31
Shared lavatory 
(yes = 1; no = 0) –0.20 –0.02 –0.20 –0.21 –0.03 –0.01 –0.02
Latrine (yes = 1; no = 0) –0.22 –0.14 –0.03 –0.15 –0.16 –0.04 0.04
Percentage of total inertia 
explained by ﬁ rst 
principal component 0.27 0.23 0.26 0.22 0.26 0.28 0.29
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see box O.1 and table 12.1 for details).
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concerned and can be interpreted as an indicator of the households’ standard 
of living or wealth. 
Some variables (such as child’s migration status and the household wealth 
index) are likely to be correlated with unobserved heterogeneity terms that 
aff ect the probability of going to school, performing domestic activities, or 
working. Children that migrated, either on their own or to follow their parents, 
may adopt diff erent behavior with respect to working or going to school not 
because they migrated but because migration was a precondition for them to 
get involved in these activities (an example is children who are being fostered so 
that they can attend school in the capital). Th e wealth index might be positively 
correlated with the probability of going to school without having any causal 
relation to it (if, for instance, the wealthiest households have a higher prefer-
ence for education). Control variables, such as the education of the household 
head and spouse, are included in the list of explanatory variables in order to 
reduce this source of bias, but we cannot guarantee that we eliminated it com-
pletely. Without any credible instrument that would allow the use of two-stage 
least squares to solve the problem, we have no choice but to recognize possible 
sources of bias when commenting on the regression results in the next section. 
Econometric Results
Table 12.7 presents the results of the estimations. Given that the standard 
deviations of the estimated coeffi  cients are potentially biased by error term 
correlations for children from the same household, the error terms have been 
corrected.
Th e residual correlation coeffi  cients indicate that the unobservable vari-
ables have opposite eff ects on school attendance and work (either domestic or 
market work). Th is fi nding suggests that a form of competition exists between 
school and work. Competition between school and economic activity (RLS) 
appears to be much stronger than competition between school and domestic 
activity (RDS). Th e value of the correlation coeffi  cient RDS is low and not sig-
nifi cantly diff erent from zero for four of the seven cities (Bamako, Cotonou, 
Lomé, and Ouagadougou), whereas the value of RLS is signifi cant and high for 
all cities. Th is fi nding is similar to that obtained by Dumas (2004) for Brazil 
and Kis-Katos (2012) for two northern Indian provinces.
For individual characteristics, the results show that older children have a 
lower probability of going to school and a higher probability of participating 
in both market activities and domestic tasks. Th is result is robust to the sample 
and the specifi cation. In many cities, boys have a higher probability of going 
to school than girls and a systematically lower probability of participating in 
household tasks. Th e fi ndings on participation in economic activities are more 
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Table 12.7 Results of Trivariate Probit Model of Allocation of Time of Children 10–14 in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02 
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Attends school
Age –0.131** –0.0685** –0.183** –0.126** –0.0926* –0.141** –0.165**
(0.0309) (0.0262) (0.0324) (0.0208) (0.0377) (0.0245) (0.0267)
Boy (dummy) 0.670** 0.206* 0.215 0.188* 0.779** 0.0227 –0.0186
(0.191) (0.101) (0.158) (0.0770) (0.195) (0.0822) (0.155)
Child of household head (dummy) 0.601** 0.363* 1.174** 0.0859 0.624** 0.310** 0.636**
(0.125) (0.143) (0.124) (0.0820) (0.174) (0.113) (0.127)
Muslim (dummy) –0.134 –0.273 –0.0550 –0.483**
(0.129) (0.177) (0.193) (0.105)
Muslim × child of household head (dummy) –0.299 0.237 –0.494 0.185
(0.201) (0.301) (0.303) (0.167)
Male-headed household (dummy) 0.0240 0.232 –0.0859 –0.206 –0.251 0.0579 0.832**
(0.179) (0.346) (0.231) (0.182) (0.231) (0.296) (0.216)
Single-headed household (dummy) 0.238 0.381 0.370 0.162 0.0763 0.0840 0.702**
(0.156) (0.338) (0.228) (0.187) (0.230) (0.298) (0.215)
Education of household head 0.0208 0.0466** 0.00895 0.0476** 0.0309 0.0518** 0.0280*
(0.0143) (0.0132) (0.0139) (0.0103) (0.0168) (0.0116) (0.0139)
Education of spouse of household head 0.0274 0.0149 0.0156 0.0483** 0.0279 0.0199 –0.0106
(0.0191) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0140) (0.0233) (0.0142) (0.0157)
Education of household head × boy 0.0481* 0.0272 0.0441* 0.00471 0.00380 0.00191 0.0515*
(0.0245) (0.0200) (0.0217) (0.0136) (0.0318) (0.0160) (0.0232)
Education of spouse × boy –0.0624* 0.00379 0.0349 –0.0153 0.0315 0.0336 0.0178
(0.0311) (0.0259) (0.0307) (0.0193) (0.0479) (0.0218) (0.0258)
Self-employment of household head (dummy) –0.190 –0.244* –0.232* –0.298** –0.287* –0.213** –0.0322
(0.102) (0.0974) (0.106) (0.0720) (0.119) (0.0816) (0.0873)
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Number of adults in household 0.0344 0.0610** –0.0152 –0.00742 0.0528 –0.00297 0.0184
(0.0197) (0.0194) (0.0260) (0.0110) (0.0283) (0.0147) (0.0200)
Number of children in household 0.0283 –0.0545* –0.0142 –0.0242 –0.0133 –0.0136 –0.0382
(0.0274) (0.0218) (0.0259) (0.0141) (0.0385) (0.0156) (0.0203)
Internal migrant (dummy) –0.787** –0.831** –0.809** –0.638** –0.590** –0.675** –0.314*
(0.137) (0.185) (0.150) (0.143) (0.176) (0.196) (0.158)
Migrant × child of household head 0.746** 0.469* 0.566** 0.537** 0.736** 0.568* 0.699**
(0.203) (0.235) (0.210) (0.207) (0.244) (0.228) (0.212)
Wealth index 0.155** 0.0241 0.0972** 0.114** –0.00642 0.0820* 0.0316
(0.0285) (0.0320) (0.0302) (0.0195) (0.0327) (0.0328) (0.0255)
Intercept 1.295** 0.894 2.238** 2.070** 1.638** 1.999** 1.718**
(0.431) (0.536) (0.515) (0.324) (0.582) (0.449) (0.447)
Participates in domestic tasks
Age 0.0989** 0.0848** 0.0811** 0.137** –0.0312 0.0545* 0.0801**
(0.0284) (0.0237) (0.0257) (0.0197) (0.0325) (0.0218) (0.0225)
Boy (dummy) –0.762** –1.106** –0.598** –1.266** –0.852** –1.065** –0.949**
(0.186) (0.101) (0.138) (0.0802) (0.194) (0.0839) (0.125)
Child of household head (dummy) –0.392** –0.171 –0.219 –0.150 –0.144 –0.0561 –0.144
(0.126) (0.136) (0.126) (0.0789) (0.153) (0.117) (0.123)
Muslim (dummy) 0.155 –0.577** 0.0817 0.0747
(0.140) (0.164) (0.298) (0.0953)
Muslim × child of household head (dummy) –0.617** 0.609** –0.0829 –0.153
(0.205) (0.228) (0.368) (0.139)
Male-headed household (dummy) –0.218 0.105 0.125 –0.0600 –0.0243 0.374 0.370
(0.175) (0.317) (0.172) (0.138) (0.226) (0.253) (0.219)
Single-headed household (dummy) –0.268 –0.110 –0.117 –0.126 –0.276 0.302 0.241
(0.162) (0.309) (0.173) (0.138) (0.233) (0.250) (0.219)
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Education of household head –0.0190 0.0123 –0.0112 –0.0105 –0.0325 –0.00486 –0.0171
(0.0147) (0.0110) (0.0138) (0.00972) (0.0193) (0.0109) (0.0128)
Education of spouse of household head –0.0242 –0.0328* –0.0134 –0.0197 –0.0511* –0.0117 0.00592
(0.0196) (0.0143) (0.0156) (0.0129) (0.0260) (0.0139) (0.0148)
Education of household head × boy –0.00487 –0.0152 –0.00234 0.0208 0.0275 0.0110 0.0235
(0.0209) (0.0152) (0.0166) (0.0131) (0.0244) (0.0152) (0.0157)
Education of spouse × boy 0.0297 0.0371 0.0302 0.0364* 0.0266 –0.0201 –0.0278
(0.0268) (0.0197) (0.0209) (0.0180) (0.0313) (0.0225) (0.0199)
Self-employment of household head (dummy) –0.132 –0.131 0.172 0.152* 0.0550 0.132 0.00493
(0.115) (0.0897) (0.0986) (0.0747) (0.117) (0.0814) (0.0836)
Number of adults in household –0.0327 –0.0367* –0.0586* –0.0227* –0.0115 –0.0152 –0.0107
(0.0223) (0.0156) (0.0238) (0.0110) (0.0260) (0.0156) (0.0174)
Number of children in household –0.0613 0.0286 –0.0389 –0.00119 0.0205 0.00199 –0.0516**
(0.0327) (0.0193) (0.0256) (0.0136) (0.0334) (0.0177) (0.0199)
Internal migrant (dummy) 0.251 0.0961 0.133 –0.00141 0.508* 0.300 0.389*
(0.141) (0.176) (0.168) (0.149) (0.199) (0.193) (0.160)
Migrant × child of household head –0.309 –0.105 –0.0390 0.0579 –0.0568 –0.130 –0.198
(0.194) (0.220) (0.209) (0.204) (0.235) (0.225) (0.191)
Wealth index –0.0748* –0.0346 –0.0313 –0.0249 0.00148 –0.0493 –0.0309
(0.0311) (0.0277) (0.0287) (0.0204) (0.0344) (0.0296) (0.0232)
Intercept –0.185 –0.743 0.307 –1.104** 2.156** –0.610 –0.810*
(0.441) (0.483) (0.412) (0.295) (0.567) (0.396) (0.408)
Participates in market activities
Age 0.126** 0.199** 0.208** 0.247** 0.0917** 0.0848** 0.174**
(0.0399) (0.0356) (0.0348) (0.0307) (0.0341) (0.0269) (0.0317)
Boy (dummy) –0.364 0.213 –0.0358 0.369** –0.451** 0.237* 0.0394
(0.218) (0.112) (0.175) (0.110) (0.170) (0.0972) (0.203)
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Child of household head (dummy) –0.348* –0.0442 –1.145** 0.000821 –0.327* –0.216 –0.612**
(0.165) (0.153) (0.133) (0.110) (0.160) (0.143) (0.146)
Muslim (dummy) –0.0873 0.270 –0.305 0.382*
(0.153) (0.175) (0.200) (0.152)
Muslim × child of household head (dummy) 0.320 –0.399 0.126 –0.0761
(0.239) (0.353) (0.294) (0.215)
Male-headed household (dummy) –0.166 –0.236 0.263 0.260 0.356 0.157 –0.416
(0.196) (0.406) (0.231) (0.172) (0.202) (0.269) (0.301)
Single-headed household (dummy) –0.201 0.0699 –0.169 –0.00493 0.239 0.238 –0.190
(0.173) (0.400) (0.247) (0.176) (0.209) (0.259) (0.293)
Education of household head –0.0257 –0.00460 –0.0128 –0.0200 –0.0188 0.00319 –0.0295
(0.0181) (0.0134) (0.0152) (0.0144) (0.0162) (0.0154) (0.0192)
Education of spouse of household head 0.0125 0.00876 –0.0285 –0.0423* –0.00510 –0.0433* 0.0262
(0.0200) (0.0170) (0.0186) (0.0214) (0.0242) (0.0183) (0.0216)
Education of household head × boy –0.0498 –0.0316 –0.0760** –0.0361 0.00239 –0.0389 –0.00870
(0.0277) (0.0171) (0.0276) (0.0202) (0.0252) (0.0199) (0.0256)
Education of spouse × boy 0.0320 –0.0415 –0.00248 0.0358 –0.00833 0.0510* –0.0205
(0.0301) (0.0223) (0.0389) (0.0276) (0.0339) (0.0236) (0.0285)
Self-employment of household head (dummy) 0.322* 0.171 0.284* 0.237* 0.279* 0.330** 0.0803
(0.130) (0.110) (0.117) (0.0934) (0.112) (0.0996) (0.111)
Number of adults in household –0.0522 –0.0185 0.0172 0.00425 0.0406 –0.0249 –0.0456
(0.0308) (0.0196) (0.0264) (0.0150) (0.0237) (0.0189) (0.0236)
Number of children in household –0.0126 0.0183 0.0202 0.0176 –0.0304 –0.00986 0.0560
(0.0353) (0.0216) (0.0300) (0.0168) (0.0332) (0.0230) (0.0319)
Internal migrant (dummy) 0.635** 0.626** 0.588** 0.703** 0.556** 0.577** –0.0511
(0.171) (0.185) (0.149) (0.173) (0.173) (0.210) (0.180)
Migrant × child of household head –0.718** –0.507* –0.562* –0.738** –0.476* –0.291 –0.465
(0.256) (0.250) (0.220) (0.266) (0.218) (0.255) (0.269)
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Wealth index 0.00113 –0.0128 –0.0389 –0.0866** –0.0767* –0.0394 –0.0324
(0.0354) (0.0329) (0.0314) (0.0269) (0.0342) (0.0395) (0.0328)
Intercept –1.959** –3.558** –3.173** –4.964** –2.313** –2.315** –2.875**
(0.604) (0.671) (0.567) (0.454) (0.524) (0.459) (0.543)
r DS –0.389** –0.0749 –0.0618 –0.0968* –0.165 –0.156** –0.0934
(0.0636) (0.0535) (0.0630) (0.0417) (0.0932) (0.0482) (0.0506)
r LS –1.189** –0.389** –1.866** –0.671** –0.766** –0.411** –0.759**
(0.108) (0.0650) (0.148) (0.0646) (0.0850) (0.0655) (0.0789)
r LD 0.0746 0.231** 0.101 –0.0293 0.362** 0.222** 0.0524
(0.0744) (0.0612) (0.0696) (0.0563) (0.0774) (0.0479) (0.0506)
Number of observations 1,168 1,526 1,327 2,367 1,130 1,820 1,744
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected WAEMU countries 2001/02.
Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 12.7 (continued)
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
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varied: boys are less likely to engage in an activity outside the home environ-
ment in Lomé but more likely to do so in Dakar and Niamey. Th e nature of 
the child’s relationship to the household head is an important determinant of 
allocation of time between work and school. Biological children of the house-
hold head have a higher probability of going to school and a lower probability 
of working (at home or in the market) than other children.5 Children who were 
not born in the capital have a signifi cantly lower probability of going to school 
and a higher probability of working in all cities except Ouagadougou.6 Th is 
result is true only for children who do not reside with their biological par-
ents, however, as the migratory status variable’s interaction with the children of 
household head dummy is always signifi cantly positive. Th is fi nding suggests 
that children who migrated to the capital and whose biological parents are likely 
to live elsewhere are more likely to work than to go to school. 
One possible explanation of these results is that migration status may aff ect 
the probability of working or attending school because migration and the 
choice of activity are part of the same project. Children who migrated with 
their parents may be more likely to go to school because one of the reasons for 
migrating was to enhance the possibilities of getting the children educated.7 
Children who migrated without their parents may have moved in order to 
fi nd work.
Many nonbiological children, particularly children born outside the capital, 
are likely to have been fostered to an adult member of the household. In Sen-
egal, for instance, about 12 percent of children 15 and younger are fostered, 
and 32 percent of households host or send one or more fostered children (Beck 
and others 2011). Th e fact that these children have a lower probability of going 
to school than the biological children of their hosting household is consistent 
with the hypothesis, popular among some international organizations and sup-
ported by some academic works, that fostering may have a negative impact on 
children’s well-being (Kielland 1999; UNICEF 1999; Case, Lin, and McLanahan 
2000; Case, Paxson, and Ableidinger 2004; Bishai and others 2003). Early stud-
ies on child fostering, such as the study by Ainsworth (1996), fi nd evidence that 
does not contradict this hypothesis, but these studies are limited by the nature 
of the data, which do not allow comparison of fostered children with children 
in their household of origin. 
Using data that match the origin and hosting households of fostered chil-
dren in Burkina Faso, Akresh (2008) shows that fostered children do not have 
a lower probability of going to school than the biological children of their host-
ing household and that this probability is signifi cantly higher than that of their 
nonfostered siblings. Using 2006/07 data from Senegal, Coppoletta and others 
(2011) show that adults who were fostered when young have slightly higher 
levels of education and better positions in their households than adults who had 
not been fostered. Hence, in the absence of other evidence, we cannot interpret 
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our results as fi rm evidence that fostered children are disadvantaged compared 
with their biological siblings.
A number of household characteristics also infl uence the time allocation 
decisions made for children. Having an educated head of household—and, 
to a lesser extent, spouse—raises the probability of a child going to school 
in most cities and reduces the probability of the child working. Th is fi nd-
ing is consistent with what is generally found in the literature: the presence 
of educated adults in a household raises children’s returns to education by 
providing fertile ground for learning and encouraging them to spend more 
time in school and less time working. Th e impact of the level of education of 
the household head is particularly strong among boys in Abidjan, Cotonou, 
and Ouagadougou. 
Th e level of education of the spouse of the household head is less signifi cant, 
because it encompasses two opposite eff ects. On the one hand, an educated 
woman has more employment opportunities and is therefore more likely to del-
egate domestic work to children in her household, which reduces their chances 
of going to school (however, results from chapter 7 show that the number of 
hours of domestic work does not decline when women work for income). On 
the other hand, an educated women is in a better position to support the chil-
dren in her household in their school education and therefore to send them to 
school rather than work.
Th e eff ect of the number of adults in the household on children’s schedules 
is signifi cant in only a few cities. In Bamako and, to a lesser extent, Abidjan and 
Lomé, the presence of more adults increases the probability of going to school; 
it reduces participation in domestic activities in most cities. Th ese results sug-
gest a distribution of tasks among diff erent household members. Children in 
the same household appear to compete with one another to go to school, as an 
increase in the number of children tends to reduce school attendance. However, 
the impact is not statistically strong or signifi cant, except in Bamako. 
Self-employment by the head of household and the household wealth indi-
cator have strong eff ects on children’s allocation of time. Living in a household 
whose head is a self-employed entrepreneur signifi cantly raises children’s par-
ticipation in economic activities in fi ve of the seven cities (all except Bamako 
and Ouagadougou), at the expense of schooling. One could argue that the deci-
sion of the household to start a business depends on whether there are young 
children able to help out. If this is the case, entrepreneurship is jointly deter-
mined with child work. 
Th is fi nding can be interpreted in two other ways. First, labor market 
imperfections may make it diffi  cult to hire external labor. A household head 
could consequently be driven to rely on family members, especially children. 
Th is interpretation mirrors in an urban setting the fi nding of Bhalotra and 
Heady (2003) in rural Ghana and Pakistan. 
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Second, work experience gained by children in the family business could 
enhance their employability, encouraging them to opt out of school. Household 
heads using the labor of their children (or other children in the household) 
could well be equipping them with skills or specifi c human capital they can 
then sell on the labor market. Th is interpretation echoes the hypothesis that 
children’s professional experience gained in the fi rst period raises their labor 
productivity in the second period.
As many empirical studies show (see, in particular, Psacharopoulos 1997; 
Ray 1999, 2000; Lachaud 2004), household wealth is an important determi-
nant of the time allocation decisions made for children. It has a positive and 
signifi cant eff ect on school attendance among children in four of the seven cit-
ies (Abidjan, Cotonou, Dakar, and Niamey), where it reduces their participa-
tion in work (economic or domestic) activities. Th is eff ect is to be expected 
where access to the fi nancial market depends on the level of household wealth. 
Higher wealth allows households to relax the budgetary constraint, favoring 
school enrollment. Given that the wealth variable is not instrumented, one can-
not exclude the risk of an upward bias for the wealth coeffi  cient estimate in the 
schooling equation and downward bias in the labor market participation equa-
tion. However, given that the education levels of the household head and spouse 
are included in the equations and qualitatively identical results were obtained 
in fi ve of seven cities (all but Bamako and Ouagadougou), a true wealth eff ect 
appears to be at work, at least in some cities.
Conclusion
Th e chapter examines some of the factors infl uencing the allocation of children’s 
time in seven West African cities. It fi nds that both domestic and economic 
activities compete with school, but many children combine school with domes-
tic activities. Marked diff erences are evident between boys and girls, biological 
and nonbiological children, and migrant and nonmigrant children, with boys, 
biological children, and nonmigrant children having a higher propensity for 
going to school and a lower propensity for participating in domestic tasks and 
(for all groups but boys) economic activities. Th e propensity to attend school 
(work) is generally signifi cantly higher (lower) in more educated and wealthier 
households and households in which the household head is not a self-employed 
entrepreneur. 
Th is last fi nding points to a potential drawback of the standard recommen-
dation of providing credit and other asset-building mechanisms to poor house-
holds. To the extent that these mechanisms allow parents to operate their own 
business, they could actually increase child labor (Del Carpio and Loayza 2012 
for Nicaragua and Hazarika and Sarandi 2008 for rural Malawi fi nd results that 
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confi rm this intuition). Th is negative impact on school attendance may be miti-
gated if children learn specifi c skills that allow them to increase their resources 
in adulthood by more than the forgone earnings attributable to reduced school-
ing. Th e data suggest that boys seem to have privileged access to this alternative 
way of accumulating human capital. If further investigations confi rm this result, 
it would mean that gender inequality in access to education is coupled with 
inequality in access to on-the-job training in West African countries.
Notes
 1. Th e ILO defi nition of child labor is rather restrictive. It includes work that is “men-
tally, physically, socially or morally dangerous and harmful to children; and inter-
feres with their schooling by: depriving them of the opportunity to attend school; 
obliging them to leave school prematurely; or requiring them to attempt to combine 
school attendance with excessively long and heavy work” (ILO 2012). According to 
this defi nition, a child who is prevented from attending school because of involve-
ment in family activities is not considered at work as long as these activities are not 
dangerous or harmful.
 2. Th e age of the end of compulsory schooling varies across countries (11 in Benin; 
12 in Niger and Senegal; 15 in Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Togo; 16 in Burkina Faso). It 
is not clear whether this age is relevant, however, as it is not rigorously enforced. As 
is usual in the literature, we thus chose to focus on children ages 10–14.
 3. Dakar, where 52 percent of working children are apprentices, is the exception. 
Apprentices are also important in Cotonou (32 percent), Ouagadougou (26 percent), 
Abidjan (25 percent), and Bamako (24 percent). Apprentices are generally not paid, 
but they learn to become welders, mechanics, tailors, blacksmiths, tinsmiths, and 
restaurant servers.
 4. Although Abidjan and Cotonou are not administrative capitals, we refer to them as 
capitals because they are the most important economic centers in their countries 
(Cotonou is also the seat of government).
 5. Children with the status of domestic staff  were excluded from the sample to avoid 
biasing the results.
 6. A large proportion of children in some cities (37 percent in Lomé, 31 percent in 
Abidjan, 27 percent in Cotonou, and 23 percent in Ouagadougou) were born outside 
the capital. Th is proportion is lower in Bamako (17 percent), Niamey (15 percent), 
and Dakar (9 percent).
 7. It could also be the case that these children share with their parents common unob-
served characteristics that increase both the probability of migration and the prob-
ability of attending school. Our data do not allow us to test this possibility.
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Working in West Africa after 
Retirement Age 
Philippe Antoine
Until recently, the retirement age in most French-speaking capitals in West 
Africa was 55. However, only people who work for the government or private 
fi rms in the formal sector of the economy pay contributions and are therefore 
entitled to pensions. Th e majority of workers work in the informal sector and 
do not receive pensions. 
Th ere is very little interest in seniors (defi ned here as people 55 and older) 
in the labor market, mainly because they represent just 5 percent of the popula-
tion. Yet there are at least two good reasons for looking into their situation. Th e 
fi rst has to do with the sharp upturn in their numbers, which will grow more 
rapidly in Africa than any other continent (Velkoff  and Kowal 2007). Th e second 
concerns the participation of seniors in the labor force at relatively later ages.1 
Who works aft er 55 and in what lines of business? What are the proportions 
of older men and women in the labor market? Do some people see retirement as 
a time to retrain and change occupation? Is the prolonged activity of old work-
ers a potential source of confl ict between generations?
To answer these questions, this chapter analyzes data from the 1-2-3 surveys 
coordinated by the Observatoire économique et statistique d’Afrique Subsahari-
enne (AFRISTAT) and Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation (DIAL) in 
seven capitals in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).2 
Th is secondary analysis of a survey designed mainly to study the labor mar-
ket identifi es the position of seniors on the labor market in each of the capitals 
studied, diff erentiating between informal sector workers and pension recipients. 
Most of these people still have children to support and therefore need to work.
Data and Variables Used
Th e data used come from the 1-2-3 surveys conducted in the seven French-
speaking West African Economic and Monetary Union capitals in 2001/02. Th e 
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analysis covers 4,955 individuals 55 and older who were interviewed in Phase 1 
of the surveys (table 13.1).
Th e main variables covered by Phase 1 of the surveys are the characteristics 
of the household and each of its members. Th e Phase 1 augmented labor force 
survey concerns all individuals 10 and older. Th e questionnaire covers current 
employment, main job and any second job held, job-seeking, unemployment, 
father’s job, previous employment, and unearned income. Most of the respon-
dents are employed workers, but information from the surveys also sheds light 
on individuals 55 and older. 
Sociodemographic Characteristics
One-third of WAEMU’s population live in towns and cities. A large propor-
tion of this urban population is concentrated in the country’s economic capital, 
which generally attracts most investment. Some cities, such as Abidjan (popula-
tion 3 million) and Dakar (population 2 million), are large. 
Th e population is young: people 55 and older account for a very small pro-
portion of the capital’s population, ranging from 3.2 percent in Abidjan to 
6.8 percent in Dakar. A large share of the capital’s population are migrants from 
the country’s interior, many of whom arrived in the 1970s and are now reaching 
retirement age.
A substantial proportion of the population in each of the capitals has no 
schooling; this share is particularly high among people 55 and older. Although 
illiteracy is being pushed back among the younger generations, many people 
lack postprimary education. Work still needs to be done in this area, particu-
larly in Dakar, Niamey, and Bamako. 
Table 13.1 Number of People Interviewed in Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 Surveys in Seven Cities in 
West Africa, 2001/02
City
Number of 
households
Number of 
individuals Number of seniors
Seniors as percent 
of sample
Abidjan 2,494 11,257 360 3.2
Bamako 2,409 12,760 707 5.5
Cotonou 3,001 11,535 761 6.6 
Dakar 2,479 18,700 1,272 6.8 
Lomé 2,500 9,676 457 4.7 
Niamey 2,500 14,342 683 4.8 
Ouagadougou 2,458 13,513 715 5.3 
Total 17,841 91,783 4,955 5.4
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected WAEMU countries conducted in 2001/02 by the 
Observatoire économique et statistique d’Afrique Subsaharienne (AFRISTAT); Développement, Institutions et 
Mondialisation (DIAL); and national statistics institutes.
WORKING IN WEST AFRICA AFTER RETIREMENT AGE   375
Importance of the Informal Sector
Labor force participation rates for men range from 59 percent in Cotonou to 
70 percent in Abidjan (table 13.2). For women, there are sharp diff erences 
between the capitals of the Gulf of Guinea countries (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and 
Togo), where just over 60 percent of women 10 and older participate in the labor 
force, and the capitals of the Sahelian countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and 
Senegal), where 35–50 percent of women do so. Th ese fi gures refl ect diff erences 
in the status of women in the two regions (Adjamagbo and others 2005).
Th e survey divides the sample into fi ve institutional sectors: public admin-
istration, public sector corporations, the formal private sector, the informal 
sector, and nonprofi t organizations (Brilleau, Roubaud, and Torelli 2005). Th e 
informal sector accounts for 76 percent of employed workers across all seven 
capitals. Th ere is little diff erence across cities (table 13.3). Th e formal private 
sector is in second place (except in Niamey), accounting for an average of 
14 percent of jobs, ranging from about 10 percent in Cotonou to about 18 percent 
in Abidjan. Except in Niamey, relatively few people are employed in the public 
sector, which accounts for just 8.4 percent of employed workers (6.6 percent in 
the administration and 1.8 percent in public and semi-public corporations). 
Even in the formal private sector, most workers (71–92 percent) do not pay 
pension contributions) (table 13.4). Th e majority of workers thus work in a sec-
tor that provides no social security.
Table 13.2 Sociodemographic Characteristics of the Sample in Seven Cities in West Africa, 
2001/02 
(percent, except where otherwise indicated)
Statistic Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Population 
(thousands) 3,046 1,143 809 1,906 784 675 856
Structure by age 
0–14 34.1 44.0 36.4 34.6 35.0 43.0 37.6
15–54 62.9 50.8 58.3 58.9 60.4 52.4 56.9
55+ 3.0 5.2 5.3 6.5 4.6 4.6 5.5
Male labor force 
participation rate 
among population
10 and older 70.1 59.3 58.8 62.1 68.9 63.5 66.3
Female labor force 
participation rate 
among population
10 and older 60.3 45.6 60.9 41.1 66.9 35.2 49.6
Net primary school 
enrollment rate 73.2 70.7 81.2 65.9 83.2 70.5 79.7
Sources: Population and labor force participation statistics are from Brilleau, Roubaud, and Torelli 2005; 
 structure of the population by age statistics are from Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries 
(see table 13.1 for details).
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In the seven cities studied here, as in many other low- and middle-income 
countries, the social security system covers only a tiny minority of the 
population (mainly civil servants and formal sector workers). Informal sector 
workers—the vast majority of the population—have no welfare protection and 
are therefore particularly vulnerable when they can no longer work (Apt 2002). 
Improving these workers’ lives, especially in terms of health and pensions, requires 
giving them the option of joining the state social security systems (Kannan 2007). 
Setting up a real welfare safety net is an eff ective way of protecting the poor against 
the risk of destitution (for a discussion of these issues, see James 1999; Gillion et al. 
2000; Kakwani and Subbarao 2005; Scodellaro 2010; Willmore 2000). 
Th e Importance of Seniors 
Th e demographic weight of seniors in Sub-Saharan Africa is still small. In 
2006, about 7.2 percent of the population was older than 55. Aging-related 
problems are not expected to emerge until 2030 (United Nations 2003; Velkoff  
and Kowal 2007). It would be a mistake to underestimate the demographic, 
social, and economic importance of seniors because their numbers are small, 
Table 13.3 Distribution of Employment by Institutional Sector in Seven Cities in West Africa, 
2001/02 
(percent)
Institutional 
sector Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou All
Public 
administration 5.5 7.5 6.3 5.7 5.2 13.5 10.4 6.6
Public sector 
corporation 1.1 2.5 2.2 1.8 2.3 1.8 2.3 1.8
Formal private 
sector 17.6 11.4 9.9 15.0 10.5 11.8 11.8 14.2
Informal sector 74.7 77.5 80.3 76.4 81.0 71.1 73.4 76.2
Nonproﬁ t 
organization 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.8 2.1 1.2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Brilleau, Roubaud, and Torelli 2005.
Table 13.4 Proportion of Workers in Private Formal Sector Paying Pension Contributions in 
Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02 
(percent)
Sector Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou All
Formal private 10 19 12 13 8 15 17 12
Nonproﬁ t 
organization  0 26  5  7 5 17 16  8
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 13.1 for details).
WORKING IN WEST AFRICA AFTER RETIREMENT AGE   377
however; although their authority is gradually being challenged, elders continue 
to play an important economic role (Antoine 2007).
By the time they are 55, most men are heads of household (or at least say they 
are), except in Dakar, where men become household heads later than in other 
cities and not all men become heads of household (fi gure 13.1).3
Th e proportion of female heads of household is high in Abidjan, Lomé, 
Cotonou, and, to a lesser extent, Dakar and Niamey. Th e proportions are much 
lower in Bamako and Ouagadougou. Th e large proportion of older female heads 
of household mainly refl ects women who are widowed and do not remarry 
(Adjamagbo and Antoine 2009).
Although people 55 and older account for a very small share of the popu-
lation, they make up a signifi cant share of heads of household, ranging from 
10 percent in Abidjan to 32 percent in Dakar. Nearly one in four people lives in 
a household whose head is 55 or older; these fi gures range from 16 percent of 
the population in Abidjan to more than 40 percent in Dakar (table 13.5). 
Pensions in Africa 
Th e term pensioner is sometimes used incorrectly in Africa, as not all “pension-
ers” receive pensions. Th e 1-2-3 survey defi nes as pensioners all people who 
report drawing a pension. All seven countries have similar pension schemes: 
a contributory pension scheme for the economy’s formal private sector and 
a  system for civil servants, whose pensions are budgeted for in the national 
 budget and paid out based on the number of years spent in the civil service. 
Case Study of Senegal
State pensions in Senegal are managed by two institutions, the Senegal Pension 
Insurance Institution (IPRES) for the private sector and the National Pension 
Fund (FNR) for the public sector. Pursuant to the labor code in force since 
1952, in 1958 an agreement between management and labor unions set up the 
West African Welfare Institute (IPRAO) for private sector employees. Following 
the break-up of the French West Africa federation and the independence of its 
member states, many of these states withdrew from IPRAO. In Senegal, IPRAO 
became IPRES in 1978. In 1975, it became a legal obligation for all salaried 
employees and employers to join this pension scheme (Diop 2003). 
Th e IPRES pension system is a contributory scheme, which pays out to pen-
sioners part of the contributions paid by contributors (employers and employ-
ees) aft er deductions for administrative expenses. Th e pensions for a given 
period are fi nanced by the same period’s levy on earnings, giving rise to a rela-
tionship between the number of contributors and the number of pensioners. 
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Figure 13.1 Age Distribution of Heads of Household in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 13.1 for details).
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Th e FNR is a special Treasury account. It handles the pension scheme for 
civil servants (government employees in stable employment governed by ser-
vice regulations). Th e scheme is a contributory system. Pensioners enjoy the 
same health care and treatment advantages on the same terms as working civil 
servants in state hospitals and health care structures. Until 2005, the retire-
ment age was also 55, except for certain groups of employees. Since then, it 
was raised to 60.
Th ere are some 118,000 pensioners in Senegal across both public and pri-
vate sectors. Because of fi nancial problems in the system, they are no longer 
sure of collecting their pensions. Th e FNR has a defi cit of CFAF 6 billion. 
IPRES is also struggling to meet its obligations. With just over 100,000 con-
tributors, it was expected to pay pensions to nearly 60,000 pensioners, 35,000 
widows, and 2,370 orphans in 2003. In 2003, IPRES paid out a quarterly aver-
age of CFAF 71,408 to pensioners, CFAF 28,666 to widows, and CFAF 15,789 
to orphans (CFAF 793 a day to pensioners, CFAF 319 to widows, and CFAF 
175 to orphans). 
Th e extremely low level of pensions means that retirement forces changes in 
pensioners’ economic situation. Th e substantial drop in income can disrupt the 
running of the household, as explained by a recent retiree interviewed in Dakar: 
“Th e family head who earns CFAF 100,000 to feed his family when he is work-
ing gets CFAF 60,000 a quarter when he retires. It’s very tough. It’s not enough 
to support a household.” Th is respondent noted that the cut in resources makes 
retirement a time of insecurity. “You can’t put your feet up when you retire, 
because the money you get is useless. So you’re retired, but you’re scrabbling 
about for money to survive,” he observed. For people receiving IPRES pensions, 
the fact that payments are made quarterly adds to their problems. Another per-
son interviewed observed that retirement was an unpleasant surprise because 
of the unexpectedly low pension. “I was disappointed when I retired. I worked 
for companies that didn’t make the contributions for me. I worked for 45 years 
Table 13.5 Importance of People 55 and Older in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
Item Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Heads of household 55 and older as percentage of all heads of household
Male  9 20 16 30 10 19 18
Female 16 26 24 36 19 31 23
All 10 20 18 32 13 21 19
Proportion of individuals living in household headed by person 55 or older 
Percent 16 26 20 41 18 28 25
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 13.1 for details).
380  URBAN LABOR MARKETS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
and now I get a pension of CFAF 22,000 every three months. What can you buy 
with that?” 
Other Countries in the Region
Th e situation is similar in the other West African capitals. In most countries, the 
retirement age is 55, except in certain civil service corps. An exception is Niamey, 
where the retirement age is 60 for men and 55 for women. In 1998, the gov-
ernment of Niger responded to pressure from the Bretton Woods institutions 
and to the need to curb its expenditure by introducing a number of unpopular 
measures, among which was retirement at 55 or following 30 years of service. In 
May 2006, the government reinstated the retirement age of 60 for civil servants. 
In most of the countries in our study, the pensioner-contributor ratio is 
increasing, putting a heavy strain on cash fl ows. Th is erosion partly refl ects the 
fact that younger cohorts are increasingly working in insecure jobs with no social 
security coverage (Antoine, Razafi ndrakoto, and Roubaud 2001; Diagne 2006).
Everywhere, the same union cry has gone up: raise the retirement age, 
mainly to increase the low level of most pensions. In Burkina Faso, for example, 
these demands were voiced in January 2004, when the government decided 
to increase the retirement age for all workers. In the civil service, the retire-
ment age now ranges from 55 to 63, depending on occupational category. In 
November 2004, the statutory retirement age for private and semi–public sector 
workers was set at 56 for manual and equivalent workers; 58 for nonmanual 
and equivalent workers; 60 for supervisors, managers, and equivalent; and 63 
for doctors and professors working in the private sector (Le Pays, December 31, 
2004). In Senegal, the retirement age for civil servants was raised to 60 in 2005; 
a management-labor agreement provides, in principle, for a gradual transition 
to 60 in the private sector. Implementation of this agreement has been slow; in 
June 2006, bank workers in Dakar donned red armbands to lobby for increasing 
the retirement age to 60 (Wal Fadjri, June 12, 2006). 
Workers’ concerns are matched by experts’ fears about the viability of a pen-
sion system inherited from the colonial period. Th ey believe that the pension 
system is oversubsidized and balanced only by making the entire population 
pay. “Th ese systems can impose unfair burdens on the less well-off  outside the for-
mal economy, while providing them no systematic support in their old age,” notes 
Holzmann (2000, p. 18). Pension expenditure accounts for about 1.5 percent of 
gross domestic product, but the sums paid out are oft en paltry. In 2004, Robert 
Palacios, a senior pension economist at the World Bank, advocated for reforms 
in Senegal to increase the retirement age, raise the contribution base, reduce 
benefi ts, and improve management to cut costs. He raised questions about the 
long-term viability of the system and stressed the need to raise contributions to 
keep the schemes in the black (Palacios 2004). 
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Seniors Who Work
Th e productivity of seniors generally decreases with age, either because they are 
physically diminished or because they fi nd it hard to learn new techniques. Th e 
proportion of workers falls at retirement age for both men and women. Th ere 
is a clear drop in the share of workers between 50–54 and 55–59 in all capitals 
except Niamey, where the retirement age is higher (fi gure 13.2). Th is sudden 
decline at 55 is surprising, given that most people work in the informal sec-
tor and are not covered by pension systems. Some male respondents mention 
health and disability problems; the share of the population citing these factors 
rises with age (4 percent at 55–59, 8 percent at 60–64, and up to 20 percent aft er 
70). Large percentages of older men continue to work very late in life, however, 
with more than 45 percent in Bamako and more than 30 percent in Niamey and 
Ouagadougou still working at 70–74.
Women are also well represented in the labor market aft er age 55, especially 
in Lomé, Cotonou, and Niamey (fi gure 13.2, panel b). Older women have some-
times gone back to paid work very late in life, aft er bringing up their children. 
Th is is the case in particular in Dakar (Adjamagbo and Antoine 2009). Higher 
percentages of women than men cite health problems: 11 percent at 55–59, 
16 percent at 60–64, and 32 percent at 70–74. 
When it comes to work by seniors, the cities can be divided into two groups. 
In the fi rst group, the proportion of working women is higher than the propor-
tion of working men. Cotonou, Lomé, and, to a lesser extent, Abidjan are in 
this group. Women in these cities have more independence than women in 
the Sahelian countries, which leads them to continue to work longer than men 
(fi gure 13.3). In the second group, men work more in old age than women. Th e 
Sahelian countries, especially Mali and Burkina Faso, are in this group. Th is pat-
tern refl ects a certain level of continuing dependence among women. 
Rates of employment among older men vary widely in Western countries 
(table 13.6). In some countries, the majority of men still work at 60–64 (65 percent 
in Japan, 55 percent in the United States). Rates are very low in other countries, 
such as Belgium (21 percent) and France (15 percent). Th ese diff erences refl ect 
countries’ welfare policies and the ages at which retirement is actually taken (the 
average retirement age is oft en three to fi ve years lower than the offi  cial age). 
West African workers do not enjoy the same welfare protection as Western 
workers. Th eir employment rate at 60–64 is high, although the offi  cial retire-
ment age is lower than in Western countries. Th eir life expectancy at 55 is also 
much shorter than in the developed countries. Working late into life therefore 
leaves them fewer years of retirement. 
Th e already dominant share of informal sector jobs in West Africa is even 
larger for older workers. Th ere is a clear swing to the informal sector between 
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Figure 13.2 Proportion of Employed Workers in Seven Cities in West Africa, by Age 
Bracket, 2001/02
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 13.1 for details).
the 50–54 and 55–59 age brackets in all seven capitals. Th e proportion of men 
working in the informal sector in Abidjan increases from 37 percent at 50–54 
(before retirement) to 61 percent at 55–59 (aft er retirement) (fi gure 13.4). Th e 
picture is the same in Bamako (where 44 percent of people 50–54 and 75 percent 
of people 55–59 work in the informal sector) and Cotonou (where 42 percent 
of people 50–54 and 62 percent of people 55–59 work in the informal sector). 
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Figure 13.3 Male-Female Differences in Proportion of Employed Workers in Seven Cities in 
West Africa, by Age Bracket, 2001/02
Table 13.6 Proportion of Men in Selected Countries Who Are Working, by Age Bracket, 
2001/02 
Country or city 25–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 
Developed countries
Belgium 85.7 77.1 52.3 21.3
France 87.5 84.0 60.2 14.5
Japan 92.0 92.1 88.8 64.7
United States 86.5 92.3 74.2 54.5
Africa
Dakar 77.7 80.2 61.3 35.9
Niamey 80.5 75.7 75.0 57.5
Average for seven commercial capitals in 
West African Economic and Monetary Union 82.2 81.7 63.2 47.0
Sources: Data for Western countries are from d’Autume, Betbèze, and Hairault 2005. Data on Africa are from 
Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 13.1 for details).
Th ree causes underlie this transition. Individuals reaching retirement age 
today were massively recruited into the formal sector in the 1960s and early 
1970s. Th ey represent a larger proportion of formal sector workers than sub-
sequent generations (people in their 40s and younger). On retirement, some of 
the people who worked in the formal sector switched to the informal sector. 
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Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 13.1 for details).
Figure 13.4 Proportion of Employed Workers in Seven Cities in West Africa Working in the 
Informal Sector, by Gender and Age Bracket, 2001/02
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Other formal sector workers withdrew from the labor market. Informal sector 
workers continue to work longer than formal sector workers. Together, these 
factors mean that aft er 55, the older individuals get, the more likely they are to 
work in the informal sector if they continue to work. Th is tendency is even more 
pronounced among women. In Abidjan, for example, the share of active women 
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in the informal sector is 85 percent at 55–59 work, 95 percent at 60–64, and 100 
percent at 65 and older. Similar patterns are found in other cities.
Th e change in socioeconomic group on retirement could be studied only for 
a small number of individuals, because this information is available only for 
people who receive a pension and are still working. In the absence of suffi  cient 
numbers for each city, the calculations were made for all seven cities. 
A large proportion of managers (74 percent) become self-employed or set up 
a small business. Half of all nonmanual and skilled manual workers (53 percent) 
and a majority of unskilled workers (67 percent) do likewise (table 13.7).
Th e switch from formal to informal sector is therefore the dominant swing 
among formal sector workers who continue working aft er retirement age. 
Only a minority continue to work in the formal sector, either because their 
status allows them to do so (as is the case with certain civil service man-
agement positions) or because they secure new contracts. Th e small share 
of workers who were employers or self-employed obviously remain in their 
original sectors.
Not all workers have the experience they need to succeed in a new job that is 
sometimes very diff erent from their previous job. Unions and pensioner asso-
ciations are nevertheless pushing for working retirement by fostering access 
to loans and means of production. One of the motions tabled by the Eighth 
Congress of the National Association of Civilian and Military Retirees of Sen-
egal (ANRCM) was that the government and private business should promote 
third-age access to new information and communication technologies in order 
to help reintegrate seniors into production. It would be useful to take a closer 
look at this transition, to determine how many retirees attempt to switch sectors 
and how many are successful in doing so. 
Table 13.7 Previous and Current Jobs of 55- to 64-Year-Old Working Retirees with Pensions 
in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
(percent) 
Current socioeconomic group
Previous 
socioeconomic group Manager
Nonmanual/skilled 
manual worker
Unskilled 
worker Employer
Self-
employed
Manager 23 2 0 37 37
Nonmanual/skilled manual 
worker 6 30 11 4 49
Unskilled worker 0 0 33 0 67
Employer 0 0 0 0 100
Self-employed 0 0 0 21 79
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 13.1 for details).
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A Range of Situations among Seniors
We combine labor status with pension status to gain a clearer picture of the 
diversity of situations among people 55 and older. Figure 13.5 shows the share 
of the population in each of the following fi ve groups:
• Nonworking pensioners (people who receive pensions and no longer work)
• Nonworking nonpensioners (people who do not work and do not receive 
pensions)
• Working pensioners (people who work and receive pensions)
• Working nonpensioners (people who work and do not receive pensions)
• Deferred retirees (people who continue to work in the same job in the  formal 
sector).4
Th e majority of men (63 percent) still work at 55–59, with a minority (less 
than 5 percent) combining work with a pension.5 Th e majority of pensioners in 
this age bracket have stopped working (18 percent); 43 percent of men 55–59 
who work have no pension. About 15 percent of the men in this age bracket 
have not yet claimed their pension and continue to work in the same formal 
sector fi rm or administration. Th e older they get, the fewer male seniors work: 
by 60–64, 53 percent have stopped working. Nevertheless, nearly one-quarter of 
men 70–74 still work, with one-fi ft h of them also drawing pensions.
Th e situation diff ers across cities. Lomé (10.5 percent) and Cotonou 
(7.5 percent) have the highest proportion of pensioners who switched to a new 
job (table 13.8). Between 5.4 percent (Lomé) and 11.9 percent (Abidjan) of men 
55–74 continue to work in the same business. Th e relatively high proportion of 
seniors in Niamey who have not retired refl ects the higher legal retirement age 
(60). 
Th e major diff erences across cities are in the proportion of seniors with-
out pensions who continue to work. Th eir numbers are much lower in Coto-
nou, Dakar, and Lomé than in Niamey and Ouagadougou. It is hard to explain 
these diff erences, which could refl ect particularities of the labor market in 
each city or structural age bracket issues. In some capitals, in particular in the 
coastal countries (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo), retirement could mark the 
age when individuals leave the capital and move back to their home regions. 
 Beauchemin (2000) addresses this question using data from a 1993 Ivorian sur-
vey on  emigration and urbanization.6 He fi nds that emigrants from urban areas 
are fi ve times less likely to be retirees than nonmigrants, implying that return 
migration from retirees is marginal. Beauchemin suggests that pensioners are 
probably people whose urbanization is most complete. In the absence of a more 
detailed analysis of this phenomenon of older people migrating from the capital 
to the hinterland, the question remains open.
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Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 13.1 for details).
Figure 13.5 Work and Pension Status of Men and Women Past Retirement Age in Seven 
Cities in West Africa, by Age Bracket, 2001/02
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A slightly diff erent picture emerges for women. Far fewer women draw pen-
sions.7 Most women who draw pensions no longer work, and most women 
who still work do not receive pensions. Nearly half (49 percent) of all women 
still work at 55–59, a much smaller proportion than among men (63 percent). 
Among women 70–74, 26 percent work (the fi gure for men is 23 percent). Half 
of these women are widowed heads of household. Th e others are married and 
take the place of their husbands, who are generally much older, to fi nd the 
resources the household needs to survive. Most of these women sell food.
Workers with pensions, workers without pensions, and deferred retirees 
work in diff erent occupations (table 13.9). Most active men without pen-
sions are heads of small businesses or self-employed, mainly in informal trade 
(82 percent). A minority of pensionless workers (18 percent) are wage earners, 
generally in low-skilled or unskilled jobs. 
A much broader range of situations is evident among pensioners who are 
still working. Th e majority (62 percent) turn to self-employment or set up small 
businesses; a substantial proportion of the men in this category remain employ-
ees, some as managers, others in skilled jobs. People who stay at work past 55 
oft en work in management positions and skilled jobs; half of them are in the 
civil service. Th e self-employed tend to be traders in the formal sector, who are 
generally in relatively well-paid positions.
Regardless of whether they draw a pension, the majority of women are self-
employed in the informal trade sector. Th e small minority of older women who 
have not yet retired work mostly in the civil service, mainly as teachers.
Responsibilities of Older Heads of Household
Employment among seniors is far from negligible. Most men 55–74 are heads 
of household with a large number of dependents. What percentage of the 
Table 13.8 Working and Pension Status of Men 55–74 in Seven Cities in West Africa, 
2001/02 
(percent)
Status Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou All
Nonworking pensioner 30.7 17.9 36.4 31.5 32.4 11.7 19.7 27.6
Nonworking nonpensioner 20.9 30.1 20.6 27.7 25.4 26.4 27.1 25.4
Working pensioner 1.9 4.3 7.5 6.1 10.5 4.1 6.3 5.4
Working nonpensioner 34.6 39.7 29.4 28.6 26.3 47.9 41.3 33.8
Deferred retiree 11.9 8.0 6.1 6.1 5.4 9.9 5.6 7.7
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 13.1 for details). 
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household’s resources do the head’s earnings represent? We consider three 
sources of income for the household:
• Income from the head of household’s employment
• Other sources of income of the head of household (pension, real property 
income, remittances, and so forth)
• Income from other household members (earned income, property income, 
remittances, and other sources).
Th e combination of these sources yields eight possibilities:
• No income from the household itself 
• Income solely from household members 
• Unearned income from head of household 
• All income from other household members and unearned income from head 
of household
• Earned income from head of household only
• All income from other household members and earned income from head 
of household 
• Head of household’s earned income and other income sources 
• All income from head of household and other household members. 
Th e male head of household’s earned income is the sole source of income 
in a minority of households, ranging from 14 percent in Lomé to 31 percent 
in Niamey (fi gure 13.6). His earned income contributes to the household bud-
get in about half of all households (in Niamey, the percentage is 62 percent). 
Table 13.9 Job Type and Pension Status of Men and Women 55–74 in Seven Cities in West 
Africa, 2001/02 
(percent) 
Type of position
Men Women
Without 
pension Pension
Deferred 
retirement
Without 
pension Pension
Deferred 
retirement
Senior manager 1.6 7.7 18.7 0.1 4.0 5.8
Middle manager 1.5 3.8 18.6 0.1 5.8 30.4
Skilled manual/nonmanual 3.6 12.9 21.5 0.3 1.3 9.6
Semi-skilled manual/nonmanual 4.4 2.9 10.8 0.6 0.0 26.9
Unskilled 6.7 10.7 14.1 1.8 0.0 20.7
Employer/proprietor 12.8 23.0 10.1 6.5 0.0 2.2
Self-employed 69.4 39.0 6.2 90.7 88.9 4.4
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 13.1 for details).
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Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 13.1 for details).
Figure 13.6 Sources of Income of Households Headed by Men and Women 55–74 in Seven 
Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
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Including other sources of income, mainly pensions and rental housing 
income, about 80 percent of the households live totally or partially off  the 
head of household’s resources. Diff erences across cities partly refl ect the fact 
that the proportion of households in which no member declared any income 
ranges widely, from 4.8 percent in Cotonou and 8.8 percent in Abidjan to 
about 17.5 percent in Bamako and Ouagadougou. In the Sahelian cities 
(Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou), seniors remain the head of the family 
compound; in some cases, children living elsewhere fi nance the compound’s 
expenditure. However, only about 5 percent of households live solely off  the 
resources of other household members (11 percent in Niamey). Th ese fi nd-
ings reinforce the idea that older heads of household have more than just an 
age-related position of prestige. Th ey also fulfi ll an economic function linked 
to their income, whatever its origin.
Th e household head’s earned income is the only source of income for 
16.5 percent of households headed by women. Th e proportion is particularly 
high in Lomé (24 percent), with its massive contingent of dynamic women on 
the labor market. At the other end of the scale is Ouagadougou, where the pro-
portion is relatively low (8 percent). About half of households draw on income 
from their female head’s employment. Th is fi gure is the same as for male heads, 
but the disparities across cities are greater. Most households headed by women 
in  Cotonou (68 percent) and Lomé (60 percent) draw on the household head’s 
earned income. In contrast, just one-third of households in Bamako and Dakar 
do so. Th is Sahelian–coastal city split partly refl ects diff erences in the status 
of and roles conferred on women. As with men, only a small proportion 
of households (about 10 percent) live solely off  income from other house-
hold members (generally children or close family members). Exceptions are 
Bamako (19 percent) and Dakar (15 percent).
Older male heads of household generally still have dependent children. Late 
fatherhood is common, and very large age diff erences are oft en found between 
the oldest and the youngest child. We take a single indicator to illustrate this 
situation: the proportion of households headed by men with at least one child 
still at school (table 13.10). Th is indicator is imperfect, because not all children 
go to school in these capitals. However, it provides a rough measure of the share 
of households headed by men over 55 with dependent children.
Across all work and pension statuses, a large proportion of male heads of 
household (72 percent on average) still have dependent children at 55–59. 
Th is proportion decreases with age but remains high even among men 70–74 
(almost 40 percent). It is lowest among households headed by working non-
pensioners. A large share of men in this category (informal sector workers) 
have no schooling, and some of them do not send their children to school. Th is 
indicator therefore underestimates the proportion of still-dependent children 
in these households. It reveals the extent of family responsibilities weighing on 
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older male heads of household, who oft en have to cope with the problems of 
aging while raising and supporting young children.
Conclusion
A relatively large share of men in West Africa continue to work aft er reaching 
retirement age (more than 60 percent of men 55–59). Th e proportion of workers 
decreases with age but still stands at more than 50 percent among men 65–69 
in Ouagadougou and Niamey and at about 30 percent in the fi ve other cities 
studied. Th e situation is more varied among women. Th ey are still very much 
on the labor market at 55–59, especially in Cotonou (nearly 75 percent) and 
Lomé (55 percent), and they continue to work as they age, working longer than 
men in Cotonou and Lomé. With age, workers are increasingly confi ned to the 
informal sector.
Pensions in West Africa are very low, especially outside the public sector, 
suggesting that they act more like minimum survival income than replacement 
income. Retirees struggle to make their meager incomes meet family outlays. 
People 55 and older still make substantial contributions to the economic life of 
their households; few seniors depend exclusively on their family’s help (women 
appear more dependent on family support than men). In fact, most household 
heads still have young children to support. Elderly heads of household oft en 
support adult children who have not yet entered the labor market. Understand-
ing of these issues remains weak; more research on them is called for.
Th roughout the WAEMU region, countries are gradually raising the retire-
ment age in the formal sector to 60. Later retirement provides a short-term indi-
vidual solution for formal sector workers; it does nothing for the already shaky 
Table 13.10 Proportion of Households Headed by Men 55–74 with at Least One Child Still in 
School, in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
(percent)
Status 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74
Proportion of 
heads of household 
with no schooling
Nonworking pensioner 84 66 56 48 30
Nonworking nonpensioner 74 65 58 32 61
Working pensioner 78 78 70 36 28
Working nonpensioner 62 63 68  37 70
Deferred retirement 83 66 66 48 32
All 72 66 60 39 52
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 13.1 for details).
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pension scheme balance. In addition, it restricts the younger generation’s access 
to jobs in the formal sector and the informal sector, the main sector in which 
seniors continue to work, exacerbating the already diffi  cult youth employment 
situation (DIAL 2007). Th e debate on raising the retirement age is thus really a 
generational debate. Th e eff ect of a higher retirement age is currently marginal, 
as only a minority of the West African population draw pensions. It will take on 
growing importance as the number of seniors rises and their needs have to be met.
Later entry into the labor market may make retirement even more diffi  cult 
for future generations than it is for today’s retirees. It is not uncommon in West 
Africa to start a career in the formal sector at 30–35. Even with the retirement 
age at 60, this late start makes for a very short contribution period. Moreover, 
the majority of workers are still excluded from pension systems, although some 
trade associations have started to provide benefi ts. Extension of social security 
to all remains a major challenge.
Notes
 1. Th e issue of seniors continuing to work late in life is high on the West African social 
agenda; unions in the region are calling for the retirement age to be raised to 60, 
because of the very low level of most pensions. Most countries in the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) negotiated public sector solutions in 
2004/05; talks are still under way in the formal private sector in several countries.
 2. Th e cities are Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Lomé, Niamey, and Ouagadougou. 
Although Abidjan and Cotonou are not administrative capitals, we refer to them as 
capitals because they are the most important economic centers in their countries 
(Cotonou is also the seat of government). For a description of the 1-2-3 surveys, see 
box O.1 in the overview.
 3. Th e relatively high cost of housing in Dakar doubtless prevents some men from 
establishing an independent home for their families; some couples and their chil-
dren continue to live with another family member. It is diffi  cult for a man who lives 
with his father to declare himself the household head, even if he is the main income 
provider.
 4. Th e 1-2-3 surveys were not designed to study retirees; they therefore lack specifi c 
questions on their situation. In the absence of information on individual transitions 
to retirement, we draw on a number of variables to identify formal sector work-
ers who continue to work in the same business aft er 55 and do not yet claim their 
pension. 
 5. It may be that more former formal sector workers attempt to make the switch to the 
informal sector. Th e survey does not provide information on this point.
 6. Th is survey defi nes retirees as people who draw pensions. It therefore underesti-
mates the number of people who leave Abidjan when they feel they have come to 
the end of their working lives.
 7. Th e questionnaire is not clear about how widows’ survivor’s pensions are classifi ed: 
we assume that they are classifi ed as “other pensions”; only the pension paid to 
female employees is classifi ed as a work pension.
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Chapter 14
Challenges and Directions for 
Future Research
Philippe De Vreyer and François Roubaud
Th e 1-2-3 surveys provide a wealth of information and analysis on labor mar-
kets in Sub-Saharan Africa. To build on and expand on the knowledge they 
yield, researchers could follow several paths.
Th ree chapters that were supposed to have been included in this book were 
ultimately left  out, because the research was not completed in time. Th e fi rst 
deals with spatial inequalities and African labor markets. It explores two types 
of questions: spatial polarization and ghettoization phenomena and agglomera-
tion and social interaction eff ects. Th e originality of the idea lies in exploiting 
the area frame for primary sampling units (enumeration areas) of the 1-2-3 
survey sampling method in order to study neighborhoods, based on recent 
research (Ioannides 2002; Goux and Maurin  2007). Th e second considers 
within-fi rm training. It quantifi es this phenomenon and measure its returns 
in terms of human capital accumulation, by applying matching techniques to 
estimate the eff ects of training. Th e third tackles regulation and employment in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. At its heart lies the issue of potential labor market rigidities 
and their possible consequences on labor and income. Th rough a political econ-
omy perspective, this research examines the following questions: Did structural 
adjustment programs lead to liberalization of labor legislation in Sub-Saharan 
Africa? Are African countries (in particular French-speaking countries) more 
rigid than other developing countries? To what extent is labor legislation actu-
ally applied? What is the impact of the highlighted rigidities (on unemploy-
ment, the size of the informal sector, and so forth)? 
All these issues are still relevant. We strongly encourage their authors to 
continue and fi nalize their research, even if recent studies (as well as older 
ones; see the overview to this book) suggest that labor regulations are not 
major binding constraints in Sub-Saharan Africa (AfDB and others 2012). For 
instance, according to the enterprise surveys conducted by the World Bank 
(2011), only 0.9 percent of African fi rms blame labor legislation as the greatest 
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obstacle to doing business on the continent, the second lowest (with courts) 
of 15 potential obstacles proposed (access to fi nance and electricity were the 
most cited obstacles by entrepreneurs, with about 20 percent of respondents 
citing each). Th is fi gure appears at odds with the conclusion drawn from the 
same surveys that labor regulations in Sub-Saharan Africa are the most rigid 
in the world. Th e apparent paradox can easily be explained by the huge gap 
between de jure and de facto regulation: although the restrictions stipulated in 
national laws are unfavorable on paper, they are not eff ectively applied, because 
of weak enforcement capacity. Lack of enforcement does not mean that labor 
market regulation issues should not be addressed, particularly given the fact 
that regulations are tighter in richer African countries (South Africa and the 
countries of North Africa) and will likely increase in poorer countries as they 
continue to develop.
Th e survey data can also be used to investigate other issues (some of which 
have already been explored), including the role of trade unions, social net-
works and information, and effi  ciency wages; the integration of young people 
(Antoine, Razafi ndrakoto, and Roubaud 2001; DIAL 2007); the modeling of 
unemployment or multiactivity (holding more than one job at the same time); 
and the characteristics of employment in the public sector (Razafi ndrakoto and 
Roubaud 2001) and in international fi rms and export processing zones (Glick 
and Roubaud 2006; Cling, Razafi ndrakoto, and Roubaud 2005, 2009). In terms 
of methodology, it is necessary to depart from reliance on the earnings equa-
tion, which, despite the intrinsic fragility of income measures (see the over-
view), is overused. 
Th ree areas are at the top of the list for further exploration: employment and 
the informal sector, especially in relation to poverty; the microeconomic and 
macroeconomic dynamics of the labor market; and the impact of public poli-
cies. Th e three sets of issues are closely interconnected. 
Employment, the Informal Sector, and Poverty
Using the defi nitions proposed by the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
and the offi  cial statistics community (labor statisticians and national accoun-
tants), the chapters in this book show that the concepts of the informal sector 
and its extension (informal employment) could pay off  analytically, provided 
they are handled with a rigor; given their importance in labor markets in the 
region, understanding informality is critical. Alternative concepts (such as vul-
nerable employment, defi ned below) are more problematic. 
Given that the 1-2-3 survey was designed precisely to understand the infor-
mal sector and informal employment, use of survey phases 2 and 3 should gener-
ate signifi cant knowledge about the informal economy, especially in Africa. Th e 
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completed project “Unlocking Potential: Tackling Economic, Institutional and 
Social Constraints of Informal Entrepreneurship in Sub-Saharan Africa” (2009–11)
has already provided decisive additional results (Grimm, van der Hoeven, 
and Lay 2011; Grimm and others 2012). Among the issues it addresses are the 
returns to physical and human capital (economic constraints), the costs of legal-
ization and corruption (institutional constraints), and the weight of redistribu-
tive pressure and the role of social networks in informal sector performances 
(social constraints). Combining the three phases of the 1-2-3 survey also yields 
a tool that is well suited to measuring and analyzing the working poor (as 
defi ned by the ILO). 
Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Labor Market 
Dynamics
Th e only dynamic aspect addressed in this book is intergenerational mobil-
ity. Expanding research on this issue requires cross-sectional, multiround 
surveys or panel data. Both types of 1-2-3 surveys have been conducted in 
African countries such as Madagascar, where a 15-year series (1995–2012) is 
available. 
Comprehensive development of all the issues that could be studied is 
outside the scope of this chapter (a research program conducted by Dével-
oppement, Institutions et Mondialisation [DIAL] on macro and micro labor 
market dynamics that addresses them is in progress). It should be possible to 
gain insight into the cyclical or countercyclical nature of the informal sector 
from cross-sectional or pseudo-panel data; panel data could be used to study job 
transitions between the formal and informal sectors to gain a better understand-
ing of labor market segmentation. Independent of their time properties, panel 
data form an invaluable source of information with which to enrich analysis, 
as they can be used to control for “unobservables” assumed to be constant over 
time. As a result, information can be gathered on questions as simple and crucial 
as the largely unknown impact of international fi nancial crises on labor markets 
in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Impact of Public Policies
Africa is rife with programs that directly or indirectly target the labor market, 
including education, vocational training, and on-the-job training; support to 
job seekers, young entrants, and staff  of privatized public enterprises; programs 
that seek to increase market access and access to information; microcredit 
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programs; social security schemes; and other policies. Th ese programs are rarely 
rigorously evaluated. All of the policy evaluation examples that appear in the 
latest ILO report on youth employment trends (2010) and the report on growth, 
employment, and social cohesion by the ILO and the International Monetary 
Fund (2010) concern developed countries. 
Many African governments want to extend existing protection schemes in 
order to reduce poverty and increase social cohesion and political stability, with 
the aim of achieving universal coverage. Many policy makers want to reform 
these programs, which many believe are dysfunctional. Before embarking on a 
new agenda of reforms—such as decoupling social protection from employment 
status, creating individual unemployment saving accounts, or more broadly lib-
eralizing African labor markets (by, for example, eliminating severance pay)—
existing and planned mechanisms should be carefully and rigorously assessed. 
Th e recent, well-founded interest in ex post public policy evaluation evidently 
applies, and these approaches warrant development. Th e 1-2-3 surveys, rounded 
out by ad hoc protocols, could serve as a suitable medium for analysis (see, 
for example, Gubert and Roubaud 2006 for an impact study on a microfi nance 
institution in Madagascar). Researchers also need to study the impact of further-
reaching macroeconomic policies (such as the eff ect of international openness 
on the informal economy) and shocks such as the international fi nancial cri-
sis, infl ation created by the food crisis, and the rise in commodity prices and 
deregulation policies (minimum wage, labor code liberalization, and so forth).
The Data Challenge
Th e glaring lack of data has led the ILO to develop macroeconometric mod-
els to estimate and forecast employment and unemployment worldwide (the 
TRENDS model provided by KILM [Key Indicators of the Labor Market] data-
bases). Given the rather crude assumptions they use, these models are no substi-
tute for survey data. More surveys—that are comparable over time—are needed 
in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Th e paucity and low quality of national labor force surveys has forced 
researchers to use other sources of data. Th e chapter on youth employment in 
Africa in the study by the AfDB and others (2012) draws heavily on the Gallup 
World Poll labor market module. Th e main arguments for using these data are 
broader coverage (39 African countries covered between 2008 and 2010 versus 
only 16 labor force surveys conducted between 2002 and 2007); the fact that 
the data are more recent; the greater comparability across countries, thanks to 
the use of identical questionnaires; and the inclusion of valuable opinion ques-
tions dealing with key issues such as subjective well-being and perceptions of 
obstacles and opportunities, job search, and business success. 
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Using the Gallup World Poll data rather than national labor force surveys 
also has some drawbacks (AfDB and others 2012). Some labor market concepts 
are not aligned with ILO standards, and the sample sizes are limited (about 
1,000 respondents, compared with the 20,000 or more usually included in labor 
force surveys). Th ese issues are not the main source of concern about use of 
these data, however. Delegating the collection of information on labor markets 
to private polling represents the de facto privatization of the national statistical 
system. As a public good, labor market indicators should be delivered by public 
statistics authorities, in Sub-Saharan Africa as elsewhere in the world. 
For two decades, we have been calling for the generalization of labor force 
surveys in Sub-Saharan Africa (Roubaud 1992), until recently without much 
eff ect. As stressed in the overview of this book, the ideal tool should be an 
extended labor force survey designed not primarily to measure unemployment 
but instead to capture the fundamental labor market specifi cities in developing 
countries, particularly the informal sector and informal employment. Adapted 
indicators should also be developed. Th e conventional split into primary, sec-
ondary, and tertiary sectors to proxy productive versus unproductive jobs is not 
useful in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using such an aggregate divide to assess mod-
ernization and structural change theory in developing countries is deeply mis-
leading where the informal sector colonized manufacturing, construction, and 
services and coexists with the formal sector (see overview). 
Not all recent eff orts to expand labor market indicators are useful. For 
example, the concept of vulnerable employment (defi ned as self-employment 
and contributing family jobs) proposed by the ILO seems much less relevant 
than the NEET (not in education, employment, or training) ratio or the over- 
and undereducation ratios developed in this book. Th e concept of vulnerable 
employment is consistent with the conventional view of duality and informality, 
which implies that all wage jobs are good jobs and all self-employed jobs are 
bad jobs. Th e recent literature clearly shows that the picture is mixed. Once all 
dimensions of jobs quality and individual preferences are taken into account, 
self-employed workers in the informal sector may be better off  than wage work-
ers in the formal sector (see Roubaud 1994; Maloney 2004; Bargain and Kwenda 
2011; Falco and others 2011; Nordman, Rakotomanana, and Roubaud 2012; 
Nguyen, Nordman, and Roubaud 2011; Razafi ndrakoto, Roubaud, and Wachs-
berger 2012; and chapter 6 of this book). Th e vulnerability intensity indicator 
developed in chapter 4 seems much more convincing in this respect. 
Th e NEET indicator is much more useful than the youth unemployment 
rate, because it reincorporates the massive component of discouraged workers 
excluded by the usual measures of underemployment, providing a much better 
indicator of the true extent of the potential lack of jobs. Incorporating subjective 
dimensions (such as job satisfaction and happiness, and opinion questions) into 
labor force survey questionnaires is also needed (see chapter 3). 
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To incorporate these dimensions, the 1-2-3 surveys should be developed fur-
ther, building on the work by DIAL and others in recent years. A new generation 
of surveys incorporating some methodological innovations is already planned 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Th e new surveys will address two pending measure-
ment issues. First, they will broaden geographical coverage at the national level 
to capture informality, farming, and off -farm activities in rural areas. Second, 
the Phase 1 questionnaire has been adapted and a new module developed in a 
participatory manner to fi t with the Decent Work agenda (Herrera and others 
2012). Expanding the focus in Sub-Saharan Africa beyond the French-speaking 
countries would add a wealth of information. More broadly, offi  cial socioeco-
nomic household surveys in Sub-Saharan Africa should rely on generic surveys: 
augmented labor force surveys (such as 1-2-3 surveys) to assess the labor market 
and the informal economy, and living conditions surveys to assess poverty and 
livelihoods (Razafi ndrakoto and Roubaud 2007).
Th is data collection work will not yield results without associated programs 
in which researchers from developing countries, especially Africa, participate. 
On this continent where poverty and the informal economy are at their most 
intense and where research activities are the least developed, we need to work 
to gradually bring the information and research on labor markets into step with 
the wealth of information and research found in this area in Latin America 
(where the many panel surveys have made for substantial progress with our 
understanding of the mechanisms at work) and, to a lesser extent, in Asia.
“Good Jobs” and “Bad Jobs”
All of the issues raised above share a common denominator: the “good jobs” 
versus “bad jobs” dilemma, described in the World Development Report 2013 
(World Bank 2012). Beyond the imperative to create jobs to tackle the para-
dox of “jobless growth,” the nature of the jobs provided is at the core of the 
development agenda. Identifying and promoting good jobs is far from trivial. 
Doing so depends on the objective sought: increasing short-term or long-term 
employment, improving individual or collective welfare, raising living stan-
dards, increasing productivity, enhancing social cohesion. For example, some 
jobs may enhance the monetary outcomes and well-being of the people who 
hold them but hurt long-term development (rent-based jobs). Similarly, good 
jobs in one country may be bad jobs in another (low-technology jobs). Trade-
off s are involved. Creating (some) jobs at any cost is not the best solution.
Th e frontier between good jobs and bad jobs is fuzzy, and the priority in 
terms of policy promotion is not straightforward. Some authors claim that 
creating good jobs may have an eviction eff ect on global job creation, a point 
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put in a provocative way by Teal (2012) in his blog post “Why We Need More 
Bad Jobs (and Fewer Good Ones).” Teal argues that the creation of protected 
jobs with better pay increases poverty, because it requires a lot of capital. 
Th e choice is simple: “You either use that capital to benefi t the lucky (well-
educated) few who get these good jobs or you use it to create more ‘bad’ jobs 
for the many.” 
Even if one can see in this extreme view the classical argument of the rheto-
ric of reaction developed by A. Hirschman in his seminal book (1991), it war-
rants attention. Is the lack of capital responsible for labor underemployment 
in Africa (DIAL 2007)? It is tempting to accept this explanation. Between 1960 
and 1994, when average annual investment outside Africa was 15.6 percent 
of gross domestic product, Africa invested just 9.6 percent (Hoeffl  er 2002). 
Th e result was a lower stock of capital per worker than in other continents. 
Some authors have suggested that this lack of investment is the main source 
of underdevelopment in Africa (Barro and Lee 1994; Collier and Gunning 
1999). However, investment is endogenous. Several recent studies suggest that 
when its endogeneity is taken into account and the eff ect of other param-
eters, such as quality of governance, is controlled for, the long-term eff ect of 
investment on growth tends to disappear in Africa. An increase in investment 
fl ows would therefore probably not be suffi  cient to increase the growth rate 
and reduce underemployment (Hoeffl  er 2002; Devarajan, Easterly, and Pack 
2003). 
Whatever the cause of underemployment in Sub-Saharan Africa, informal 
sector jobs are at the core of this discussion. In Sub-Saharan Africa—and low-
income countries in general—the informal sector is a key part of structural 
transformation. Lewis’s (1954) dualistic view of the job market does not accu-
rately describe how modernization will occur. Th ere will be no shortcut between 
agricultural jobs and formal sector jobs: modernization will occur through an 
increase in informal sector jobs in most countries, spurred by demographic, 
urban, and off -farm transitions. Th is transformation is also an opportunity, 
because informal sector jobs are more productive, pay higher wages, and yield 
higher job satisfaction than smallholder farm jobs (Haggblade, Hazell, and 
Reardon 2010; Fox and Pimhidzai 2011), including in high-growth economies 
where agriculture is exceptionally dynamic, such as Vietnam (Cling and others 
2010; Razafi ndrakoto, Roubaud, and Wachsberger 2012). Even compared with 
formal sector jobs, informal sector jobs cannot always be considered “bad jobs.” 
Th e question is thus not quantity versus quality or formal versus informal sector 
jobs. A multipronged strategy should be promoted by facilitating transitions 
from both agriculture to off -farm jobs and from informal sector jobs to formal 
sector jobs. At the same time, increasing productivity and protection for infor-
mal sector (and agricultural) workers is imperative. 
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How best to improve productivity and working conditions remains unclear. 
What is certain is that employment policy should broaden its focus beyond the 
formal sector. 
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